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Abstract
Peter Richard Hocknell
Post-partition Management of Transboundary Resources: The Case of Cyprus
As a developing international norm, the process of managing transboundary resources
represents a significant opportunity for the development of peaceful cooperation through
equitable and sustainable means. Paradoxically, however, this management process has
the power also to create new tensions and reinforce pre-existing divisions amongst
interested parties. This thesis explores the manifestations of this contradiction through a
detailed case study of transboundary resource management in the de facto partitioned
state of Cyprus. How has transboundary resource management operated across
Cyprus's de facto partition boundary? Why have problem-solving mechanisms formed
to deal with some transboundary resources, but failed to achieve success in connection
with others? Is it possible to de-link resource conflict issues from the protracted
political conflict, so that the former could be resolved without reference to the latter?
The thesis is structured into three parts, and is presented—although not
correspondingly—with broadly three audiences in mind. Within Part I (Chapters 2 and
3), at one level, by examining partitioned states this study specifically addresses those,
most notably within the discipline of political geography, currently debating the role of
'international boundaries'—both territorial and socio-spatial—and reassessing the
normative assumptions upon which they are (re)constructed. At another level, the
theoretical discussion addresses the debate amongst 'political realist' and 'liberalist'
accounts of the circumstances under which parties cooperate or, indeed, fail to cooperate
in the management of transboundary resources. In so doing, the international relations
community is addressed. The argument of Part I, taken as a whole, constitutes both a
critique and reconsideration of theoretical and methodological debates within and,
increasingly, across these two disciplinary communities.
Following this, Parts II and III should then inform and raise the awareness of
policy-makers, academic observers, and other interested parties to the importance of
transboundary resources in Cyprus. The implications of cooperative and/or conflicting
transboundary resource management for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict hardly
need highlighting, yet this remains a subject which has barely been touched upon in
contemporary literature. Part II (Chapter 4) examines the rapid reconfiguration of the
territorial character of intercommunal relations on the island, from the late-1950s until
complete de facto partition in 1974. A knowledge of these events not only provides a
necessary backdrop to transboundary relations post-partition, but is also imperative for a
sufficiently contextualised analysis of subsequent decision-making strategies in Cyprus.
Part III (Chapter 5 onwards) is devoted to a detailed analysis of transboundary
resource management in post-partition Cyprus. While the chronology of events is
important, these three chapters are structured more thematically to open up further
consideration of the theoretical concerns. Methodologically, in order to address the
'level of analysis problem' common to most `transboundary' research, a dualistic
research strategy was employed—whereby multi-method and multi-source analysis
concentrated, at one geographical scale, on the 'borderland' of Cyprus, and, at a second
geographical scale, on the island-wide perspective. The sub-division of the borderland
interface into two further studies—of the largely rural United Nations buffer zone, and
of the transboundary urban space of Nicosia and Famagusta—was also practical. Both
studies examine the processes and outcomes of transboundary resource management,
yet in relatively distinct politico-geographical contexts. Chapter 8 ties together the main
descriptive and analytical themes of the overall thesis by way of conclusion.
This thesis demonstrates that post-partition Cyprus has exhibited a number of
islands of cooperation over transboundary resource management and that, under certain
politico-geographical conditions, the Cyprus conflict has not been unchanging and
intractable. Even so, an increasingly diverse and complex form of `transboundary
relations' has co-existed with, and has been directly related to, a central overarching
cleavage over the political economy of recognition. 'Cooperation' has become, for both
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, a matter of judging its importance
in terms of potential gains/losses; in turn, transboundary resources are seen not only in
absolute but also in relative terms. Transboundary resource conflicts are patently
concerned with boundaries, 'national' sovereignty and contested 'state' development.
In this light, transboundary resource management in Cyprus appears increasingly
prevalent in the island's affairs and represents a potentially critical focus both for future
cooperation and conflict. While this thesis does not blindly offer a prescription for the
resolution of this dilemma, it seeks to enhance what has been a surprisingly limited
understanding of its complexity.
(b)
Contents
Page
Abstract	 ii
Contents	 iii
List of Illustrations	 ix
List of Plates	 xi
List of Tables	 xii
Acronyms	 xiii
Units and Conversion Factors 	 xiv
Acknowledgements	 xv
Chapter 1
Introduction
	
1.1	 Introduction
	 1
	
1.2	 Partition
	 2
	
1.3	 A Spatial Typology of Transboundary Resources 	 6
	
1.4	 Transboundary Resource Management 	 9
	
1.5	 The Case of Cyprus	 13
	
1.6	 Research Framework	 19
1.6.1 A note on geographical research in Cyprus
	 19
1.6.2 Methodological approach	 22
Part I	 Transboundary Resource Management
Chapter 2
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations
	
2.1
	 Introduction
	 35
	
2.2	 Approaching the Problem of Transboundary Cooperation
	 36
2.2.1 Political realism and neorealism
	 37
2.2.2 Functionalism, neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism 43
iii
	2.3	 Rethinking Transboundary Relations 	 49
2.3.1 Deconstructing boundaries
	 50
2.3.2 Recognition of boundary functions and 'borderlands'
	 53
2.3.3 Geographical space and scale in transboundary interactions
and flows	 58
	
2.4	 Conclusions	 61
Chapter 3
Theory into Practice, Practice into Theory:
Transboundary Resource Management in Partitioned States
3.1	 Introduction	 74
3.2	 Perspectives on Transboundary Resource Management in Partitioned
States	 75
3.3	 Configurations of Power 	 77
3.3.1 Towards the management and resolution of transboundary
resource conflict	 79
3.3.2 Partition and the balance of power	 80
3.4	 Transboundary Resource Needs 	 84
3.4.1 Developing transboundary resource law 	 85
3.4.2 The political dimension of partitioned resources 	 89
3.4.3 The role of `other(s7 needs	 91
3.4.4 Separating transboundary resource 'needs'
	 92
3.5	 The Role of Interests and Ideas 	 95
3.6	 The Functions of the Partition Boundary 	 99
3.6.1 Borderland 'models' within the European Union and North
America	 99
3.6.2 Partition, borderlands and state reintegration	 102
3.7
	 Conclusions
	 108
iv
Part II	 Partitioning Cyprus
Chapter 4
Partitioning Cyprus and the Creation of Transboundary Resources
4.1	 Introduction	 122
4.2	 Partitionism and Partitionists 	 123
4.2.1 Pre-1960: colonialism and self-determination 	 123
4.2.2 The 1960 constitutional 'settlement' 	 127
4.2.3 1960-1974: from independence to de facto partition	 128
4.3	 Territorial Partition	 137
4.3.1 The United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas 	 137
4.3.2 The 'green line' of Nicosia	 140
4.3.3 The Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves' 	 142
4.3.4 The United Nations buffer zone 	 146
4.4	 Conclusion: The Creation of Transboundary Resources 	 153
Part III	 The Management of Transboundary Resources in Post-
partition Cyprus
Chapter 5
Island-wide Perspective: Contesting Transboundary Resources, Development
and an 'Island' State
	5.1	 Introduction	 165
	
5.2	 In the Aftermath: Interpreting a Geographical Redistribution of
Resources	 166
5.2.1 Representing absolute and relative losses	 166
5.2.2 Reassessing the resource base 	 169
	
5.3	 The Meaning of Transboundary Resource Management
	
172
5.3.1 Water resource management (I): a common, transboundary
V
problem	 172
5.3.2 Power lines	 185
5.3.3 'Humanitarianism' and the quid pro quo	 190
	
5.4	 'Other(s')' Transboundary Resource Needs 	 194
	
5.5	 Development of an 'Island State' 	 197
5.5.1 An 'island economy' 198
5.5.2 An 'island environment': security discourse and bicommunalism 204
5.5.3 The UNDP 'Environmental Programming for Action in Cyprus'
study	 209
	
5.6	 Conclusions	 217
Chapter 6
Borderland Perspective (I):
Managing Transboundary Relations in the United Nations Buffer Zone
6.1	 Introduction	 234
6.2 UNFICYP and the Buffer Zone	 235
6.2.1 Managing the territorial and military status quo	 236
6.2.2 In search of 'normal conditions' 	 238
6.3	 Economic Activities at the Borderland Scale
	
240
6.3.1 Access and utilisation	 240
6.3.2 Managing migratory resources
	
250
6.3.3 A `liminal' state
	 252
6.4	 Water Resource Management (II): Hydrological Interdependencies In
and Along the UNBZ
	 255
6.5	 Buffer Zone, Nekri Zoni, or Sinir?	 261
6.5.1 Contrasting approaches to boundary management 	 261
6.5.2 Reading between the lines: discursive representations of space
and place	 267
6.5.3 Delimitations of the borderland	 273
6.6	 Conclusions	 279
vi
Chapter 7
Borderland Perspective (II):
Nicosia, Famagusta and Transboundary Urban Space
7.1	 Introduction	 293
7.2	 Water Resource Management (III): Nicosia and Famagusta 	 294
7.2.1 The supply of the capital(s)
	
294
7.2.2 The destabilisation of the quid pro quo	 297
7.2.3 Famagusta's dual dependency
	 301
7.3	 Underground Cooperation: The Nicosia Sanitary Sewerage System	 303
7.3.1 The bi-polar development of Greater Nicosia 	 303
7.3.2 The Nicosia sanitary sewerage system	 305
7.4	 The Nicosia Master Plan	 309
7.4.1 A second agreement	 312
7.4.2 Common or superordinate goals? 	 316
7.4.3 Functional spill-over' and the limits to cooperation	 320
7.5	 Famagusta: The Other Divided City
	 323
7.5.1 Post-partition development of Famagusta 	 324
7.5.2 Exorcising the ghost	 326
7.5.3 Rebuilding as 'confidence-building': Boutros-Ghali's `CBMs',
1993-1994	 327
	
7.6	 The Saliency of a Dualistic Borderland 	 332
7.6.1 Land uses along the 'green line'	 333
7.6.2 Representations of the border 	 336
	
7.7	 Conclusions	 340
Chapter 8
Conclusions: Cyprus, Partition and Transboundary Resource Management
	
8.1	 An Overview	 352
	
8.2	 Explaining Transboundary Resource Management in Cyprus
	 353
8.2.1 The rise and fall of low politics' 	 353
8.2.2 The political economy of recognition	 357
VI I
387
394
8.2.3 The institutionalisation of territoriality	 362
	
8.3	 Prospects for Cyprus	 365
8.3.1 Implications for a resolution to the Cyprus conflict	 366
8.3.2 Contested territory: state, inter-state or trans-state management?	 367
	
8.4	 Partition and Transboundary Resources 	 371
Appendices
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Appendix 5
Appendix 6
Appendix 7
Major Third Party Interventions in the Cyprus
Conflict since 1974
High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979
Mapping the Territorial Boundary Proposals
In-depth Semi-structured Interviewing
UNFICYP's Mandate of 1964
De Facto and De Jure Territorial and Maritime
Boundaries of Cyprus
UNFICYP's Deployment
377
378
380
382
385
Bibliography
Primary sources	 399
Newspapers and media	 399
United Nations documents 	 400
Cyprus official documents	 402
Other documents	 405
Maps	 406
Secondary sources	 407
List of Illustrations
Figures
Figure 1.1
Figure 1.2
Figure 2.1
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
Figure 4.4
Figure 4.5
Figure 4.6
Figure 4.7
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
Figure 6.1
Figure 6.2
Figure 6.3
Figure 6.4
Figure 6.5
Figure 6.6
A spatial typology of transboundary resources 	 7
The de facto partitioned island of Cyprus 	 16
Spatial elements of House's operational model of
transactional flow across boundaries 	 59
Overlapping perspectives: schematic representation of
core intervening variables in transboundary resource
management in partitioned states	 78
Stages of transboundary relations between partitioned
states
	 103
British proposal (1956) and Turkish proposal of
35° parallel (1957)	 126
The 'green line' of Nicosia within-the-walls 	 141
Turkish Cypriot proposal to Gab o Plaza, 1965	 145
Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves', 1970 	 147
Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves', 1973	 148
Denktash and Giines plans, August 1974	 152
Positions of the Turkish military intervention forces, July-
August 1974	 152
Major water supply projects and distribution networks
in Cyprus	 176
Electricity generation and transmission networks in
Cyprus	 187
Diagrammatic representation of the management of
the UN buffer zone	 241
Land uses within and along the UNBZ, 1975
	
242
Avlona, Astromeritis and the UN buffer zone 243
Transboundary resources in the Lefka-Skouriotissa region 248
Schematic representation of water transfers across the
UN buffer zone	 257
Geographical imagination along the United Nations
ix
Figure 6.7
Figure 7.1
Figure 7.2
Figure 7.3
Figure 7.4
Figure 7.5
Figure 7.6
'green line'
Partition of the de jure administrative boundaries of
Athienou, Lysi and Dherinia	 276
Nicosia's transboundary water supply: supply from
Morphou and to north Nicosia, 1974-1994 	 298
Greater Nicosia and the UN buffer zone	 304
Priority 'revitalisation areas' for Greek Cypriot government
funding in central Nicosia, 1991-1996 	 318
Urban morphology and development of Famagusta	 325
Land uses along western half of Nicosia's 'green line'
	
334
Land uses along eastern half of Nicosia's 'green line'
	
335
272
x
Plates
Plate 6.1	 Redrawing 'Cyprus' through the 'logo-map': KTP station
signs, pre- and post-1974	 268
Plate 7.1
	
The Nicosia sanitary sewerage system 	 306
Plate 7.2	 Greek Cypriot caricature of Akinci (left) and Demetriades
(right) cooperating over the sewerage system	 310
Plate 7.3
	
Turkish Cypriot caricature of Nicosia's unified sewerage
system	 311
Plate 7.4
	
NMP's Physical Development Plan 'with' and 'without'
buffer zone	 314
Plate 7.5	 Urban regeneration in Chrysaliniotissa: Minoos St.,
Nicosia (south)	 315
Plate 7.6	 Urban regeneration in Arab Ahmet: Kamil Pasha St.,
Nicosia (north)	 315
Plate 7.7	 Ledras Street viewing point and memorial, Nicosia (south) 337
Plate 7.8	 'Border' shop , Kyrenia 	 337
Plate 7.9	 The border as 'spectacle': advertising hoardings in
Dherinia	 338
Plate 7.10	 Varosha through the looking-glass 	 338
xi
List of Tables
Table 1.1	 Major cases of state partition since 1900
	 5
Table 2.1
	 'Borderlands' and 'border regions': a comparison of
conceptual frameworks based on an integration
continuum	 56
Table 5.1
	 Estimates of island's resources under 'occupation'
post-partition
	 168
Table 5.2
	 Estimated island-wide water balance in Cyprus
	 174
Table 5.3
	 Principal aquifers in Cyprus 	 174
Table 5.4	 Estimated water consumption in Cyprus (de facto) by
sector in 1994
	 180
Table 5.5
	 Comparative electricity generating capacities of AHK
and KIB-TEK in 1994
	 189
Table 5.6
	 The geographical scale of 'action areas' proposed by
UNDP environmental programming study
	 213
xii
Acronyms
AHK	 Electricity Authority of Cyprus
CFL	 Cease-fire Line
EC	 European Community
ECJ	 European Court of Justice
EU	 European Union
FDL	 Forward Defended Locality
FSL	 Farming Security Line
ILA	 International Law Association
ILC	 International Law Commission
KIB-TEK
	 Kibris Turk Elektrik Kurumu (Turkish Cypriot Electricity Authority)
NMP	 Nicosia Master Plan
OP	 Observation Post
PTCA	 Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration
ROC	 Republic of Cyprus
SBA	 (UK) Sovereign Base Area
SCP	 Southern Conveyor Project
SEM	 Single European Market
TFSC	 Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TRNC	 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UDI	 Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNBZ	 United Nations Buffer Zone
UNCHS	 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	 United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	 United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	 United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	 United States Agency for International Development
WDD	 Water Development Department (ROC)
Units and Conversion Factors
Units of length
1 nm	 = 1.852 km
Units of area
1 donum	 = 0.10 hectares (ha) = 0.22 acres
1 square kilometre (km2)	 = 100 ha = 1,000,000 square metres
1 square mile (m2)	 = 2.59 km2
Units of flow
1 cubic metre (cu.m.)
	 = 1,000 litres
,
xiv
Acknowledgements
This thesis has been made possible by the support I have received from many sources. I
wish to acknowledge gratefully the studentship from the Department of Geography,
University of Durham. Those who have freely offered their advice and time are such in
number that it would be impractical to name them all individually. While thanks are
collectively theirs, there are those who warrant additional credit.
I must firstly acknowledge the inspiration and guidance of my two supervisors,
Professor Gerald Blake and Michael Drury, whose own work sowed many of the seeds
for this thesis. My previous working experience with Gerald Blake at the International
Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) was to open numerous and varied avenues for me to
explore, for which Clive Schofield, Martin Pratt and Carl Grundy-Warr often helped me
along the way. Also at Durham, the presence of Paul Sant Cassia, Rodney Wilson, John
Norton and Kaiyan Kaikobad provided opportunities for a necessary multidisciplinary
perspective on my work. On occasions where I presented preliminary findings from this
work, the technical assistance of Arthur Corner and David Hume in the Department's
Drawing Office proved crucial, and was to be later supplemented by my introduction to
cartographic software courtesy of Owen Kimber and Helen Dunsford.
Both Nancy et al. at the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute
(CAARI), and Niyazi at the Hydarpasha Ticaret Lisesi (in south and north Nicosia
respectively), made me feel a welcome researcher while living in Cyprus. At the same
time, I was most fortunate to befriend, in particular, Eleni, Joseph, Michael, Myria,
Oliver, Peter (times two!), Ruth, Stavros, Tamer, Yiannis, and Yusuf. I could not
overestimate my gratitude for their generous support and critical advice.
It remains for me to offer my warmest thanks to both my family, whose constant
encouragement they may have at times regretted, and Francoise, who was always there
to boost me up or to bring me down to earth, whichever was needed at the time! While
this thesis is dedicated to all four of you it was written in memory of my late grandfather
Top', without whom this work would literally not have been possible.
XV
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1	 Introduction
In normative terms, the process of managing resources in environments partitioned by
political boundaries represents a significant opportunity for both the development of
peaceful cooperation and the effective and equitable management of resources, not only
at the level of the partitioned 'state', but across local, regional, and global scales.
Paradoxically, however, this process also has the power to create new tensions and
reinforce pre-existing divisions among interested parties, potentially to the detriment of
international peace and both short- and long-term resource management, in that an
emerging duty to cooperate for the joint management of transboundary resources
challenges the very core of the international legal order, grounded as it is on the
sovereign right of control over activities within 'state' borders.
This paradox represents the central focus of this thesis, for two main reasons.
First, disputes over transboundary resources are being increasingly recognised; it has
even been posited that conflicts involving the management of natural resources are the
most numerous source of international conflict.' On examining the spatial extent of
natural resources, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that such resource management,
representing both an internal and external threat to environmental security, will be a
contributory factor to future disputes. International drainage basins, for example,
constitute 47% of the earth's land area, while there are an indeterminate number of
groundwater aquifers of similar status.' Moreover, of the 221 'high-priority natural
habitats' identified worldwide, 35% straddle international boundaries.' Any significant
interference by one state on the management of such transboundary resources may have
effects—beneficial or detrimental—on another state, be it contiguous or distant.
In parallel, politico-territorial 'realignment'—either through partition or
secession—has arguably become the 'order of the day'. 4 The November 1995 Dayton
Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Hercegovina reignited the debate over partition as a
solution to conflict; unlike the 'velvet divorce' of Czechoslovakia, it evoked strong
1
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memories of the previous attempt to 'ratify' partition—in Cyprus.' Partition is a
manifestation of the dialectical relationship between the Wilsonian doctrine of 'self-
determination for peoples' and the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of
'states'. Some 127 new states have emerged since 1945, and the number of recognised
international land boundaries has increased from approximately 280 in the late 1980s to
about 315 today.' New land is not being created; instead, states have fragmented into
smaller states and other political structures.' Ever since 1648 international law, the
basis of the Westphalian state system, has abhorred undefined territory and portrayed
international boundaries as inviolable; indeed, this is embodied in the constitution of the
United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Duma agreement on the
Commonwealth of Independent States.'
In essence, as both processes—transboundary resource management and the
creation of international boundaries (de jure and de facto)—become ever more salient, it
is argued that they have become inherently though not necessarily contradictory. This
study explores the manifestations of this contradiction through a detailed case study of
transboundary resource management in the de facto partitioned state of Cyprus. By
considering the debates surrounding 'partition', 'resource management', and
`transboundary resources' in this opening chapter, the basis for the theoretical
framework will be provided. The case study is introduced, along with the means by
which research was carried out and the methodological challenges set by the research
environment.
1.2	 Partition
It is clearly beyond the scope of this study to evaluate fully the short- and long-term
conditions of partition's effectiveness as a peaceful means of political and territorial
management. Having been the subject of surprisingly little comparative investigation
over the last half century, the legitimisation of politico-territorial separation has received
varied critical commentary in recent years, of which several common approaches can be
identified. 9 One notably underdeveloped line of analysis concentrates on what
Waterman has described as the 'petty consequences' of partition: the direct
consequences of an imposed partition boundary on peoples and socio-economic
2
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networks which were previously geographically part of a single political unit.'° While
dismissing the pejorative undertones of this description, this thesis—concerned as it is
with partition's implications for resource management at various geographical scales—
brings this tranch of analysis to the fore.
In the disciplines of political geography and international relations, the concept
of 'partition' is generally understood to describe a situation in which an existing
political-geographical entity is territorially divided into two or more separate parts." It
is therefore both an attribute and a process—by the divisions that it creates in political
and economic terms (territorial or socio-spatial, de jure or de facto), and by virtue of its
discontinuities taking place over a temporal scale.' Partition accordingly has a strong
functional character. Be it a case of nationalistic, political or ideological conflict
amongst groups, the role of partition is often seen as a means of conflict management, if
not of its resolution. It has generally been presented as "a traditional and accepted
method for terminating disputes outstanding amongst nations without recourse to war",
"a useful technique for resolving conflicts on the basis of equity and reciprocity", and "a
very practical geographically highly relevant way to end war and to make peace"." It
has been the 'best worst solution', a 'small price to pay', preferable to potential or actual
war. 14
This immediately begs the question: 'for whom does partition function?'.
McGarry and O'Leary argued that partition is compatible with liberal democratic
institutions." When effective, partition resolves conflict by allowing the divorce of
antagonistic communities within multi-ethnic states. However, by reducing
intercommunal contact in volatile situations the physical separation of warring
communities may help to create, in Galtung's terminology, a 'negative peace', or peace
through dissociation." Legitimising separateness may lead to both genuine and
imaginary conflicts of interest." Partition is also rarely negotiated between equal
partners but is more often imposed, multilaterally, involving one or more 'foreign'
power as broker and/or perpetrator. 18 Partition, as Hitchens rightly observed, requires
partitionism and partitionists.'
How do partition boundaries differ from any other international boundary? How
can partition be analytically distinguished from other politico-territorial realignments?
These are not just problems of semantics but of important subjectivities; geographical
separation might be seen as something cede by force by one party, whereas as a
3
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secession by another. Secession infers an indigenous process of realignment through
the unilateral rejection of the state's sovereignty—the new state is 'liberated', in other
words, with the issue of boundaries being comparatively muted. 2° Consequently,
apparent cases of partition are often cases of secession, such as Norway from Sweden
(in 1905) or, more recently, Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia (in 1992) and Eritrea
from Ethiopia (in 1993). By contrast, relatively clear instances of partition include
British India and Palestine, although the case of the Republic of Cyprus remains more
problematic for some observers.21
Whilst acknowledging latent problems in distinguishing partition from
secession, Table 1.1 offers an overview of the major partitioned states created this
century. Partitions which accompanied the collapse of empires are not included,
although the recent case of the USSR, the dissolution of which two influential authors
have argued generated 'new partitions', illustrated the problem of assessing the largest
realignment this century. 22 Given the scale of this case, however, and the fact that the
new states were territorially well-defined pre-1989, it does not enter this analysis. Other
omissions include instances of simple boundary line changes, transfers of relatively
small parcels of territory from one state to another, partitions not involving a common
land border (for example, East and West Pakistan), or internal state (re)partitions (e.g.,
Nigeria).23
Examining the characteristics of these thirteen cases, there are some
commonalties worthy of immediate note. Nearly half of the states were partitioned with
violent, intercommunal unrest; three were directly linked to the tail-end of colonial
empires; while there is just a single case of partition by mutual consent.' In theory,
only two contained more than two new politico-territorial entities (although the original
'Palestine' never was, the proposed one has yet to be, and East/West Pakistan were
nominally as one). Perhaps most notably, only two partitioned states have ever
reunified. Although conclusions were drawn from the analysis of a limited number of
cases of partition, Stultz was able to recognise several other features common to the
generation of state partition including, inter alia: the most eager parties for partition
were the minority population; there were religious differences between the majority and
minority population; partition plans involved the creation of just two political entities;
Introduction
Table 1.1	 Major cases of state partition since 1900
Territory Duration Territories produced Length of
partitioned of common land
partition boundary
(km)
French Syria 1920/21- Syria, Greater Lebanon 375
British Palestine 1921-47 Palestine, Transjordan >300
Ireland 1920/2 1- Irish Free State, Northern Ireland 360
Germany 1945/47-
90
Federal Republic of Germany,
German Democratic Republic
1,381
Palestine 1947- Israel, Transjordan, (Palestine) 238
British India 1947- East and West Pakistan, India 2,912 (India-
West Pakistan),
2,519 (India-
East Pakistan)
French 1949/54- Cambodia, Laos 541
Indochina
Korea 1953- North Korea, South Korea 238
Vietnam 1954-76 North Vietnam, South Vietnam 76
Ruanda-Urundi 1962- Rwanda, Burundi 290
Republic of
Cyprus
1963/74- Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus
181
Czechoslovakia 1993- Czech Republic, Republic of Slovakia 197
Bosnia and
Hercegovina
1995- Bosnia and Hercegovina Federation,
Serb Republic
1,053
external third parties played critical roles in the drawing and implementation of
partition; time constraints promoted partition (as opposed to other, assimilative
strategies); and the relocation of 'misplaced' persons was necessary following the
boundary creation. 25 There remains outstanding, however, a lack of work on the role of
strategically perceived transboundary resources in the development of partitioned states
after partition. In Chapter 3, by way of overview and to place the Cyprus conflict in the
wider context, contemporary partitioned states are surveyed so as to facilitate further
evaluation of their post-partition commonalties (and dissimilarities) and, in turn, to
complement previous attempts to establish general characteristics of partitioned states
which have generally disregarded the creation of transboundary resources.26
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1.3 A Spatial Typology of Transboundary Resources
While transboundary resources represent the main units of analysis in this thesis,
identifying what constitutes a 'resource' is problematic.' Zimmerman now famously
professed that;
"resources are not, they 'become'; they [...] expand and contract in response to
human wants and actions".28
Their interpretation in association with political boundaries has drawn often confusing
categorisations, ranging from the legalistically-specific to the conceptually-vague.'
Perhaps not coincidentally, these resources have been interchangeably classified as
'shared', 'international' and `transboundary'. Yet Szekely has cogently argued that the
'sharing' of resources implies the perpetuation of (inherently conflicting) dual
sovereignties—a suspect notion of 'inter-state' resource management." At a more
extreme level, P.J. Taylor pointed out that, by adding a transboundary dimension;
"our 'inter' concepts are set against our 'trans' concepts' as polar opposites: the
former defines processes reproducing states, nations and territories, the latter
processes that undermine them".31
Contrary to belief that the words 'shared', 'international', and `transboundary' are
synonymous, it is assumed that these concepts must be 'unpacked' 32
In this light, to assist this analysis, particularly in order to accommodate its
inherent spatiality, four general and often overlapping types of transboundary resources
are identified (Figure 1.1). 'Intra-boundary resources' lie 'within' a boundary (e.g., a
buffer zone, demilitarised zone (DMZ)), while 'straddling resources' are located
'across' a boundary line separating political entities 'A' and 'B'. As Figure 1.1
illustrates, 'migratory resources' have a more dynamic and fluid character; at any time,
they may also become 'straddling' or 'intra-boundary resources'. They are often
associated with `transboundary externalities', which occur when management activities
located wholly within one distinct territory produce results that affect another, usually
contiguous, territory. In theory externalities can be either negative or positive, but in the
context of transcending jurisdictional boundaries, they are more often the former."
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Finally, 'common property resources' refer to those transboundary resources that are
technically beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., territorial spaces such as the deep seabed,
the troposphere, stratosphere and, arguably, Antarctica). They may also be known as
the 'global commons' or the 'common heritage of mankind', after Arvid Pardo." Once
again, this terminology suggests 'political realist' undertones in that it implies a
sovereign right to territory, and is synonymous with the idea that the 'tragedy of the
commons' is simply a problem of inappropriate property right allocation." Yet
elements of the principle of the 'common heritage of humankind' do have a bearing
within areas of state jurisdiction, and there is much work on a broadened concept of
'global commons'. 36
 According to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the 'commons' are outside either 'national' jurisdiction or the ability of
national authorities to deal with them; subsequent definitions have included, for
example, 'social' space occupied by those who fall outside 'national' jurisdiction
(especially refugees and the internationally displaced)."
All four types illustrated may involve non-renewable resources (e.g.,
hydrocarbons), renewable resources (e.g., fresh water resources) or, significantly, take
the form of complex ecosystems.' In this last case there may be a multiple number of
riparians involved as the externalities of the management process may be geographically
far-removed from the point of origin, and the number and type of actors concerned with
such resources will expand or contract as the jurisdictional boundaries shift." This
typology can of course be extended by adding new perspectives on what a 'resource' is
(e.g., refugees) and on which 'boundaries' to consider (e.g., regional administrative,
geopolitical `blocs'). Nonetheless, that the nature of the process of transboundary
resource management differs considerably from one type to another is highly significant
in trying to assimilate the differing interpretations of transboundary resource
management demonstrated in a rapidly growing literature.
One must also note within this literature the prevalence of traditional
examinations of transboundary resource management which focus solely on a single
natural or infrastructural resource. Utton rightly argued that because transboundary
resources have been the object of isolated, resource-by-resource study at academic,
government, and private levels, certain transboundary resources have received
considerable attention (e.g., international river basins) to the detriment of more
comparative analysis.' Sympathetic to this, attempts to produce a more integrated,
8
Introduction
holistic and ultimately multidisciplinary study of an affected 'environment', recognising
the variety of scarce resources embedded within it, are complemented in this thesis.'
This involves integrating a longitudinal survey of disputes—both ongoing and
resolved—with what Kaufman termed 'lateral learning' from similar transboundary
conflicts, to inform a more interdisciplinary model of conflict resolution.' The focus
therefore rests on the transboundary resource(s) perceived to be key to relevant parties,
be this perception politically, economically, culturally and/or environmentally
determined.
1.4 Transboundary Resource Management
An understanding of the process of transboundary resource management logically
necessitates an initial appreciation of 'resource management'. In a much-cited work,
O'Riordan considered it to be;
"a process of decision making whereby resources are allocated over space and
time according to the needs, aspirations, and desires of man [sic] within the
framework of his technological inventiveness, his political and social institutions,
and his legal and administrative arrangements"."
As previously argued, however, the politico-geographical character of the 'framework'
within which the decision making takes place cannot be assumed. The sovereign state
remains the foundational systemic premise for international relations, both in theory and
(arguably, to an ever-lessening degree) in practice. It remains a basic tenet of state
sovereignty that a state has the right to exercise 'full' and 'permanent' sovereignty over
its resources." 'Internal' (or 'territorial') sovereignty suggests exclusive competence
and a monopoly of power, 'equal' to all other states. 'External' sovereignty suggests
that the state is not subject to a higher authority, although this is not 'absolute' in that
various international institutions are in evidence.
The characterisation of resource management in terms of this modernist concept
of sovereignty suggests that the complexity of the 'arrangements' that O'Riordan
highlighted is accentuated further; indeed, to understand this, an appreciation of the
normative concerns behind this management process proves necessary and instructive.
As Marsh, Malthus and Ricardo gradually destroyed the idea of the 'superabundance' of
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resources and a `divide-and-conquer' approach to resource management, concerns over
physical scarcity have been translated into concerns over the economic and geopolitical
scarcity of 'developmental resources'. 45 This became most famously institutionalised in
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth, followed by the 'blueprints' of Pearce, which
ultimately advocated a market-based approach to environmental problems. 46 In this
light, mainstream 'utilitarian' models of international resource management have
assumed that whenever a distinct area of (political or economic) consensus exists, actors
will reach agreement over mutually beneficial institutional and organisational
arrangements.' Rational utility maximisers will find ways to optimise: to realise
feasible joint gains, while simultaneously minimising transaction costs.
Subsequent considerations, reflecting widespread indications of a progressive
shift of public opinion toward more ecologically-informed policies, critically reassessed
"[Ole underlying values behind the abstraction labelled resource management", and
exposed a techno-centric and utilitarian ideology. 48 A traditional (Western) approach,
assuming that nature and natural resources were available to be exploited for human
benefit, was to instead emphasise 'rationality over emotionalism', 'ethics over
economics', and 'ecology over engineering'. 49 Associated with this philosophy is the
eco-centric idea that ties of interdependence often prescribe the unitary development of
certain environments, and crucially inseparable from this is a recognition that resource
management at the international and global scale might be the most crucial as it exposes
the dichotomy of state and environmental values. 50 After all, the concept of ecosystemic
management dictates the need to manage many species sharing a common habitat rather
than one species in isolation. Reflecting this, the 1987 'Brundtland Report', with the
substantive agenda of UNEP in tandem, came to emphasise both intergenerational
equity and 'holistic' approaches to environmental protection." UNCED's Rio
Declaration in 1992 formally recognised the need to integrate economic development
with environmental protection into what has been perhaps most widely conceptualised
as 'sustainable development' 52
As previously suggested, transboundary resource management has generally
been understood to address natural, organic ecosystems, but there are arguments for also
applying these principles to other spatial (e.g., urban, economic) systems." Clearly, the
existence of a distinct 'urban system' is highly problematic in that a city as an
'ecological unit' suggests that some equilibrium can be reached. Nonetheless, the
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particular political practices of a given locality (especially the 'local', municipal state)
and the wider structural and systemic processes present must also be examined.'
Transboundary governance suggests a need for the development of broader
'transnational structures', structures which appear most prevalent in Western Europe
and North America." Nijkamp has argued that, in the former, the provision of
accessible transnational network infrastructure (physical and non-physical) is a sine qua
non for economic restructuring processes in border regions which will, otherwise,
continue to reflect their weak 'frontier position'." The densely populated `transfrontier
metropoli' of Western Europe (e.g., Geneva, Lille, Maastricht) and the US-Mexico
border (e.g., San-Diego-Tijuana, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez) illustrate how the economic
base, transport structure and social composition of once separate border cities become
intertwined.' In some of the 14 'twin' border cities of North America, Herzog
illustrated the significance of the spatial context, going so far as to argue that, when
located in highly urbanised areas, international boundaries 'fade'. The urban areas join
to create a transnational living space."
The consideration of spatial delimitation has clearly been key to this process of
conceptually understanding transboundary resource management in opposition to a
homogenising modern state, and various propositions can be cited. Young sought to
develop the idea of an 'international resource region' as an appropriate managerial unit
for resource management and environmental quality: "a[n international] geographical
area demarcated in terms of the functional issues associated with the management of
natural resources and the maintenance of environmental quality"." Westing thought in
terms of `ecogeographical regions', defined as "a unit made up of living and non-living
components of the environment that interact to form a life-support system". 6° Hayton
and Utton referred to a 'critical transboundary resource management area', to be
managed as a unified system in terms of both natural and infrastructural resources.' In
addition, Scott recognised more recent work on the concept of `bioregional planning' as
a basis for reformulating border area policy.'
Do these spatial unitisations sufficiently acknowledge, however, that
transboundary resources are most efficiently and equitably managed in the context of
cooperative arrangements involving all relevant parties?" Fundamentally, as will be
considered in Chapter 2, any territorial 'division' of the management of natural
resources raises serious and complex questions concerning an emerging duty to
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cooperate for the management of transboundary resources, and definitions of resource
management and environmental 'security'. As further considered in Chapter 3, the
implications of functional (re)unification has been most vividly illustrated in urban areas
comprehensively disrupted by intercommunal conflict. Transfrontier externalities take
many forms including sewage contamination, air and water pollution. The substantial
duplication or parallelism in the provision of public services on both sides create
'contiguity diseconomies' which impede 'synergistic' collaboration. 64 Yet, while state
leaders are increasingly aware that cooperation, coordinated policy-making, and more
integrated domestic policy is necessary to manage and relate multiple interdependent
forces involved in environmental protection operating at various scales,' Jerusalem,
Beirut, Berlin, and Mostar, along with Cyprus' capital, Nicosia, exemplify the need not
only for an understanding of 'rational' responses to technical problems, but also for an
understanding of the political and economic differences between bordering groups that
can and do impede the coordination of common planning solutions.
In many cases protracted political conflict severely constrains the practice of
creating collaborative regimes, although in certain instances effective cooperation can
be augmented, and even eventually aid the long-term goal of seeking a peaceful
resolution to the wider conflict. Like transboundary resource management, therefore,
the process of `transboundary cooperation' in general must also be examined, if only
because of its normative significance.' In turn, the first half of Chapter 2 suggests that
cooperation can be seen by conflicting parties to be both legitimate and illegitimate.
These observations are informed by the debate within the discipline of international
relations amongst 'political realist' and 'liberalist' accounts of the circumstances under
which parties cooperate or, indeed, fail to cooperate in the management of
transboundary resources.' Utilitarian concepts, based on arguments of administrative
efficiency, environmental protection and the promotion of citizen's welfare, may be
rightfully employed to legitimise attempts to institutionalise transboundary
cooperation." Contested issues of equability and externalities, nevertheless, arise
repeatedly in conjunction, in that by constructing frameworks to manage the growing
complexity of interdependence it is assumed that the proposed frameworks are most
appropriate, and that there are sincere grounds for agreement amongst the disputing
parties. 69 Universalistic claims, in short, can be often appropriated by one state or
hegemony to justify its (rational/idealist/devious) agenda in international politics."
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The further implication of this is that, in adopting a prescriptively
internationalist (or 'top-down') approach to transboundary resource management,
traditional mechanisms and diplomatic responses provide merely a palliative—
succeeding only in 'managing' the resource conflict, as a consequence of by-passing the
fundamental 'resolution' of what is also a group identity conflict. The problem can
therefore be turned on its head, to suggest that it is the institutional procedures
themselves which are perpetuating this political realist scenario." Picking up the
gauntlet, theorists and practitioners are increasingly focusing on a more pluralised
peacebuilding and peacemaking process in the hope of contributing to a long-term
management or even permanent resolution of international conflict, and moving from a
'negative' to a 'positive peace'.' In the meantime, a comprehensive definition of
`transboundary resource management' remains elusive, and inherently so it would seem.
A recent reconceptualisation of 'resource management' is pertinent to this dilemma.
Westcoat defined the process as;
"a conscious, intentional, formal rationalization of everything which can serve as a
means towards some end. It is entirely instrumental. It is oriented towards
'success', which might be construed as sustainability, survival, social justice,
utility or capital accumulation, depending upon the context in which it occurs".73
It is apparent that while two normative concerns have combined to create a broad
principle applicable to resource management in the 'international' context—the peaceful
management of transboundary resources in an equitable and sustainable manner74—this
multi-dimensional principle is inherently, though not necessarily, undermined by
various contradictions between its elements.
1.5 The Case of Cyprus
Geographical 'scale' is critical to the analysis of what is the third largest island in the
Mediterranean. Indeed, it has been customary for observers to employ other area
comparisons: Cyprus' 9,251 km2 of land is roughly equal in size to Connecticut (US), to
the Lebanon, to Puerto Rico, or to the UK counties of Norfolk and Suffolk combined.
Similarly, considering that approximately 815 km constitutes the average length of a
contemporary international land boundary (de jure), the 181 km-long United Nations
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buffer zone (UNBZ) appears to be a minor boundary (de facto). Indications of Cyprus'
small scale of significance are also to be found in demographic studies of the island.
With a population of little over 235,000 in 1900, by independence in 1960 it had grown
to stand at 650,000. There were still important etlmo-demographic distinctions to be
made—the Greek Cypriots made up 77.1% of the population, Turkish Cypriots 18.2°0,
with the remainder made up of British (3.1%) and Armenians, Maronites and Latins.
Moreover, the overall population island-wide steadily grew throughout and beyond the
intercommunal violence of the 1963-1974 period, if with significant intercommunal
variations, such that the estimated population was 850,000 by the second half of the
1990s. 75 Nonetheless, the populace on the island has not yet crossed the one million
threshold.
Spatial determinism, however, belittles the intrinsic value of the island's
character. In an environment which hosts diverse and highly sensitive ecological
systems, where water is a scarce and vital resource, and where economic development
has depended on unevenly distributed land and coastal resources, that the island should
be managed as a unified system is intuitively appealing. It is one, however, which
conflicts with the political realities of violent conflict and territorial control. Drury
suggested, that "not only is no man an island; neither, within the spectrum of political
geography, can any island be so regarded". 76
 To examine legitimate resource concerns
in Cyprus it is necessary to temporarily move away from their geo-, meteoro- or hydro-
logical setting to view them in a much less territorially-defined context. In so doing, the
choice of which geographical scale is to be employed in analysing the Cyprus case
becomes paramount because, throughout history, Cyprus has held a position in the
annals of international conflict 'out of all proportion to its size'." Firstly, in line with
the 1960 independence treaties, Britain kept a foothold on the colony in the form of two
Sovereign Base Area's (SBAs). Then, after a protracted process of partition—when the
principally Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities grew further apart, the
latter establishing territorially-distinct 'enclaves'—the island was effectively divided in
1974 by the creation of a United Nations buffer zone (UNBZ) between cease-fire lines
(Figure 1.2). On Cyprus, the actions of both Greece (400 km to its west) and Turkey
(75 km to its north) were complicit in this process.
Immediately, Cyprus became a more challenging environment for research, both
theoretically and methodologically. It is widely accepted that the general character of
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intercommunal relations which subsequently developed was largely determined by the
predominantly unproductive process of intercommunal and 'high level' negotiations
undertaken intermittently, and largely through the channels of the UN, from 1974. The
various and multifaceted peacemaking efforts employed by third parties to address the
wider Cyprus conflict post-partition have been widely discussed and speculated upon
elsewhere (Appendix 1). 78
 It is sufficient here to briefly highlight two critical
dimensions of such negotiations—the constitutional and the territorial character of any
settlement—as a precursor to distinguishing their implications for transboundary
resource management.
Only by early 1977 did summit meetings begin to again seriously consider a
solution to the protracted Cyprus conflict. Rauf Denktash, President of the self-declared
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) and Archbishop Makarios, President of the
internationally-recognised Republic of Cyprus (ROC), agreed on a basis for future
negotiations—the so-called 'Four Guidelines' (Appendix 2)—which envisioned the
future state as bicommunal, bizonal, and with each territory to be determined according
to economic viability, productivity and existing property rights. Subsequent meetings
saw little progress, until May 1979 when a 'Ten-Point Agreement' was reached which
saw Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou (succeeding the ROC presidency after Makarios'
death) reaffirm the 1977 principles (Appendix 2); nonetheless, it constituted an
agreement on a form of words but not on what they were intended to convey." In
particular, the territorial character had become a sticking point (Appendix 3). Apart
from these two substantive high-level agreements in the immediate post-partition
period, while subsequent negotiations claimed adherence to their success, the UN-
sponsored search for a solution was to be plagued by failure. While Greek Cypriot
demands had technically evolved from complete reunification to a bicommunal
federation, they included strong central powers (overseeing, inter alia, natural resource
and public utilities management), certain territorial concessions from the north and the
removal of Turkish troops from the island. In essence they came to revolve around what
were seen as three essential 'freedoms' reliant upon no internal borders: freedom of
movement over the whole island; freedom of settlement and the right of refugees to
return to their pre-1974 property; and, the freedom to own property in the north.
15
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In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot negotiators had sought a `bi-regional',
decentralised federation (with resource management devolved to the federal states), with
political equality in its main institutions, although even that position was to become
increasingly unacceptable as the Turkish Cypriots' territorial base acquired in 1974
metamorphosed into the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' (TFSC, in 1976), and then
to the unilateral declaration (UDI) of an independent 'Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus' (TRNC, in 1983) which remained, it is crucial to note, internationally
unrecognised. Since then, the failure of direct talks between successive ROC presidents
(Kyprianou, Vassiliou (from 1988) and Clerides (from 1993)) and Denktash (the on-
going TRNC president) have cast doubt on the whole negotiations process (Appendix
1). Two relatively intensive peacemaking initiatives were undertaken by Perez de
Cuellar (`Set of Ideas', 1992) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali ('Confidence-building
Measures', 1993-94), but these were similarly unsuccessful.
The UNBZ continues to function as a largely closed border today," from the
island-wide perspective and from the borderland perspective, and significant questions
remain over the future role of the de facto boundary in the region as a whole: will it
function as a Greece-Turkey (and therefore intra-NATO) boundary? will it function as
an 'internal' or 'external' border of the EU (could the EU cope with an 'internal' border
conflict?)? As the Mediterranean becomes what King described as Europe's 'Rio
Grande'—a 'water boundary' separating two economic systems, demographic regimes,
and ways of life—how will Cyprus's internal (and external) border function within this
divide?'
While, after 1974, the academic study of the high-level negotiations
consolidated a well-established tradition in Cyprus, the study of geography, not least
'political' or at times 'politicised' geography has proven less attractive. 82 In particular,
politico-geographical studies of transboundary resource management and transboundary
cooperation in post-partition Cyprus thus far are embryonic and fragmented. Analyses
of transboundary relations have been overwhelmingly dominated by studies of the so-
called 'high politics' and often violent nationalist-integrationist dialectic as manifested
in intercommunal negotiations, political party debate, and politicised social movement
struggles. Admittedly, it is axiomatic that transboundary relations at the island-wide
scale have been extremely limited since 1974; while the UNBZ remained so
impermeable, both physically and psychologically, non-cooperation has consistently
17
Introduction
been the 'easier option' to cooperation. But at least as far back as the 1950s there has
been an almost constant debate over the possibility of cooperation and coexistence
between the two communities of the island, and since 1974 this debate became even
more intense and significant for the very reason that it was believed to prove indicative
to both the international community and, most importantly, to the local population, of
the extent to which the two communities could live again within the same boundaries,
under the same government. However, with few exceptions, research has perpetuated
the relative neglect of numerous low politics' transboundary relations, despite the fact
that many of them raise issues of identity and territory." Given the variety of de facto
resource transaction flows and linkages between the ROC and the TRNC, added to the
mix of de jure and de facto interdependencies between the ROC/TRNC and the UK
SBAs, this neglect is surprising.
Yet, while this approach does not suggest that transboundary resource
management at the island-wide scale has been the product solely of the tensions and the
progress of 'high level' initiatives towards a settlement, nor that it has been in any way
an inevitable outcome of the widespread conflict, it does establish that contested
resource management policies should be firmly located in the context of a political
struggle. To this end, an understanding of the conflict over the management of
transboundary resources, their relationship to the larger political conflict, and the
potential for cooperation and collaboration, must be provided by reconstructing the
process of partitioning Cyprus—from its inception in the late 1950s, to its territorially
fragmented form in the 1960s, until its most concretised (although not legalised)
manifestation in 1974. In line with Minghi's suggested sub-division of studies of
partition (a 'pre-partition' stage, an 'active partitioning' stage, and a 'post-partition'
stage), the aim of this reconstruction in Chapter 4 will be to underscore those aspects of
the politico-territorial, socio-economic, and environmental partitions of Cyprus that
explicate the subsequent ('post-partition') significance of particular transboundary
resources to the respective Cypriot communities, as examined from Chapters 5 to 7•"
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1.6 Research Framework
The research and methodological framework generated for this study is detailed in this
final section, while Appendix 4 presents more particular methodologies employed.
1.6.1 A note on geographical research in Cyprus
As previously suggested, transboundary processes are something rarely considered in
relation to the Cyprus conflict. This has been especially so since the events of 1974
when the two main communities of the island became most effectively partitioned. Two
possible factors observed during my own research stand out when looking to explain
this shortfall.
First, as is common with psychological dynamics during conflict, there is a
general paucity of information (both printed and verbal) which transcends the divisions.
This 'silence' is of course historical; Patrick's research of the political geography of the
1963-1971 period has received an unprecedented level of academic recognition largely
for its empirical insights into otherwise highly confused and contested times." Since
then, while the number and variety of research sources has grown, this cannot be said of
the degree of 'information-openness' displayed by concerned parties. During research
for this study, where information was evident it often remained either classified or,
when available, required detailed verification.' It must be cautioned that, for both
political and technical reasons, until mutual agreement is reached between the two
communities various data will remain in dispute. In certain cases, indication will be
given for the consideration of figures as orders of magnitude, not technical data.
Second, any reference to 'boundaries' and 'borders' and, by extension,
`transboundary' issues in Cyprus is on the one hand de rigueur (according to the
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot official line) and, on the other hand, anathema (according
to the policy of the Greek Cypriots, the UN and the remainder of the international
community). Once again, this is highly instructive in itself, explaining to a large degree
the unwillingness of previous studies to move the analytical perspective to the border
region." It also calls for me to state that such loaded terms are used in their conceptual
and abstract, not legal or 'official' meanings. Am I 'pro-Greek' because I discuss
intercommunal cooperation, 'pro-Turk' because I emphasise the role of boundaries and
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the saliency of territoriality, or 'pro-Anglo-American' because I consider both? It is
hoped that the reader understands that because a certain name/term is used, a conscious
stand in the dispute should not necessarily be inferred."
As a researcher, it would be just as ethically wrong to fail to highlight the
contrasting localised events—largely negative, but also positive in character—which
took place just before, and then during the bulk of my fieldwork in Cyprus between
September 1996 and May 1997. 'Negative' events continued to receive the majority of
academic attention. In August 1996, the status quo on the island reached something of a
watershed with the worst period of intercommunal killings for 22 years, concentrated in
the increasingly under-resourced UNBZ. Protesting over the impermeability of Cyprus'
border relative to those of Europe, a motorcycle rally made various incursions into the
UNBZ, over 40 demonstrators and 19 UNFICYP soldiers were wounded in clashes, and
at Dherinia a Greek Cypriot was beaten to death by Turkish Cypriot police and counter-
protesters. Three days later, immediately following his funeral, the Greek Cypriot's
cousin was fatally shot (again at Dherinia) while trying to lower a Turkish flag in the
UNBZ. Then, in September, an attack launched on a Turkish Cypriot observation post
along the UNBZ resulted in the death of one Turkish Cypriot soldier and the wounding
of another. The killing, which has remained unsolved, exacerbated a situation only to
be further worsened the following month by the shooting of another Greek Cypriot by
Turkish soldiers manning the northern cease-fire line. Thereafter, events took on an
increasingly military and geostrategic character, involving not only annual exercises
conducted by the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces (in October) and Turkish Forces (in
November), but also, in January 1997, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives'
vote to purchase Russian S-300 surface-to-air-missiles."
By way of contrast, a more positive development in October 1996 saw the UN
peacekeeping force repeat an 'open house' at Ledra Palace Hotel (within the UNBZ) to
celebrate 'United Nations Day'. Both communities were invited, and the previous year
this had attracted 5,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots, making it the largest bicommunal
gathering since 1974; in September 1996 3,000 attended and I was fortunate enough to
participate in this, the first of a number of bicommunal meetings I would eventually
attend." Such public gatherings, however, failed to completely dispel the prevailing
tension. From October, Greek Cypriot campaigners began to blockade intermittently
the southern side of the Ledra Palace border checkpoint; on one occasion during the
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following January tear gas was used by Greek Cypriot police to disperse the
demonstrators. And although in April over 400 Turkish Cypriots crossed the border to
make a pilgrimage to Hala Sultan Tekke mosque (arguably the third most important
Muslim landmark in the world, yet based in the southern city of Larnaca) and, a week
later, over 100 Greek Cypriots crossed north to visit Apostolos Andreas monastery for
the first time since 1974, the day after I left the TRNC a bicommunal 'peace concert' in
the UNBZ served only to mix any messages further.' As one of the biggest
intercommunal gatherings since 1974, it was violently opposed from the start by right-
wing elements: in the south, the Pan-Cyprian Anti-Occupation movement' clashed with
police, while in the north the Turkish nationalist 'Grey Wolves' attacked the concert
bus.
In addition to these contextual observations, other ethical considerations directly
affected the methodological approach employed in researching this study. An
appreciation of postcolonialist and postmodern writings demands recognition of the
'other' and the role of 'Orientalist' discourse. 92
 Moreover, it heightens awareness of the
role of the observer/outsider as researcher and representer, and of changes to the nature
of the object of research through the research process itself—what is technically termed
the 'double hermeneutic'. 93
 These ethical considerations are an imperative in research
environments such as Cyprus, where traditionally the politicisation of issues has even
determined which baker to visit, or what beer to order." Perhaps to an even greater
extent, however, my research approach has been informed by what the critical theorist
Robert Cox identified as the differences between the (narrow, abstract) 'problem-
solving' and the (open, reflective) 'critical theory' perspective on international conflict,
generated by the dialectical interaction of theory and practice." Given the normative
value of the process of `transboundary resource management' already noted, questions
of ontology and epistemology can easily be marginalised by the congenial, empiricist-
positivism of social and intellectual 'givens'. The analysis of transboundary resource
management, both in general and with particular reference to partitioned states, will
illustrate how accommodatory rather than revisionary both traditional legislative and
diplomatic approaches to 'problem-solving' remain. The status quo—both in terms of
operational and discursive practices—has remained implicitly uncontested. More
'cognitivise approaches suggest, instead, a growing recognition of the narration of
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'norms', 'knowledge', and 'progress' on which these traditional approaches have been
founded.
It is intended, nevertheless, that while my mode of representation will be
illuminated by such 'anti-foundational' epistemology, it recognises that the analytic
views of 'outsiders' remain important for understanding." Although cultural difference
is accentuated through the particularism of ethnographic studies, and the inherent
subjectivity of truths and facts must be recognised, it remains necessary to generate
empirical (though not empiricist) information. Adopting a reflexive approach does
however position myself as a (British, educated, white, male) subject in relation to the
'other'—suggesting power relations that influenced what I did, how I interpreted and
howl related to the subjects of this study. Where relevant, such relations are indicated.
1.6.2 Methodological approach
In order to identify and explain complex processes of transboundary resource
management in a partitioned environment, it is necessary to adopt the method of
identifying causal mechanisms situated in localised contexts.' To provide a
geographical expression to much of the contemporary 'transnational discourse',
empirical research is necessary to supplement and ground theoretical understandings.
To this end, by using a single-case study approach the practice of managing Cyprus'
transboundary resources is assessed, and explanations for its operational character
sought. While the case study framework has at times been criticised for being
idiographic and externally invalid, J.C. Mitchell's and Hamel et al.'s emphasis on
relating the particularities of the locality back to theoretical propositions mirrors this
thesis' purpose." The theoretical debates, in other words, must become geographically
'embedded'. If the causes and forms of transboundary resource management in Cyprus
are sufficiently different from the expectations of the various theoretical approaches,
one may question their theoretical capabilities in explaining transboundary cooperation
in this context. The single-case study framework is also being embraced for its
proficiency in framing closed, singular objects of study—in the case of Cyprus, where
the relatively 'closed' island system and the ties of geography often prescribe unitary
development, this approach becomes particularly relevant."
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During preliminary field research in Cyprus (December 1995) it was noted that,
in terms of transboundary relations, it was imperative to analyse not only the individual
agents in their causal contexts, but also how the causal mechanisms geographically
manifested themselves in the local partitioned environment. For reasons elaborated in
Chapter 2, a 'borderlands' perspective provides a suitable analytical tool, if with
important clarifications. As previously observed, for `transboundary' analysis a number
of geographical scales must be considered. Researching the 'borderland' similarly
invites debate on the so-called 'level of analysis' problem, whereby the 'borderland'
(read: 'region') can be understood to be all that is, on the one hand, 'sub-national' and,
on the other, `supra-local'. Events invariably have more than one cause, and causes can
be found in more than one type of location.' As Yeung lucidly noted, attributing
causal power to territorially-defined yet analytically-constructed 'borderlands' and
'regions' may suffer from the same logical flaw of 'containerisation' as 'states' do
according to the `borderless world' discourse.' This study of Cyprus, instead,
advocates a borderlands perspective (i.e., researching at the 'scale' rather than
necessarily at the 'level' of the border).
Overall, a dualistic research strategy was therefore chosen—of detailed
'borderland' work complemented by research undertaken at the island-wide scale. As
Paasi argued, "[t]hese perspectives are not mutually exclusive but are necessarily
complementary. [...] [N]ational and local perspectives should be both constituted and
constitutive for each other"." Basing both research strategies on a more thematic focus
of transboundary resource management largely circumvented the problem of separating
`local/regional/(inter)national' levels from `local/regional/(inter)national' scales, and
allowed for their subsequent resysnthesis. Moreover, although there remain inherent
difficulties in comparing one borderland with another, when such research is
approached thematically—and is informed by recent 'transnational' developments-
(dis)similarities should become more identifiable.'" It was necessary to capture and
research spatial interactions, from the level of the individual to international influences,
in the borderland. Using the 'trans-border prism' of the borderland makes it possible to
view complex dynamics of policy-making, both 'international' and 'national', 'foreign'
and `domestic'.'" The sub-division of the 'borderland' interface into two further
studies—the largely rural UNBZ, and the transboundary urban space of Nicosia and.
secondarily, Famagusta—was also practical. Both studies examined the processes and
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outcomes of transboundary resource management, but in quite distinct environmental
contexts.
When evaluating theoretical explanations about causal relations, it is recognised
that 'how' and 'why' questions are useful in guiding intensive case study analysis.' In
the light of the above, the research questions to be answered in the case of Cyprus are;"
• How does the process of transboundary resource management operate in this
partitioned state? To what extent have institutionalised principles and practices of
transboundary resource management been able to develop since partition?
• Why are mechanisms formed to deal with some transboundary resource management
issue areas, but fail to achieve success in connection with others? Is it possible to de-
link resource conflict issues from the protracted political conflict, so that the former
could be resolved without reference to the latter?
• How has the general 'milieu' of Cyprus affected the progress of both transboundary
resource management and intercommunal peace?'°7
• How useful is it to use a 'borderland' perspective to address problems of resource
management affecting two or more (de jure or de facto) states? In Cyprus, to what
extent is the 'borderland' an appropriate managerial unit in the context of
transboundary resource problems?
• What recommendations may be made for the future management of transboundary
resources in Cyprus, whether in a political climate of reunification, or in one of
perpetual de facto or eventual de jure partition?
• What lessons, if any, can be learned from Cyprus to develop understanding of
managing transboundary resources in other partitioned states and other boundary-
related contexts?
These questions are directly addressed in Chapter 8, which brings together the main
descriptive and analytical elements of the study in order to draw conclusions.
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Multi-methodological approaches, both in terms of means of data collection and
analysis, were employed within the single-case study framework to address these
questions, as it is argued that evidence based on a variety of cross-checking methods—
the process of 'triangulation'—aids internal validity. 108
 Baxter and Eyles have noted,
however, that simply using two or more methods does not necessarily guarantee more
rigorous results; rather, triangulation of both methods and sources strengthens
credibility. 109 This has become a strong tenet of interpretative research design and, in
reaction to the traditional discourse of international relations centred on state
'governance' and 'sovereignty', the application of critical theory to international
relations studies increasingly recognises the need to acknowledge the power relations
present in both 'reality' and `observation'."' Analysis of the 'intellectuals of
statecraft'—leaders, bureaucrats, experts and advisers—by examining the 'texts of
international politics', including rhetoric, metaphors, and forms of reasoning, allows for
the appreciation of the `politicalness' of the historical production of geographical
knowledge." Examining the conceptual and practical reasoning used to legitimise
policy, moreover, must be adopted universally, be it either the analysis of traditional
'security' or, for example, the analysis of more `ecopoliticar discourse."'
Supplementary to the referencing of secondary sources previously suggested,
therefore, primary data collection was undertaken—largely as an amalgam of archive
searches and interviews. Documents were sourced in the UK, notably at the UN
Information Centre Library (London) and library and database resources at the
International Boundaries Research Unit and the Middle East Documentation Unit
(Durham). Given the inconsistent policy within UNFICYP regarding access to detailed
information, both contemporary and historical, the UN Secretary-General's six-monthly
reports on peacekeeping operations prove educational. Patrick's previous insight into
UNFICYP's operations illustrated previously the explanatory power of such empirical
data, and also UNFICYP's role as 'gatekeepers' to extensive primary research.'"
In addition, three fieldwork sessions were conducted in Cyprus for a combined
duration of nearly six months—in the south (September-December 1996), in the north
(March-May 1997), and then both in the south and north (September 1997).
Govenu-nent and private libraries, and newspaper archives were referenced."'
Verification of both primary documents and secondary sources of information was
possible through interviews and observations with key actors/informants (and vice-
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versa). At one level, in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted on both
sides of the de facto partition lines. Interviews evolved around a semi-structured
questionnaire; Appendix 4 outlines this research methodology in more detail. In
accordance with the geographical perspectives previously introduced, numerous
interviews with a broad range of actors and informants were conducted to analyse
decision and policy matters with potential causal groups, and to elucidate pertinent
processes of transboundary resource management. In addition, in-depth 'oral histories'
were extracted from users and managers of the resource-significant UNBZ in order to
aid trend analysis of, for example, historical events and changes in land use."' The
relating of this 'local knowledge' (based on an ethnographic approach) to the
identification of island-wide patterns (based on a more expansive approach) proved an
important analytical process.
Parallel to interviewing, field observations were made within the UNBZ and in
areas adjacent to it by adapting 'rapid appraisal' methods which have resulted from the
growing interest in "simple, systematic and innovative techniques designed to acquire,
analyse, and effectively utilise information", especially on issues such as natural
resource management in developing rural areas.' 16
 Methods of participatory `transect
walks' were adopted in the urban environment with key local informants, and adapted to
the UNBZ in the light of practical constraints)" Complementary, therefore, to
qualitative time-series analysis of historical maps and aerial photographs from the state
level (where available), rapid appraisal mapping studies and observations facilitated an
assessment of the outcomes of resource management processes at the local level."' In a
similar vein, that evidence be obtained from persons in border regions participating in
both 'formal' and 'informal' transboundary activities was a crucial determinant on the
research process (i.e., including public and private representatives))19
The data thus collected was linked with the broader analytical methods to
provide the central arguments of the thesis. Asking the same questions of different
sources of evidence—allowing one method to inform the other, the discovery of
paradox and contradiction, and extension of the breadth of enquiry—and, subsequently,
sequencing them together through analysis, leads to an advanced and more accurate
understanding of the post-partition management of Cyprus' transboundary resources.
Yet, while grounding the theoretical discussion in empirical analysis, this thesis seeks to
make a contribution towards developing concepts and theories. It examines several
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research questions in depth through a theoretical case study of a single, well-defined
partitioned state. Inherently, therefore, there are spatial, temporal and personal biases.
Nevertheless, the conceptual framework developed and the general conclusions in
Chapter 8 may prove applicable to other cases of partition and other international (i.e.,
non-partition) boundaries.
This study does not blindly offer a prescription for the resolution of the many
transboundary resource management problems that have developed in Cyprus from the
1950s. Rather it seeks to enhance the understanding of the complexities of these
interrelated problems in the hope that, in the long-term, this understanding might
contribute to their resolution, and to a resolution of the intercommunal conflict.
Transboundary resource management appears increasingly prevalent in Cypriot affairs
and, as suggested at the start of this chapter, represents a potentially critical focus both
for future cooperation and conflict. This study has only started to address this dynamic
and much neglected issue.
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Transboundary Resource Management
Chapter 2
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations
2.1	 Introduction
It has been argued in the opening chapter that the problem of the achievement of
effective cooperation between relevant parties represents one of the greatest obstacles to
ensuring the equitable and sustainable management of transboundary resources. This
chapter will look in detail at the idea of cooperation, and critically examine the
theoretical debate spanning a number of disciplines concerning the conditions under
which cooperation amongst international actors may or may not arise. Section 2.2
examines the debate broadly contested amongst 'political realists' and 'liberalists' over
the origins of, and potential for, cooperative behaviour, drawing on theoretical work
which has particular relevance to transboundary resource management. It is appropriate
to examine the interrelations between cooperation and conflict: exploring 'conflict' that
is both resource-specific and more generic in nature, and the means of managing both
conflicts as a step towards more cooperative behaviour.
In Section 2.3, means of analysing the transboundary context will be revisited
and an argument will be made for a reassessment and a repositioning of the focal point
of analysis. A territorial dimension informed by a greater understanding of the
significance of socio-spatial boundaries—a 'borderland' perspective, that precipitates a
fuller comprehension of the process of managing transboundary resources—will be
(re)emphasised. In conjunction with this section, preliminary conclusions will then be
drawn on the theoretical approaches to transboundary cooperation within dynamic and
complex transboundary contexts such as Cyprus before moving on, in Chapter 3, to
examine and illustrate the developing practice of transboundary resource management
with particular reference to partitioned states.
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2.2 Approaching the Problem of Transboundary Cooperation
It can be argued that there has been little theoretical work on cooperation across
boundaries, or what is referred to here as `transboundary' cooperation) Analysts often
choose to consider what is commonly known as 'international' cooperation, and the
majority of theoretical and conceptual work under consideration below concerns itself
with cooperation as part of traditional 'international' relations—the policies, in other
words, adopted by individual states in relation to other states. Writers with differing
perspectives of international relations, however, offer contrasting interpretations of the
conditions under which 'international' cooperation is likely to occur, and an
examination of the ensuing debate holds implications for traditionalist approaches to the
analysis of what can be understood instead as `transboundary' cooperation.
Initially, it must be stressed that the analysis of cooperation should not be
confused with its celebration, nor necessarily identified with optimisation or 'positive-
sum games'? Milner, after problematising the concept of international cooperation,
recognised three general forms: 'tacit' cooperation which may occur without
communication or formal agreement, but when actors' expectations converge;
'negotiated' cooperation which follows an explicit bargaining process; and 'imposed'
cooperation which implies more coercive approaches that have not surprisingly been the
focus of studies on so-called hegemonic powers. 3
 Cooperation is an inherently
subjective term, and Jervis went so far as to argue that distinguishing behaviour as
cooperative or not is an artificial process. 4
 This study chooses, like Groom and Taylor,
to look at cooperative relations that are not solely inter-state or inter-governmenta1.5
Unlike Groom and Taylor's work, however, which argued for the analysis of
'legitimised' relationships alone (i.e., those which are 'not overtly or structurally
coercive'), this study prefers to take a less restrictive and less prescriptive approach, in
the belief (like Jervis) that what is perceived as 'cooperative' must be contextualised. It
is argued moreover that this analytical process can be in itself highly instructive.
There are a number of theoretically-informed explanations of transboundary
political and economic cooperation originating from the discipline of international
relations, and a growing body of work is applying such theoretical approaches to
transboundary resource problems.' Although for pedagogic reasons they are divided up,
it will become obvious that approaches intersect at numerous points and, through
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necessity, many observers draw on more than one in their analysis of international
cooperation.
2.2.1 Political realism and neorealism
The traditional 'realist' school sees cooperation in terms of intergovernmental relations
between independent states, where concern rests with the relation between state power
and order. States are the major actors in international affairs and, in the absence of an
effective and legitimate international authority, they are seen to competitively interact in
the context of anarchy with notions of 'national security' permeating all their actions.'
In turn, cooperation, in whatever form, is likely to be ad hoc and determined largely by
the interests of the most powerful state actor or hegemon. Cooperation, in other words,
is both a function of and conducted within the parameters of power politics.'
In this light, states will at best respond to the developing knowledge of scarce
transboundary resources and important systemic linkages through the traditionally
competitive and conflicting pursuit of state power, and in this pursuit of power states
prefer to avoid or minimise dependency on other states if this necessitates a reduction in
their relative power position.' 'Dependency', in this sense, connotes some form of
vulnerability to the choices of whichever party is dominant in the relationship. The
realist approach to international relations is thus ambiguous in suggesting how states
will manage transboundary resource management problems or, rather, how self-
interested actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy and overriding conflicting
interests. Realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics determined by this
'security dilemma', with the 'high politics' of military security dominating the low
politics' of economic, social or environmental affairs. Leadership provided by
hegemonic states is understood by some as facilitating achievement of positive
collaboration among states, but more generally, issues of 'low politics' are relegated to
the back burner:"
Some realists have, however, refocused the much-contested concept of 'power'
in material terms, concentrating instead on control over the production process,
including raw materials, sources of capital, and markets." These neo-, or 'structural'
realists recognised growing economic interdependencies in the 1970s in the search for
material resources. In terms of environmental 'power resources', for example, state
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power translated as being the primary controller of the resource so as to determine any
collective decisions affecting it, or having enough capacity to affect unilaterally the
quality of a transboundary resource.'
As part of the neorealist school, there are divisions between those who suggest
that cooperation is most likely to occur in a condition of hegemonic stability, and those
that claim limited cooperation is possible in the absence of hegemony.' Some
neorealists therefore advocate that cooperation may occur where the costs of
unreciprocated concessions are less, as state survival is perceived to be less at stake."
The work of Keohane and Nye presented the characteristic of 'complex
interdependence', suggesting an increasing number of 'trans governmental relations'
involving significantly both a diversity of issues and of actors.' Even these more
'liberal' neorealists, however, continue to focus on political power suggesting that
without changing the underlying principle of Darwinian anarchy, effective and
extensive cooperation is virtually impossible. Competitive behaviour remains intrinsic
to all forms of collective action, and selfish interests are instead pursued within
multilateral institutions. International principles, rules and decision-making procedures
are non-mandatory and volatile; as a consequence, side payments and issue-linking (or
'package deals') become important steps in generating a 'balanced' agreement, as
relative gains becoming more important than absolute gains.16
Both classical and `neo' realist interpretations of international cooperation
rightly acknowledge the structure of the international, decentralised political (and with
structural realists 'economic') system, from the perspective of inter-state relations. As
the work of Keohane and Nye went some way in recognising, however, there is room
for a more 'pluralist' approach to issues affecting global affairs. The realist approach
has received much critical attention for which groups of actors it emphasises and which
issues preoccupy it; it is beneficial to consider three commonly-voiced criticisms in
more detail.
First, with an emphasis on the so-called 'billiard ball' system it is assumed that
the state is a rational actor whose identity and interests do not change. Yet, the idea of
rational foreign policy decision-making by a reified state has been undermined by
emphasising how cognitive dynamics distort the decision-making process. Jervis'
seminal work illustrates the problems decision-makers are faced with in a world of
uncertainties." Rather than reducing perception and misperception to exogenous
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variables, it is necessary to recognise the vital role they play in decision-making
processes, which often lead to `sub-optimal' courses of action. In addition, and perhaps
more fundamentally, the coherent pursuit of a 'single' national purpose is often thwarted
by sub-systemic interests. The complexity of internal decision-making has led many to
reconsider the role of 'domestic' politics.' With increasing political decentralisation,
institutionalised power in foreign-policy making, and effective organisational influence
(i.e., access to decision-making), domestic factors significantly intrude into systemic
theories of cooperation.' Milner suggested three reasons for this: a deconstruction of
intrastate politics is necessary to understand how cooperation has been legitimised,
while an understanding of internal policy helps explain the strategies states use to realise
their part of the cooperation. 2° Finally, domestic ratification of formal cooperative
agreements is a fundamental requirement.
This shortfall in political realism has been somewhat superseded by a second,
that of its ahistorical approach. An entrenched state-centric perspective which leaves
the concept of territorial sovereignty untouched ignores the unprecedented elimination
of economic barriers (e.g., EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) and the creation of a so-called 'global
geopolitical' economy through 'transnational liberalism',' which has led many to talk
of the 'death of the state' and 'a borderless world'." In terms of transboundary
interactions, international boundaries appear increasingly less problematical: research
on economic and spatial restructuring, and on the shifting ground under established
political institutions, practices and concepts, stresses the 'unbundling' of territorial
sovereignty." Harvey interpreted a growth in 'placeless' transboundary
interdependencies (conceptualised as 'space-time compression') as contradicting
notions of exclusive territoriality. 24
 The growth of common markets and of various
trans-state functional regimes affecting both global and local space has led to a 'pincer
movement' or 'geopolitical squeeze' on the traditional concept of the territorially-
integral state.' Consequently, in some world regions it has become increasingly
difficult to distinguish 'foreign' from 'domestic', 'outside' from 'inside', 'us' from
'them' .2'
While economic forces have played a large part in undermining state autonomy,
recent political developments have further fuelled the 'demise of the state' debate!' The
'resurgence' of nationalist and ethnic groups, dominating armed conflicts over recent
decades, illustrated the political weight of non-state group identities. A shift from
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primordial conceptions of ethnicity to revisionary theories emphasises a growing
geopolitical 'disorder', exemplified by the dissolution of the USSR, the break-up of the
state Socialist economies of Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the
post-Cold War environment. Samuel Huntington's contentious thesis inspired work on
the growing significance of contesting 'cultural civilisations', advocating cultural-
economic primacy over the political in defining borders. 28
 New actors and interests
have (re)emerged, exposing a realist approach that fails to accommodate non-'inter-
state' conflict. 29
 The emergence of political movements outside the framework of
territorial states inspired Agnew's criticism of conventional assumptions that have
dehistoricised and decontextualised state formation and integration, of states seen as
fixed units of sovereign space, and of the 'snapshot' representation of the everyday
world political map. 3° Political identity, in other words, is no longer anchored in the
singular, normatively appealing `nation-state', with a Westphalian notion of identity
being ever more undermined by diasporas, social movements, social classes, interest and
ecological groups. It is easy to demonstrate that the idea of, firstly, a (unitary) 'nation
state' speaking and acting in the (uniform) 'national interest' and, secondly, a dominant
language of 'international' (sic) relations exclusionary in its treatment of 'non-
languages' employed by the 'other', are both highly problematic.3'
Yet, such perceptions of politico-territorial dissolution appear far from
universally applicable. It has been rightly pointed out that many of these observations
have taken place in advanced industrial states, predominantly in North America and
Western Europe (which make up less than 10% of the total length of international land
boundaries), and J. Anderson noted that even the processes identified here were;
"partial and selective, with globalisation affecting different state activities
unevenly. Contemporary configurations of political space are a complex mixture
of new and old forms, the latter continuing to exist rather than being tidily
removed to clear the ground for new polities".32
More generally, P.J. Taylor argued that the 'efficacy of territoriality' is too apparent;
politically the state remains the major power container.' The resurgence in national and
regional territorialities suggests that the stability of many borders between 1945 and
1989 owed more to Cold-War subordination than a new, emergent international order—
ethnic and national pluralism, in other words, need not be state-destroying.' Indeed,
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dividing up existing states along cultural lines may actually strengthen the interstate
system as its new members move nearer to the 'national ideal', suggesting a
predisposition to take on the characteristics and discourse of 'international relations'."
Moreover, like Cyprus, there remain conflicts that have survived beyond the Cold War-
period and remain "in a twilight world between deadlocked war and permanent
negotiation"."
Thus, while a postmodern or postnationalist critique seriously undermines the
dominant schools of international relations, it should not be extended beyond visible
realities as in many cases states remain the most consequential actors.' Rather this
critical thinking has forced the recognition of 'others': would-be or 'pseudo' states,
intergovernmental organisations, international NG0s, multinational corporations, and
various associations and networks—all independent actors exercising functional control
in a more pluralised space
This leads onto another major criticism of traditional realist approaches.
Recognition of the gradual `globalisation' of economics and culture noted above
necessitated, in addition, a reconceptualisation of the political assumptions upon which
state's preoccupation—that of 'security'—is based. One issue central to this study is
that of ecological, transboundary interdependencies which traditionally have been paid
scant attention within international politics. Global environmental issues directly
contest state sovereignty and security, particularly transboundary resource and
environmental management problems that enrich the growing `geoecological world
view' of potential for environmental catastrophe ignorant of state boundaries." The
overriding concern with state security deserves revision as so-called 'low politics'
increasingly overlap the traditional concerns of 'high politics'. 39 Effectively addressing
these transboundary problems will require ever-greater levels of cooperation among
states that all too frequently assert their prerogatives of sovereignty.
The marriage of ecopolitics and security was championed by the sociological
liberalism of Karl Deutsch, developing his work on non-state groups and social
communication to identify transboundary 'security communities' which marked a shift
from state-orientated power politics.' More recently, Pirages reconfirmed that
increasing economic and ecological interdependencies necessitated an understanding of
different actors involved in more numerous transactions. 4 ' As observers note, however,
the merits of integrating environment and resource management concerns with the
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notion of 'security' are frequently contested.' A body of work has developed which
cautions against casually adopting terms such as 'environmental security' and 'resource
diplomacy', largely because of their state-centric connotations. The politicisation or
even militarisation of environmental and resource management problems, and their
treatment as existential threats, may restrict the range of means available for resolving
such conflicts. Grundy-Warr and Rajah, for example, have documented the specific
links between state building and the 'security' problematic in the developing world
whereby state legitimacy and coerced social cohesion become the key determinants of
'whom' security is for (often a particular political identity), and 'where' it is contested
(often at the margins of its spatial ecumene)." Indeed, Grwger argued that the
Vesecuritisation' of the environment would actually accommodate two alternative
levels of action to the state: the global and the local." Often the most salient political
factors are not state-confined, but are 'localised' citizens groups, social movements,
international environmental organisations, or global corporations."
There appear, nevertheless, legitimate concerns that a more extensive
understanding of 'security'—be it state or non-state oriented—must recognise
environmental and resource management interdependencies.' As noted in Chapter 1,
the concept of sustainable development has forced actors more fully to acknowledge the
links between economic and environmental issues. In turn, this further undermines the
realist conception of territorially-integral states with absolute sovereignty; Homer-
Dixon suggested, for example, that increasingly there are environmental components to
inter-group conflict.° Although not envisaging alarming, often historically-
deterministic scenarios of 'resource wars' which have been most often debated in
studies of 'hydropolitics', he argued that environmental conflict would be a persistent
feature of sub-national politics, necessitating appropriate and effective conflict
resolution mechanisms." In turn, there were clear benefits from comprehending further
the reverse relationship, that of the effect of military security on the environment, in that
environmental change can be both cause and consequence of conflict." Arthur
Westing's work examined the full extent to which major war might disrupt the
environment, particularly in the extreme form of environmental warfare." While
cautiously optimistic about the nurturing of non-bellicose and pro-environmental
cultural norms, he stated that true human security could only flow from a combination
of social and environmental 'security'.5'
42
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations
In whatever form, a more holistic conception of security has significant
implications for the analysis of transboundary resource management in its exposure of
the contradictions between traditional accounts of international relations and the
emerging environmental agenda.' Resource exhaustion and environmental destruction
have provided states an element of mutual self-interest, and an imperative for avoiding
the 'territorial trap'." In so doing, the dysfunctionality of explaining collective action
through an understanding of power structures alone is accentuated. In the light of these
commentaries, it is no coincidence that alternative schools of thought have developed in
parallel. To address these theoretical realignments an examination of developments
within the liberal institutional school of thought is called for."
2.2.2 Functionalism, neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism
A functionalist approach to international cooperation originates with David Mitrany's
vision of expanding a 'working peace system', whereby transboundary organisations
replace the state as the mechanism for satisfying common needs rather than 'high
politics'. Mitrany's work, along with that of Rosenau and Burton, argued for
encouraging 'webs' of human interaction to the extent that "boundaries of states would
be hidden from view"." It was believed possible to extend cooperative transactions in
common issue areas excluded from the elements of ideology and dogma to more
politicised relationships, meaning that, in terms of institutional structures, 'form would
follow function' as trans-'national' community-building generated sets of relations and
new demands for international institutions satisfying felt needs." Mitrany argued that;
"the functional approach [...] would help the expansion of [...] positive and
constructive common work [...] making frontier lines meaningless by overlaying
them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative
goals"."
This perspective has clear implications for international conflict in that mutual contacts
over common tasks may engender greater amity at the individual level, while the
gradual enmeshment of governments through ever-growing interdependencies will make
the cost of severance through conflict prohibitively high." The creation of integrated
institutions would gradually foster transboundary cooperation via a 'spill over' effect.
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Such an approach clearly overlaps with integration theory in its recognition of
the significance of interdependency, but here Pentland has argued the similarities end."
Of the four major traditions of thought concerning international political integration,
functionalism is seen as the most threatening to the political state system. 'Federalism',
by contrast, is essentially a state-led approach while 'pluralism', although a community
model, remains more politicised. Contrary to this view, however, P. Taylor
convincingly argued that Mitrany's prescription was not the abolition of governments
but rather issues of 'sovereignty' becoming irrelevant' ) Mitrany himself argued that;
"[o]ur social activities are cut off arbitrarily at the limit of the state and, if at all,
are allowed to be linked to the same activities across the border only by means of
uncertain and cramping political ligatures. What is here proposed is simply that
these political amputations should cease. Whenever useful or necessary [...]
activities would be released to function as one unit throughout the length of their
natural course".61
Pentland's fourth integrationist tradition of thought distinguished is that of
neofunctionalism, whose concerns lie less with recognising consensus than interest-
groups' demands, particularly economic groups which are seen to heavily impose on
decision-making processes and stimulate further integration. In contrast to functionalist
beliefs in a 'spill over' process which involved the transformation of the relative
importance of particular issues, neofunctionalism argues that a hierarchy of issues
persists and thus 'spill over' occurs only as a consequence of decision-making
procedure. A process of ramification develops as successful collaboration by states in
one particular technical area encourages expansion into other issue areas; this process
became idealised as the 'necessary logic of functionalism' or the 'functional
imperative'.' This would be particularly prevalent in issue areas that concerned matters
of 'low politics' (i.e., economic, social, scientific, environmental issues).
Neofunctionalists therefore suggest that certain supra-national, task-related
organisations are possible, but only once the resistance of other organisations and
individuals has been overcome.
Ernst Haas' refinement of functionalism's integrationist elements became
synonymous with the embryonic process of European integration, the-then-EEC
representing the `neofunctionalist showpiece'. 63 Here, E. Haas recognised that the
'European Coal and Steel Community' was established because it accommodated a
number of compatible rather than coincidental interests for different groups." Along
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with Sewell, E. Haas attempted to be more realistic about the possibility of de-
politicising the process of international cooperation (i.e., by-passing state institutions),
suggesting that there was more potential for cooperation in some affairs than in others.°
Even here, however, neofunctionalists are uncomfortable with the distinction between
political and welfare relations. At the procedural level, functionalists must logically
envisage 'spill over' leading groups into increasingly political sectors, where
particularist values generate unintended consequences. In addition, functionalism
explains neither a breakdown of international coordination nor a fundamental change in
the content of regional integration. E. Haas instead argued that cooperation results not
from the unsolicited surrender to a common good, but from the convergence from the
separate perceptions of interest.° His work therefore reintroduced various factors into
the integration process: politics, power, free will, individual leadership, learning
processes and, significantly, institutional failure and breakdown.'
Parallels can be made with Muzafer Sherif's belief in `superordinate goals'.°
These 'goals' are "compelling and highly appealing to members of two or more groups
in conflict but which cannot be attained by the resources and energies of the groups
separately"." A superordinate goal, therefore, differs from a common goal in that the
latter can be achieved unilaterally." In the former, any discussions, plans, or action are
collated, and a cumulative effect of reducing prevailing friction transpires!' Sherif
warned, in turn, that 'contact' between hostile groups without superordinate goals could
simply serve as a medium for perpetuating attitudes and stereotypes. His work did
therefore infer homogeneous 'attitudes, sentiments, aspirations, and goals' in the
groups' values and norms." As Ryan rightly tried to explain, however, in applying
these reconciliatory features of group dynamics to protracted social conflict it is
necessary to learn from neofunctionalists, who do not recognise a pre-existing moral
community but, instead, seek to motivate interdependency through self-interest."
When examined together, the broad conceptualisation of 'institutions' within
functionalism and neofunctionalism has drawn their greatest criticism and has prompted
further analysis of institutional structures, powers, rules and procedures.' This has been
best exemplified by `neoliberal institutionalists' who in general have ascribed greater
importance to the role of institutions in the mitigation of conflict and the development
of cooperation in the political and economic order, claiming that formal and informal
rules play a much larger role than in realist approaches.' They have not employed
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simplistic liberal institutional (or 'mercantilist') beliefs that cooperation is an implicit
expectation but rather assumed that, if the two conditions of mutual interest and
institutional variation exist, cooperation and collaboration are possible. Neither have
they assumed that international agreements are easy to keep, but they take a less
deterministic view than realists of 'anarchy' in international relations. In cases where
states receive assistance from institutions that reach beyond the state system, and reduce
the uncertainties they may have about the intention of others, international institutions
make it possible for actors to take otherwise inconceivable actions. As arguably the
principal agents of transboundary cooperation, institutional frameworks appear in many
forms of which Keohane emphasised three: formal international (non-)governmental
organisations; international regimes; and societal conventions.' Young recognised
feedbacks nonetheless; international organisations may be initially instrumental in
regime formation, but then may also become the objects for administrating such regimes
(e.g., UNEP).77
In the advocation of the need for 'world government', notably through the
writings of federalists, (neo)functionalists, and pluralists, international organisations
have traditionally been seen to provide the necessary management given the growing
complexity of interdependence within and between issue areas, although recent analyses
have taken a less benign view, presenting their systemic (and systematic) failure both
within and across issues and institutions.' A much more decentralised approach to the
possibilities for cooperation in international relations focuses on the functional role of
international 'regimes' in facilitating cooperation." International regimes are generally
presented as a form of collective action by states to govern specific 'issue areas', where
their behaviour is constrained by common principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures!' In this sense they are not necessarily a new phenomenon, but are
increasingly recognised as undermining traditionalist views of state sovereignty. The
management of interdependencies requires instruments and structures which go beyond
conventional diplomacy and formal international organisation. While neorealists have
rightly criticised regime theorists for missing the true origin of cooperation, in that the
very existence of a regime implies a previous agreement to cooperate (determined by the
particular distribution of power), regimes have proven potential for generating further
cooperation through issue-linkage and side-payments!' On the issue of international
resource and environmental management, Oran Young noted that institutional and
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organisational regimes can generate a strategy of spontaneous, negotiated or imposed
'order' •82 Functionally, therefore, regimes may stabilise mutual expectations about
normative behaviour,' reduce transaction costs, provide scarce information, and
generate a 'shadow of the future' s' in situations in which (as 'game theorists' would
describe) instrumentally rational actors have an incentive not to cooperate.
Recent neorealist interpretations of regime development suggest a move to
'issue'-based analysis, examining the organisations and institutions (and, significantly,
their differently distributed `power resources') within specific, more clearly defined
issue systems that allow for greater complexity." This device was pioneered by a
'Tubingen school' (examining East-West relations) in response to 'the American
preoccupation' with the theory of hegemonic stability, which was seen as failing to
explain that among the same state actors cooperation occurred in one issue area,
whereas in other issue areas, 'unregulated conflict management' persisted." The `issue
area' in this sense is determined by the degree to which the sub-issues (or `objects of
contention') are linked functionally (i.e., for technical reasons) or perceptually (i.e.,
through the perceptions and behaviour of the participating actors). In so doing, this
school of thought develops from Rosenau's early work on the importance of 'linkage
politics' (whereby certain issue areas will be dealt with in certain ways);" from the
work of Mansbach and Vasquez who offered an issue-based paradigm for explaining
inter-group relations;" and from Keohane and Nye's analysis of two specific issue areas
in international relations." A 'problem-structural approach' is adopted which implies
that inherent characteristics of issues or conflicts predetermine the way in which they
are dealt, and therefore mirrors the neorealist distinction between 'high' and low'
politics; they hypothesise, accordingly, that if the conflicts in the issue area are conflicts
of interest about goods assessed relative to other parties, regime formation is a difficult
process or in fact does not occur at all."
Yet, as can be seen from the foregoing, along with other studies of
interdependence, regime analysis still largely ignores transnational, non-state agents to
the aggrandisement of powerful states." One attempt to correct this imbalance is Peter
Haas's work on the influence of 'expert knowledge' (or 'epistemic communities') on the
reformation of national objectives.' He preferred to look at policy making in terms of
such non-systemic variables as ideas, knowledge, beliefs, experts and scientists, arguing
that emphasis on cognitive frameworks addresses the issue of variable state perceptions
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and interests which, he argued, (neo)realist and historical materialist approaches lack."
In a state of ecosystemic complexity, for example, government officials rely on
knowledge and expert opinions of others. Young's work on the role of 'political
leaders' in regime formation similarly 'brings the individual back in'." He argued that
the establishment of effective international institutions ordinarily requires the interplay
of at least two of three common forms of political leadership', 95 just as P. Haas's work
illustrated the integral role Stjepan Keckes played in orchestrating the Mediterranean
pollution control regime." Both these approaches indicate how states and leaders may
realise that new attitudes and political decision-making procedures are necessary to cope
with economic and environmental pressures. In their most provocative form, they also
suggest how 'hegemony' in either the cognitive or Gramscian sense can dominate policy
making in different national settings.'
Neoliberal institutionalist thinking also develops on more traditional, state-
orientated concerns with international organisations and international law. Young noted
that both the contractarian approach of those who advocated 'world peace through world
law' and the functionalist beliefs in incrementalism via 'spill over', succeeded in
highlighting the significant role of international organisations and institutions in global
affairs. Where they fell short, however, was not only in their failure to evaluate the
effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability of such organisations and, in turn, the
institutions within which they were situated, but also to determine the conditions under
which 'governance without government' could practically solve collective-action
problems." Young's understanding of a 'governance system' hinged on the process of
'institutional bargaining' on matters of common concern to a distinct social group based
on a consensus rule—as opposed to 'legislative bargaining' which aims to meet the
requirements of majoritarian rule." Moreover, he argued that the latter simply
distributes provisions among the parties while the former provides incentives to settle,
on provisions seen as equitable to all, in an integrative fashion.'
Overall, these theoretical developments have led to a reduction in the limitations
of traditional political discourse, providing space for new voices in the decision-making
process, and creating opportunities for institutional and 'conventional' changes. More
nuanced, pluralist approaches have gone some way in suggesting how `transboundary
relations' can be explained when the boundary in question is not de jure, and how
theoretical approaches that take a 'top-down' perspective on international cooperation
48
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations
and transboundary resource management are in danger of being blind to non-state actors
and issues. With this increasingly complex 'milieu', a number of theoretical and
methodological challenges arise in understanding the politico-geographical space and
boundaries being 'transcended'. Rittberger advocated a 'microscopic perspective' in
order to understand why regimes emerge in some issue areas but not in others, while
Tooze argued for an empirically-grounded approach.' If there is any consensus it is to
be found in a recognition of the need more firmly to ground these on-going theoretical
discussions in historical empirical analysis. It is to these challenges which this analysis
will be turned to next.
2.3 Rethinking Transboundary Relations
As indicated throughout the previous discussion, across many disciplines there has been
an 'epistemological celebration' of spaces and positions astride boundaries, and in-
between nations and identities. 1 °2 This has precipitated a welcome critique of a variety
of discursive practices, including political geography and international relations, in its
recognition of difference and multivocality in both 'core' and 'periphery'. 103
Furthermore it has led to a reassessment of what 'boundaries'—in both the general and
specific meaning of the word—represent, their origins and their functions. In the light
of fresh observations, this section aims to reintroduce and reinterpret theoretical and
conceptual approaches to boundaries as a means of further 'rethinking' transboundary
relations. This study draws inspiration from both recent examinations of the
construction of socio-spatial identities and the associated narrative power of boundaries,
and from studies of a seemingly paradoxical reaffirmation of territorial saliency."
These examinations call for further consideration of transboundary relations from a
variety of perspectives to critically examine political, economic, social, and
psychological processes, and how they are manifested in transboundary contexts.
Implicit to this approach, however, is a recognition that the spatial manifestation of
these processes is central to any geographical investigation of transboundary resource
management. Boundaries, in particular, continue to play a key role, not only as a
political weapon, but also as a distinct location for transboundary cooperation/conflict.
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2.3.1 Deconstructing boundaries
Political geographers have traditionally understood boundaries as expressions of the
'territoriality of states', whereby 'political space' is invariably portrayed as synonymous
with 'physical territory'. As previously indicated, this has proven a similar point of
departure for studies of international relations. Recent work, however, has noted how
geographers increasingly seek to place the traditionally state-orientated notions of
boundaries within other social theoretical constructs, with studies moving away from
focusing on a restrictive, purely territorial construction of state boundaries to a social
and symbolic construction, one where state-society relations do not necessarily operate
within the same, non-problematic division of space.' In parallel, other social scientists
have attempted to understand the role of space and territory in their understanding of
personal, group, and national boundaries and identities, and to argue that boundaries
should be understood as the spatial outcomes of various societal processes.I°6
State boundaries are equally social, political, and discursive constructs, with
deep symbolic, cultural and historical origins. They are manifestations of the social and
historical construction of both spatial and social demarcations—what Paasi has termed
`socio-spatial consciousness'." The notion of a boundary is, in other words, now more
explicitly connected with such problematic categories as nation, race, ethnicity or state.
Identities and boundaries are increasingly interpreted as synonymous in that boundaries
both create identities and are created through identity. 108 Discussion regarding the
construction of socio-spatial boundaries has developed in tandem with an increasing
evaluation of the role of language and discourse in the process of constructing spatial
demarcations, and the way in which territory itself is employed as an ethnic `marker'."
Geographers participating in 'critical geopolitics', in particular, have increasingly
challenged the geographical assumptions of international relations theory by arguing
that more attention should be paid to boundary-producing practices and representations
of identity—the epistemic processes by which `us/them', 'inside/outside' and
`self/other' are objectified and delimited."' Invariably, the outcome of such territorial
inscription is that "boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of
legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged and alternatives
marginalized". ' ' '
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With these `postrealist epistemologies' in mind," 2 it seems pertinent to this
discussion briefly to differentiate between what is understood by 'partition' and
'division' or, rather, how these two terms are represented in both lay and academic
discourse. In an oft-cited work, Henderson and Lebow sought to distinguish between
two forms of partition—a 'partitioned state' and a 'divided nation'."" Territorially, the
former is "one that has disintegrated from internal strife among heterogenous ethnic,
linguistic, or religious groups that formerly coexisted as a single polity", while cases of
the latter "possess high ethnic homogeneity, common historical traditions, and a
previous record of successful political unity"." 4 Clearly this distinction needs to be
reconsidered on one fundamental assumption, that being the notion of a homogenous,
demarcated 'nation'. The legitimisation of self-identifying groups remains a
fundamental challenge to the world's state system, and contentious notions of nation-
building and nation-destroying litter the history of territorial management.' As noted
in the opening chapter, the normative idea behind partition is the principle of 'self-
determination' yet, by definition, the degree to which a group identity is perceived to be
'unified' or, in contrast, 'separate' represents the very crux of the identity conflict
itself. 116 Classification, in other words, becomes necessarily more troublesome when
considering the case of the ROC, where many Greek Cypriots have argued that the de
facto partition of 1974 halted what was slow but steady progress towards a nation-state
norm. By contrast, many Turkish Cypriots and Turks saw taksim ('partition') as the
inevitable resolution of inter-communal conflict begun (at the very latest) in 1963. In
other words, on one hand Cyprus is represented as an 'unjustly' divided nation, while on
the other it is a 'naturally' partitioned state.
It seems useful to adapt Henderson and Lebow's conceptualisation further for,
while not unique to boundaries of partition, it is the process of separating what were
notionally unitary and integrated systems—be they river basins or urban plans—that
makes 'division' through partition so meaningful. As long as there is no obvious moral
hierarchy enabling liberalists or socialists to claim that integration is better than
partition, such actions will remain inherently contested." 7 In turn, the narrative power
of boundaries needs to be taken far more seriously as distinguishing 'internal' from
'external' is in itself a social and political action.
Yet, in the light of these critical developments, what role, if any, do physical,
territorial boundaries have now in constructing socio-spatial and national boundaries
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and identities? Contemporary discourse on territory raises many questions concerning
the normative modes of political and territorial compartmentalisation, which are
themselves represented as a 'territorial trap'." 8 The apparent transformation of socio-
spatial organisation into a so-called 'postmodern hyperspace' is inherently interlinked
with the debate over the extent to which international boundaries are threatened in both
their physical and functional form.
Given the tenor of much of the recent work of critical geopolitics it might seem
strange to witness something of a 'return' to the study of boundaries.' 9
 As has been
argued in Section 2.2, perceptions of politico-territorial dissolution are spatially and
temporally distinct. Since the end of the Cold War, territorial issues—land and
maritime—have become particularly salient problems in European politics (both eastern
and western), while remaining critical issues elsewhere.' 2° Recent history is witness to
the resurfacing of 'territorial ideologies' fuelling violent conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia and Iraq, and prolonging presently unarmed conflict over the 'last frontiers'
of territorial gain (such as maritime areas, Antarctica and outer space). 121 Between the
late 1980s and late 1990s the number of international land boundaries grew from around
280 to 315. 1 ' Deterritorialisation, in other words, is accompanied by reterritorialisation
because 'territoriality' persists as the geographical expression of social and political
power, and territory continues to function as a spatial means of defence and control, and
as an economic asset in itself. 123 Transboundary relations and the management of
transboundary resources cannot be understood without recognising the tendency for
political and economic power to be organised territorially.
Yet, in spite of the continuing presence and, arguably, dominance of sovereign
states in these relations, the value of territory is not constant and an ahistorical approach
to such value ignores contextual developments. If, as has been argued, the relationship
of security and the economy to territory is socially constructed, subjectively perceived
'justice' rather than 'rational' state interests might provide an alternative basis for
explaining the emergence of territorial disputes. 124
 Boundaries, as such, remain
manifestations of the nation-building process and the more general principle of
territoriality. As institutions they inherently embody contested norms and values.'25
Newman and Paasi pointed out that boundaries become one part of the discursive
landscape of social power, control, and governance;' with their Janus-faced character
in mind, the degree to which boundaries are 'open' or 'closed', 'soft' or 'hard',
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'barriers' or 'bridges' becomes highly revealing. These considerations lead the
discussion on to critically examine the strategic, functional character of boundaries
further, with the possibility of reconstructing their role in decision-making.
2.3.2 Recognition of boundary functions and 'borderlands'
Although boundary function classifications invariably interlink in practice, it is possible
to broadly distinguish political from socio-economic functions. Since the Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648, international boundaries have primarily performed a role of
security and this has commonly led to the reduction of boundaries to the function of
containerisation, with border-related problems centred on territorial disputes and
violations of 'sovereign space'.' 27 Conceptions of regions contiguous to a boundary
correspondingly remained rooted in a tradition preoccupied with peripherality and
under-development. 128 Boggs' work on international boundaries illustrated a view that
boundaries could not 'promote' trade or human intercourse, so much so that they simply
functioned as 'institutionalised buffer zones'.' 29 From a socio-economic point of view,
the work of Christaller and LOsch theorised the effects of similarly 'closed' borders.'"
LOsch emphasised the artificial distorting element of the boundary, whereby the
perceived conflict between a state's priorities of performance, control, culture, and
progress, contradicted regional priorities for economic rationality. Likewise, Christaller
hypothesised that border regions lacked the necessary conditions for economic
development and were socio-politically disadvantaged.
Contemporary research on border regions and border landscapes, however,
offers fresh insights and exposes, firstly, a static perception of boundary functions
employed within traditional international relations and localisation theory. Secondly, it
has highlighted the intrinsic value of the 'border' as a source of sub-national political
power. Most vividly, the combination of a 'Europe of regions' with a 'Europe without
borders' has demonstrated the increasing importance of 'networks', 'connectivity and
`interoperability' in transboundary European relations."' Even in cases where political
divisions retain their primacy in dictating inter-state relations, common cultural
landscapes at the local level have begun to create `transborder regions'.' Cappellin
suggested, moreover, that transboundary cooperation may reduce core-periphery
disparities by encouraging the integration of peripheral regions into the wider political
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system, and, in a similar vein, in North America Duchavek has illustrated how
`subnational units'—their elected officials, experts, or administrative staff—project
themselves on to the international scene spatially, through what is termed `transborder
regionalism' and 'global micro-/para-diplomacy'. 133 The former refers to a subnational
unit's geographical response to complications of contiguity, similar to what Ratti
identified as `transbordering economies' and Ohmae as naturalised economic regions.14
'Global micro-/para-diplomacy', in turn, illustrates subnational units' awareness of
global interdependencies and their increasing propensity to deal with the functional
sectors of a 'foreign' central government and/or private enterprises.
Particularly with the legacy of artificial boundary-creation and partitioning,
across Africa space has opened for transboundary linkages to (re)develop. 115 Given the
policy of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the status quo in terms of boundary
demarcation has been maintained, associated structural obstacles have similarly
persisted, and political concerns, particularly those relating to state security, are still
generally viewed as more important than economic or welfare issues.' Yet a number
of observers have been at pains to highlight a sub-division of Duchavek's subnational
level, distinguishing 'formal' from 'informal' relations—the latter involving neither
national governments nor local authorities, and characterising many transboundary
linkages in Africa. Asiwaju's work, in particular, sought to emphasise 'humanistic'
dimensions of transboundary relations emanating from the partitioning of cultural
areas. 137
Awareness of a more dynamic functional role of 'border regions' has steadily
grown. Indeed, Duchavek was prompted to translate the conceptualisation of an
'international regime' from Krasner's state-centric context to the context of
"geographically delineated regions that cooperate across an intersovereign boundary"."8
This reformulation of the 'regime' concept is worth highlighting if only in that
Duchavek's `transborder regime' constituted a necessary attempt to address the
geographical realities of contiguous regions, and to recognise the functional significance
of 'sub-state' areas in international affairs. Indeed, certain geographical categories can
be rethought in connection with processes which are `trans'-boundary, including the so-
called 'first law of geography' in that transboundary resource management has an
inherent spatial dimension by nature of its frequent involvement of parties contiguous to
each other.'" While Keohane and Nye explained 'complex interdependence' in terms of
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inter- or trans-state (i.e., societal) relations, they failed to pursue the relationship
between issue structure and particular patterns of intra-state politics, and so undervalued
the importance of domestic-policy making processes involving subnational units."° Far
from obliterating local cultural differences, international influences in fact shape 'the
particularities of place' by stimulating and encouraging distinctive local and regional
spaces."'
The idea that border areas are now developing as a dynamic interface suggests a
conceptualisation more akin to the classical notion of a `frontier'." 2 To better
understand this, various attempts have been made at classifying or modelling the
development of border regions in terms of transboundary political, economic, and social
relations. Stoddard, for example, presented a relatively static model of a 'border buffer
zone', functionally linked through a symbiotic 'doctrine of mutual necessity'. 	 More
recent work, however, has incorporated both a spatial and temporal dimension to the
development of border regions—or 'borderlands', based implicitly on the notion of an
integration continuum: 44 Table 2.1 illustrates four well-documented and relatively
distinct studies for comparison.
The common assumption for each framework is that inhabitants of border
regions may play an exponentially-greater, and perhaps even determining role in the
transition from conflict to cooperation, despite the obstacles frequently raised by central
governments:" Each framework is unique, however, in conceptualising the
development of 'border regions' and 'borderlands' in different issue areas. The most
celebrated has been Martinez's people-focused approach which suggested the gradual
generation of a 'borderlands milieu' through socio-economic interaction, arguing, if less
deterministically than Hansen, that economic development is a principal stimulus for
transboundary cooperation.'" By contrast, Momoh's 'borderlands' correlated more with
group-identity, while Suarez-Villa et al.'s typology, in line with the work of Ratti and
Reichman, concerned itself with the border as a barrier and its associated transboundary
economic and administrative disparities.' 47 Goonerate and Mosselman's work in
Eastern and Southern Africa differed, yet again, in that it suggested that a necessary
factor in the development of certain 'border regions' was cooperation over
transboundary resources (Table 2.1).
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Despite its conflict resolution implications, nonetheless, this and other work
further illustrated how 'borders', 'barriers', and 'bottlenecks' impact negatively on the
synergy and symbiosis of network configurations. The effects of border discontinuities
and the spatial diffusion of activities persist, and substantial duplication or parallelism
in the centralised provision of public services, infrastructure, or law enforcement on
either side of a boundary reproduce 'contiguity diseconomies'. 52 The particular modus
operandi of potential transboundary 'nodes', for example, may prevent suitable
compatibility in practice and, perhaps most important of all, if 'dissimilar belief sets'
exist (even after the elimination of the physical boundary) then either side's interests
may become subordinate to nationalist nodal centres."' Church and Reid, and Kratke
shared similar concerns over the loss of geographical proximity (or the 'closeness
effect') when positive developments of transboundary cooperation 'leapfrog' the border
region itself, in favour of a nodal centre elsewhere."' As indicated in Chapter 1,
cooperation is not necessarily 'positive'. Interdependency does not always equate with
mutual benefit as transboundary exchanges can be both licit and illicit, equitable and
inequitable.' 55
 Trade does not necessarily facilitate peace, as Barbieri's historical study
of interstate economic linkages suggested—extensive interdependence may actually
increase the likelihood of conflict."' There may not be, in other words, an automatic
move toward the dynamic, developing border regions analysed by modern theories of
regional development.'"
It is clear that the key to understanding border regions is related to the function
of the border and the nature of the integration shown across it."' Conceptual work on
'borderlands' has begun to reflect such dynamics yet, perhaps most importantly, such
work suggests the need to move away from a monolithic, aspatial, and atemporal
approach to international boundaries.' The proposal is for an approach which
recognises the functional character of such boundaries—traditionally understood as
delimiting State 'A' from State 'IV—as variable in practice. Morehouse's recent work,
for example, highlighted the on-going need to delve further into the functional character
of transboundary regions, and to examine the implications of boundaries as social
constructions.' 6° Her typology of seven boundary functions differentiated between the
legitimising reasons given for particular boundary management in disputes over natural
resource and environmental issues. Permeability of the border, in this sense, was
invariably issue-specific. As such, borderlands must be theorised as highly contested
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and dynamic areas of ideological, cultural and physical turmoil, but realising this
analysis, in turn, necessarily becomes more complex and problematic:6'
2.3.3 Geographical space and scale in transboundary interactions and flows
The conceptualisations of borderlands and state reintegration illustrated above fail to
compensate fully for the seemingly contradictory processes of cooperation and conflict
present in the same border zones, and are generally weak in explaining why interaction
occurs when it does, and identifying what structural relationships are involved. By
extension, they collectively demonstrate the analytical problem of comprehensively
representing a multitude of issue areas within a border context. Given the
'differentiation' within boundaries, it becomes necessary to break down the analysis
further as each activity and each interest group has its own 'border' and 'border zone'.162
A more empirical understanding of border-related processes would seem to
necessitate an analytic framework dealing with transboundary cooperation as a process.
One frequently referred operational model, based on the core-periphery concept and on
transaction flow analysis, was proposed by John House who was conscious of the
contribution political geography could make in a field very much exclusive to political
science and international relations. m A structural model introduced in parallel
recognised the distinctive regional and national levels of policy-making on borders, and
identified in particular their 'adaptive' and `maladaptive' tendencies. The overall
method advanced was empirically-based, specifically examining actual transactions and
linkages in what House recognised as developing 'transnational frontier regions'.'" By
aggregating 'cross-frontier transaction flows' amongst several issue areas (goods,
people, capital and services) it sought to integrate the complexity of social, economic,
cultural, and political data as a coherent basis for understanding transboundary
interaction (Figure 2.1). House argued that as neighbours evolved from a state of crisis
to a more stable and harmonious relationship, `A-B' transactions developed and 'Az-Bz'
transactions followed thereafter.
There have been numerous analyses of transboundary linkages that have
mirrored House's operational approach, and Minghi suggested that the borderlands of
Western Europe provided ample evidence to support the notion that under 'normal'
peaceful conditions, House's 'Az-Bz' transactions take on a major role. 65 Despite
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Figure 2.1	 Spatial elements of House's operational model of transactional flow
across boundaries
Source: House (1981: 295).
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implicitly neorealist) reservations that borderland transactions are virtually non-existent
along hostile or 'closed' borders, it has been illustrated that connections such as those
identified by House can occur even when one side does not recognise its neighbour's
existence. 166
 Both House's models have certain limitations, however, many of them
inherited from transactions analysis in the 1960s.' 67
 The lack of general theoretical
focus has lessened their explanatory power, and Hansen argued that they were too
descriptive and empiricist, containing only highly qualitative statements.'" Structural
elements demand access to complex and detailed information on transboundary flows
and linkages, and there has yet to be any explicit analysis of the models in singular or
comparative border contexts. 169 Moreover, Hansen questioned the degree to which they
could analyse the complex interdependencies of border regions and suggested instead
distinguishing between economically-orientated 'efficiency values' and politically-
orientated 'sovereignty values', as it was argued groups motivated by the former play a
more prominent and less constricted role in transboundary cooperation."° Duchavek
again questioned whether transboundary regional interaction would necessarily increase
should state-centre to state-centre interaction increase."'
House's model nonetheless highlighted the on-going need to better identify and
understand a variety of transboundary processes. Conscious of the outstanding need to
recognise the specific contexts for transboundary cooperation, therefore, a number of
studies have sought to emphasise these processes at various geographical scales. To
better understand the contrasting evidence highlighted above it must be recognised
explicitly that international boundaries have a differential impact at different scales of
analysis. As Newman and Paasi argued, they exist simultaneously at the global scale (in
the geopolitical and economic landscape), the state scale (in the nation-building
process), and at the local scale.' 72
 The need to assess changes in the character and
function—the 'meaning'—of state boundaries in itself necessitates an appraisal of the
significance of such boundaries at different spatial scales.
Overall, by moving away from the 'boundary' as abstract, normative space to
real 'place', the study of processes within areas contiguous to the boundary is thus
opened up. Focus is placed on the territorial interface—the physical boundary and its
associated 'borderland'—where issues of traditionally 'domestic' politics increasingly
confront or conform with those of neighbouring states, and/or those of their own state.
This approach increasingly highlights peoples and problems that have too often been
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placed on the 'periphery', both theoretically and methodologically. Local contexts
therefore present several theoretical and methodological challenges.'" The 'naturalised'
categorisations of 'local', 'regional', 'national' and 'global' become analytically more
ambiguous.' 74
 Concluding from this, there is apparent encouragement to shift focus to
the realities of the landscape being manifested in and around the politico-territorial
divide in that the borderland is seen to provide "a unique opportunity for a local-scale
regional focus but within an international context", a place where the interaction
between integration and national sovereignty is especially `transparene.175
International boundary studies have long-focused upon the delimitation and
function of boundaries and their impact upon borderlands and borderlanders." 6
 As such
they have played a major role in identifying and empirically investigating the intricacies
of the border. Perhaps more importantly, however, they suggest that the key to
understanding and defining border regions is related to the nature of the border rather
than a polarised approach on an 'open-closed' axis. Areas of geographic contiguity,
most notably with a `transborder economic space', can play an ever-growing role in
inter-state relations and eventually gain substantial autonomy.'" A border area need not
necessarily suffer permanent disadvantage and its development is not only determined
by its geographical situation in the framework of the state economy, but even more so
by its own regional economic, functional, and developmental context in transboundary
space.
2.4	 Conclusions
In several ways there exists great scope for integrating a more nuanced 'borderlands'
perspective with developing theoretical approaches employed in analysing
transboundary resource management. It is worth reiterating those benefits on offer to
the two disciplines of political geography and international relations. By reassessing the
assumptions within their own disciplines and, in parallel, opening them up to
complementary debates within other disciplines, a more mutlilayered and
multidisciplinary approach appears not only possible but desirable.
On one hand, for international relations theorists there are two interlinked
developments which in this analysis have been presented as an integral part of
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rethinking international relations as `transboundary' relations. The driving force behind
this reconceptualisation is contemporary, often multidisciplinary research which
highlights an ever more pluralised political environment involving new actors, issues,
and spaces—'new' in that previously they were either unrecognised, undeveloped, or
under-represented. Firstly, a dualist, inter-statist approach to 'new' inter-group relations
simply reproduces traditional conceptualisations; a consensus has developed arguing
that approaches to international relations must account for the growing complexity of
`transboundary' relations in terms of economic restructuring, cultural diversity, and a
more pluralised space inclusive of 'non-state' actors. The management of
interdependencies requires instruments and structures which go beyond conventional
diplomacy and formal international organisation, which clearly originate from a variety
of sources, depending on what assumptions and foci are employed in explaining
transboundary cooperation.'78
By extension, there is similar discontent with approaches which systematically
distinguish 'high' from low politics'.'" Duchavek suggested;
"the line between security concerns, on the one hand, and nonsecurity issues is
obviously quite fluid and certainly not as clear as the authors of old or new
constitutions and traditional diplomats seem to believe.'8°
A preoccupation with military, 'national' (read: state) security excludes the recognition
of other political movements operating not only at this level, but potentially at the local
or the global level. However it is configured, it is evident that the surge in
transboundary regionalisms and nationalism are part of the complex of the dynamic
relationship between state and society, and analyses need to be more appreciative of
cultural and social, as well as political and economic, theory. A Gramscian-inspired
perspective on transboundary relations—more contextual, and linguistically conscious
of 'facts'—allows us to think of state boundaries more as strategies in social struggles
than simply 'preordained' social facts.' Focus must also fall on the territorial
embeddedness of uneven political and economic systems within their own geographical
and historical contexts, for it is the contextual location that "infects the system" with
particular cultural meanings.' At the very least this prescribes a more sociological
approach that does not predefine cultural conditions, but rather teases out the human
dimensions of 'daily life'; an interpretative perspective demanding an awareness of both
institutional, structural and social processes, and their localised manifestations.'
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On the other hand, for borderland scholars there are two fundamental points for
reconsideration. The first is that traditional political geography has implicitly adopted
many realist assumptions previously discussed, but such geopolitik as realpolitik has
become ever more contested.' 84 Territory simplifies issues of political control and gives
relationships of power a greater tangibility and appearance of permanence; by providing
symbolic markers, a 'sense of place' distinguishing 'us' from 'them' is (re)created.'"
Underlying this therefore, and secondly, use of a more theoretically nuanced
understanding of cooperation over transboundary resource management (learning
particularly from neoliberal institutionalist and neofunctionalist explanations of
cooperation) seeks to overcome a "lack of concern with explanation and a consideration
of process" in traditional regional geography. 186 These analytical developments strongly
suggest, as Newman and Paasi argued, more of a multidimensional and
multidisciplinary framework for the study of boundary-related phenomena like
transboundary resource management.187
At most, this critical debate has suggested distinguishing instead 'trans-state'
from ambiguous, so-called 'transnational' or interstate' relations highlighted from the
late 1970s;
"a focus on trans-stateness [...] should imply more than simply 'across': we need
to use the strong sense of the prefix 'trans' to mean 'beyond' [...] interstateness
accommodates adaptation of states [...] trans-stateness implies demise of states in
a transition from that system".188
New forms of governance appear to be developing in parallel with the 'de-realisation of
borders' in the post-Hobbesian state.'" Nonetheless, and to a large degree countering
the growing discourse of `transnationalisation' in economic and political relations—
which has moved away from analysis of 'fixed' geographical conditions (including
international boundaries) and retreated from a 'strong' spatial determinism—there must
be a commitment to the use spatial concepts as a means of analysing politics at a variety
of spatial scales.'" Boundaries, after all, are 'functionally determined' and not
necessarily state determined;''' as such, these functions are differentially `spatialised'.
Alger declared that;
"[t]his is not to say, of course, that states are necessarily unimportant, nor that
state borders may not have special significance. But these are questions to be
answered by empirical investigation, not a priori assumptions".192
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While they are necessarily problematised, boundaries are not erased neither socio-
spatially nor territorially, highlighting an imperative to evaluate closely the emerging
'boundary-opening' rhetoric.'"
The systemic determinism of a political realist approach has failed to sufficiently
accommodate these variables, well-established within the discipline of political
geography. While there is a conscious move away from atheoretical case studies of
boundary conflicts, demarcation processes, and empirical presentations of
transboundary relations, the empirical core of these studies continues to have a
legitimate role in the construction of knowledge about boundaries which remain a very
practical and often technical question in both 'international' and `transboundary'
relations. As will be seen in the next chapter, borders transform from a locus of division
to one of cooperation and integration under certain favourable conditions, yet there
remain many cases of both land and maritime boundaries largely closed to such
integrationist processes.'"
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Chapter 3
Theory into Practice, Practice into Theory:
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States
3.1	 Introduction
The preceding chapter concentrated on the theoretical study of transboundary relations
with regards to cooperation and resource management in general. This chapter will
examine in more detail the application and manifestations of these disciplinary
approaches to transboundary resource management in practice. At the same time, this
analysis necessarily acknowledges that there is a recursive process of learning and
adaptation between theory, policy and outcome—that the dominant dichotomy of theory
and practice (between 'abstract' and 'concrete') is in reality inseparable, although
invariably there are significant discrepancies between the two.'
The focus of this chapter rests on the implications of dividing the management
of resources through partition. To frame this analysis, Section 3.2 suggests an overview
of the intervening variables involved in transboundary resource management in
partitioned states. As previously noted, problems over transboundary resource
management are not particular to states that have been territorially separated, in that all
inter-state boundaries have the capacity to generate similar if not the same problems, yet
it can be argued that a disproportionate number of the most seemingly intractable
conflicts over transboundary resources have been manifested in partitioned states. In
substantiating this qualitative argument, this chapter will examine cases of partition
other than Cyprus, offering a broad outline of the character of transboundary relations
pertaining to transboundary resources. The framework forwarded evaluates the extent to
which both (neo)realist and (neo)liberal institutionalist perspectives have manifest
themselves in, and are reflections of, the decision-making and management practices of
partitioned states.
Waterman has rightly noted the lack of comparative work on the political
geography of partition, 2 and an understanding of transboundary resource management in
partitioned states 'beyond' the single-case study is no exception to this shortfall. While
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it is neither practical nor desirable to generate such generalisations here, the framework
proposed can only benefit further comprehension of the many implications of state
partition, although the level of generality remains high due to the inadequacies of
existing theoretical discussion on the topic. As such, the following discussion raises a
multitude of immediate questions concerning transboundary relations in partitioned
states which may be analysed further elsewhere.
3.2 Perspectives on Transboundary Resource Management in Partitioned
States
The variance in thinking about questions of international or `transboundary' cooperation
in general is attributable to the disciplinary perspectives and larger world-views which
analysts may bring to the study of this subject, echoes of which were heard throughout
Chapter 2. What they all have in common, however, is their call for a change (of
varying degrees) to decision-making procedures, and international organisations and
institutions which are presently seen as unconducive to the successful management of
global affairs as they perceive it. (Neo)realism seeks to explain international behaviour
in terms of the system in which actors operate, rather than in terms of factors internal to
the parties. Countering a Grotian view of rules or norms, the realists' maxim is that new
institutions and governance systems are epiphenomenal, merely reflecting the
underlying balance of power. Moreover, at the `subnationar level, the dynamic
development of 'border regions' (which points to their practicality as areas of
cooperation rather than conflict) is in fact an extension of political and economic power
seeking to overcome the barriers to international finance.'
Regime analysis has, in response, sought to examine the institutionalised
cooperation of states for managing conflicts and interdependence problems, instead of
relying on self-help strategies (even when self-help action may seem to produce greater
individual benefits or less individual costs). 4
 In addition, the neoliberal challenge to the
realist approach has proven revealing. Clearly, both regimes and epistemic
communities have the power to reduce uncertainty by providing information and
facilitating negotiation.' Moreover, they counter the anarchistic beliefs of a Hobbesian
worldview;
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"[Ole fact that there is no central government in international society should not
blind us to the roles of a wide variety of international organizations in the
administration of issue-specific governance systems".6
Mitrany's functionalism, it should be noted, has been more prescriptive in its analysis of
international cooperation; indeed, a number of observers have argued that
'functionalism' is not so much a theory as a strategic approach—a 'way of building
piecemeal'—and, in this sense, it suggests an open-ended process.' Even the less
normative logic of integration that neofiinctionalists emphasise, while falling short of
the functionalist's technocratic determinism, implicitly preserves a positivist ideal of
cumulative encroachment, and fails—particularly in their analysis of European
integration—to question where the locus of power lies. 8 Neoliberalism, in contrast, has
argued that states look primarily to their own prosperity and capability, but with little
concern about their position (and possible 'gains') relative to an increasingly complex
mix of political entities. The potential for facilitating other, novel forms of governance
aside from the territorially-based 'nation-state' is highlighted. Moreover, it bases its
analyses on the constellation of interests and the decision-making level of analysis that
(neo)realism has generally ignored.
The creation of state interests and preferences would appear to necessitate
greater comprehension of cognitive theory that does not assume rationalistic approaches
are irrelevant, but rather chooses to explore the limits of human rationality, emphasising
instead knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities.' Indeed, cultural theorists
(and later even E. Haas himself) noted neofunctionalism's organisational determinism
and its inadequacy in accounting for significant changes in belief-systems.' Keohane,
nevertheless, has argued that a more `reflectivise approach fails to generate a feasible
alternative to the established research programs of neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism. In the analysis of international regimes, a majority of observers share
the view that 'the most persuasive interpretations' are likely to draw from a number of
theoretical traditions." The study of environmental regimes in particular has so far
demonstrated that it is impossible to explain regime dynamics in terms of any single
variable.'
With these preliminary observations in mind, a number of broad variables must
be recognised in order to formulate explanations of transboundary resource management
in Cyprus. From an analysis of developments in partitioned states, and in the light of
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the foregoing discussion, it is possible to draw up a more precise list from the numerous
variables suggested to determine the character and development of transboundary
resource management in partitioned states. Four core intervening factors, which
depending upon the contextualities of the individual case will not always be of equal
importance nor concurrent, are identified in a framework (Figure 3.1)." These are
examined in more detail in the following four sections, although not necessarily in any
order of significance. It will become clear that the first three sections draw on both
'traditional' and more recent concerns of the international relations community, while
the fourth variable has been a common concern for political geographers.
3.3 Configurations of Power
It is axiomatic that elements of conflict prevention, control, de-escalation, settlement
and resolution are an integral part of optimising transboundary cooperation and, in turn,
transboundary resource management.' The debate between realists and liberals hinges
on the degree to which conflict resolution in transboundary resource management can
facilitate cooperative behaviour on other issues, particularly those of concern to 'high
politics'. Whilst realist interpretations suggest that a transboundary resource issue
cannot be divorced from a larger, protracted social conflict, and therefore cannot be
truly resolved until that wider conflict has itself been settled, functional integration has
the potential to spill over into political peace according to liberal institutionalists—at the
global scale for Mitrany, at the regional scale for E. Haas. Clearly, in the context of
partitioned states like Cyprus, the potential to resolve transboundary resource conflicts
as even a limited precursor to resolving the overall political conflict deserves serious
consideration. It is argued, nonetheless, that state partition may hold significant
implications for the subsequent configuration of power amongst those party to a
transboundary resource conflict.
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Figure 3.1
	 Overlapping perspectives: schematic representation of core intervening
variables in transboundmy resource management in partitioned states
FUNCTIONS
OF THE
BOUNDARY
(i)' configurations of power'
	 (a)symmetry of political, economic, and
military relations, both inter- and sub-
'state'.
(ii) `transboundary resource needs' absolute and relative resource needs,
depending on linkages, spatial typology,
and issue area.
(iii) 'role of interests and ideas'
	 access to and perceptions of conflict
resolution and third parties, and
motivations of interest-based groups (e.g.,
institutions, epistemic communities, elites,
individual leaders).
(iv) functions of the boundary' boundary management, characterisation of
the border and perceptions of the
adversary, and borderland integration.
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3.3.1 Towards the management and resolution of transboundary resource
conflict
Conventional methods of addressing transboundary resource conflict are usually defined
in terms of security threats with all the methods available to settle disputes operative
only upon the consent of the particular states, although the role of third parties as
intermediaries in international conflicts is now well established with, typically,
international organisations and agencies, and states (local or distant) participating." The
principal formal mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution
remains, however, the United Nations, while the main procedures for addressing
resource conflict through peaceful means are diplomacy and adjudication.' Of the
former, negotiation, mediation, conciliation and peacekeeping are key. Negotiation and
consultations are the most utilised, frequently taking place at the bilateral level on issues
such as access to, use of, and cooperation on transboundary resources." They are often
used as a precursor to other procedures—in particular mediation (or 'good offices'),
which can be subdivided into 'pure' mediation and mediation 'with muscle', the latter
involving significant leverage tactics by a third party, although neither having any
binding character. Conciliation involves a largely reactive yet 'independent' third party
providing an informal link between antagonists, and a settlement which must be
accepted by the parties." Peacekeeping involves the deployment of military personnel
to monitor cease-fires, although Galtung's work has inspired numerous studies on the
deficiency of short-term conflict management ('peacekeeping', which typified the UN's
1964-74 role in Cyprus) when unsupported by mechanisms for long-term conflict
resolution— 'peacebuilding' (from the 'bottom-up') and 'peacemaking' (from the 'top-
down')."
International adjudication by a legitimate, authoritative third party—either
through arbitration or judicial settlement—is held to be the most effective and equitable
method of resource dispute settlement where diplomacy appears to have failed. The
principle of peaceful settlement has been echoed in various legal instruments dealing
with transboundary resources, although judicial settlement—for example, before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and more ad hoc tribunals—is only slowly
becoming accepted by the international community. 20 Moreover, while international
legal regimes usually involve forms of compliance, there may be significant limitations
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of international law given that disputes are rarely (if ever) about interpretations of
agreed values but rather about what those values should be."
From negotiations through to judicial settlement, therefore, there is an increasing
loss of control between the disputant states.' Moreover, both diplomatic and legislative
mechanisms briefly discussed above generally operate with an implicit appreciation of
the realist belief that there can be no 'resolution' to, only temporary 'settlement' of,
interstate conflict. International diplomatic or legal institutions, from this perspective,
provide merely a `palliative'."
3.3.2 Partition and the balance of power
In the light of this conflict resolution framework, it must be recognised that a crucial
dimension to understanding transboundary resource management in partitioned states is
an appreciation that 'partition' represents a parting of the ways, at which one state
becomes two or more (de jure or de facto) states, each one of which may see itself as the
'legitimate heir' to the raison d'être of the unit which previously existed.' This is
because, for partition to come about, "either coercion or its polar opposites, cooperation
and consent, must be present". 25
 In cases of the latter, there may be little animosity as
the new political entities consider the process as legitimate and complete, as the 'velvet
divorce' of Czechoslovakia most recently exemplified. Although the separation
necessitated the renegotiation of some 2,800 documents, which redetermined 'foreign'
relations and divided transport, telecommunications and public services, these
negotiations proceeded relatively smoothly." In cases of coercive partition, however,
both the newly-created states may be inward-looking and mutually hostile, suggesting
limited development of 'interstate' relations.' But how does this larger political
conflict shape the various efforts to find a resolution to transboundary resource
disputes?
Given the choice, states generally have three options: to retain the status quo, to
seek a transboundary agreement, or states may prefer independent action over
transboundary resource management because of the loss of control over domestic
resources resulting from collective action.' The security of economic, political and
military capabilities, as Grieco argued, are "the ultimate basis for state security and
independence in the self-help context of international anarchy". 29
 The potential for
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redistributing such power to other states, especially whereby they gain relative to others,
would act as a barrier to transboundary cooperation. Any transboundary regimes that
did develop might be mere reflections of the new underlying configuration of power, or
a hegemonic state.
Furthermore, this realist view implies that partitioned states may prefer unilateral
action because of the potential loss of sovereignty and independence. States are, after
all, collective entities. To reiterate: territory is the platform for engaging in international
relations and sovereignty provides the legitimisation, yet not all territories are sovereign
states. 3° Within its boundaries, the state possesses ultimate authority—it is sovereign,
both 'internally' in that it is 'constitutionally insular', and 'externally', in that it is seen
as independent in relation to other states. Its definitive powers, therefore, are that a
sovereign state "consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained,
however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme". 3 ' This constitutional
independence is seen as the essential qualification for a state's membership of the so-
called international community, and consequently a territory which is constitutionally
contained is not sovereign and hence is not eligible to participate on a regular basis in
'international relations'. While the partition of British India into India and East and
West Pakistan in 1947 was recognised by the UN, when East Pakistan—resenting
political and military dominance exerted by West Pakistan—took this one step further,
Bangladesh initially failed to receive recognition other than from India. As in the
Cyprus case, therefore, the origin of 'recognition' in this sense cannot be found with
legitimising a sovereign, but with recognising that sovereignty is an existential issue, a
means of self-determination.
These dilemmas are aptly illustrated by transboundary resource management in
ethnic and intra-state conflicts that characterise state partition—conflicts often between
the nebulously distinguishable de facto (but not de jure) 'state' entities. Much of the
literature has failed to monitor relations between these 'anomalous' states, a direct result
of the political realism informing traditional 'security' studies which see states as
homogenous units in perpetual competition, while overlooking internal challenges to
political authority which reflect a lack of domestic legitimacy.32
 Yet MacMillan and
Linklater have suggested that by the early 1990s nearly one-eighth of states were not in
full control of their respective territories—for example, the Lebanon, Jordan, and the
Republic of Cyprus. 33
 In a number of cases these contested territories had become
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'institutionalised pseudo-states', such as the Serb Republic of Bosnia and the TRNC,
developing many attributes of a 'normal' state, declaring sovereignty (if largely
unrecognised), and in full control of their territory.' If there is therefore, as suggested
above, a continuum of procedures for handling transboundary resource and
environmental disputes (ranging from use of good offices at one end to formal court
proceedings at the other), then cases of non-recognition will significantly complicate
this diplomatic-legal axis." Indeed, it has been noted how conflicts may evolve from a
state-communal conflict to one that includes important 'interstate' interactions (e.g.,
balance of power mechanisms, arms races), such that appreciation of the pattern of
spatial expansion of a conflict becomes paramount directly because it implies that a
combination of 'international' and 'intercommunal' third party intervention strategies
will be required.' The UN, in turn, with diplomatic (peacekeeping and peacemaking)
tools designed to reduce inter-state conflict, risk being overwhelmed by a high number
of 'interminable' conflicts?'
Such complex politico-territorial circumstances may be represented
internationally as cases of 'occupation', as has been the case given the presence of
Turkish Forces on Cyprus, in that international law abhors lack of title to territory, and
regards belligerent occupation as an inherently temporary state." In turn, the basis for
the international protection of 'occupied' resources may be derived from the confluence
of the law of military occupation—the so-called Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,
and the principle of permanent sovereignty of people over natural resources reflected in
previously mentioned UN resolutions. Specific obligations also arise from the UNGA's
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), which respects,
inter alio, the right of self-determination and for peoples to dispose freely of their
natural wealth and resources. 39
 The very fact that any principled utilisation of the
Jordan river and its tributaries, for example, has been superseded by de facto usage
raises the question of distinguishing between de jure and de facto uti possidetis (i.e., the
doctrine of 'what one possesses, one shall possess') when taking into account
'prolonged usage'.4° Accordingly, Israeli proposals for the Med-Dead Canal and more
recent settlement construction in the West Bank clearly illustrate the balance of power
associated with such arguments. While the occupying power must not exercise its
authority in order to further its own interests (e.g., to exploit the resources or other
assets of the territory under its control for the benefit of its own territory or economy),4'
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the prolongation of such occupation nonetheless raises serious questions over the rights
of populations in 'legal and political limbo'. During a long occupation, many practical
problems (e.g., road construction, higher education, water use, electricity generation)
may arise that do not admit of mere temporary solutions based on the idea of preserving
the status quo ante.' States concerned wishing to maximise individual benefits have a
powerful incentive to exploit resources unilaterally.' Given the sacred cow of national
security, the primary concern of the parties, in other words, becomes the issue of
relative, and sometimes even absolute, `gains'."
As in Cyprus from the 1950s, cooperation and conflict may become a function
of the minority's/autonomous groups' demands for self-government and contacts with
the 'mother'-country on the other side of the/another border.'" These systemic and
regional power balances were ideologically-based in the case of Vietnam, where
military supplies from North Vietnam and China in the South post-1954 led to the
military involvement of the US within ten years of partition. Further illustrating the
importance of both exogenous and endogenous power sources post-partition, the
Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Hercegovina, respectful of its ethnic and ideological
ties with the militarily powerful Serbia (and Montenegro), may yet prefer unification
with Serbia rather than restoration of the multi-ethnic Bosnian state nominally declared
in 1992. Rather than permit the return of Muslims and Croats 'ethnically cleansed'
during the war, radical leaderships have continued to block efforts to enforce the 1995
Dayton agreement's goal of recreating centralised management institutions for a 'united
Bosnia'.
In the light of these observations, symmetrical politico-legal structures are
generally considered favourable preconditions for transboundary resource conflict
management. The constraints on one party, due to lack of power, may be greater than
others, and the outcome of a cooperative arrangement will then depend on this
asymmetry. Crucially, the basis for 'symmetry' may differ. As previously noted, in
certain cases partition has suggested an exogenous move towards realignment. The
'skewed' partition of Palestine came about when the British referred the debate to the
UN, whilst the partition of British India and Ireland was part of consecutive post-World
War imperatives which led the British to 'divide and quit'.' The most powerful
state(s), benefiting from economic inequalities in the international system, subsequently
have obvious incentives to support a management arrangement that operates to maintain
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and secure their skewed advantages. With time, however, this power configuration may
alter such that cooperation then becomes more likely, as occurred in Germany in the late
1960s when, as West Germany came to recognise the political regime in the East,
cooperation in the form of the Quadripartite and the Helsinki Agreements became
possible.'
In these contexts in particular, parties are frequently loath to make concessions
regarding specific issues more out of a concern for the future negotiating positions on
other issue areas (i.e., the problem of issue linkage) than out of any policy on the
particular issue at hand. It remains, therefore, to recognise the importance of an
international political system with no superordinate central authority for managing
transboundary conflict, and to consider the suspicion and distrust that this may breed in
managing transboundary resources. In essence this perspective, generally adopted by
political realists, suggests that power and capabilities define transboundary relations
concerning resource management. However, as the next three sections will suggest, in
addition to these structural factors, the unique character of the 'state' and the resources
themselves may also influence the conduct of transboundary affairs.
3.4 Transboundary Resource Needs
Waterman raised, but did not fully consider, the following questions: does an uneven
distribution and sharing of resources hinder the separate development of partitioned
states? Does it encourage their eventual reunification? Or does it prompt the state
which is better endowed to consolidate its separate development?" In essence, he
addressed one of a number of dimensions of transboundary resource 'needs' which may
affect transboundary resource management in partitioned states. It is necessary to state
that absolute and relative resource needs are in themselves determined by a number of
factors intervening—political, economic, social, and psychological, but ultimately
`entropic' (i.e., the physical limits of the resource). As North noted, 'resource scarcity';
"will depend to a considerable extent upon the demand for it and the pattern of
distribution, as well as the 'absolute amount' of it in existence, the amount of
conflict over it, and the various costs associated with obtaining it".49
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The geographical context of the transboundary resource itself is, in other words, of
primary concern. In terms of 'absolute' fresh water resources, for example, a secured
water supply is a cornerstone of national planning and development, particularly in
water-scarce regions.' The intertwining of natural resource ownership, control and
exploitation as part of state building (as 'national property') is argued to be a prominent
feature of Third World societies, as is a perception of any contestation of such resources
as a 'security' threat.' Mandel has suggested, moreover, that resource scarcity
increases transboundary confrontation rather than cooperation, especially when scarcity
is perceived as the product of intentional human manipulation."
3.4.1 Developing transboundary resource law
Once again, it is beneficial to examine both traditional and developing 'norms' and
'rules' for managing transboundary resources, and resolving conflicts over resource
needs. It remains difficult to discuss transboundary resource needs without some
understanding of the central role played by international law, which shapes the
underlying framework of the international system for allocating such resources. As
Vogler noted, "just as apolitical discussions of legal frameworks will tend towards
unreality, so the significance of legal questions for the study of regimes should not be
underestimated"; their rules and principles continue to shape how states see
transboundary resource problems and the solutions they consider." The various sources
of international law have traditionally been considered—international conventional law
(i.e. treaties), international customary law (i.e. state practice), general principles of law
recognised by 'civilised nations', and international case law and judicial decisions. 54 It
is not possible to study critically one single body of doctrine constituting `transboundary
resource management', as clearly no such body exists." Nonetheless, it is necessary to
shed light on, in preliminary fashion, the following questions: What attempts have been
made by the international community to codify and realise a comprehensive series of
legal principles covering transboundary resource management? In turn, to what extent
does state practice reflect an emerging duty on states to coordinate and cooperate in the
management of competing transboundary resources needs?
Up until the early 1970s, the institutionalisation of conflict management and
resolution was generally state-orientated such that traditionally 'realist' legislative and
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diplomatic frameworks largely remained the sole instruments of conflict management
and resolution. As part of this 'classic' paradigm, bilateral approaches historically
predominated over multilateral forms of cooperative engagement across boundaries.
For obvious reasons states were inclined to formulate rights expanding their sovereignty
rather than recall their duties, such that Carrol had to mark the origin of the exercise of
transboundary 'environmental diplomacy' with the advent of the recognition of acid rain
in the late 1970s." Many observers, however, date the dawn of a transboundary
resource management 'doctrine' to 1972 and the UN Conference on the Human
Environment, which adopted the Stockholm Declaration and proclaimed in 'Principle
21' that;
"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction"."
UNEP was established, and UNGA resolutions were soon to reflect this principle, in
particular Article 3 of the 1974 UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
which provided that;
"in the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each
State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior
consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing
damage to the legitimate interests of others".58
UNGA Resolution No. 3281 was commonly recognised as a first step to articulating a
set of principles governing the management of transboundary natural resources." By
1978 UNEP had issued a series of fifteen Draft Principles which, whilst in the light of
notable state objections fell short of specifying state obligations, reiterated the main
concepts of cooperation, joint management, avoidance of negative externalities, and
exchange of information.' Since then, however, the process of reconciling the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources with the duty to cooperate for the joint
management of transboundary resources has encountered inherent difficulties.6'
In general, possibly the most difficult transboundary resources to manage have
been those which move 'across' international boundaries. Such migratory (and, at
times, straddling) transboundary resources raise unusual challenges to their use and
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development and they appear to be the most prevalent.' Perhaps the most extensive and
significant developments thus far have been concerned with transboundary fresh water
resources, including rivers, drainage basins and lakes, and groundwater resources.'
Indeed, through this case it is possible to illustrate the availability of certain institutional
frameworks that may offer the most optimism in addressing transboundary resource
needs. Fresh water is essential to life and a basic human need, yet it is a finite resource
and various factors are recognised as likely to diminish its availability in the future:
economic development, population growth, climatic change, and political control."
Supplementary to this, 214 river basins—accounting for over half the land area of the
Earth, and encompassing nearly 40% of the world's population—are listed as crossing
international boundaries, with 26% of these shared by three or more riparians.' Indeed,
of the 15 largest river watersheds worldwide (covering 26% of the land area) all but 3
are international in character. 66
 In spatial terms, integrated, holistic, drainage basin-wide
water management is prescribed by most observers, but the unitary approach conflicts
with the jurisdictional realities, exacerbated in that rivers (so often naturally dynamic)
have often been used for delimiting boundaries and cease-fire lines.'
Any obligation of management can only be based on either general principles
and (largely UN-initiated) recommendations within international law, or on customary
principles adopted by the riparian parties within each transboundary water system." Up
until the 1950s the main concern for those managing transboundary rivers and lakes was
that of freedom of navigation. With the growing demand for an ever more diverse range
of uses for water, however, the international community increasingly looked to
international law for assistance in codifying water sharing agreements over consumptive
(i.e., non-navigational) use of international waters, to the extent that over 2,400 bilateral
agreements developed which deal with water management allocations of international
basins—two-thirds of which have been signed in Europe and North America.'
Up until the first half of the twentieth-century, the basis for shared waters was
the 'Harmon doctrine' which provides that a state has an absolute right to manage water
lying within its territory as it sees fit; states have no right of continuous water supply
from other states even if they are located within the same river system.' By definition,
this emphasis on sovereign territory benefits upstream users. Linked with this approach
is the doctrine of 'prior appropriation', whereby water rights are prescribed to the first
user in time.' Alternatively, the doctrine of absolute integrity of a river basin is often
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favoured by downstream states in that it advocates the corollary, whereby each state
renounces exclusive rights to water quantity and quality. Over time, both of these
extreme doctrines have been rejected and other principles have begun to take their
place.72 While recognising that there remain no binding treaties, it has been argued that
international customary law now provides a set of four basic guidelines: the principle of
equitable utilisation; the prohibition of management practices likely to cause
appreciable and lasting injury to other states; the duty of prior consultation; and the duty
to co-operate and to negotiate in good faith with a genuine intention of reaching an
agreement.'
The principle of equitable utilisation of shared water resources evolved with the
belief that a riparian's 'share' be determined by the overall water balance and their
contribution to it. To make use of this highly subjective principle, the International Law
Association's (ILA, an NGO of legal experts) Helsinki Rules on the Uses of
International Rivers in 1966 formulated the 'drainage basin' concept, a term which in
addition to rivers, lakes, and channels included groundwater, seasonal streams,
estuaries, canals, flora and fauna!' Since then, the Helsinki Rules' ambiguous
terminology has generated inherent problems in effectively quantifying 'equitable' and
'reasonable' utilisation!' While few international treaties subsequently made direct
reference to this duty, the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, drafted by the International Law Commission (ILC, an
organ of the UN), succeeded in citing the principles of 'reasonableness' and 'equity' as
the basis for a legal obligation and thus further cemented limitations on the sovereignty
principle.76
 The prohibition of management practices likely to cause appreciable and
lasting injury to other states drew largely from 'Principle 21', although this was to be
later clarified in the specific context of transboundary waters with the adoption of the
World Charter of Nature by the UNGA in 1982 and the Helsinki Convention on the Use
of Transboundary Watercourses of 1992, the latter which re-emphasised the need for
upstream users to avoid any negative externalities on downstream users."
In addition to these two principles, the duty of prior consultation calls for the
exchange of necessary and accurate data and information, as illustrated in UNEP's 1978
Working Group report which further called for joint scientific research!' 'Agenda 21'
of UNCED's 1992 Rio Declaration implicitly recognised the need for 'harmonisation'
of transboundary water resource strategies, just as ILC draft articles made exchange of
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data and information mandatory." Lastly, the duty to co-operate and to negotiate in
good faith with a genuine intention of reaching an agreement was based on the
recognition that it was in the long-term interest of states to demonstrate honestly a
commitment to improved relations. 'Agenda 21' specifically called for states to
"[c]ooperate in the assessment of transboundary water resources, subject to the prior
agreement of each riparian State concerned", while the 1992 Helsinki Convention called
for riparian parties to cooperate "on the basis of reciprocity, good faith and good-
neighbourliness".'
None of these principles can be wholly considered a legal obligation but remain
instead dependent upon circumstances." Moreover, and significantly, the duty to
cooperate largely underpins the others which in themselves suffer from ambiguous
terminology (inherently so, it could be argued, given their role as guidelines).
Nonetheless, the significance of these four embryonic principles in the development of
transboundary resource management in general should not be underestimated. They
clearly place limitations on the absolutist doctrines concerning territorial sovereignty
and integrity, and prescribe new parameters on which to draw up water sharing
agreements. Over the last thirty years, in spite of its overarching consensual character, a
number of prevailing principles emanating from international customary law can be
identified. Not only do states have a duty to notify and consult on the use of
transboundary resources, recognising the imperative to move from passive information
to active 'internationalisation' of such knowledge as part of conflict reduction,
management and resolution.' They also have to share equitably in the management and
use of transboundary resources, and to prevent serious damage to the environment of
other states." Finally, states are increasingly obliged to preserve res communes omnium
('things owned by everyone'), up until now referring to specific geographical areas but
potentially gaining relevance to biodiversity."
3.4.2 The political dimension to partitioned resources
As Bjiirkbom observed, whilst 'Principle 21' is subscribed to in 'theory', the basic
principle of transboundary resources law in 'practice' remains state sovereignty over
natural resources." Partitioned states are certainly no exception to this generalisation.
Along the western flank of the Middle East, home to the most geographically
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concentrated number of partitioned states (French Syria, British Palestine, Palestine, and
the ROC), the implication of a regional scarcity in fresh water has attracted considerable
academic attention, notably concerning the waters of the Jordan, Litani, Orontes and
Yarmouk which took on even greater importance in the partitioned environment of
Israel-Palestine.' Given the 'international' hydrology of this area, a regional water
sharing and development plan would be desirable yet remains unattainable whilst
unilateral developments remain the norm. With the creation of the Palestine-Lebanon
partition boundary in 1923, the important Litani headwaters fell 4 km into southern
Lebanon. The Zionist-Israeli belief in 'legitimate rights' to the river further
strengthened in the 1940s as southern Lebanon's abundant water resources became an
anomaly in the semi-arid environment." A plan was devised in 1943 whereby the
Litani would be diverted via a tunnel into the Jordan basin, flowing south into Palestine;
as a measure of reciprocation, the Lebanese would be compensated with hydroelectric
power generated from the water transfer. After a series of Israeli-initiated plans
proposed throughout the 1940s, the so-called 'Cotton Plan' was recommended in 1954
by the US presidential envoy, Eric Johnston. Even though it excluded the Litani, the
Israelis eventually accepted its recommendations, only for the plan to be halted by use
of a veto in the Arab League Political Committee. Syria believed such a plan would
indirectly constitute recognition of Israel.
Since then, without any comprehensive legal focal point, neither Arab nor Israeli
planners could justify nor receive complaints that were not in themselves contestable,
and development of the region's water resources occurred unilaterally." Ironically, the
Johnston plan developed a 'sacrosanct value' by all parties concerned and whenever
disputes arose both the US and the Johnston plan's principles were often referred to."
Yet by the late 1990s up to three-quarters of the West Bank's water resources was still
being diverted into Israel, Mekorot (Israel's national water company) having integrated
the West Bank and Gaza supplies since 1982." As this example suggests, absolute
needs are often based on perception enforced by the contradictory character and lack of
data transboundary data.9'
In this sense, the level of understanding about a particular (or, especially,
systemic) transboundary resource problem will determine to a large degree the
consensus between parties. Henderson and Lebow placed particular emphasis on the
post-partition existence of two increasingly independent sets of political institutions,
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and the corresponding divergence of administrative structures which would encourage
bureaucratic resistance to transboundary mergers.' Just as a unified technical
perception of a transboundary problem may favour successful international agreements,
so may a dissimilar belief set discourage this.'
3.4.3 The role of 'other(sT needs
The chequered success in traditional third party involvement in transboundary resource
management can be reinterpreted as the failure of third parties to comprehend
sufficiently the nature of the essential 'needs' of the disputants. Both Azar's work on
'protracted social conflict' and Burton's examination of 'deep rooted conflict' consider
disputes over basic human needs highly resistant to de-escalation in general. These
conflicts are characterised by intense mutual distrust resulting from an interconnected
array of structural factors (political, economic, ethnic, religious), where power-based
and coercive forms of conflict management and resolution may further frustrate needs
for recognition and participation."
In response, another peace-building method with a more explicit third party
involvement has developed. 'Problem-solving workshops' have gained increasing
currency from their application in the Irish, Arab-Israeli and Cypriot conflicts, whereby
'impartial' facilitators or consultants assist politically-involved members of each
community in analysing the underlying issues while searching for creative solutions.95
Applicable to both international and intercommunal conflict resolution, Fisher called it
'third party consultation' which, it was argued, should be seen as complementary to
traditional mediation at the international level, particularly at the pre-mediation or pre-
negotiation phase (as both Rothman, and Fisher and Keashley have argued). % This
informal, low-risk, non-coercive methodology clearly employs a social-psychological
approach to conflict and cooperation. Yet, as Fisher and Keashley noted, it does not
necessarily negate a more realist notion of 'objective' differences in interests causing
intergroup conflict, but it does emphasise how perceptions, attitudes and interactions
can then determine the subsequent (de)escalation of the conflict.' This work is also
clear in its recognition of a mix of 'real' and 'perceived' dimensions to conflict,
although it remains rightly inconclusive in prescribing which type of intervention for
which ('objective' or 'subjective') dimension of the conflict. Rather, a contingency
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approach is suggested whereby issues of common concern constitute an agenda and are
discussed first, building trust and interdependencies in preparation for discussions over
the most divisive issues."
Burton has argued moreover that, by removing the ground for conflict and
eliminating or transforming the conflict situation, a permanent 'resolution' may be
achievable." Conventional conflict management is based on the premise that a given
conflict is the result of competition over tangible resources (i.e., territory, economic
resources, power, authority) which can be distributed, thus creating a 'settlement'.
However, since these distributive methods are resisted in protracted social conflicts,
integrative conflict management—problem-solving, integration, consensus-building and
superordination (i.e. 'positive-sum' games)—offers a supplementary form of
diplomacy. (no Examining needs-based disputes outside the state-versus-state framework
this acknowledges part of the political reality which has to be dealt with. m Such
workshops are increasingly recognised as one part of a so-called 'unofficial' or 'track
two' diplomatic process, which advocates bringing together conflicting groups,
influencing public opinion and developing economic cooperation.' While
distinguishing 'common' from 'divisive' disputes remains inherently problematic, 'a
central task of diplomacy' will be sorting out these issues in order to coordinate, via a
'multi-track' approach, complementary distributive and integrative strategies.'
3.4.4 Separating transboundary resource 'needs'
These observations return this analysis to the debate over the so-called 'separability
thesis'.'" To what extent is it realistic to separate 'welfare' needs from 'politics' needs,
low politics' from 'high politics'? Claude asked;
"Ws it in fact possible to segregate a group of problems and subject them to
treatment in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at
the door and busy themselves only with the co-operative use of the tools of
mutual interest?".105
Neoliberals (and to the greatest extent, functionalists), as previously noted, suggest that
there is more potential for cooperation in economic and welfare matters than in 'national
security' issues. Blatter hypothesised that 'productive tasks' (e.g., common transport
facilities) with the expectation of positive results for all concerned parties are easier to
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manage than transboundary problems with a redistributional character; in cases of the
latter (e.g., transboundary water resources), supposedly constituting low politics', any
regulation represents a 'zero-sum game'. 06 From a functionalist perspective, less
contentious issues could be 'neutralised', and as states became ever more interdependent
in economic, technical and welfare issues, the continuous process of interaction would
'spill over' into regional peace.' In economic terms, Smooha and Hanf noted the
argument that since the duplication of state apparatus is costly, further multiplication of
an already divisive and inefficient world system would be counterproductive.'" Such
conclusions were drawn in their observation of West Germany in that certain
humanitarian principles had to be recognised to make the inner-German border more
permeable, even if that led to de facto acceptance of the status quo. Partition will often
hamper the development of post-partition economies and, given the inertia within West
Germany to maintain transboundary linkages and flows and seek a more normal footing
to ensure the security and viability of Berlin, even after a twenty year period of partition
there was a sense of inevitability in the emergence of Brandt's new Ostpolitik.'"
However, the case of the Republic of Ireland more fully illustrates the limits of
this argument. Like the German case, the partition line largely followed the historical
provincial boundaries, and historically the island location lent urgency to a perceived
need for more regional cooperation and integration. The Government of Ireland Act in
1920 envisaged a 'Council of Ireland', composed of representatives from both south and
north, yet it never met."° Something of a watershed was predicted, however, with the
coming of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1992, which confirmed the fears which
it had generated in the peripheralised north for the prospect of a 'one-island
economy'.'" On one side of the argument were those who believed that cross-border
cooperation could and would undermine political and cultural roots of partition, leading
ultimately to political reintegration and unity. What Lyne termed 'technocratic anti-
partitionism' developed from the belief that the border was merely a temporary division,
and that naturally-forming economic and cultural ties legitimised eventual
reunification."' In contrast, the pro-partition lobby (including those in the south
displaying a sense of 26-county nationalism) accepted, implicitly or explicitly, that
demands for territorial autonomy and nationhood on both sides of the boundary needed
to be satisfied. At the most, Unionist agreement on economic cooperation was
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conditional on the separation of economic developments from political means and
effects.113
Clearly, in this case the existence of a 'semi-militarised frontier' ensures that it
is not easy for technocratic anti-partitionism to supplant the more limited rationalisation
of partition embodied in present forms of transboundary cooperation. Instead, it has
been suggested that transboundary cooperation can only take place in connection with
'non-contentious issues'. The Foyle Fisheries Commission, controlling fishing on
Lough Foyle, illustrated the development of 'rational' transboundary resource
management, although its establishment was not part of any trend, nor was its remit
extensive.' Douglas more recently highlighted the benefits of cross-community
interaction within Northern Ireland, where 'non-political and non-constitutional issues
set in a variety of non-sectarian contexts' have been prioritised (e.g., local government
administration, education, employment and the voluntary sector). 115
 The ratification of
the April 1998 agreement reiterated an apparent 'cross-border' imperative documented
in both the 1973 `Sunningdale' and 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreements, raising new socio-
economic as well as 'political-national' reasons for cross-border institution building.'
It nevertheless retained what Anderson and Hamilton termed the 'bogus separation' of
the 'political' and 'economic', promulgated by 'functionalist' unionists.117
This would appear to concur with the view that comparative advantage—or
'relative gain'—is attainable in all transactional forms, be they military, economic, or
ecological interdependencies. Rees similarly argued that;
"[s]ince the value of resources is determined by the culture that uses them, it
follows that the value of particular resources varies not only over time but also
over space".118
In this sense it can be argued that transboundary resource needs may also depend upon
the spatial typology of the resource in question. With regards to the importance of
upstream access to transboundary water systems, as previously suggested, strategic
position may offset structural power weaknesses."' Adopting a traditional approach to
transboundary relations, there appear contradictory approaches to 'foreign' relations,
with both cooperative and conflicting transboundary policies being employed over time.
It is not necessarily the case, in other words, that cooperation and conflict are
respectively limited to low' and 'high' politics. This suggests that the higher the level
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of transboundary resource interdependence, the more complex and pervasive collective-
action problem-solving becomes.'
3.5	 The Role of Interests and Ideas
The willingness to participate in cooperative, peace-building initiatives concerning
transboundary resource management problems (indeed, by extension the willingness to
seek actively a resolution within such ventures) will be greatly determined by specific
interests with respect to the transboundary 'problem', and the very perception of the
`problem'. 121
 'Objective' indicators determining participation, as previously noted, may
include resource dynamics, socio-economic conditions, and technical infrastructure.
However, as argued in Chapter 2, culturally normative and cognitive factors may also
influence the perception of problems and the definition of preferences and self-interests,
and may vary according to levels of analysis, be it state, 'international', 'supranational',
or subnational'.
Scott et al. noted generally that the intensity of transboundary cooperation in
general will often depend on the existence of an elite—invariably political, but also
business, NGO or community, willing to invest time, effort, and money in promoting
the development of transboundary networks. 122 At the state level, Jo and Walker
similarly recognised that pre-partition collaboration resulted in a predilection for
encouraging transactions which, in turn, increased interstate collaboration. 123 The
(a)symmetry of inter-state political and economic relations, however, has already been
noted as a crucial intervening variable, supplemented by the internal, 'vertical'
boundaries between levels of government and among agencies, and the 'horizontal'
boundaries between 'pseudo-states' and other intra-state 'rebel' elements.' 24
 Where this
explanation may falter, in other words, is when the dominant form of power is not
'legitimate' power, whereby a non-zero-sum game becomes unattainable. 125 To
reiterate, 'states' which have referred to themselves as 'sovereign' have been seen as the
legitimate actors in the international system since European colonialism, and 'non-state'
organisations have been recognised with some reluctance as subsidiary actors.'26
To circumvent these barriers, transboundary resource management has become
increasingly characterised by a multifaceted network of participants, in which public
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and private interests from different political 'levels' are involved. States may
collaborate with the assistance of institutions, organisations, and regimes, particularly in
non-zero-sum contexts. Indeed, in her study of riparian relations in the Jordan, and the
Tigris-Euphrates and Nile basins, Lowi concluded that;
"states which are antagonists in the 'high politics' of war and diplomacy tend not
to agree willingly to extensive collaboration in the sphere of low politics',
centred around economic and welfare issues. They have to be induced to do so".127
Whilst the involvement of international third parties may have a particular role, as noted
throughout Part I of this thesis, even then transformation to a cooperative setting is not
guaranteed as formal compliance in transboundary arrangements remains the principal
barrier. In the context of international relations, parties may be directed to act in
particular ways when confronted with complex transboundary interactions because of
attributional biases, whereby helpful acts are perceived as inconsistent with the nature of
'others' and it is accordingly believed that the 'other' would not have taken such action
had it not been forced to do so.' 28 Eric Johnson discovered this problem of ' stereotype%
reproduction in trying to formulate agreement amongst the riparians of the partitioned
Jordan River in the 1950/60s, which was only indirectly successful. More recently,
while the Oslo Declaration of Principles set the timetable for a permanent settlement,
including the status of Jerusalem, little progress has been recorded since 1993.129
Similarly, in Bosnia, the Dayton Accord proposed a common economic space and arms
control, and created structures for the return of refugees rebuilding civil society, in the
hope that these spaces would make the partition lines irrelevant."' Annex 9 of the
Dayton Accord saw the establishment of public corporations within Bosnia and
Hercegovina covering infrastructural issues such as transportation, energy, postal and
communication facilities, with two members from the Muslim-Croat Federation and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) each and one from the
Republika Srpska examining issues of 'mutual benefit."' The accord was in reality a
partition agreement, and the lack of progress since has instead raised legitimate
concerns of its development into three-way (Hercegovinian Croats from Bosnian
Muslims) or even four-way (western from eastern Republika Srpska) partition.132
Yet, despite the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework,
parties to partition have at times been influenced by a 'new willingness' to negotiate in
different forms.' 33
 As partition drew the border between India and Pakistan across the
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Indus River system so it highlighted the need for irrigation water on both sides; during
1947-48 India invoked the 'Harman doctrine' and cut off transboundary canalled water
supplies. In 1960, through the World Bank and, in particular, the leadership of Eugene
Black (the-then-President of the World Bank), a bilateral agreement was drawn up
whereby India effectively relinquished its upper stream sovereignty and the Permanent
Indus Commission prepared specific cooperative arrangements, initiated studies and
coordinated policies (although it did not commit riparians beyond this consent so that
integrated development of the resources remained implausible). 34 The corollary of the
threat of water scarcity was witnessed, however, on India's eastern borders where
agreement was more recently reached with Bangladesh over the sharing of the
Ganges." A Joint Rivers Commission oversaw the management of more than 140
tributaries common to both states since 1972, by which time East Pakistan had seceded,
and was temporarily supported by a 1977 to 1989 agreement committing the riparians to
equitable apportionment and prior consultation after the Farakka dam-building
dispute.' Even further east—encompassing the partitioned states of Cambodia, Laos,
Vietnam (and Thailand)—the UN's Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) initiated the Lower Mekong River Committee in 1957. In close collaboration
with ECAFE, the committee promoted and controlled the planning of the lower basin
from the mid-1950s through the many violent conflicts that characterised the region,
generating a so-called 'Spirit of the Mekong' which appeared to permeate an April 1995
treaty on cooperation for sustainable development in the basin.
Leading on from this, the role of regimes and epistemic communities in reducing
uncertainty by providing information must also be recognised. 'Networks',
characterised by loose, informal couplings between actors, organised less as territorial
units and more on the basis of la geometrie variable, may form an integral part of the
cooperation process.' Informal network relations can often react more flexibly to
prevailing problems, recruiting members without having to take sectoral or horizontal
(i.e. 'international') interests into account, and the network can be (re)formed at little
expense or effort.' Interpersonal contacts and mutual trust appear to be preconditions
to such networks; problems of legitimacy may be exacerbated in this way, however, as
informal networks may lack transparency and democratic participation. Indeed, this
presupposes that the participants involved have the necessary authority to make
decisions. While `epistemic communities', therefore, need to lobby both 'upwards' (to
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top policy makers) and 'downwards' (to actual resource users) in non-participatory
regimes, when consensus by a public consultation process may not be normal, then the
extent to which these communities must lobby 'upwards' is magnified.39
In addition, it must be noted that epistemic communities who become influential
actors in their own right are not necessarily consensual or impartial, such that
intracommunal conflicts may develop, bringing into question Haas' argument that
epistemic communities are truly 'transnational' groups.' 4° Cooperation, to reiterate, can
come about through both trust and coercion. Even if a state-led interest group (which
will usually have the necessary decision-making authority) offers less coercive
involvement in generating transboundary resource management, by definition a
politically powerful promoter will politicise the initiative. The distinction between
'neutral' and 'partisan' representation, in short, remains subjective; it threatens to
reproduce traditional commitment to an `epistemic realism' of actors independent of
ideas or beliefs about them."' These dynamics have been clearly illustrated in on-going
efforts to formulate a transboundary 'peace bioreserves system' within and beyond the
Korean demilitarised zone (DMZ). 142 The subject was separately broached with UNEP
by both North and South Korea in 1991, but subsequent interest originated solely with
the southern government which greatly encouraged international environmentalists'
concerned about the 'safe haven' for fauna and flora within the DMZ itself."3
Ultimately, the scheme—which would involve the establishment of bicommunal
villages and an overall erosion of the military landscape—was interpreted by the south
as a substantial confidence-building measure to 'smooth the way' for ending the
'unnatural' partition of the peninsula.'" This teleological argument, previously noted in
the case of Ireland, threatened to become a derivation of geographical determinism
however; assuming this, as Pounds noted, the division of the former Spanish island of
Hispaniola into Haiti and the Dominican Republic, of Timor into its Portuguese and
Indonesian sectors, and even of the Malay Peninsula, could be diagnosed as morally
wrong.145
As noted in Chapter 2, if international organisations as entities exist as passive
servicing bodies whose function is to facilitate inter-state deals, as realists would argue,
then this explains more why transboundary resource problems cannot be resolved than
why they are. Few states are able to participate as individual actors even though
international organisations may not necessarily 'transcend' the state as the building
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block of international order(s). Instead, a coalition of interests develops. This might
still be explained, as by international 'regime theorists', considering the state as the
underlying principle of regimes such as UNCLOS. According to the 'new
institutionalist' revival of Grotian international law, by contrast, it is supranational,
societal ideas, principles and norms that govern state, market and individual behaviour
about a transboundary issue. One such example is the supranational role of the EU in
the Irish conflict, which was further emphasised after the 1992 watershed, most notably
through the 1995 Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation.'" In
tandem with an EU-funded INTERREG programme from 1990, this not only
concentrated on promoting N. Ireland and the Irish border counties, but placed special
emphasis on promoting reconciliation through integration. Essentially functionalist
beliefs of 'technocratic anti-partitionists' in the integrating powers of the SEM have
been largely misplaced, given the failure of the EU to develop closer economic links.'47
3.6	 Functions of the Partition Boundary
The preceding sections have highlighted the plurality and complexity of power,
resources, interests and ideas involved in transboundary resource management in
partitioned states. Finally, it is necessary to look at the role of the partition boundary
itself as an intervening variable, given the recognition that 'national' borders can
usefully be considered as units of analysis in their own right.'" It is beneficial to
reconsider initially a number of boundary-related institutional developments referred to
in the previous two chapters, namely the changing functions of border regions in certain
'Western' contexts.
3.6.1 Borderland 'models' within the European Union and North America
It was suggested in Chapter 2 that Western Europe and North America were witness to
significant developments in transboundary cooperative regimes. A vast body of
literature has developed around this and has led some observers to refer to the EU's
formulation of a new 'paradigm' of transboundary cooperation,' and to both the US-
Mexico and EU border regions as a 'generic model of transfrontier cooperation'.'" In
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applying Keohane's logic for means of analysis (who was analysing transboundary
cooperation in general), academic focus has invariably been placed on areas where a
doctrine of transboundary resource management appears to have developed most and
where, arguably, the benefits of transboundary cooperation have appeared easiest to
In Western Europe, for example, from the 1970s the Council of Europe
developed the 'European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between
Territorial Communities or Authorities', which significantly provided a possible
'international law basis' for agreements between territorially-based public authorities
below the 'national' level.' Its significance led Asiwaju to hail it as a 'triumph of
micro-diplomacy'. 1 " Yet, the 'Outline Convention' had itself been preceded by
predominantly localised initiatives concerned with development and planning agencies,
and transboundary river commissions; notable examples included the Regio
Basiliensi, 154
 the EUREGIO," the Rhine and Danube River Commissions,' and
various initiatives on the Upper Rhine Valley.' 57 The Regio Basiliensi, a tri-national
planning and promotional agency overseeing the French-Swiss-German border, formed
in 1963 notably through the common interests of both the business and civic elites in
Basel, although the origins of the Regio are widely recognised as the result of the Swiss
government's needs to offset the disadvantages of non-membership of the EEC."
Indeed, although the Regio has been described as the 'leading world model for
transfrontier planning', 159 most West European regions were by the 1990s still
dependent upon additional, traditionally bilateral agreements, 16° and the Outline
Convention was limited in impact.' In North America, similarly, the institutional core
of transboundary resource management had until recently centred on two bilateral,
environment-related agencies—the International Joint Commission (IJC) and the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). Although they were able to
lay a legitimate claim to autonomy from the executive branch of their member
governments (Canada-US, and US-Mexico respectively), the IJC's efforts have been
seen to be exclusive, technocratic, and often by-passed by ad hoc diplomatic initiatives
determined by state interests, 162 while the IBWC—although being described as
"[perhaps] the finest example of functional cooperation in transboundary resources
management between highly dissimilar countries anywhere on the globe"63—was
established on an inflexible and soon-outmoded mandate' 64 given the dynamic
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developments of the US-Mexico border region.' Transitional arrangements brought in
from 1983 (with the 'La Paz Agreement'), and more comprehensively as side
agreements to the trinational NAFTA in 1993, offered more hope in overcoming the
IBWC's shortfalls.166
Overall, these developments in North America and the EU nonetheless contrast
starkly with statist and narrowly-defined, 'political' security-obsessed attitudes which
mark so much of the realist rhetoric. Neofunctionalists have argued that the
development of European integration—from the European Coal and Steel Community
to the Maastricht Treaty, and particularly the renewed political activity from the late
1980s—has personified the search for problem-solving instruments, and Ryan has
argued that the European Community exemplifies the pursuit of superordinate goals at
the macro-level.' Yet, this argument contradicts on-going work that has disputed an
idealised 'spill over' explanation (the main thesis of neofunctionalism) of European
cooperation and integration.'" In many respects, it is suggested that the EU's approach
has not escaped the conceptual and pragmatic mould of the sovereign state system.
While the embryo of a federal Europe exists in supranational institutions and developing
EU border regions, the EU is dominated by its member states and its transboundary
policy is likely to be tolerated or promoted in order to further 'national' politico-
economic interests for the foreseeable future. The limited practical effect of the 1981
Outline Convention personified the confusing links between economic integration and
national sovereignty.'" The 'peace by pieces' approach within the EC, should it be
forgotten, is not only a functional process but also a process of territorial alliance;"° a
revived neofunctionalism threatens to ignore the renewed salience of historical borders
and identities Europe-wide, and their growing contestation in political and economic
forums.
In this light, M. Anderson has argued that, while objectives are impressive and
ambitious, the forms and the legal bases for transboundary cooperation at the borderland
scale are hardly new, being largely based on intergovernmental agreements or
conventions, treaties, private law agreements, and other informal arrangements."'
Transboundary associations, even issue-specific river authorities, have little judicial or
executive power, such that borderlands continue to escape any real democratic
accountability." 2
 Hansen's comparative study of cooperation in Western European and
North America noted how issues involving adjacent border regions generally had to be
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dealt within the respective national capitals because the only institutionalised means of
communication across borders was 'international' law and diplomacy: 73 . Integrationist
initiatives across state borders have become salient features of European Union and
NAFTA affairs, yet all the while they leave outstanding questions over the degree to
which these constitute autonomous 'regions' or more 'pseudo-territorial' units"4—in
other words, whether they truly represent a move away from modern geographical
scales of political space (i.e., the territorial logic of 'local', 'national', 'international') to
more deterritorialised, heterogeneised forms of governance."5
Hansen has suggested that the US-Mexico border in particular may prove
instructive for other, less understood border regions.' 76
 It is perhaps surprising to note,
therefore, that instead there have since been tentative calls for the translation of the
European 'models' beyond their context—to the Middle East,'" and to Africa's OAU
where, in spite of the imposition and reproduction of colonial boundaries, states with
poorly administered borders have indirectly allowed the continuation of substantial
transboundary movements of people, goods and resources: 78
 The application of such
models to Southeast Asia proves just as complicating; it has been suggested that
economic 'growth triangles' within ASEAN and its embryonic Free Trade Area, built
upon minimal institutionalisation (and therefore maximum political control), potentially
throw up distinctly 'Asian' forms of `transboundary' cooperation:" Peachy et al.'s
analysis of the Singapore-Indonesia border region, by way of example, suggested that,
while joint projects significantly transformed the socio-economic landscape of the area,
with the dominance of 'high politics', genuine transboundary institutions have failed to
prosper.'"
3.6.2 Partition, borderlands and state reintegration
In terms of the development of functional relations particular to states which have
undergone partition, similar models can be identified. Minghi recognised three stages in
partition: 'pre-partition'; 'active partitioning', and 'post-partition', and this final stage
was the focus for most of Henderson and Lebow's earlier work which recognised five
more distinct stages in the development of functional relations within states that have
undergone either partition or division: 81
 According to their model (Figure 3.2), after the
'pre-partition' stage of unity the initial stage of partition was characterised by intense
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Figure 3.2	 Stages of transboundary relations between partitioned states
Stage III - Middle term
Stage IV - Rapprochement
Stage V - Unification
Source: Henderson and Lebow (1974), cited in Waterman (1987: 162).
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mutual antipathy. A third stage accounted for de facto acceptance of one another, which
was followed by rapprochement that eventually led back to unification.
The underlying assumption of staggered development post-partition in this work
is self-evident, as indeed are its similarities with Martinez et al.'s modelling of
borderland integration. The final two stages of Henderson and Lebow's model
suggested progression from rapprochement to reunification, particularly in cases of
'divided nations'. Henderson and Lebow recognised that 'normalised' functional
relations between newly-partitioned states were slow to develop, and that a hazily-
defined 'in-between' status of partial reunification (Stage IV) would prove common:8'
Even so, partial or even total reintegration of the partitioned states was predicted,
making strong parallels both with Martinez's model and, historically, with
prescriptively integrationist characteristics of neofunctionalism as noted in R.E.
Johnston's work.'"
In the light of the above observations, it can be argued that the nature of the
partition boundary and border region is clearly important, and provides further evidence
of the role of external forces in the post-partition environment.'" First, it is vital to
appreciate that in a large number of cases of partition, the character of the post-partition
boundary was (or was to become) not a simple, single demarcation line synonymous
with modern international land boundaries, but alternatively a DMZ, 'buffer zone' or
'zone of separation' with a territorial character of its own. DMZs are usually
established as a necessary post-conflict measure, such as the 1949 Armistice
Agreements which established DMZs between Israel and Syria. Although they were
most common immediately post-World War I, they remain a salient means of border
management today (e.g., between Iraq and Kuwait from April 1991), while one of the
most celebrated DMZ's—what is in essence a 14 km wide boundary established
between North and South Korea in 1953—continues to act as a container for over 3,300
km2 of territory. Vietnam's DMZ, agreed upon at Geneva in the summer of 1954,
varied in width from 5.6 to 101cm. As Prescott noted, while the lines containerising such
DMZ's function exactly as 'international' boundaries; indeed, they are also much more
difficult to cross and more apparent in the landscape than most other boundaries.'"
Other 'alternative' territorial arrangements have been considered for partition.'"
In post-Dayton Bosnia and Hercegovina, an ambiguously termed 'zone of separation'
was eventually set up around what was the agreed cease-fire line but which now largely
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constitutes the 'Inter-Entity Boundary Line'. The zone, which is all but demilitarised,
extends for up to 2 km either side of this line in open terrain, yet (as in Nicosia) was
narrower than 1 km in parts of Sarajevo.'" The federation lines in Bosnia were set up as
a transitional line of division, and were nominally supported by freedom in both human
movement and trade.'" The 51:49 per cent partition included the right for refugees to
return to their properties or receive fair compensation for being misplaced; in practice,
the boundary has become an indelible feature of the post-partition landscape.'"
Clearly, in a large proportion of partitioned states (Table 1.1, Chapter 1) it is not
acceptable to take the boundary for granted. In cases where, although general inter-state
recognition may have been achieved, there remain outstanding territorial claims, then
states may not cooperate in transboundary resource management because the very
'boundary' to be transcended is contested. As in the case of UNCLOS, international
law has only entailed an obligation to consult and negotiate where states have broadly
agreed on the delimitation of their maritime boundaries, and not in cases where no
boundary is delimited in a disputed area." While joint development arrangements
provide a ready solution to mutual problems in intractably disputed maritime areas, such
legal mechanisms do not represent the solution to more fundamental jurisdictional
problems."' While it is true that boundary management is in general a reflection of
centralised state policy, which in itself may be determined by the perceptions of the
adversary and the historical characterisation of a 'border' in 'official' discourse, the
intrinsic value of the border region must not be subverted. The problem of delineating
two or more hermetic parts illustrates the difference between what Klieman
distinguished as the 'conceptual' and 'planning' stages of partition, "where the issue
becomes not whether to make an incision but exactly where to draw the lines of
division"." For instance, the very positioning of the partition boundary also brings
with it the problems of ethnic minorities trapped or 'enclaved' with the new majority
group.' This is still witnessed in the initial partition of Palestine, which failed to
satisfy either Arab or Jewish land-owners. Another notable example is the conflict
embroiling India and Pakistan over the 'unfinished business of partition', in Kashmir.'"
Indeed, it is useful here to reconsider the concept of 'antecedent' and 'subsequent'
boundaries: in the former, where there is little development before boundary-creation,
any future population settlement would generally accord with the boundary; but where
development occurred subsequent to boundary-creation, then once homogenous ethno-
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territories become separate socio-spatial political entities.'" Studies of India, Palestine
and Ireland noted that, while some transboundary political institutions were retained
post-partition (most often to deal with economic linkages), the overwhelming rhetoric of
partition meant that such residual cross-border elements remained `still-born'.'"
These observations bring the analysis back to Henderson and Lebow's
distinction between partition types, introduced in Chapter 2—the difference in essence
between the permanence and ephemerality of the partition boundary.'" In what ways
does Korea's partition boundary differ from Cyprus', or Ireland's from India's? In the
cases of Israel-Palestine/Jordan, and North-South Korea, 'normalisation' has barely
begun. As can be seen, in certain cases, a nation will remain divided (e.g., Korea),
while in others, various destabilising forces—such as the undermining of a particular
ideological/economic regime, or less conspicuous practices of transboundary socio-
economic reintegration and nationalism—instigate the process of reunification (e.g.
Germany). Although this was never an explicit assumption of Henderson and Lebow's
modelling, which identified an 'in-between' status of partial unification (Stage IV), the
use of 'stages' produces strong inferences of successive development.'" It would
appear that critical observations of the 'developing borderlands' school of thought made
previously (see section 2.3.2) appear to be mirrored in the development of partition
boundary functions. There is no necessary inevitably about staggered progression or
'development'; ultimately, the model suggests little scope for permanent partition.199
While Kumar optimistically suggested that the `no-man's land' of India's partition has,
unlike in Cyprus and Bosnia, gradually become a border rather than a buffer zone, he
was rightly forced to recognise the constant recreation of `no-man's land' in Kashmir.'°
Moreover, a study of the two cases of Cold War partitioned states which have
reunified—Vietnam and Germany—suggested that even once a common group identity
has been territorially reestablished, the notion of peaceful coexistence remained
elusive.' While in Vietnam the southern elites were politically dominated by their
northern counterparts following 1976, in Germany traditional and oppositional elites of
the late-GDR became subordinate to the west Germans. Additionally, cultural and
social dissimilarities persisted for some time after reunification; indeed, to such an
extent in Vietnam that the strength of the southern capitalist region virtually negated the
political power of the 'winning' northern elite.' Thus, while the 'borderlands-to-
centrality' thesis is supported in post-1990 Germany, if only where east-west linkages
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have rejuvenated Berlin's central role, in largely non-industrialised Vietnam the national
economy has failed to marry north with south." Overall, these developments suggest
greater acknowledgement of Minghi's more open-ended subdivision of the process of
partition.
Lastly, transboundary cooperation between local or regional actors, other than
that initiated at the central state level, usually takes place within the context of legal and
institutional restrictions. The problem in developing a legal status, as previously
suggested, is because a legal personality can only derive from one body of law; in
addition, the principle of territorial jurisdiction implies the rejection of the use of
judicial and legislative powers on 'foreign' soil. Local authorities may in turn lack
administrative or financial autonomy as one of the main risks involved in subnational
diplomacy is the fear on the part of the state, of erosion of authority through policy
fragmentation.' As such, problems of compatibility and flexibility may be confronted
directly by the border regions. Yet on the basis of developments in Western Europe,
just as the nation-state would be eroded 'from above', so regional forms of government
would erode the nation 'from below'. A further implication of this, of course, is that a
'Europe of Regions', in superseding the 'Europe of nation-states', would dissolve any
national conflicts.' In the Irish conflict, however, neither government north or south
was willing to devolve control over resources to the border region which had no
regional body to represent it; correspondingly, European integration in this context
exemplified, as Anderson and Goodman noted, the contradictions of substate regional
development and the logic of 'national' sovereignty. 206
This would strongly suggest that, no different from states, border regions are not
unitary actors.' In terms of the 'environmental security' debate, Thomas reiterated the
point that competition over scarce resources also takes place within the domestic sphere;
both Mumme and Ingram have similarly highlighted the determining power of domestic
policy on transboundary relations, in the context of the US-Mexico border.2"
Transboundary resource management, from this perspective, becomes less a problem of
international than intranational relations when, within border regions, different interest
groups compete for their demands. 'Political will', in turn, may in fact be necessary
most at the level of implementation; in the case of border regions, this may be
determined by the organisational resources, the level of autonomy, sufficient knowledge
about the problem, and the existence of common interests (or 'regional
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consciousness').' Burton similarly added that resource management must to be
functionally effective at the 'domestic' level before it can be argued that it could be
arranged on an international scale. 21 ° From the borderland perspective, this would seem
to be especially pertinent given the legal, administrative, or linguistic barriers to be
overcome in partitioned states.
In the light of the many contradictions, in a number of ways these popular
models of transition are undermined because they are based on the rationale of
Eurocentric/Western notions of transition and development. Regional participation may
be strongly dependent upon the degree of decentralisation of the respective 'national'
authority, and given that 'national' agents can still be identified as the dominating
participants for transboundary resource management in the EU and North America,
because they still have the necessary authority and resources to address problems
concretely, it is of little surprise that the extent of state decentralisation and
regionalisation has been a large determinant of transboundary integration initiatives in
partitioned states. Although they must be recognised as simplified models, given the
shortfall in attempts to theorise and conceptualise the process of transboundary
cooperation in partitioned states, their explanatory significance should not increase
unchecked. It can be seen that a 'gradualist' assumption clearly evident in European
integration was reflected in Henderson and Lebow's model.'"
What this 'borderlands' approach does provide, however, is a more appropriate
framework of spatial analysis. Cooperation over transboundary resource management is
often limited to the spatial confines of the border region. This is the result of the
interplay of factors, most notably the actors involved, the spatial distribution of resource
problems which are recognised as being `transboundary', and the dynamics of a
restrictive border management in partitioned states. By focusing on the borderland,
these processes are more easily located.
3.7	 Conclusions
Over the last thirty years a limited but important range of principles, norms and models
have developed in relation to transboundary resource management. Reflecting a more
general 'squeeze' on the practices of sovereign states, these developments manifest
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geographically, on one hand, at the global or transnational scale and, on the other hand,
at the borderland/regional or subnational scale. In turn, these practices are inherently
both reflections of and reflected by various theoretical perspectives on the process of
transboundary resource management. `Transboundary resource management' can be
seen in this light as both an active process and a normative goal, but these two
characteristics may not always coincide.
With the population sample of partitioned states, however, it has been argued
that it is necessary to begin reexamining these theoretical perspectives, reweighting in
particular certain determining factors in the light of various characteristics which,
although not individually unique to partitioned states, collectively substantiate the need
for a revised explanatory perspective. In certain aspects, in other words, the 'theory'
needs to be remoulded in the light of the general 'practice'. None of the recognised
theoretical propositions alone can explain transboundary resource management. This
may be a consequence of the failure of transboundary cooperation to develop enough
autonomy as a 'political phenomenon' thus far, but also a result of the relative paucity
of data on 'practice' on which to base 'theoretical' interpretations.' The framework
proposed therefore synthesises various theories and seeks to give each of them some
weight. As part of the recursive process, analysis concurs with already established
factors and supports their explanatory power in examining the general developments at
the global and borderland scale. The debate between neoliberalism and neorealism has
rightly highlighted the weakness of most international institutions and the absence of
sanctioning power, although the basic tenets of functionalism are clearly still of
influence in the study of regional integration; it is possible to create effective regimes
for shared natural resources and environments in areas of great strategic sensitivity."
Political factors—in particular questions of legitimising authority, fears over national
security, and historic conflicts—have plagued even the 'models' of European
transboundary resource management. Within this heartland of transboundary
cooperation, the conclusions of O'Dowd are supported;
"[f]or all the political arguments over the future of European integration and the
theoretical analyses offered by the functionalists, realists and post-modernists, the
actual outcome of EU integration for national sovereignty remains obscure. It is
here that empirical studies of national boundaries and border regions can help
illuminate the rather complex and fluid order emerging".2"
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Much of the postmodern discourse has its roots in a Western European territorial
narrative, propagated by scholars within the Western European and North American
tradition—while, "for the rest, territorial partitioning remains the order of the day". 215
Planning and policy-making at the physical edges of states must be understood within
its local context where, as many observers still find, national sovereignty remains a
dominant force. Functionalist approaches underestimate the 'inertia' of existing
structural conflicts with a self-sustaining dynamic of their own.' In short, there is not
yet a single case where a boundary is so well defined that there will be no extra
technical and juridical consequences for the management of transboundary resources.2"
Beyond this, generalisations become less valid, if not self-defeating. While the
cases of partition share certain basic similarities there are significant differences in
conditions and variables that account for the variation in outcomes. The analysis in this
chapter has inevitably begged the question: are there models of transboundary
cooperation and resource management to follow in Cyprus? European transboundary
cooperation is still in its infancy, and a majority of observers now argue that the
Western European 'model' is inappropriate for understanding the asymmetries of the
US-Mexico border region, and beyond.' Conversely, in fact, perhaps there is more to
be learnt from examining the US-Mexico case as a means of better understanding
problems at the EU's external borders, where economic disparities are currently being
exacerbated.219
Perhaps, more realistically, there is a need to look beyond (or behind) both
contexts after recognising the difficulties in constructing policy models of
transboundary resource management which presuppose the existence of harmonious
bilateral relations, and a convergence of interests at the local, regional and global
scales. 22° An alternative to a priori models is the distillation of lessons from a range of
contexts where institutional developments can be examined as they are nested at all
levels—regionally, nationally, and internationally—with authority residing at each level
according to political will, resources, and knowledge. 221
 The complexities span
institutional, structural, spatial, temporal and cognitive dimensions, and the particular
idiosyncrasies of partition generate too many case-specific causal factors. There is
clearly much more thought required to consider the transfer of any 'model'
arrangements to partitioned states. In the rest of this analysis, using the theoretical
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framework provided in Part I, these and other problems are addressed in a detailed case
study of the management of transboundary resources in Cyprus.
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Part II
Partitioning Cyprus
Chapter 4
Partitioning Cyprus and the Creation of Transboundary
Resources
4.1	 Introduction
Like all boundaries, partition boundaries are social, economic and psychological, as well
as political constructions of a historical origin. In the two preceding chapters it was
argued that in order to understand how and why cooperative transboundary interaction
develops, a partitioned state must be situated not only within the larger structures and
processes of the political economy, but also within its specific historical, cultural and
locational milieu. A starting point for this case study, therefore, must be the analysis of
state formation and change in Cyprus, with its territorial and socio-spatial dimension as
a central theme.
In order to comprehend the complex policy and practice of transboundary
resource management in Cyprus, it is necessary to consider a number of historical,
structural and contingent factors: the chronology of partition; the legacy of
asymmetrical economic development between the two main communities of the island;
and, contingent factors of political interests and ideas—what Hitchens termed
'partitionists' and 'partitionism'—which led both to the establishment and subsequent
undermining of the ROC's constitution and, ultimately, to its partition.' To this end,
Section 4.2 mirrors Minghi's sub-division of the partitioning process by examining the
'pre-partition' and 'active partitioning' stages. 2
 Consideration of the 'post-partition'
stage will become an important focus of Chapters 5-7; instead, the objective here is to
provide a background to the politico-territorial problems of resource management in
Cyprus. To explain this more fully, Section 4.3 deconstructs the boundary-creation
process whereby, first, the capital city of Nicosia was effectively partitioned and the
Turkish Cypriot community withdrew into territorially-distinct enclaves, and, second,
the island as a whole was separated territorially by the UNBZ. It is argued that the
particular development of territorialities in Cyprus (by the two communities', their
'motherlands', and other international parties)—a process which has received
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surprisingly little academic attention—was to have major implications for policies
subsequently adopted towards managing transboundary resources 'post-partition'.
4.2	 Partitionism and Partitionists
Using a standard narrative approach this section recounts the causes and consequences
of the partitioning process in Cyprus up until 1974, developing in particular a focus on
the impact of the process on what were to become transboundary resources after 1974.
As a prelude to partition, political, economic and social developments in Cyprus from
the mid-1950s were to generate a number of violently divergent ethnonationalist forces,
such that between 1960 and 1974 the majority of international diplomatic attention was
devoted to attempts to contrive an acceptable method of power-sharing within a unitary
state. In practice, however, by 1974 a policy of state partition had proven the most
powerful political and military force.
4.2.1 Pre-1960: colonialism and self-determination
From pre-classical times, several foreign powers—Egyptians, Assyrians, Romans,
Franks, and Venetians included—successively conquered, acquired and then ruled the
island of Cyprus. In spite of the turbulence of this period, the development of its
political, socio-economic and cultural character had served to introduce three foreign
powers of particular note to Cyprus—Greeks, Ottoman Turks and the British Empire.
Principally of Greek cultural origin, Cyprus was without Turkish inhabitants until the
Ottoman conquest of Venetian Cyprus in 1571, when the nucleus of the Turkish Cypriot
community was established alongside relatively indigenous Greek-speaking Christians,
although by the eighteenth century Greek numerical ascendancy had been reasserted. 3 It
was not until 1878, after the Congress of Berlin, that the administration fell under
British control, in return for a guarantee to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russian
aggression and for the island to remain technically under Ottoman sovereignty. At the
onset of World War I, during which the Ottoman Empire was to ally with the Central
Powers, Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus, and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (which
relinquished Turkey's rights to the island) confirmed the new colonial power's status.
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Within two years Cyprus was a Crown colony; geopolitically, to the British not only
had it come to represent a Russian-Turkish frontier but also a staging post for residual
interests in the Far and Near East.4
Generally, during Ottoman times the Turkish Cypriot population had dispersed
widely over the island, although it avoided the densely forested (and largely Greek-
populated) Troodos Massif.' Throughout the British colonial period the population ratio
of the two main communities remained roughly four (Greek) to one (Turkish), although
the total population rose threefold. Nevertheless, the population distribution pattern pre-
independence was such that in none of the six administrative towns (nor their districts)
did the ratio of Greek to Turk exceed 7.4:1 or fall below 2.2:1. 6 The number of 'mixed',
intercommunal villages oscillated, however; in 1891 they constituted 346 of 702
population centres, yet by 1960 out of 623 settlements only 114 contained both
communities.' While this was also a consequence of growing urbanisation, by 1960
ethnic 'quarters' even in villages appeared, separating the 'majority' from 'minority'.
Only 37 villages had no single group at least twice as numerous as the other.'
Against this demographic backdrop, colonial rule served further to differentiate
rather than assimilate. The education system was segregated from the early 1920s,
intercommunal marriages occurred but were frowned on, and socio-economic life had
proven manageable though not completely integrated. 9 On to this the British colonial
principle of administrative divisions along ethnic lines formed the first roots of
partition.'° An ineffective multicommunal Legislative Council had been formed in
1882; 11 from 1925 it was reconstituted, yet once again fostered more mistrust than
alliance. This was to be further exacerbated by the involvement of the two Cypriot
communities on opposite sides during the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, World War I, and the
1919-23 Grwco-Turkish War, after which ethnic division came to be based more on
`postjudices' rather than simple misconceptions.' Ironically, the Greek Orthodox
Church had become a significant political, social, and educational force due to the
Ottoman millet administrative system, and now served to whip up civil unrest. In
particular, Greek Cypriot nationalist sentiment—in the form of enosis ('union'), as part
of the wider Megali Idhea in Greece of liberating and unifying the Hellenic world—
developed to the extent that by October 1931 major anti-colonial riots were witnessed in
Nicosia, and the Legislative Council was dissolved as Greek Cypriot members for the
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second time walked out. Political parties were subsequently banned by the colonial
power until 1941."
In 1954, the resurfacing of EOKA 14, the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial, pro-
Hellenic organisation and the confirmation of Cypriot self-determination as part of
Greek foreign policy signalled the growth of Turkish fears for Greek Cypriot hegemony.
EOK_A sought to bring about the cultural idea of enosis militarily, and as a counterforce,
the idea of taksim ('partition') was advanced by Turkish Cypriot nationalists. Anti-
colonial riots from April 1955, politically led by the ethnarch Archbishop Makarios III,
signalled the almost total dependence of the colonial forces on the Turkish Cypriot
minority for policing: 5
 While they had more to gain from British patronage, Turkish
Cypriots were increasingly 'nationalised' as they were drawn alongside the British in
fighting enosis. 16 Turkey had also reacted; the nationalist position, buoyant since the
1920s with the creation of Atatiirk's 'new' Turkey, was, up until the 1950s, for the
reversion of Cyprus to Turkey following the departure of Britain, but it now proposed
the partition of the two communities (Figure 4.1)—in 1957 the Turkish premier,
Menderes, was to suggest the adoption of the 35 0
 parallel of latitude for the purpose of
partition; territory to the north would become Turkish, and to the south Greek. The
right of self-determination dictated, instead, that the 'natural' result would be the
partitioning of the island as Cyprus was, by 'natural necessity', tied up with the
Anatolian mainland: 7 In 1955 Turkish Cypriot organisations had formed in opposition
(Volkan, later TATI), 18 acting as a counterfoil to EOKA yet intensifying intercommunal
clashes. Ethnic minorities evacuated villages with the onset of large-scale rioting. By
the time the shooting ended in March 1959, 509 people had been killed of which 156
were British. 19
This so-called 'Emergency Period' (1954-59) had effectively sowed the seeds
for intercommunal partition. Britain, deeply involved with the events in Suez in 1956,
was to dispatch a force 30,000 strong, yet let it be known that any solution appeasing
Greek and Turkish interests would be acceptable. 2° Segregation was to a large extent
reflected in British proposals too; Radcliffe suggested in 1956 the self-determination of
both communities. A north-south line (Figure 4.1) west of Nicosia had been proposed,
with Greek Cypriot territory to its east.' As in Palestine, by most conceivable standards
the situation was that of two distinct ethnic groups coexisting most uncomfortably
within a single, small geographic area. However, again like Palestine in 1946, and in
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Figure 4.1	 British proposal (1956) and Turkish proposal of 350 Parallel (1957)
Source: Mgt& (1957); Melamid (1960: 120-121).
India a year later, partition E IS part of 'divide and rule' was rejected on the grounds of
unfeasibility and the risk of conflict." The colonial power's competency in the 'art and
science' of partition was greatly complicated by the Cold War dimension, with the
US—as the post-Suez regional superpower—seeking to balance Greek-Turk (and
consequently NATO) interests.' In parallel, Cypriot dccolonisation was gathering
strength as a movement, and having been discussed at the UNGA from 1954 to 1958,
the British were slowly resigning themselves to the idea of self-determination—or,
rather, the familiar device of devolving responsible government to Cyprus within the
Commonwealth. Dual nationality and a Greek and Turkish sharing of administration
on the island constituted the salient points of the 'Macmillan Plan' of 1958- a plan
which the Colonial Office classified as 'pre-partition', and the British Prime Minister
himself described as 'metaphysical partition'. This framework was to shape profoundly
the subsequent constitutional settlement in 1960."
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4.2.2 The 1960 constitutional 'settlement'
In early 1959 talks were held in Thrich between Greece, Turkey and Britain. In keeping
with the island's history, the two Cypriot communities were not party to the
negotiations which led to final agreements at the London Conference on Cyprus in
February, when action was taken to prepare for a transfer of sovereignty.' The so-
called Ziirich-London Agreements were made up of three international treaties through
which the ROC's 'alliance' was to be determined by a Greek and Turk military presence
on the island, its 'establishment' was to safeguard a British military presence also, while
its constitution was to be 'guaranteed' by Greece, Turkey and Britain. Article 1 of the
Draft Treaty of Guarantee declared that;
"Nile Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its
independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its
Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political
or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited
any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other
State or partition of the Island"."
Without any referendum on the island, the communities were presented with a fait
accompli; both enosis and taksim were to be abandoned.
In providing for a `bicommunal' state, however, the constitution recognised the
two communities by their ethnic origin, language, culture and religion; indeed, this
communal dualism was most effectively institutionalised in government offices.
Recruitment to positions of power was to be made explicitly on the criterion of the
ethnic identity of the applicants." Executive power was divided between a Greek
Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President; while there was an inherent
provision for bona fide cooperation between the two leaders, both had the power of final
veto over legislation and decisions of the House of Representatives and of the cabinet on
foreign affairs, defence and internal security." The public service was to be separated
between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot on a 70:30 ratio respectively; this was even
reflected in the Council of Ministers where one of three key posts (defence, finance, or
foreign affairs) was also to be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot. Representatives of the
House were to be elected separately by the two ethnic groups and divided into two
communal chambers, while, once again, the House president was Greek Cypriot and the
vice-president Turkish Cypriot. Finally, composition of the lower courts in the judicial
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system was to be determined by communal membership. Whilst in addition to a Greek
Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot representative, the Supreme Court was composed of a
'neutral' judge—neither a citizen of Greece, Turkey or Britain. In essence, therefore,
the two communities were seen as "the two sharers of the power, resources and wealth
of the State";' within this framework, 'other' citizens—the Maronites, Armenians,
Lebanese which made up nearly 2% of the island's population at the time—were given
three months to choose the community to which they were to 'belong' (all opted to be
`Greeks'). Not only was the identity problem left unaddressed, its symptoms had been
accentuated.
4.2.3 1960-1974: from independence to de facto partition
With independence on 16 August 1960, 'Cypriot' society was now more territorially-
defined than ever before; it was de jure synonymous with the island and not,
specifically, with an 'anomalously' aterritorial Hellenic notion of identity, nor with any
ideal of a 'Greater' Turkish nation. The ROC formally fell under a new leadership of
what was nominally a Cypriot `nation-state'. Following elections the previous
December, Malcarios became President and Dr Fazil Kactik took up the post of Vice-
President.
The constitution, which had been imposed by third parties, was now ironically
left to the two communities with minimal third-party involvement in implementation.31
It was not long before the 199-article constitution focused itself as two major issues. Of
primary debate was the Turkish Cypriot insistence on implementation of their
constitutional right to fill 30% of the public service posts, a prerequisite for a shared
division of resources.' The Greek Cypriots argued, with some justification that there
was a shortage of qualified Turkish Cypriots, conscious also of the discrepancy between
the specified ratio and the general population ratio on the island (80:20). Greek Cypriot
civil servants threatened collective resignation, and numerous appointments were
disputed in the Supreme Court (now with a German 'neutral' judge)." Turkish Cypriots
feared being by-passed and dominated in political affairs.' Operational deadlock
similarly developed in legislative bodies, to the extent that taxes were eventually used to
finance separate communal institutions.
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Perhaps more significant was what became known as 'the battle of the five
towns': Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos were to be divided under
separate Greek and Turkish councils according to the constitution, which stated that a
'co-ordinating body' made up both communities would 'concern itself with matters
which required a degree of cooperation' .35 Accordingly, five separated municipalities in
the five district towns, which had existed de facto from the EOKA uprisings in 1955,
were to receive de jure recognition on the basis of territorial separation. 36 Their
continuation was to be reviewed after four years. This 'municipal partition' was never
effected by the Greeks Cypriots; the Turkish Cypriots stopped paying rates, vetoed
Government financial policies, and eventually 'legalised' councils of their own in early
1963.3'
A constitutional deadlock had come about. Post-independence, with the
formalisation of ethnic and political cleavages, the nationalist sentiments of both
communities were rapidly evolving and immobilising the state apparatus." In essence,
the Turkish Cypriots feared a majority, Greek Cypriot leadership seeking to erode their
newly-won rights, while Greek Cypriots saw Turkish Cypriot obstructionism as a
prelude to a Turkish-initiated partition. Each side sought to ethnicise the state in its
favour," and as certain elements of each community become more frustrated, and
looked to Greece and Turkey for support, so the problem was further internationalised
(by right of birth the republic had sought to establish itself with the UN, the Council of
Europe, the British Commonwealth, and the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations).
On 30 November 1963 Makarios, who had always claimed the constitution was
imposed by force majeure, moved unilaterally to alter it. Among the thirteen changes
proposed would be unified town councils and the abolition of the 70:30 ratio of Greek
and Turkish Cypriots in the public services. Certain areas would fall under
'Improvement Boards' to be designated by the government, as a unitary state with
majority rule was implicitly sought in favour of the Greek Cypriot community. Cyprus
had indeed become geopolitically a terra nullius, a political instead of an administrative
`orphan'. 4° Malcarios' non-aligned, anti-NATO stance had the tacit support of the
island's largest and by now Communist-dominated labour movement AKEL41 , and these
strategic manoeuvrings did not go unnoticed. In reply to the proposed amendments,
Kticiik warned of the spectre of enosis and called for the rejuvenation of the
bicommunal state, or acceptance of partition; at the local level, the government was
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pressed to demarcate pre-existing if blurred ethnic municipal boundaries. Significantly,
on 16 December Turkey also officially rejected the amendments if only for the
precedent they were setting. 42 Within five days the much-predicted intercommunal
violence began, and 700 Turkish Cypriot hostages were seized in north Nicosia. 43 The
development of 'private armies' on the island, which had been stockpiling since
independence, was further encouraged. The constitution had stated that 40% of the
'national' army was to be made up of Turkish Cypriots, yet Ktictik and Makarios
insisted on ethnically dividing and integrating units respectively. The compromise of
independence instead of enosis had appalled the military leader of EOKA, General
Grivas (a Cyprus-born Greek army officer), and a conscript Greek Cypriot National
Guard came to be staffed by Greek officers and controlled from Athens. In early 1963
their expansionist `Akritas Plan' went so far as to rejuvenate the idea of enosis, through
force if necessary.
Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey had been able to maintain on
the island 950 and 650 troops respectively; in December, they both left their camps near
Nicosia to join the fighting. In the capital, Turkish Cypriot representatives in the
government, House of Representatives, Civil Service, Police and Army moved from
their positions and into the Turkish quarter, thus creating de facto Greek Cypriot
government bodies. By 25 December, the threat of Turkish military intervention
pressured Makarios into a cease-fire while he appealed unilaterally to the UN Security
Council. A tripartite force, involving the three Guarantors' forces stationed on the
island, was formed in principle (although at no time did this truce force act in unison to
maintain order; in practice, the British contingent led the way as `postcolonial'
peacekeepers)." A London conference in the new year broke down as Greek Cypriot
demands for the abrogation of the London-nrich agreements and a unitary state clashed
with Turkish Cypriot calls for geographical partition."
The Security Council was to eventually debate the issue in February, with
Makarios seeking to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee and to have recognition of what
was, de facto, a monocommunal ROC reaffirmed. He rejected a US-proposal of NATO
peacekeepers and the US, conscious of a Soviet-Greek Cypriot alliance on the island,
warned Makarios that UN precedent suggested that, were Turkey to intervene, partition
would be the favoured solution."
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By March 1964 Makarios was to learn from Turkey that unless there was an
immediate cease-fire, an end to 'the killing of Turks', and a return of all hostages,
Turkey would 'use the right of unilateral action conferred on her by the Treaty of
Guarantee'!" Turkish forces on the island positioned themselves around northern
Nicosia, and there were reports of military concentrations along Turkey's southern
coast. Following an emergency meeting of the Security Council the tension subsided,
and emphasis was placed on quickly introducing what was then only the third mission
by a world peacekeeping force." Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March, set
against the backdrop of escalating tension in the Eastern Mediterranean which in Anglo-
American eyes had generated a peace imperative, fell in Makarios' favour and called for
a UN mediator and for the setting up a peacekeeping force to take over from the British.
Even if the status of the treaties remained an open question, most importantly the
legitimacy of what had now become a Greek Cypriot government had been secured at
the highest level. The resolution recommended, inter alia;
"that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international
peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and,
as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order
and a return to normal conditions".49
The mandate was only timetabled for a 3 month period. Given its ambiguous use of
language (Appendix 5), it was interpreted differently. For the Greek Cypriot
community, while UNFICYP was to operate as a neutral this did not equate with
equality in treatment; rather, UNFICYP's role was to assist (the Greek Cypriots) in the
elimination of the 'rebels' and 'separatist movement' and, in so doing, return Turkish
Cypriot territorial enclaves to 'government' control. Mistakenly, it was also believed
that the 1960 treaties would be revised and that an internationalisation of the conflict
through the UN would negate Turkey's threat of invasion. By contrast, UNFICYP was
greeted by the Turkish Cypriot side as protectors and, more importantly, a 'return to
normal conditions' was read as UNFICYP restoring the equal status of the two Cypriot
communities as under the 1960 constitution, if not on the same geographical basis." In
turn, the UN mediator's role was to bequeath it equal recognition, a vital piece of
diplomatic armour which had been temporarily lost under Resolution 186.5'
As for the UN, both of these interpretations were rejected. The mandate, while
recognising one side as the legitimate government, was to be informally interpreted such
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that UNFICYP could maintain an 'uneasy equilibrium'. 52
 As for the 'return to normal
conditions', this was seen to necessitate providing assistance in ameliorating
administrative, economic, social and judicial problems arising from the communal
divisions.' For both communities and for the UN, therefore, if for completely different
reasons, a 'return to normal conditions' was seen spatially to redress the island-wide
political circumstances. This was to prove significant when, after the creation of the
buffer zone ten years later, this part of the mandate was to be recentred onto activities in
the de facto border region
In spite of its contested meaning, this mandate was to remain intact throughout
the rest of the 1960s. The communal divide had widened as Greek Cypriots moved
towards majority political control and the Turkish Cypriots stood by power-sharing. As
violent clashes continued and chaos reigned, the Greek Cypriot government charged
TMT with coordinating the mass movement, and UNFICYP—in particular the
preliminary British contingent—of tacitly partitioning parts of the island. These charges
of partitionist and non-cooperation tactics grew as the Turkish Cypriot leadership more
frequently pointed out that coexistence in a unitary state as proposed by the Greek
Cypriots was unacceptable. m A year after the Nicosia incident 25,000 Turkish Cypriots
had become refugees, nearly 5% of the community's population, 4,000 of whom were in
temporary refugee camps awaiting their return." Turkish Cypriots had evacuated 72
mixed villages and abandoned another 24 solely-Turkish Cypriot villages in their quest
to move to the security of Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves'."
By June, Turkey was reaffirming its intentions to attack, while Greece reiterated
its promise to follow Turkey into any war. Much to Turkey's frustration, an eleventh-
hour letter from US President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonti temporarily silenced
them, while also ostracising them within NATO. Nonetheless, by August, in response
to Greek and Greek Cypriot forces' attacks on the strategically vital Turkish Cypriot
enclaves in Tylliria (especially aimed at neutralising the Kokkina beach-head), there
were Turkish air force bombardments. By now Cyprus had become entangled in Cold
War politics. Ever more conscious of a potential Greco-Turkish war and the strategic
significance of Cyprus on the south-eastern flank of NATO, US peacemaker Acheson
forwarded a revised yet just as ill-judged 'double enosis' plan (negotiated between
Greece and Turkey) at a conference in Geneva which called for, inter alia, the
unification of Cyprus with Greece, the provision of a military base on the island for
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Turkey, and the territorial division of Cyprus into eight cantons (two of which were to
be administered by Turkish Cypriots)." Turkey provisionally accepted it, while
Makarios rejected its attack on Cyprus' 'full and unrestricted independence'. Now fully
cognitive of Turkey's military commitment to the conflict, a guarantee of military
protection was sought by Makarios from the USSR, which duly publicised its
commitment in response to what they perceived as a threat near to its their 'southern
borders' .58 Tensions subsided, but further diplomatic battles were won by Makarios.
The Gabo Plaza report of March 1965, the first major perspective on the conflict
presented by a UN mediator suggested the abandonment of talks on the basis of the
1960 accords and by rejecting any notion of federation. This implicitly backed
Makarios' long-term objectives to the extent that Turkey rejected the UN mediator's
role outright. In the General Assembly, Makarios' predicament struck a chord with
newly-independent decolonised states.
In the absence of intercommunal and international diplomatic interventions,
General Grivas—the Greek Commander of the Cyprus National Guard—led armed
clashes in November 1967 with Turkish Cypriots into the enclaves of Kokkina and
Ayios Theodhorus. Once again Turkey talked of a major attack but was dissuaded by
intensive US, NATO and UN shuttle diplomacy, spearheaded by Cyrus Vance. Greek
troops were forced to withdraw, although geopolitical variables were proving unstable
as Makarios (now perceived in the US as the 'Castro of the Mediterranean') refused to
dismantle the National Guard and received Soviet support in his argument that the
Greek junta—which had ruled since the coup in April—had received US backing."
Makarios was now more consciously distancing himself from the junta, viewing
independence as more 'feasible' than enosis; at these polar opposites, however, the
National Guard was becoming increasingly split.
Throughout the 1964-67 period the political landscape had rapidly changed as
more Turkish Cypriots withdrew and concentrated into territorially-distinct enclaves.
Given the fragmented control of its dispersed territories, the Turkish Cypriot leadership
was initially disrupted; a civil-military synthesis of administration was to develop
whereby a 'General Committee' had formed in the urban enclave of Nicosia by May
1964, while the Turkish Cypriot quarters of the district towns were operating as
municipalities.' From December 1967, this fragmented administration was to
transform into the 'Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration' (PTCA) as the Turkish
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Cypriot leadership sought recognition of their apparatus for a 'state within a state'."
Once geographically separated, economic development remained—in Sherif s
terminology—a common goal of both communities, but was conducted unilaterally and
asynchronously." Separation was most prominent in the large towns, where services
and administrative structures were duplicated. UNFICYP became key negotiators in
managing any intercommunal trade.' With Greek Cypriots controlling over 90% of the
island, the local balance of power was overwhelmingly in favour of the majority
population." At the time of independence the average per capita income of a Turkish
Cypriot was around 20% below that of a Greek Cypriot, while between 1961 and 1971
the Turkish Cypriot's mean per capita income dropped to half that of their
counterparts.° In the mid-1960s, the economic embargoes were virtually
comprehensive as the ROCs government argued that materials and merchandise could
easily be used for armed efforts.
Frequent charges of discrimination were made by Turkish Cypriots of the
island's now wholly-Greek Cypriot administration. By the time the UN arrived in late
March 1964, approximately 55,000 Turkish Cypriots were relying on food and medical
supplies from Turkey. 66
 The ROC built new roads, electricity supply lines and water
distribution networks which circumvented the enclaves, arguing that facilities were not
provided in villages which owed money to the 'government' and that District Officers
also collecting taxes were prevented access to the enclaves.' By September 1964,
4,000 Turkish Cypriots were without their income from government posts.°
Guaranteed water supplies ended, and with restrictions on the sinking of boreholes,
water rationing being commonplace during the frequent dry periods. With the
breakdown of functional unity, agriculture became the hardest hit sector of the Turkish
Cypriot economy, although UNFICYP—in addition to their more general humanitarian
assistance—effectively escorted farmers to their fields.° Even so, conflicts arose over
harvesting rights, and UNFICYP estimated in 1966 that half of Turkish Cypriot
abandoned lands were being leased to the other community while the ROC government
tried to impose up to 50% taxes on Turkish Cypriots grains being produced in the
northern enclave of Nicosia." In the light of these constraints there was little private
investment by the Turkish Cypriot business community; for them new, transboundary
relations were evolving with the Turkish mainland and with UNFICYP.
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Both parts of Cyprus survived in their separate ways, pursuing their different
goals, and the boundaries between them took on a new solidity and endurance,
physically and psychologically. It was the Greek Cypriot government, and their claims
to the whole island, that brought the greatest reaction from the Turkish Cypriot
leadership. Greek Cypriot observers noted the 'symmetry' and 'symbiosis' of the
communities' cultures, which had become threatened only upon foreign intervention!'
In the economic sector, if any, there was more or less complete unity and mutual
dependence of the two communities pre-1960. 72 Yet the degree of cohesion, of
commonality, of nationhood, was now clearly contested; paradoxically, the economic
blockade of enclaves was itself part of a cycle of reprisals which made Turkish Cypriots
more insistent on a separatist solution, coupled with often-self-imposed isolation of the
Turkish Cypriot community!'
At the 'grassroots' level, however, limited cooperation over community issues
survived as patterns of coexistence were never totally disrupted!' and this received a
boost when intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash (having returned from
exile in Turkey) began in 1968, now based notably on the equal status of the
representatives of the two communities!' Although the restrictions of Turkish Cypriot
freedom of movement was lifted in March 1968, 7' and intercommunal relations visibly
improved, the spatial segregation remained as the Turkish Cypriots rejected the
Secretary-General's suggestion of allowing the free movement of Greek Cypriots
through their enclaves!' By now, there were even fewer political and associational
organisations that transcended ethnic divisions, and those that remained were exposed to
viscious attacks from right-wing elements within both communities who sought to
negate a 'Cypriot' nation in preference for a Turk or Hellenic ideal!' Two
subcommittees, established during intercommunal negotiations in 1969, met until
January 1970 to study, inter alia, Turkish Cypriot participation in the public utilities
(i.e., water, electricity, telecommunications), only to remain 'in limbo' due to a lack of
substantive agreement!' Overall, the territories remained ethnically homogenous. As
Patrick noted prophetically in 1971, given the fragmented character and size of the
Turkish Cypriot territories, compulsory migrations and land swaps would be needed if a
viable geographic base was to be established."
From November 1972, with Grivas back on the island, the resurrection of an
increasingly anti-Malcarios form of EOKA came to light. One year after the
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establishment of EOKA-B, which was vehemently opposed to 'partition disguised as
enosis' , Makarios also learnt of a change of head of the Greek military junta, and
tension between Makarios (having survived various assassination attempts) and the
Greek government heightened. By mid-1974, it was Greek military action that was
looking a possibility. Intercommunal talks on the island had been suspended since 2
April and, in May, the Secretary-General understatedly reported 'little progress' towards
a return to 'normal conditions'. 81 On 6 July 1974 Makarios publicly claimed that the
650 Greek officers with the Cyprus National Guard were collaborating with EOKA-B.
As he called for their withdrawal, Greek and Greek Cypriot National Guard troops on
15 July moved in to depose him and to open the way for Nikos Sampson, notorious for
his killings of the British with EOKA and his anti-Turkish and pro-enosis sentiments, as
de facto leader of the state.
Turkey's reactions to the coup d'etat against the island's government,
orchestrated by the National Guard and under the direction of Greek officers, had been
seriously underestimated. Disregarding pressure to reach a non-military solution from
both an ambivalent Britain and a US preoccupied with 'Watergate', Turkey chose to
intervene sending sea and airborne forces to northern Cyprus on 20 July. Unilaterally
invoking the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, it began an extensive military operation in the
north which eventually culminated in the control of around 37% of the island. To
counter what was eventually internationally rebuked, Turkish Cypriots (backed by
Turkey) pointed out that a return to the status quo ante was impossible given the
subordinate role their minority had come to play in that state; the Turkish 'Peace
Operation' had been prompted by the coup d'etat while noting that the other
guarantor—Greece—was the perpetrator.
The Greek mainland military junta was to collapse on 22 July, Sampson
resigned a day later, and Clerides became Acting-President in Makarios' absence (the
latter having escaped, ironically, to London thus confounding reports of his
assassination). UNSC Resolution 353 called for tripartite talks, and Britain, Greece and
Turkey met in Geneva from 25 July. Further talks began on 10 August, only for both
Gi.ines and Denktash to propose geographical separation, whereby Turkish Cypriots
would control 34% of the island in total (see below). The Geneva conference broke
down on 13 August and a second phase of the military activity began, to be concluded
three days later with another but this time final cease-fire arrangement. Ecevit, the
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Turkish Prime Minister, was to declare that the foundations for a federal state were now
laid, although there were still some 40,000 Turkish Cypriots left in the south.' While
Turkey had won a military victory and the Turkish Cypriot community had been saved
from what was arguably developing into some form of enosis, the second phase of the
military intervention brought widespread condemnation for rejecting a non-violent path
to a solution." Precise figures may never emerge, but the events of July-August 1974
reportedly claimed the lives of 900 Turkish Cypriots with 600-900 missing (from a
Turkish Cypriot population of some 116,000), the lives of 2,000 Turkish troops, and
from the Greek Cypriot community (which at the time totalled approximately 500,200)
2,000 deaths and over 1,600 missing. More than a third of the island's total population
became refugees, 180,000 of them Greek Cypriot."
4.3	 Territorial Partition
In the light of these political, economic and social developments on the island, a more
detailed examination of the spatial manifestations of the process of partition holds
several benefits. The four main stages of the ROC's territorial partition are therefore
considered below.
4.3.1 The United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas
With the turmoil of the intercommunal conflict, it is often forgotten that the first
modern-day international boundaries of Cyprus—de jure or de facto—were those
delimiting the ROC from British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). They were to impact
on the 'island state' to the extent that even before the events of 1974 the ROC's
sovereign control was never to be fully independent, nor fully synonymous with the
island of Cyprus. Moreover, it was to perpetuate the temptation for 'outsiders' to treat
Cyprus as a tactical pawn rather than as a fully independent country."
Upon Cyprus's independence, two bases—Dhekelia SBA and Akrotiri SBA—
were retained by Britain as sovereign territory (Appendix 6 (a)).86 The British
government, conscious of the 'security of tenure' on the island as a base for the Middle
East, had been unwilling to concede in negotiations, and their involvement in the future
137
Partitioning Cyprus
of Cyprus was further legitimised in their role as a guarantor of the new republic's
independence, territorial integrity and security." Yet they faced an Archbishop who
sought to mitigate the resentment of exclusion from the Zurich-London agreements by
extracting as many concessions as possible. Negotiations in February 1960 focused on
the size of bases, and on the location of ancillary facilities. While in May 1959 the
British Foreign Office had talked of bases covering 160 square miles (m 2) including
seven villages, the first Cypriot delegation suggested 36 m 2, excluding all villages. 88 An
unsuccessful British counter-proposal provided for an area of 120 m 2 with the exclusion
of all villages except Akrotiri. Following a series of talks, Makarios dropped out of the
negotiations; they were contributing to the postponement of the republic's declaration of
independence, at a time when the economy was stagnating and unemployment was
exacerbating intercommunal tensions." It was left for Kticiik on 2 April to propose an
area of 100 m2, and on 1 July an agreement was eventually reached; a total of 99 m 2 of
non-ceded lands was eventually demarcated as British sovereign territory, roughly 3%
of the island land area.9°
Demarcation was undertaken by a Boundary Commission composed of
representatives appointed by the former colonial power and the ROC. Provision was
made for the settlement by an 'independent expert' of any question regarding correct
interpretation, and minor amendments to the boundaries taking into account local
administrative conditions were allowed, if agreed by both sides." The limits of the land
boundary and the territorial sea boundary were delimited as international boundaries
within the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. Delimitation of the former attempted to
minimise military use of what was highly productive territory. Akrotiri's boundary
excluded much of an intensively cultivated horticultural region west of Limassol; even
so, irrigated land in the northeast of the peninsula was incorporated as a land connection
between an air base and camps, the island's largest salt lake became a military sensitive
sight, and the Greek Cypriot village of Akrotiri was incorporated. 92 Dhekelia SBA, by
contrast, included at the time mainly unirrigated cropland. It nevertheless extended for
24 km along the coast, and enforced the `enclavemene of two villages and much of their
irrigated lands and two areas (separated by a British road) encompassing Dhekelia
power station."
While the territorial land boundary was clearly delimited and demarcated, the
territorial sea boundary was, characteristic of maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern
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Mediterranean as a whole, less well defined (see Appendix 6 (b)). 94 The SBAs were
governed, along with the UK's other dependencies, by the Territorial Waters
Jurisdiction Act of 1878. 95
 Four specific lines were established running from the low-
water mark off the international boundary terminals. They were not lines of
equidistance, however, but instead appeared to have been drawn perpendicular to the
shoreline.96
 As they proceeded away from the coast the orientation of the line changed,
presumably because a greater length of coast was considered in determining its general
direction.' It is important to note that the agreed maritime boundaries did not have any
seaward terminus, and could theoretically be continued indefinitely or until the adjacent
lines connected—as they would do 32 nautical miles (nm) offshore in the case of
Dhekelia SBA." As such, they could accommodate both the UK claim of 3 nm and the
Greek Cypriot claim of 12 nm, as well as any extension of either claim (Appendix 6
(c))."
The functional character of the SBAs' boundaries were also clarified. Annex F
to the Treaty of Establishment detailed that both governments recognised that—in order
not to "impair the economic, commercial or industrial unity and life of the Island"—
customs barriers ought to be avoided with duty and tax of any sort, once having been
charged, exempted on goods crossing the border.' 99
 Subject to the 'military
requirements and security needs of the British government', the Cypriots were granted
freedom of movement across the boundaries, and extensive rights regarding
administration, cultivation and employment inside the bases. Similarly, Cypriots had
freedom of navigation and fishing in the SBAs territorial waters. An annual rent of
UK£12 million (mn) was to be paid to the ROC until 1965, and then subject to review;
this was withheld from 1964, however, as payment to 'Cypriots' proved too legally
complicating for the British authorities.' As for Britain's more general presence on the
island, it retained the right to use, without restriction or interference, forty specified
smaller sites including buildings, water sources, parts of ports, and Nicosia airport. 192 A
further ten training areas (including land, sea and air space) were available to British
forces for restricted use; these were in fact larger than the SBAs.193
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4.3.2 The 'green line' of Nicosia
Before the establishment of the SBAs, during the inter-communal troubles between
1955-59, a proto-boundary had developed in Nicosia within-the-walls with the
ironically-named 'Mason-Dixon line', a wire fence following Paphos and Hermes
Streets for most of its length. This physically separated the Greek and Turkish quarters
of the Old City, and the 'green line' was later to mirror it.'" The killing of two Turkish
Cypriots on 21 December, as Greek Cypriot policemen patrolled the Old City's 'red-
light' area (which was situated, for 'mutual convenience', on the borderline between the
two communities), was to encourage the formation of barricades.' Following more,
localised fighting and the likelihood of a Turkish military intervention, a nominal cease-
fire was agreed on Christmas Day. The next day British representatives suggested to
Makarios the deployment of SBA troops in positions where they could separate the two
communities.
The events surrounding the delimitation process were to prove revealing of how
the UNBZ would eventually evolve. Major-General Peter Young, the commander of the
British units, met the British High Commissioner and senior representatives from both
communities, while Greek and Turkish diplomats and commanders were also
consulted.'' Primarily, the commander was aware of a fragile peace; in response, a
'neutral zone' was sought within which troops could observe fighters' movements.
Ground-level observations of fighters' positions were made but agreement was not
forthcoming, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership continued to reject British patrols, whilst
offering their own interpretation of any boundary—notably along the lines of Menderes'
representation (Figure 4.1)." It was not until the night of 28 December that an
agreement of sorts was possible, during a meeting at the British High Commission:
Clerides and Georghadjis represented the Greek Cypriot community, Denktash and
Orek represented the Turkish Cypriots, whilst Greek, Turkish and British officials were
also present. At 4 am the following morning general agreement had been achieved; a
'Joint Political Committee' was to oversee the formation of a peace force, and the
establishment of a 'neutral zone' had been eventually accepted;
"[t]ime and time again [the commander's] green chinagraph pencil retraced the
line across the talc of his field map, only to be rubbed out and changed in
direction to suit the requirements of one side or the other. At last the pencil
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Figure 4.2	 The 'green line' of Nicosia within-the-walls
Source: 'Green line' delimitation based on UNF1CYP Master Map, D/008/96, Scale
1:7,500
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wavered no more—and the Green Line [sic] was finally and irrevocably
drawn,,.108
The line (Figure 4.2) was soon demarcated using oil drums distinctively painted
green.' Outside Nicosia's walls, the line snaked along the forward positions of
opposing fighters, rarely more than the width of a street across and inviting the fighters
to infiltrate buildings which marked the boundary.
• A tripartite 'Truce Force', to include contingents from the three guarantor states,
was immediately created to disengage forces and to bring Nicosia back "to a state of
normality". 110
 In practice, however, a force of only 2,700 British soldiers remained to
keep the peace. The 'green line' legitimised the separation of the two main
communities, providing a `chinagraph frontier' which was to soon outlive its original
purpose of ensuring a workable but temporary cease-fire." Yet, while the Greek
Cypriots rejected it for its restrictions on their 'unfettered independence', and Turkish
Cypriots noted its symbol of partition, it was largely the fear of attack and abduction
which had halted movement within the capital; elsewhere on the island, in places where
no cease-fire lines existed, it was significant that each community remained in its own
sector.'12
4.3.3 The Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves'
In December 1963, as Turkish troops left their barracks to take up strategic positions in
Nicosia's suburbs of Orta Keuy and Geunyeli, and Turkish fighter planes were flying
over the island, petty violations of the 'green line' were quickly to take on greater
proportions. With the cease-fire, enclaves had developed in areas with a relatively high
local density of Turkish Cypriots or mixed villages.' Although only a few areas were
to become recognised formally by UNFICYP as 'enclaves', eventually forty-four
pockets of Turkish Cypriot territory developed, including the urban quarters of Nicosia,
Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos. Even in Paphos District, which at the time had the
highest ratio of Turk to Greek (1:3), the desire to settle in population clusters rather than
risk geographical divorce became paramount for Turkish Cypriots."'
The largest and strategically most important enclave extended from north
Nicosia northwards, high into the Kyrenia range, merging with the Turkish Cypriot
village of Temblos on the coast. This enclave was 130 km2
 in area with 35,000
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inhabitants, of whom approximately one fifth were refugees. The Geunyeli-Aghirda
enclave, as it became known, developed not only because of its proximity to the origin
of intercommunal violence in Nicosia, but also as a result of a large catchment area in
Nicosia's surrounding mixed and Turkish Cypriot villages. It had entrapped both the
Nicosia-Kyrenia road (a route for the anticipated Turkish military intervention) and the
stronghold of St Hilarion castle, necessitating the drawing of new cease-fire lines
(CFLs) by UNFICYP. It was centred in central Nicosia, where both communities had
improved and extended their defensive positions along the 'green line', which was
subsequently redelimited and redemarcated—a cordon sanitaire had been established
between the opposing forces' fighting positions. From March 1964, UNFICYP began
to monitor this 'no-man's land' with which they were 'saddled', based as it was on an
agreement to which they had not been party to.115
In this sense, a part of Nicosia, along with other less distinct enclaves in the
major towns, was in fact territorially separated; it is clear nonetheless that territorial
partition was incomplete and Nicosia was able to continue operating functionally.
Representations of `enclaving' elsewhere were similarly deceptive in that certain areas
remained contested in the eyes of UNFICYP. Invariably, 'local agreements' had been
drawn up to overcome the interlocking mosaic of social and economic movements. The
intercommunal boundaries, as Patrick noted, resembled more of 'frontier zones';
"such zones are ill-defined, and their irregular shapes depend on local patterns of
ethnic settlement, land ownership, communication, transportation, and
intercommunal hostility".116
Enclaves were often surrounded by two concentric rings of fortified posts, between
which UNFICYP patrolled a 'contested zone'. 117
 There were geographical
idiosyncrasies in certain urban areas, however: around the Turkish quarter of Famagusta
a demilitarised zone was established; in Paphos a derelict 'no-man's land' ran through
the town; while, in Larnaca, a confrontation line similar to that in Nicosia came under
UNFICYP's surveillance and (also like Nicosia) continued to restrict the freedom of
movement after January 1964. 1 ' 8 The disengagement of forces in Limassol in February
1964, which was overseen by a 'Political Liaison Committee', did not necessitate
CFLs. 119 The most innocuous enclave could be found at Ktima (Paphos), where British
troops established a cease-fire in March 1964 only to then demarcate and patrol a CFL
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as in Nicosia and Larnaca, yet encompassing a Turkish Cypriot area only a few hundred
yards square in size."
In the light of Makarios' municipal amendments, and his belief in integrating
Cyprus with Greece so that the 'borders of Greece' would extend to North Africa,
territorially the control of the main Turkish areas became an imperative. Reflecting an
increasingly ethnocentric view of Cypriot territory in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot
community, without such clear demarcation these areas would remain perpetually an
'archipelago' of neighbourhoods, townships and villages within a 'Greek sea'." Legal
recognition of separate communal status within the five main municipalities was
inadequate unless a spatial dimension was added." The Turkish Cypriot community
had created new functional regimes, adding a vital spatial dimension to their call for
recognition." These 'holes' now riddled the nominally unitary Republic, and by 1964
only 48 mixed villages remained.'
Given UNFICYP's formal recognition of the 'enclaves' generated only by cease-
fires which they oversaw (Nicosia, Kokkina, Limnitis and, at times, Ktima), these
territories officially constituted only between 0.5-1.6% of the island's land area yet, in
reality, some 10% of the island's territory was now enclaved'." By extension,
approximately 90% of all Turkish Cypriots lived in areas outside the military control of
the recognised government." In November 1964, UNFICYP had reached an agreement
with the ROC such that, while the 'whole' island was open to UNFICYP movements,
access was largely restricted to the enclaves.' Lightly armed community forces on
both sides successfully controlled movement on certain roads. Yet, this new spatial
regime was to reproduce many pre-existing barriers; concrete walls represented
'psychological walls' and, in the sense that the UN aided it, it was becoming a 'partition
be default' .'28
Acheson's proposal had envisaged a sovereign Turkish base on the eastern
panhandle of Karpas, but Turkish Cypriots would have only two or three areas of 'local
self-administration'." As for Gab o Plaza's report a year later, the Turkish Cypriot case
for federation had been firmly rejected; moreover, the island was to be demilitarised
thus exacerbating Turkish Cypriot fears for security. On 22 February 1965, Ktictik had
forwarded a memorandum calling for the creation of a boundary to separate the two
communities (Figure 4.3). Running from Yalia on the north-west coast, through
Nicosia's 'green line' before reaching Famagusta on the east, the boundary would create
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Figure 4.3
	 Turkish Cypriot proposal to Gabo Plaza, 1965
Source: Karouzis (1976: 86).
a new territory of over 1,000 m2, 38% of the Republic's area. While they had left room
for compromise, not surprisingly the proposal was poorly received by both the Greek
Cypriot administration and the UN (and was dubbed the 'Attila line')."° Between late
1970 and mid-1971, during intercommunal negotiations, Clerides was reported to be
providing for the redrawing of district boundaries whereby the Turkish Cypriot
populace, lands and administrative centres would be more coincident."' But by 1970
there remained only 35 'mixed' villages, with 105 now exclusively Turkish Cypriot, and
the PICA sought the redrawing of autonomous boundaries primarily according to
'communal' considerations.'32
Any formal recognition of the enclaves' territory would have proven impossible
in practice. Their delimitation remained contested, CFLs were inexact and their
ambiguities led to many micro-territorial clashes. Inevitably, given the fluidity of
territorial control at the local scale over an eleven-year period, and their general
contestation, a variety of cartographic representations were to be provided. While
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Patrick's mapping of the enclaves in 1970 (Figure 4.4) remained the most widely-cited,
several other interpretations (such as the Kolodny map of 1971, which resembled
markedly an American version) effectively demonstrated both the contested and fluid
nature of the intercommunal boundaries.' Patrick's work differed (and sometimes
significantly) from previously unpublished observations made by Blake and Drury in
1973 which, given the partial 'normalisation' of relations five years previously, sought
to distinguish between Turkish Cypriot settlements which controlled Greek movement
from those which did not (Figure 4.5). Nonetheless, in principle, the enclaves had
become 'ghettos with an extraterritorial status'." Cumulatively, they had become the
'geographical stepping stones' to Turkish Cypriot autonomy and, ultimately, de facto
statehood. 135
4.3.4 The United Nations buffer zone
In view of the time that had passed since its establishment, it is noteworthy how much
remains undisclosed about the initial creation of the buffer zone." What were the
reasons for the introduction of such a territorial regime? How was the final decision on
its delimitation reached? To what extent was there agreement between and within the
Greek, Turk, British and UNFICYP representatives, and how did this relate to the
aspirations of the two Cypriot leaderships? The significance of these issues is fully
demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7.
The coup d'etat on 15 July 1974 had set in motion the most territorially
disruptive chain of events in the island's modern history. Five days later Turkish Forces
had swamped the Cyprus theatre of conflict, with landings by parachute and helicopter-
borne troops into the main Nicosia-Kyrenia enclave, and seaborne troops west of
Kyrenia. Despite virtually guaranteed naval and air superiority, Turkish Forces made
slower progress than the three days anticipated.' 37 Faced with strong Greek and Greek
Cypriot resistance, a shortage of ammunition, both the seaborne assault and paratroopers
succeeded only in reaching Geunyeli as other Turkish Cypriot enclaves fell to the
National Guard. Eventually, a wedge was driven from the Kyrenia bridgehead to forces
in Nicosia, establishing an overcrowded corridor of some 8% of the island.' A cease-
fire was brought about on 22 July but, for the Turkish government, while the area
secured would "remain permanently as a Turkish Cypriot region" and would "form the
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basis for the final settlement of the Cyprus problem",'" the boundaries established
proved insufficient for Turkish purposes, with some 50-60,000 Turkish Cypriots
(approximately half the community) still lying outside the now enlarged Kyrenia-
Nicosia enclave."° UNFICYP assisted in delimiting opposing forces' positions as at
1600 hrs, but its Commander, Prem Chand, had failed to get universally ratified any
document listing conditions to be observed."'
In spite of the collapse of the Greek junta, fighting and intercommunal atrocities
resumed the next day and Turkish Forces edged outwards from their stronghold. The
commercially and politically significant Nicosia International Airport—at the time
under Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek army control, but constituting a new
objective for Turkish Forces—received particular attention. British SBA Forces, who
still held the right to exercise control over the airport in emergency under the 1960
constitution, augmented the UN troops.' 42 The UK found itself (as the main troop
contributor) 'within an hour' of war with Turkey, but the airport was not taken and,
once fully occupied by UNFICYP troops, it was declared a UN 'protected area'." 3 The
US were finally able to initiate the conference which they had sought since the start of
Turkey's operations; while Turkish units were still advancing, Greek and Turkish
delegations met under British chairmanship (Foreign Secretary Callaghan) at Geneva on
25 July. 144
Tense and abnormal conditions surrounding what became the first of two
Geneva conferences appeared to preclude any chance of success, as international
attention was concentrated on avoiding an inter-NATO war. While the Greek, Turkish
and British Foreign Ministers formally noted the 'existence in practice' of two
autonomous administrations, in producing a map Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister,
declared on 26 July that Turkish units had advanced a further 100 km2 since the cease-
fire; the US representative sought to know of Turkey's 'terminal boundaries'.' 5 Given
the fragility of their hold of territory, the settlement of security issues had become an
imperative for the Turkish government at the conference.'" Ecevit called for the
extension of Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave both west and especially eastward as far as
Famagusta, in spite of the major territorial gains possible to its north.' 47
 It would appear
that the Turkish Forces had agreed to a cease-fire and insisted on the creation of a broad
'security zone' in order to generate enough room for their forces to reassemble and be
reinforced; yet at 'expert' meetings, while Bitsios (as the Greek delegate) proposed a
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600 metre-wide zone controlled by UNFICYP, the Turkish side sought a wider zone
free of UN personnel. 148
As a compromise, another military standstill was agreed on 30 July, and the
Geneva Declaration called for the immediate effecting of a 'security zone' at the limit of
the areas occupied by Turkish Armed Forces—a zone the size and character of which
was to be finalised by the Greek, Turkish, British, and UNFICYP representatives at
another conference a week later. Pending such a determination, no forces were to enter
the existing area, but the overall withdrawal of all foreign troops was notably put off.'
As for the already established Turkish Cypriot enclaves under siege, Greek and Greek
Cypriot forces were to be evacuated and those enclaves outside the present area of
Turkish control would continue to be protected by the 'security zone'.
From 2 August, the military representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the UK met
with LTNFICYP to determine the size of the new zone, but with no success. UNFICYP
were instructed by UN Secretary General Waldheim to demarcate the CFLs using
helicopter flights. 15° For five days the military representatives alone contested the
location and determination of forces' positions 'as of 10 pm on 30 July', while a British
helicopter flew them along the CFLs and repeatedly over Kyrenia. A partial agreement
was struck on the Nicosia section, and demarcation was then verified by car, but
fighting elsewhere, especially in Kyrenia and Famagusta, had restricted the overall
delimitation process. 151 Finally, on 10 August a CFL document was produced, "most
of' the CFLs having been finally agreed,' and it was promptly sent off to Geneva for
the tripartite conference delegates much to Waldheim's relief.
Yet, during the seven days since the cease-fire not one aspect of the Geneva
Declaration had been successfully addressed; while the Turks insisted on the evacuation
of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the Greek side sought an immediate cease-fire.
Significantly, on reconvening at the second conference, Mavros suggested to Giines (the
Turkish Foreign Minister) that Turkish Forces had gained over 35 km 2 since 30 July."
But Turkish insistence on 'regional autonomy' had become more explicit; on 9 August
Giines informed Callaghan that;
"the area under our control is only one twenty-fifth of what the property rights and
the size of the Turkish Cypriot community would entitle us to. Naturally, that is
not enough".154
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Cease-fire maps had been prepared, on which Giines was '95% agreed', but by now
Clerides (as Acting-President) and Denktash had joined the meetings and, for the first
time, incorporated their diametrically opposed views into the debate: Clerides insisted
on the reaffirmation of the principles of the 1960 Constitution, while DenIctash sought a
new order based on 'geographical separation'. 155 Suspecting imminent expansion of the
348 km2 of territory now held by Turkish Forces, on 11 August Greece withdrew its
request for a withdrawal to the 30 July CFL, only to receive three proposals in response
the following day: 56 Callaghan initially presented a contentious draft document which
referred to 'two autonomous administrations within boundaries'; 157 then, in a meeting
with Clerides and Callaghan, Denktash submitted a proposal for a partitioned, bi-
regional federation (Figure 4.6), calling for 34% of the island to remain under Turkish
Cypriot control, although conceding that the 'frontiers' could be discussed: 58 Clerides
and Mavros rejected it, only for Gtines to propose an 'alternative': the creation of six
autonomous Turkish Cypriot cantons (Figure 4.6) whereby the Nicosia enclave was
enlarged, the Karpas remained Greek Cypriot yet isolated, but population displacement
was to be kept to a minimum. While five cantonal boundaries could be agreed upon
later, Giines insisted that the Nicosia region (making up 17% of the island) be delimited
within 48 hours, at least by a demilitarised 'buffer zone':" Turkish Forces were visibly
caught in a narrow land corridor, and compelling considerations of security remained:60
The central issue to the conference had now become the geographical federation of
Cyprus; while their exact demarcation could remain outstanding, a 'rough fixing' of
boundaries was non-negotiable. Mavros and Clerides, the latter fully conscious of
Makarios' likely rejection of the plan, asked for a 36- to 48-hour consultation period:61
This was refused by Giines, who now insisted that Clerides declared beforehand
acceptance of the principal of a single geographical zone for the Turkish Cypriots, and
that the zone be established within the next three to four days:62
As the conference collapsed and the 'second round' began, the Turkish, who had
augmented their forces during the cease-fire, advanced west, east and north-east (Figure
4.7). Having initiated a series of consecutive cease-fires in Nicosia on the night of
14/15 and 15/16 August, UNFICYP sought to negotiate one at the island-wide leve1:63
By 1800 hours on 16 August, when the next Turkish Forces cease-fire was called, a
boundary reminiscent of the 'Attila Line' existed:" The Greek Cypriots were keen to
note, however, that even this line had been extended (incorporating the villages of
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Vatilli and Lysi, for example) and that the Turkish Cypriots now had a common
boundary of approximately 45 km with the British ESBA. 166 Technically, a permanent
cease-fire line remained.
4.4 Conclusion: The Creation of Transboundary Resources
As Minghi argued more generally, the length of time a territory is under pre-existing
sovereignty is a critical factor in assessing the development of a state towards
partition: 6' Cyprus' partition was effectively institutionalised in Ztirich and London in
1959, and the division of Cyprus' developmental resources along communal lines was
to begin in December 1963 and had been effected in practice by August 1974:68
Partition had developed from concept, to plan, to policy: 69 Patrick conceptualised the
spatial and organic character of this process which began in central Nicosia, spread to
become a zone encircling the Turkish Cypriot enclave, jumped to other towns with
similar effect, while also spreading out into the rural areas as less well-defined but more
localised patterns developed in parallel.'" Yet, while the British may have sought to
replicate the characteristics of other 'neutral territories', 17 ' the SBAs constituted the
initial and an important chink in the fragile china of Cyprus' independence.
The 1960 constitution treated the ethnic groups as homogenous, self-contained
political entities whilst also 'rationing' out their responsibilities; in turn, this was to
conflict both with the majority-minority view held by the Greek Cypriot leadership and,
if to a lesser degree, with the Turkish Cypriot belief in their 'politically equal' status. In
the Legislative Council and later in the House of Representatives, empowerment was
granted on the basis of communal, not 'Cypriot' status.' n As such, the constitution was
less a consociational or functional federation designed to accommodate for the
partnership of two communities, 173 but rather a legacy of intercommunal strife.'" While
there is merit in the argument that had the two communities shown more 'willingness to
cooperate' the original constitution could have worked, in the light of the prevailing
circumstances its long-term success was always suspect.'"
It was posited in Chapter 1 that 'partition' had a wide range of meanings as an
ideology and as an institutional arrangement, but that the reality was often far removed
from the ideal. For the British, partition often served to resolve the dilemmas of
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decolonisation or when other means of stabilisation had failed, yet Cyprus was to fall
significantly short of this. Indeed, territorial surgery—what Eden had himself termed
"the last refuge of baffled statesmanship"—had been 'foreshadowed' in the very making
of colonial policy.' 76 While the devising of a complex constitution for the 'vexed
island' was in actual fact achievable, the cooperation of the Cypriots had not been
secured as the coming of independence failed to obliterate pre-existing ethnic
particularities.' 77 For the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, or notably the partitionists
amongst them, this was the consequence of an expansionist Hellenism which for the
former dictated an explicit form of political equality, preferably with a territorial
character. For the Greek Cypriots and Greece, partitionism had been unsuccessfully
fought through political manoeuvring, economic coercion, and a non-collective
nationalist aggression split amongst those seeking independence and those in search of
immediate enosis. Inadvertently, however, through their exclusionary policies, they had
conducted their own form of partitionism.
Although by 1964 de facto partition already existed, as Cranshaw suggested, its
roots were only beginning to grow deep.' 78 Intercommunal divisions, initially based in
religious and cultural terms only to be quickly refashioned along lines of nationalism,
had become more clearly defined also in geographical location. It was not until 1974,
however, that an almost total political, economic and social polarisation had been
achieved along the modernist lines of 'statehood', with the foundations for an
impenetrable boundary delimiting distinct territories. This was greatly due to the
gradual internationalisation of the conflict but not, as Joseph has argued, because the
problem had ceased to be a 'domestic' affair.' 79 In a similar vein, Drury has argued that;
"the conventional physical resources of Cyprus have been as innocent as have
been its inhabitants in influencing its fate; what has been crucial has been its
location".'
It is no coincidence that external powers completely dominated the crucial days of July-
August 1974, both in the instigation, continuation, and eventual amelioration of the
intercommunal conflict. Yet from the analysis in this chapter it is clear that, while
Drury's argument might prove strong from a geopolitical perspective, by 1974 Cyprus'
inhabitants were generating their own nationalist, material and cultural interests. Thus,
as well as the 'structural' factors encouraging the creation of weak intercommunal
linkages and the 'de-legitimisation' of cooperation, there were historical and
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geographical characteristics of significance. Nor, for that matter, were Cyprus'
resources, many of which had become `transboundary' in character, to play such an
innocent role—as this chapter has suggested, and as the next three chapters will more
fully demonstrate.
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Part III
The Management of Transboundary Resources in
Post-partition Cyprus
Chapter 5
Island-wide Perspective: Contesting Transboundary Resources,
Development and an 'Island' State
5.1	 Introduction
The previous chapter explained the partitioning process in Cyprus, and observed that
while political, socio-economic, and cultural boundaries were unquestionably
discernible between the two communities prior to 1974, the events surrounding the
Turkish military intervention were to draw most effectively a single boundary between
Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and, at the same time, across the island's resource base.
This chapter seeks to illustrate, from the island-wide perspective, to what extent and in
what form transboundary resources were subsequently recognised, examining a broad
spectrum of political debate after 1974. In this, as in the two chapters which follow,
events are not necessarily analysed in chronological order; while their sequence remains
important, and historical relations—especially concerning intercommunal and 'high
level' negotiations (Appendix 1)—are implicit throughout, and highlighted where
relevant, these three chapters are structured more thematically to open up the main
theoretical considerations which concern this thesis.
Section 5.2 considers 'official' representations of the immediate consequences of
partition in 1974 on what were perceived to be key resources for either community from
the island-wide perspective. As noted in the opening chapter, while the general
character of post-partition intercommunal relations was to be largely determined by the
unproductive process of intercommunal and 'high level' negotiations from 1974, it is
argued that, in particular, 'official' representations of the (re)distribution of resources in
the aftermath of summer 1974 were to subsequently determine their `transboundary'
character. From 1974 to 1975, a transboundary resource management agenda was
formulated by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Central to this were
two specific forms of implicit cooperation over transboundary resource management—
concerning water resource and electricity power supplies, which are analysed in Section
5.3 as a means determining the 'meaning' of transboundary resource management in
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Cyprus. The two subsequent sections go on to examine a crucial debate within and
between both 'official' and 'unofficial' spheres of society in Cyprus, over whether the
economy and the environment of Cyprus should be addressed at the geographical scale
of the 'island'. From this, conclusions are then drawn as to the extent and form of
transboundary resource management from the island-wide perspective.
5.2	 In the Aftermath: Interpreting a Geographical Redistribution of
Resources
In searching for the 'intellectual wellsprings' of partition, Klieman noted an English
cultural and historical predisposition to compromise which was, in the "sweet language
or reasonableness", expressed proverbially as 'half a loaf of bread is better than none'.'
In exploring contrasting 'official' interpretations of political and economic
developments in the immediate aftermath of the summer of 1974, it becomes apparent
that the particular bifurcation process in Cyprus meant that, for a number of reasons, not
all parties consented to receiving only 'half a loaf' (or at times less). Neither for that
matter, however, did receiving 'less' necessarily translate into producing 'less'
economically. Even within a year of de facto partition, the foundations for the socio-
economic future of each community had been laid, and the political character of
transboundary resource management had begun to take shape.
5.2.1 Representing absolute and relative losses
Given their political and economic status before the Turkish military intervention, it was
of little surprise that the Greek Cypriot, internationally-recognised government was
outraged by all the material and cultural loss that such an 'unnatural' separation
entailed. By December 1974, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Zenon Rossides (the
Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN) had documented the consequences; as a
result of the second phase of 'aggression and invasion' the area now under Turkish
'military occupation' had expanded 'tenfold', to `40%' of the island's territory.
Seventy-per cent of its total gross output had now been 'cut off . 2 Indeed, a fuller
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picture of the post-partition resource landscape began to develop from various sources,
predominantly originating with the Greek Cypriot authorities (Table 5.1).
Of the economically-active Greek Cypriot population, 35% had been made
'idle'. As a consequence of this 'biblical catastrophe', substantial agricultural
investment had been seized and tourism, 61% of whose assets were north of the UNBZ,
was 'totally destroyed'. 3 The agricultural sector (the largest employer, and producing
foodstuffs which were the traditional export) was the worst hit through the loss of land,'
exports and, in addition, a heavy loss of individual life savings.' With the two most
important tourist resorts (Famagusta and Kyrenia) and their associated hotel capacity
now in the north, tourist receipts were also lost. 6 Factories in the north collectively
producing 26% of manufacturing output were affected.' The ROC's dependence on
foreign sources of raw materials, semi-finished and final products had inevitably
rocketed.' Of Greek Cypriot property, over an estimated CY£250 mn worth of houses
had been evacuated, over CY£150 mn of movable household property was left behind,
in addition to CY£7.5 mn of agricultural equipment and CY£8.5 mn worth of cattle
stock.'
There was a general international consensus that what was left behind by the
180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees collectively constituted a greater material and socio-
psychological loss than those resources which fell beyond the reach of the 40,000
Turkish Cypriot refugees after 1974. While accepting these broad 'realities', however,
to a great extent no matter what sources were used for estimating the economic impact
in 1974, it was impossible to provide an objective evaluation—because of events just
prior to the military intervention, in particular the 1972-73 drought, the oil crisis, and
the UK's accession to the EC which had not yet affected economic indicators fully. The
military intervention had "struck an island that was already threatened".' The
construction of such precise 'balance sheets', it could therefore be supposed, served
additional purposes." Primarily, the scale of change relative to that affecting the
Turkish Cypriots clearly mattered. The Greek Cypriot authorities invariably presented
such figures as ratios or percentages, thus emphasising the reconfiguration of resources
vis-à-vis the island's skewed population ratio.' There seemed to be an imperative to
stress this even more, given that the population density in the north had fallen from over
180 to less than 95 persons/m 2, while in the south it had risen from 173 to over
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Table 5.1	 Estimates of the island's resources under 'occupation' post-partition
Resources falling under 'occupation' % island's
total
Area
territory 37-40's
coastline 53
continental shelf 40 +
Land resources
tobacco 100
carrots 86
citrus 79 +
cereals 68
green fodders 65
mining and quarrying outputs 50-56
agricultural exports 48-60
livestock production 47
crop production 46
olives 45
carobs 35
potatoes 25
Infrastructural resources
tourist accommodation under construction 87-96
fishing shelters 66
existing tourist accommodation capacity 65
industrial output 46
hospital bed capacity in rural areas 45.7
housing stock 36
school buildings 33
district hospitals 33
Sources: m.
220 persons/m2. 15 In addition, however, with regards to the ambiguous status of
Turkey's role in the north, 16 strategically important land was presented as inaccessible
and this reaffirmed suspicions that Turkish Forces, during the second phase of their
military intervention, had sought to create an economically viable Turkish Cypriot
sector." By extension, emphasis was placed on the likely 'lack of maintenance', 'crops
not harvested', and 'agricultural potential systematically destroyed' in the north.
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5.2.2 Reassessing the resource base
Within the space of a year, however, it became clear that the absolute loss of certain
resources for Greek Cypriots would not necessarily translate directly into an economic
downturn for the long-term. A series of 'Emergency Action Plans', superseding the
ROC's 1972-1976 Third Five-Year Development Plan, aimed at improving the severed
infrastructure, creating employment, and maintaining social benefits. Fortunately, most
agricultural produce was exported early in the year (and thus pre-coup and military
intervention), so that although Greek Cypriot citrus exports plummeted as the Morphou
area fell to the Turkish Forces, volume of potatoes exported (which were mainly grown
in the Kokkinokhoria region) was able to double in the next three years.' Thus, by the
end of 1976, the volume of Greek Cypriot exports was at record levels, with clothing,
footwear and cement leading the way.° In spite of their catastrophic resource base
losses, the Greek Cypriot government had established structural adjustments
underpinning an economic regeneration programme which was to pave the way for
further economic progress.2°
For the Turkish Cypriot community, the events of 1974 were largely interpreted
favourably in socio-political terms, in direct contrast to Greek Cypriots. A process of
resettlement had begun, most notably with the Turkish government and Denktash
demanding that the 9,390 Turkish Cypriot temporary inhabitants of Akrotiri SBA to
proceed via Turkey to northern Cyprus!' The SBAs had, during the military
intervention, become crowded with refugees, both Greek Cypriot (in Dhekelia) and
Turkish Cypriot (in Akrotiri). In spite of Greek, Greek Cypriot and British
protestations, a general agreement of an exchange of population was achieved on 20
September 1974. Between July 1974 and December 1975 some 180,000 Greek
Cypriots and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moved southwards and northwards respectively!'
While the Turkish Cypriot community were by implication excluded from nearly
two-thirds of the island, they now had 37% of the land area, disproportionate to their
population ratio. It was ironic, therefore, that it was they who were to suffer most in
economic terms in the aftermath of 1974. 23 Specifically, two formal developments were
to form the basis of their economic and social policy, complemented by one notably
'unofficial' development. Infrastructural resources gained priority for financial
assistance; the most urgent problem being the reestablishing of an east-west road link
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(between the citrus growing region of Morphou and the town of Famagusta). 34 Tymbou
airport was formally upgraded to international standards (and renamed as `Ercan'), and a
national airline was established. About 90% of the financial investment on these and
other projects between 1975 and 1977 was provided by Turkey?' Primarily, however,
there was a concerted programme for resettling Turkish Cypriots and reallocating
available resources—in essence, expropriating extensive Greek Cypriot property.
Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots had looted Greek property, resentful of their
economic deprivation during the past eleven years?° On 1 November 1974 the UNGA
had called for renewed talks under the 'good offices' of the UN Secretary-General. Five
days later Clerides, whilst still Acting-President of the ROC, publicly voiced his belief
for the first time that a federal solution now had to be sought, and by the following
January discussion had begun to address the powers and functions of a central
government in a federal Cypriot state, the idea of a multi-regional settlement now
having been destroyed?' This was demonstrated when, on 13 February 1975 the,
'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' (TFSC) was established, which—so the
constitution read—was ready to form the Turkish Cypriot half of a federal republic, the
economic policy of which was directed into making the best use of 'idle factors of
production', and to begin 'planning' the economy?'
Without any baseline information on the pre-1974 economic activities of
Turkish Cypriots, however, the TFSC's planning proved problematic. By using a
general classificatory system, the aim was to try to resettle every refugee village (i.e.,
the collective inhabitants) in a 'place' with similar characteristics in the north?° A
'Housing and Rehabilitation Office' advised villagers over the allocation of kahva,
farms, and boreholes. As for the transfer of title deeds, from November 1974 Turkish
Cypriot refugees owning land in the south were to receive compensatory land, together
with an 'equal value land documene. 3° This necessitated the re-surveying of
agricultural land uses before correlations were eventually found (e.g., 1 donum of citrus
orchards now equated with 10.2 donums of cereal land), and the redrawing of rural
administrative boundaries to accommodate new agricultural ownership. 3 ' Cooperative
farming organisations were quickly (re)established in order to manage perishing and
unharvested agricultural resources over the short term, especially the citrus orchards in
Morphou, while financial aid and food was more generally provided through the
authorities and through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
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A majority of Turkish Cypriots were farmers and, up to 1974, their community's share
of the island's international trade was below 10%." At the industrial level,
consequently, while a proportion of the sector was rented on a long-term basis to private
parties, a lack of previous experience in the industrial sector encouraged the TFSC to
take over the management of 60% of industrial factories, as a public company in
collaboration with corporate interests in Turkey." `Cyprufruvex' was therefore
established in 1975 to manage and market agricultural produce, while 'Cyprus Turkish
Tourism Enterprises Ltd.' were to own or rent the majority of the 2,600 hotel beds
remaining in the north. Nonetheless, by mid-1976 only 19% of the manufacturing
industries acquired were in production, and at a reduced capacity. Agriculture remained
the dominant industry, accounting for 36% of GDP."
Leading on from this was an unofficial development. The shortage of Turkish
Cypriot technical manpower to manage resources was considered resolvable through the
import of manpower from mainland Turkey. In parallel, in-migration had been
encouraged to prevent the abandonment of whole areas; the governments of both (north)
Nicosia and Ankara were concerned about an anti-mainland backlash with economic
stagnation.' Just as Turkey was to prop up the ailing economy immediately following
the military intervention, so Turkish settlers—introduced as either 'seasonal workers' or
soldiers' relatives visiting `temporarily'—were to exploit latent economic potential.
These developments, not surprisingly, brought strong diplomatic reactions from the
Greek Cypriot side; immigration was seen only as furthering the usurpation of hotels,
restaurants, factories and other industries now lying north of the CFLs. Turkish and
Turkish Cypriots were accused of reallocating heavy machinery, yachts, trucks, and cars
belonging to Greek Cypriots, or exporting them to Turkey.'
Just as the fragmentary territorial partition of the two main communities on the
island from 1963 to 1974 had affected their respective negotiating stances, so the 1974-
1975 population transfers, which completed the partition of the island into two distinct
ethnic zones, were to hold major implications for the subsequent negotiations." And
just as the negotiating positions were to develop and contest the meaning of a proposed
federal, bicommunal 'state', so the reconfiguration of the resource base between the two
communities was to become a significant source of diplomatic (and almost military)
conflict. Fundamentally, and as Waldheim was to later observe while 'evaluating' the
overall conflict in 1981, "qualitative and quantitative divergences of views have [...]
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emerged with regards to the search for objective criteria. The two sides' estimates of
natural resources, land ownership, infrastructure, percentage of land under each side's
control, number of displaced persons, differ". 38 By extension, it can be argued that there
was to be no basis for 'objective', transboundary resource management proposals for the
foreseeable future.
5.3 The Meaning of Transboundary Resource Management
Contrasting interpretations of Cyprus' resources in terms of their redistribution post-
1974 were subsequently to further impact on 'official' interpretations of their
transboundary character. Given the presence of a de facto partition boundary, the extent
to which resources—and any cooperation over their management—remained
'intercommunal', or became 'international', inter- 'state', or `transboundary' in nature,
proved highly instructive. By examining the two major issue areas—water (Section
5.3.1) and electricity supplies (Section 5.3.2)—where transboundary interdependencies
were, uniquely, accommodated after 1974, it is necessary to be equally as interested in
the history of transboundary cooperation produced in Cyprus, as the history of
cooperation produced about Cyprus, as Section 5.3.3 will consider in detail.
5.3.1 Water resource management (I): a common, transboundary problem
The scarcity of fresh water resources on the island has often been described as the
second 'Cyprus Problem' although, it in laying out the ROC's first programme of
economic development in 1961, President Makarios stated that "[t]he lack of sufficient
water constitutes the most serious problem of Cyprus". 39 Thus, in his otherwise
triumphal opening speech to the House of Representatives, Makarios observed that the
island, despite its explosive economic potential. The growth of a burgeoning agriculture
and tourism economy rested precariously upon an attenuated water resource base. In the
past, Cyprus' water shortages had been blamed on a viscious circle of natural and
structural constraints: the lack of rainfall, and the absence of a planning body to
overcome complex private water rights. With a view to an 'equitable distribution of
water', the 'nationalisation' of the island's water resources would now be considered
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and annual government investment was to increase sevenfold; dams, in particular, were
to replenish groundwater resources and improve domestic supplies."
Over the next generation, Makarios' bullishness was to be dramatically
vindicated. Notably, developments occurred on the supply side of the water equation as
the Archbishop famously declared "not a drop of water to the sea"; the water-
impoverished island came to possess the largest concentration of dams anywhere in the
world.'" In February 1960, the recently-inaugurated ROC government, as the new
member of the United Nations Organisation, had made its first request for technical
assistance to what was then the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical
Assistance (UNPTA). This was to constitute the basis for the state's first development
programme." As a result of what came to be known as the 'Thorpe Report', an
Economic Planning Commission was established which, in close cooperation with other
UN organisations and agencies, identified 'priority areas' for technical assistance and
interaction. The most substantive UNDP programmes, island-wide, were to address the
management of the scarce water resources, recognised in the original report as a critical
sector for development. Two extensive UNDP-assisted water surveys were undertaken
between 1962 and 1973, although, in the light of the intercommunal troubles they were
largely devoid of Turkish Cypriots participation. Nonetheless, upon these the ROC
were to draw their future water management plans."
Water supply problems were an island-wide phenomena. Representing a semi-
arid island exposed to the whims of low, unevenly distributed and unreliable rainfall
pattern, Cyprus' water balance had been historically precarious. While the average
yearly rainfall island-wide is limited to 470-500 mm, half of it falling between
December and January, in four out of ten years less than half of this amount is
received.4 This rainfall was also spatially differentiated, ranging from 300 mm in the
central plain and the southeastern part of the island, to 1,100 mm and 550 mm at the top
of the Troodos and Kyrenia ranges respectively. There are no perennial rivers and of
the rainfall, with average maximum temperatures in July and August reaching 36°C on
the central plain leading to 80% losses by evapotranspiration, only about 900 mn.cu.m.
of water in Cyprus is left as surface run-off and for underground recharge (Table
On this balance, of the mean annual water crop island-wide, the outflows create a small
but significant deficit of 5%.
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Table 5.2	 Estimated island-wide water balance in Cyprus
Island-wide
(mn. cu. m./yr.)
Mean annual precipitation
Evapotranspiration
4600
900
I) Surface water 600
Irrigation 150
diverted for usage or storage 190
runoff to sea 260
II) Replenishment of aquifers 300
(over)pumped 270
lost to sea 70
Sources: Iacovides (1993); World Bank (1995, Annex 1.3); WDD (1997).
Table 5.3	 Principal aquifers in Cyprus
Aquifer Pumpage Replenishment Losses to sea
(mn. cu. m./yr.)
Morphou 60 35 5
Akrotiri 25 35 10
Kokkinolchoria 25 14
Kyrenia Mtns 13 20 na
Nicosia 17 15
Polis 17 8 17
Famagusta 15 7
Maroni 7 9 2
Paphos 5 5 10
Source: Tsiortis (1993); Morvaridi (1993b: 237).
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The island's principal aquifers (see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1) were to be found
along the coast and in coastal valleys. Since 1950 the water table of Morphou's aquifer
had been dropping up to several feet per year, not only due to increasing water demands
(especially from citrus) but also due to a lack of natural replenishment.' Great
importance had been given to development of groundwater, at the time proving cheaper
than dam construction, such that between 1927 and 1959 the drilling of wells was
subsidised by the colonial government. 47 Between 1960 and 1974, in turn, further
surveys were undertaken to try and assess the potential of these critical resources, and a
series of dams, including those at Lefkara and Yermasoyia, were constructed in parallel
as an integral part of formulating a long-term water 'master plan' of action.
With independence, part of the island's critical water resource base had fallen
within the SBAs territory. However, the first precedent for transboundary water
management had been set during the SBA's establishment when it became evident that,
subject to 'military requirements and security needs being met', policy regarding the
control of water in the SBAs would be considered by a joint, 'international'
committee." Annex B of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment provided that
representatives from the ROC and UK would continually review the question of such
water supplies as they affected their respective needs, and "to ensure that those needs
are met and that the water available is fairly distributed". 49 It was to survive the 1974 de
facto partition and prove an important regime for both riparians, especially in Dhekelia
SBA which was to rely on groundwater and an ageing desalination plant for subsequent
years.5°
In terms of relations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot water users, in
contrast, the partitioning of Cyprus had quickly exacerbated the ethnic and political
nature of water control. Post-partition, in both policy and practice, there was to be
increasing divergence on an institutionalised basis. The impact of the creation of the
UNBZ on the geographical distribution of water resources had been direct. Each side
was left with sufficient water to sustain immediate community needs, but the limited
water distribution infrastructure meant that the Greek Cypriot community had lost direct
access to the largest underground aquifer in Morphou—meaning, at the time, that
over40% of the island's aquifer reserves were within the north.' Precious water springs
at Kythrea and Lapithos (estimated at 60% of the total water available for irrigation)
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were inaccessible, as were 20% of domestic water supplies. 52 It was claimed, overall,
that one third of water resources now fell under 'Turkish occupation'."
For their part, the Turkish Cypriot community was excluded from the greatest
discharging rivers, running off the Troodos mountains to the south. In strategic terms it
was clear that supplies relative to those of the Turkish Cypriots were as important as
their absolute amount. Of 40 streams island-wide, only a quarter fell in the north, while
the Turkish Cypriots' 8 active dams (with 8 mn.cu.m. capacity) compared unfavourably
with 45 dams on the Greek Cypriot side (with sixfold capacity)." During the sixth
Vienna talks in late March 1977, Onan, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, in formally
rejecting 'grossly exaggerated' Greek Cypriot claims of `75.8%' of the island's
economic resources falling in the north, estimated that only 17.3% of the (unspecified)
'water resources' were now in the TFSC, and that if Morphou and Kythrea were lost in
accordance with Greek Cypriot territorial proposals (see Appendix 2), then Turkish
Cypriots would have access to only 4.46% of the 'annual safe yield of aquifers', and
0.2% of 'running streams'.55
By 1981, when their own territorial proposals were forwarded for the first time, it
became clear that the underground aquifers were of greatest importance to the Turkish
Cypriots: those on the Greek Cypriot side were seen to offer excellent prospects for
utilisation and development, while the Famagusta and Morphou aquifers in the north
were threatened with destruction by overextraction and seawater intrusion. 56 In turn, the
Turkish Cypriot authorities noted that the Mesaoria plain received less irrigation than
land in the south. By now, Denktash was making less quantitatively but more
qualitatively precise statements;
IN* are the guards of our borders. Let us all together shout at the Greek side,
which says that if Morphou is not given there could be no peace. Then there will
be no peace. Because Morphou will never be given back"."
Indeed, Atakol, the TFSC's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, had declared on
2 March 1975 that "[i]f we proclaim our independence it is because we have been
pushed by the difficulties of our water supplies"—if without, as Pechoux rightly
observed, specifying how this institutional change would allow them to manage what
remained largely a hydrological and technical problem. 58 A lack of water data to verify
such estimations held further implications. The Greek Cypriot authorities noted that the
ROC's Water Development Department building housing the hydrological records and
177
Island-wide Perspective
the library had been burnt down during the 1974 events.' The problem of objectively
guaging available water reserves island-wide was to prove significant over the longer-
term.
These 'officially' constructed representations of a divided and distinctively
separate hydrological character to Cyprus after 1974 nonetheless failed to give
sufficient recognition to the presence of a number of inherited hydrological
interdependencies which persisted. Indeed, it was apparent that there was an informal
agreement between the two communities' de facto authorities to maintain certain
transboundary sections of the embryonic water supply system, as it was set up before
1974. Although generally presented as an island-wide (read: 'national') issue, as will be
considered in Chapters 6 and 7 the location of this cooperation was largely a product of
and limited to the borderland but nevertheless enforced a certain degree and type of
transboundary cooperation, further considered in Section 5.3.3. 60. Transfers
concentrated at the border region, where a large number of rural villages and towns
drew their domestic water supplies from the 'other' side (as further discussed in Chapter
6), where the Pendayia-Morphou boreholes made a significant contribution to the total
water requirements of Nicosia, and where the Lefkara-Skarinou region in the south
provided supplies for Famagusta (see Chapter 7).
From the late 1970s, in the south, given both the hydrological conditions and
also the realities of territorial control, which for the ROC ran counter to a rapidly
growing economy, the water development projects initiated pre-1974 were to grow both
in number and scale, involving major interbasin transfers aiming at a more complete
utilisation of all ground and surface water resources. The events of 1963-1974 had
temporarily 'postponed' but ultimately terminated the completion of those projects
which had included areas now under Turkish Cypriot control, most notably plans for the
Morphou-Tylliria project assisted by the UNDP and FAO (see Chapter 6). 61 They
failed, however, to prevent the eventual completion of the other irrigation, dam-building
and water transfer projects located in the south. While water treatment plants were
constructed at Kirokitia, Kornos and Limassol, large water development projects were
undertaken at Paphos (for irrigation, completed in 1982), Khrysokhou (for irrigation,
planned completion 1998), and in the Pitsilia and Vasilikos-Pendaskinos regions (both
localised infrastructural developments, completed in 1984 and 1987 respectively)
(Figure 5.1). The largest and most significant construction undertaken by the ROC,
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however, was the Southern Conveyor Project (SCP) initiated in 1984, for which the
UNDP continued to provide consultancy services and the World Bank invested US$300
mn. Exhausted underground water supplies in the rich potato-growing region of
Koklcinokhoria area, located in the east of the area under de facto ROC control, had
spurred on the Greek Cypriots with plans to store water from the Troodos mountains.
During the 1982-86 period, 60% of the ROC's agricultural development budget was
allocated for developing water supplies, in itself making up 26% of the ROC's total
development budget. 62 The SCP's waters were subsequently used to irrigate 14,000 ha
along the coastal area between Alcrotiri and Famagusta, and were intended to recharge
aquifers in Limassol and Larnaca districts. It was to remain the most ambitious water
development activity on the island.
Speedily-implemented and extensive water development works in the south
post-partition, were to contrast sharply with progress north of the UNBZ. The TFSC's
water authorities had immediately recognised a need to further develop the historically
plentiful supplies of underground water in the Morphou area while, at the same time, the
resource management considerations already made pre-1974 on the aquifer's
overextraction could not be ignored. In 1977, it was estimated that while irrigated citrus
in the area—which as a whole was generating 80% of the TFSC's foreign exchange
earnings—required some 55 mn.cu.m./yr., the safe yield of the aquifer was 35
mn.cu.m./yr.. 63 To supplement these resources, therefore, a project would divert 20
mn.cu.m./yr. from the nearby Xeros, Marathasa and Karyotis rivers that historically had
flowed to the sea to provide vital irrigation waters for Morphou and to recharge the
aquifer.. Funding of the project was unsuccessfully sought through the EC, the
FAO/UNDP's feasibility study for the Morphou-Tylliria was unilaterally adapted by the
TFSC, with assistance symbolically from Turkey's Water Supply and Irrigation
Department.64 Contracts for the Morphou Derivation Project (Figure 5.1)were not
established until October 1981; a regulator and canal system was initially established in
the Lefka region, while the second stage, linking Karavostassi and Nikitas, began in
May 1983. 65 Further inland, and eastwards, the areas surrounding north Nicosia and
Famagusta were characterised by very little groundwater potential, and through a
Nicosia-Famagusta 'Drinking and General Water Project', established in 1991,
Famagusta was finally linked with Morphou's aquifer (Figure 5.1)—although, in turn,
this iplaced additional demands on Morphou's reserves (see Chapter 7).
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In spite of these unilateral, supply-sided infrastructural developments in the
1980s both north and, particularly, south of the UNBZ, a common water problem
persisted. By the early 1990s there remained two general but major constraints for both
communities: high variance in local rainfed water supplies and mining of aquifers, and a
universal and disproportionate allocation of water for agricultural purposes.
Demonstrating a bias towards agriculture largely in line with southern Mediterranean
countries as a whole, and in line with most Middle Eastern countries in particular, up to
80% of water use was for irrigation purposes (Table 5.4)."
Table 5.4	 Estimated water consumption in Cyprus (de facto) by sector in 1994
Island-wide ROC
(mn.cu.m./yr.)
TRNC
Agriculture 318 215 103
Domestic 73 60 13
Industry 6.5 5 1.5
Tourism 5.5 5 0.5
TOTAL 403 285 118
Sources: Estimates from MAF (1992: 9); TAHAL (1995: 4); EIU (1997: 2nd qtr., 19).
Note: In the absence of previous analysis, 'Island-wide' is estimated simply by
combining the consumption levels for the two de facto territories.
The lion's share of available water for the agricultural sector was generally rationalised
in terms of food security and unemployment in rural areas.° And as with most
centralised water authorities, the main constraint over improved planning and
management, over the medium to long-term, was the capability to develop a
sophisticated and far-sighted water management strategy, along with the legislation and
administration to support it." The creation of a 'domestic' never mind a
`transboundary' framework for this had clearly been stalled since the 1960s onwards.
By 1994 the Turkish Cypriot water authorities, with an estimated potential water
supply of only 110 mn.cu.m./yr. (Table 5.4), were notably grappling with a marginal but
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increasing deficit. 69 Irrigated agriculture, 65% of which was made up of tree crops, was
also becoming characterised by low water quality supplies. Sea water intrusion at
Morphou, due to overpumping by the 650 irrigation and 15 municipal boreholes since
the 1950s, had now extended for up to 4 km inland." A basic lack of adequate data
continued to constrain the planning effort in the north, 7 ' while in the south the
government had been able to approach the World Bank to provide an environmental
review and action plan and subsequent reports; these, however, subsequently suggested
that rather than concentrating on new dams and desalination plants (with their respective
problems of redundant capacity, and expensive and polluting fossil fuels), Greek
Cypriot policy should concentrate on the demands of the agricultural industry. Making
such a policy-shift unattractive, however, was an ever-strong farming lobby unmoved
by the argument that the tourist and manufacturing sectors now supported the
economy. 72
A distinguishable crisis point was to be reached by both communities by the
mid-1990s. In November 1996 the Greek Cypriot Water Development Department
(WDD) noted that irrigation demands had increased 20% since 1990, while rainfall
since the previous October had been 75% normal levels." Dam levels in the south were
falling: 66.5% of capacity in February 1995; 34% in August 1996, and they were to be
only 10% two years later.' Transboundary cooperation had seemingly become a sine
qua non both to address the question of current inequalities in the distribution of
existing water resources on the island, and also to find additional water supplies and
constrain demands to provide for current and short-term supply gaps. Prescriptions had
been made previously by US observers, who advocated drafting protocols for an island-
wide 'Water Compact': a comprehensive, integrated water management programme
would better manage the complex groundwater resources, where cooperation might have
benefited from economies of scale." Yet, in spite of growing third party interest, both
state authorities continued to look away from the 'other' alternative. Following its
Middle Eastern neighbours, in the search for alternatives, with surface and groundwater
under stress, both parties looked to desalination and water imports.' The first major
desalination plant on the island, in Dhekelia became operational in April 1997,"
although with an initial capacity of only 20,000 cu.m./day, its impact was generally
recognised as limited. As the need for water supplies was recognised increasingly from
the early 1990s, the two communities had become 'outward-looking' in their search for
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external, transboundary assistance. But they were to remain, in essence, 'inward-
looking' in that the political boundaries being traversed were those of a common
'national' identification: the Turkish Cypriot authorities looked to Turkey, while the
Greek Cypriots looked to Greece.
This continuing divergence was most vividly illustrated in their reconsideration
of importing fresh water to the island. Transfers from Turkey were not a new idea,
having been first considered in the late 1950s by British and Turkish diplomats while
Cypriot independence was under discussion, and the 1961 'Thorpe Report' had
recommended to the ROC that a water pipeline link with Turkey be seriously
considered.' In February 1974, after a series of extremely dry seasons, Makarios had
requested a government study considering imports from both Syria and Turkey, but it
was only months later, just before the second wave of the 1974 Turkish military
intervention, that there were reports of Turkish investments in water (and oil) pipelines
linking the north with the mainland. 79 Within the year the TFSC Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources had expressed the belief that the Mesaoria plain was capable of
supporting over a million people through water imports, although a '30 mn.cu.m./yr.'
annual deficit in Morphou remained a major concern." In parallel, there were reports of
both British and French companies undertaking pre-feasibility studies for both pipeline
(to either the north-east or north-west of the TFSC) and tanker imports from Turkey."
While the economic downturn in Turkey temporarily undermined the scheme, the
results of a French study were publicised with much speculation in early 1978: the
laying of a pipeline had been considered most effective, but its costs suggested that
tanker imports would be preferable in the short term." With this mind, in April 1978, at
the time when Denktash was generally eager to discuss 'other practical steps to heal the
wounds of the past', he proposed the construction of a pipeline to bring water from
Turkey to Cyprus for use by both communities;" indeed, it was proposed as a 'joint
project' offered to 'the whole island'."
Although this particular proposal was in vain, throughout the 1980s the Turkish
Ministry of Agriculture refused to drop the idea of the grandiose water project. It began
to resurface from May 1991, coinciding with the worst drought on the island for 20
years. Facing local political pressures but also aware of its appeal to international
funding agencies, Denktash invited the US, World Bank and UN to prepare a project to
import water from Turkey to the TRNC, and offered again to share the water with south
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Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots were called on not to make a political issue out of what
was a 'humanitarian problem'. Rather than looking across the de facto border for
assistance, however, there were signs that the Greek Cypriot community—just like their
counterpart—was looking to its 'mainland' ally for assistance. In 1991, and now
dictated by 'necessity', the ROC gave serious consideration to its own proposal of
importing—from Crete, with some 50,000 cu.m. of drinking water transported by tanker
to Limassol each week."
The proposals of both communities failed to evolve before immediate water
shortages were temporarily alleviated with the rainfall of winter 1991, but the drought
had also focused the minds of third parties. On approval of the overall, high level
framework agreement based on the UN Secretary-General's 'Set of Ideas' in 1992, the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, in order to promote goodwill and
closer relations, were to implement an action programme that called for, inter alia, the
establishment of a `bicommunal committee' to survey the water situation in Cyprus and
to make recommendations on ways of meeting the island-wide water needs, 'including
from external sources'." Not only did this appear to address growing Turkish Cypriot
concerns over the deteriorating state of Morphou's aquifer, but kept alive the idea of
'common' water imports. The technical impracticalities that such a project would entail
clearly remained second to a basic need, and Yilmaz, Turkish Minister of State, began
to seriously concern himself with a US$200 mn water project from 1994, 8' if now as
part of a more extensive Turkish 'Peace Pipeline' proposed by Turkish Prime Minister
Ozal in 1987. 88 Turkey arguably faced neither immediate water shortages, nor did it
have extraneous limitations on its national water resources." A proposed diversion
from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers would be distributed to Syria, Israel, Jordan, the
West Bank and Gaza, theoretically to formulate a positive regional interdependency to
enhance cooperation." Additional projects using Medusa bags would carry 1,880
mn.cu.m/yr. of Manavgat water to terminals in northern Cyprus, various ports along the
Mediterranean and Red Sea and, symbolically, to Greek islands.9'
By March 1997, the 'Water for Cyprus' project had been finalised: to cost
US$250 mn, an 80 km supply line would bring up to 70 mn tons/yr of water to
Syrianochori (`Kiimkoy' in Turkish) on the west coast (Figure 5.1). Gurel, the new
Turkish State Minister, declared that it would meet the water demands not only of the
TRNC but 'all of Cyprus', and Denktash reaffirmed that "[i]f the Greek Cypriot
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administration wishes, it can benefit from it". 92
 Finally, in October, Turkey and the
TRNC signed a landmark protocol for 3 mn.cu.m./yr of drinking water to be tankered
from the Turkish mainland, in water bags, to the north-west coast of Cyprus. 93 In
logistical terms it was a 'world first'; moreover, in the eyes of Gtirel it meant "water of
life for the TRNC", and was generally presented as solving the drinking water shortage
for Nicosia and Famagusta while helping to replenish Morphou's groundwater."
The Greek Cypriot authorities, however, having repeatedly rejected previous
proposals, responded to the water-for-peace scheme as "an emergency response to the
drought on the northern side and a further attempt to integrate the north with Turkey".95
For the Greek Cypriots, transboundary water transfers of this nature could be considered
only after the Cyprus conflict was resolved. 96
 And meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot
government continued to blame the difficulties in the 'rational' development of water
resources on the 'occupation'. 97 This adversarial approach encouraged a defensive,
mistrustful, and ultimately disinterested response from the north, who made little more
of the offer but for political ammunition: common water imports could yet lay the
foundations for long-term cooperation, but their rejection would only further separate
the ways of the two `states'." By early 1998 the Turkish Cypriot press reported the
TRNC's water balance equated with a 20% annual deficit each year, while the dams in
the south, their main source of supply, had been as low as 90% empty for prolonged
periods since the mid-1990s. 99 These statistics were greatly affected by what had now
become the third worst (and on-going) drought this century, and the worst for 60 years.
New supplies seemed imperative and, in July, the infrastructure was inaugurated and
first water balloon arrived. Denktash clearly recognised his new power position: while
Turkish President Demirel observed that, once the whole water scheme had been
completed, "water can irrigate the whole of Cyprus three times over", Denktash
declared that the Greek Cypriots were "welcome to share [...] the water from Anatolia",
because whether or not they considered themselves equal, "they still need water".m
Although the Greek Cypriot authorities had informally shown an interest, unilateral
courses of action were preferable.m
Only by studying the transboundary water resource dispute in its wider context
could a fuller appreciation of not only its complex nature, but also its gravity, be
appreciated. Even with water shortages from the mid-1990s, a distributive, 'us' versus
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'them' approach to the water dispute was being reproduced. For Clerides, the link from
water supplies to 'high politics' was clear;
"we will never give up our land and water. This is not permitted by our security
nor by our national dignity. It is not permitted by our principles, our values, or the
dreams in which we believe. It is not permitted by our history ',.102
For the Turkish Cypriots, Morphou remained the key strategic resource. Commenting
on reports of its transfer to the Greek Cypriots, according to Ghali's 1992 proposals (see
Appendix 2), Denktash observed again;
"[w]ho says we will give it? Morphou and its surroundings are our source of
water. We left a fertile area with vineyards and gardens in the south that was five
times as large".m
Atakol, now as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, similarly argued that under
Ghali's maps and without Morphou, the TRNC would be left without drinking water.'"
At the island-wide scale, water had been drawn exponentially into political, socio-
economic and ideological arenas. From the island-wide perspective, the 'second Cyprus
problem' failed to become the primary concern of either government.
5.3.2 Power lines
In addition to pre-existing water interdependencies, another major transboundary
resource created with the establishment of the UNBZ was that of electricity power
supply. A year after the nationalisation of various small electricity companies in 1952,
Cyprus' first thermal power station was commissioned at Dhekelia. By 1966 a second
power station had been built at Moni (near Limassol) so that, by 1974, Dhekelia and
Moth were producing a total generating capacity of 204 Megawatts (MW) to cater for a
maximum consumption of 174 MW island-wide. Frequent complaints from Turkish
Cypriots after 1963 had necessitated UNFICYP's involvement in negotiating continued
supplies, although in general the government-controlled Electricity Authority of Cyprus
(AHK) continued to supply the enclaves.105
After 1974, however, the geographical divorce of 1974 was to see a considerable
amount of disruption to electric power lines in areas of confrontation, despite
UNFICYP's negotiations for technicians from both communities to carry out repairs.'"
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More significantly, the only two generating power stations were based in the south,
under the control of AHK. Dhekelia power station soon became uneconomic and a new
station, initially with two units with a combined capacity of 120MW, was subsequently
built alongside in 1982, although the final units were not added until 1993 at which time
the old Dhekelia power station was decommissioned. In the north, there had been
remarkably public declarations in the period between the two phases of the Turkish
military interventions in August 1974 of Turkey's immediate plans to establish a 50MW
power plant in Kyrenia.'" Yet, the first major power station was not commissioned
until 1981 at Dikmen (`Dikomo' in Greek) and operated until 1991 when it ceased
production, by which time—conscious of its fragile power supplies—the Turkish
Cypriot's own electricity authority (KIB-TEK) began to build the new power station at
Teknicik (Trapeza) in 1990, the product of a Turkey-TRNC 'technical cooperation'
agreement valued at US$120 mn.'" Even so, illustrating its configuration in 1996
(which had altered little for 15 years), Figure 5.2 shows an electricity distribution
network which connected the whole island, crossing the UNBZ from Dhekelia SBA,
Athalassa, Orounda and Karvounas. Indeed, from 1974 to 1981, the north received all
of its electricity from the south, and from 1981 some 70 to 80% of its supply came from
this source.'"
These transboundary supplies continued with only minor hiccups, however, until
they met something of a watershed in 1994, with considerable repercussions. Although
power cuts in the north had occurred up to, during, and beyond 1974, 110 they were to
grow gradually more frequent by the late 1980s. During cuts in the summer of 1987,
while the Greek Cypriot government defended itself, stating that they were the result of
unusually high demand and mechanical failures, north of the UNBZ there were strong
suspicions of political motivation." Prevention of the 'further development and
strengthening' of the northern state, as Eroglu (the leader of the right-wing UBP party)
interpreted the power cuts, was the Greek Cypriots motive—in essence, it was a move to
incorporate the electricity supply into the economic embargo."' Yet in line with Greek
Cypriot calculations, an UNFICYP report suggested that peak consumption could only
be met island-wide if all the generating facilities of both sides were fully operational."3
Eventually, between 1994-95 the situation regarding the supply of electricity shot to
the top of the agenda in northern Cyprus, was discussed by the
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Council of Ministers daily, and received unprecedented media attention. Commercial
life and industry almost ground to a halt, the fragile tourist sector suffered badly,
irrigation water pumps were rendered redundant, and domestic users were often without
power for twelve hours a day or more. Local observers alarmingly predicted the total
collapse of the TRNC economy."'
A number of imbalances had arisen. Primarily, as the new Teknicik power
station was nearing completion in August 1994 (one year behind schedule) when an
explosion occurred on one of its two turbines, killing one employee and delaying the
project for another year. In addition, the Greek Cypriots were themselves having supply
problems: with the old Dhekelia station having just been retired, and one of the units at
new Dhekelia (Figure 5.2) suffering technical problems, the AHK was finding it difficult
to meet its own community's needs, never mind those of the north. At the start of 1994
the generating capacity on the island was such that the north, with only 40 MW of
generating capacity, had clearly weaker infrastructural resources than the south which
had a total generating capacity of 605 MW (Table 5.5). However, given that the peak
demand island-wide in 1994 was 550 MW the true picture was only appreciated on
realisation that, towards the winter of 1994, Greek Cypriot capacity had fallen to 440
MW and Turkish Cypriot capacity was down to 20 MW: an island-wide shortfall of 90
MW remained unaddressed. The Turkish Cypriot government were forced to introduce
extraordinary practical measures to manage electricity supply including the prioritising
of certain businesses, the encouragement of inter-company power transfers, and the
reactivation of old generators. Even a proposal of floating power stations to the island
was under consideration."' While contacts were made to renew talks over the problem
with Greek Cypriot officials, little assistance was forthcoming.
It was clear that, since 1974, the TRNC as a whole had become heavily
dependent on AHK for its supply of electricity. When demand exceeded supply,
however, load-shedding' (i.e., rotating regionalised power cuts) as necessary; indeed,
according to UN sources, the AHK were traditionally under instructions to cut power in
the north first, and only to cut it in the south as a last resort. While power cuts had been
a common feature for the majority of the post-partition period, Turkish Cypriot patience
ran out in 1994 when they faced power cuts on a scale not witnessed before. Turkish
Cypriot public opinion was critical of previous governments for allowing dependency
on the south for electricity to continue for some twenty years, but a large proportion of
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Table 5.5
	 Comparative electricity generating capacities of AHK and KIB-TEK
in 1994
Generating Capacity (MW)
Generating Station	 Greek Cypriot	 Turkish Cypriot
Total base load generation	 530	 40
Emergency back up only 75 (2 x 37.5 MW at Moni)
TOTAL CAPACITY	 605	 40
Sources: AHK (1994a), KM-TEK (1996), and UN sources.
the blame was placed on the Greek Cypriot authorities. There was real concern within
UNFICYP that nationalist elements in the north would retaliate in some way. This
general perception was further fuelled when on both `Atattirk Day' and on the 11th
anniversary of the TRNC's UDI the power cuts were particularly severe. A similar
interpretation was made by Denktash who suggested the original explosion at Teknicik
was sabotage. 116 It became apparent that he had brought up the dependency issue on a
number of previous occasions, where DenIctash had allegedly suggested joint
management"' this time, however, Denktash's response was largely directed at the
Greek Cypriot government. In September 1994 he called for his populace to keep a
record of any losses incurred, for which the Greek Cypriots would be forced to
compensate for at a later time."' Furthermore, by that December Denktash had
dramatically concluded that, left with no alternative by the 'enemy', the only way to
resolve the problem was to 'blow up' Dhekelia and/or Moni power station. He observed
that;
"[c]reating darkness on the Greek Cypriot side is not difficult at all. We have
refrained from such an action because we maintain a conscientious approach".119
Indeed, Denktash claimed that (undefined) persons had already been deterred from
doing so.
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The threat was never carried out. 126 It had nonetheless exposed the fragility of
the apparent transboundary understanding. The Turkish Cypriot authorities argued that
they received their electricity for two main reasons: because the south as the recognised
government received all incoming international aid to the island and that, in line with
the principles of the 1960 constitution, all of the island's existing state infrastructure
was the resource of both communities jointly: 21
 The electricity supply, therefore, was
an entitlement. It was claimed, in addition, that the costs of maintaining the system in
the north was equivalent to the cost of the power gained: 22
 In response to this crisis,
there was little visible sympathy from the AHK who identified the cause of the north's
dependency on their power as a product of the northern 'illegal government's' failure to
invest in its generating capacity.
5.3.3 'Humanitarianism' and the quid pro quo
As with their supply of water (see Chapters 6 and 7), the Greek Cypriot-run AHK were
also keen to announce that 'as a result' of the 1974 events they had 'lost control' of
property estimated, at prices prevailing at the time, at CY£8 mn. 123
 Moreover, the 1974
events had signalled the beginning of a 'great economic drain' due to their inability to
collect electricity bills from the areas 'under the control of the Turkish army'. They
subsequently kept a rolling estimate of this 'drain' which by 1995 was calculated at
CY£146 mn unpaid since 1974: 24 From the mid-1980s the AHK had been warning that
the increasing use by the north could jeopardise the authority's long-term financial
position: 25 Early on in 1994 the AHK was to declare that, without a proposed new plant
(at Vassiliko), the whole island would suffer major blackouts by 1997.126
The AHK' s budgetary calculations nonetheless required clarification on two
accounts. Firstly, there were always charges for the electricity in the north, levied by
KIB-TEK, but the revenue was never transferred to the Greek Cypriot authorities (there
had been talk in the 1960s of the existence of a 'frozen account' pending a solution)
largely due to their refusal to recognise the authority of the Greek Cypriots. Up until the
1994 shortages the Turkish Cypriots had, however, received electricity well below cost
price—according to UN sources, roughly 25% of that charged in the south. As a
consequence, domestic usage in the north became almost double that in the south,
creating an even greater resource dependency. Moreover, the unbilled consumption had
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been subsidised by the consumers in the south with bills being raised between 10-
35%; 127 such subsidies appeared all the more galling to Greek Cypriots given their
apparent funding of the Turkish Forces. Secondly, it could not be determined whether
the Greek Cypriot authorities would in fact have accepted any payment from the
north—they did not do so in any other economic arena, largely for fear that doing so
might be viewed as indirect recognition of the northern 'state'. Such developments in
transboundary resource management nevertheless begged the question of why the north
refused to pay, and the south continued to supply. Assuming that the 'giving' party was
continually testing the other party, and that, as the probability of default was perceived
to increase then the amount 'given' would fall, why was this not the case in this
transboundary regime?
The rationale for this seemed to involve a quid pro quo relationship between the
two communal authorities, tacitly established immediately after 1963, involving an
informal 'water-for-electricity' exchange.' 28 This reciprocal regime operated for three
main reasons. Principally, electrical power was needed to operate the Morphou water
pumps and so maintain water supplies to the south (especially Nicosia, see Chapter 7).
Both electricity and water supplies had generally not been sanctioned since December
1963 primarily because of the fragmented population segregation; it was not possible to
cut off such services in Turkish quarters and enclaves without disrupting substantial
numbers of Greek Cypriots. 129 Indeed, the development of a quid pro quo could be
traced back to mechanisms developed in Larnaca from 1964, where the water system
had been owned by the Turkish Cypriot community prior to December 1963. As it fell
into Greek Cypriot hands, so the government chose not to bill the Turkish Cypriot
quarter for electricity supplies.'30
Another key determinant of this policy, however, was that successive Greek
Cypriot governments maintained the policy that the supply of power was a
'humanitarian gesture';
"in our plans we always considered that Cyprus is an integrated, is a unified area.
We take care of their needs too".131
Not to do so would unreasonably affect their 'Cypriot' compatriots. There appeared to
be another level to this moral, altruistic approach, however, where—as with the vital if
minimal supply of water to the north—Greek Cypriots had the chance significantly to
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lose face to the international community by controlling adversely the supply of what
was commonly understood to be a basic need. As LeMarquand noted generally on this
'image' dilemma;
"Wile desire to pursue a good neighbourly policy, to be a model of cooperative
international [sic] behaviour, or to be candidly egocentric are examples of
national attitudes which may positively or negatively influence a country's
willingness to cooperate with its riparian neighbours".32
Clearly, the former consideration was uppermost when, with the Turkish Cypriot's UDI
looming in 1983 and speculation that the Kyprianou government would cut off both
water and electricity supplies, the Greek Cypriot authorities preferred to maintain the
link.' There was throughout considerable, heated inter-party debate over the provision
of electricity for free—in 1993 DIKO (the Democratic Party) insisted that as soon as
Teknicik came on line, the supply should be withdrawn and repayment immediately
sought. 134 Nonetheless, in real terms this arrangement was considered a form of aid to
the north, paid for by the consumers in the south. As such, an issue linkage was being
sought by the Greek Cypriots: an agreement to supply not only weakened Denktash's
claim that his community lived under a complete economic blockade, but it also built up
a 'reservoir of good will' to draw on for future concessions.'35
Another added impetus to this 'humanitarianism', however, originated from the
Greek Cypriots politico-military power relations with the north. On one hand, the
military threat could never be underestimated; with a twist of semantics, Denktash's
'conscientious approach' had dissuaded Turkish Cypriots from striking the power
stations 'only' because they were "humanitarian and fair"."6 Thus restraining the
exercise of their power was the extent of reciprocal interdependence between them and
the Greek Cypriots, with the underlying assumption for the latter being that the less
evident such altruistic interdependence, the higher the chances of resource conflict. On
the other hand, the AHK refused to meet or maintain close contact with KIB-TEK for
fear of granting them tacit recognition. In so doing, they safeguarded their own power
position, that of being the only recognised government-affiliated electricity authority on
the island.
Consequently, the eventual creation of a nominally sustainable generating
station in the north (Teknicik) by mid-1996 was quickly greeted by Greek Cypriots, on
one hand, as a financial saving, but on the other hand their response was mixed with
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concern that this absolute gain in generating capacity was undermined by their loss of
political clout to a 'breakaway' state.' 37 With the island-wide demand for electricity
expected to increase at a rate of approximately 10% per annum, the need for careful
management and forward planning remained—its mismanagement already having
constituted a casus belli."8 By March 1995 the electricity shortfall had been
considerably alleviated, due to both an increase in generating capacity island-wide, and
due to Teknicik's completion.'" Subsequently, except for remaining transboundary
transfers from the south to the north along the UNBZ (especially Nicosia), the TRNC
proudly announced their self-sufficiency and Independence'. 14° From then on,
however, the system control of AHK and that of KIB-TEK were in direct telephone
contact as the Turkish Cypriot side continued to require some supplies from the south
throughout 1996, and remained dependent upon unguaranteed supplies of power plant
fuel from Turkey. 141
The existence of water and electricity interdependencies after 1974 had
necessitated different policies from the two communities. Within a year of summer
1974, the Greek Cypriots were making plans to build their own water storage systems to
reduce dependency on the Turkish Cypriot Morphou supply, who were themselves
planning their own power station.' , By the mid-1980s the Greek Cypriots had
succeeded in their quest for nominal self-sustainability in water (and thus exploding
what they perceived as the 'myth' of water dependency on Morphou)," while at the
same time ensuring that the north remained dependent upon them for largely political
and strategic reasons. In the north, the process of extracting themselves from this
dependency was not to peak until the mid-1990s, by which time the Turkish and TRNC
governments had made water and electricity infrastructure the top two development
priorities for the unrecognised state."4 Denktash was to conclude, in the light of
electricity supply problems in 1994, that "we must create a situation in which there is no
need to ask if the Greek Cypriots will be cutting our water supply or not"."
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5.4	 `Other(s')' Transboundary Resource Needs
From the mid-1980s, alongside the considerable rhetoric of cooperation over
strategically-vital transboundary resources at the 'official' level, emerged an increasing
proliferation of initiatives and organisations with different criteria and procedures,
involving other issue areas and other actors. With this came a growing recognition that
apart from strategic, military, and diplomatic factors, it was also assumed that socio-
structural, psychological, economic and cultural variables were significant in
influencing intercommunal and inter-societal relations.' 46 The abject failure of
traditional third-party interventions in the protracted social conflict—"incapable of
dealing with interstate, state-communal and intercommunal interactions"—reflected a
belief that the small-state interactions of Cyprus were merely the unfortunate 'by-
product' of superpower-dominated regional interactions and were, in turn, of little
significance.'
Rejecting this thesis, and aware that no change to the status quo had been
affected since 1974, 'unofficial' discourses of transboundary relations came to mix with
high-level debate as individual citizens on both sides of the UNBZ became collectively
involved in transboundary relations. What could be termed `semi-official' bicommunal
meetings were to take place between political parties during the 1980s. Political parties
had first met in Libya in 1980, then later in various European cities as part of an on-
going Czechoslovakia-sponsored venture."8 However, less overtly politicised,
'unofficial' sources of influence—particularly problem-solving workshops—became
more widely encouraged by the late 1980s, largely due to the growing interest of
international third parties in the Cyprus conflict (Appendix 1)." 9 In 1989, the German
'Education Institute for Democracy and the Preservation of the Environment' initiated
meetings involving both communities which, within a year, had institutionalised into the
island's first post-1974 bicommunal social movement—`The Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot Citizens' Movement for Democracy and Federation in Cyprus'. 'Independent
of' and 'beyond' any formal or official procedures, it was to last only a year but set a
number of precedents.'" With a flourish of meetings at the former Ledra Palace Hotel,
by November 1992 a `Bicommunal Steering Committee' was established. This came to
represent a core group of up to 300 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots coordinating a
growing number of bicommunal activities; it ultimately led to an intensification of
194
Island-wide Perspective
meetings and workshops from 1993, with the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) funding the training of conflict resolution skills, while UNFICYP and the
'Cyprus Fulbright Commission' provided logistical support. In 1994 these
developments were complemented by a US-based 'Cyprus Consortium', 151 and from
1996 a 'Conflict Resolution Trainers Group' overtook the Steering Committee,
reflecting the third parties' desire to allow for more loose coalitions built upon local,
citizen-based participation and coordination.
By the mid-1990s, as Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis observed, at no other time since
1974 had so many genuine efforts to reestablish contacts and cooperation been made by
so many diverse social groups in each community.' As suggested above, hopes that
'unofficial elites' could promote an alternative vision where politicians and officials had
failed were not restricted to 'grassroots' interest groups, nor was this their intention.'"
'Track II' was increasingly overlapping with 'Track I': in addition to EU, UK, German,
French and Slovak sponsored programmes, the UN, through UNHCR in particular, was
soon to recognise the value of this 'conflict resolution movement' from the island-wide
perspective. UNHCR had entered the Cyprus arena in August 1974 in its capacity as
Co-ordinator of United Nations 'humanitarian assistance' for Cyprus' displaced
populace, but it was to gradually develop a strictly `bicommunal humanitarian'
programme of activities in 1986 when the US became its sole donor (via USAID).
Moreover, from 1992 until April 1997 it was to fund only projects to be carried out by
bicommunal teams (increasingly, therefore, overlapping in mandate with UNDP),'"
such that by late 1996 it had channelled over US$273 mn to the two communities. 155
 At
the island-wide scale, a variety of issue areas were covered: forestry; pest control,
education, air pollution assessment' also, from 1991 architects were to meet every two
months, studying building restoration plans in the south and north and raising the
awareness of the island's architectural heritage.' In addition, cardiologists considered
a CY£8 mn bicommunal cardiology centre, furthering historical cooperation over health
with Turkish Cypriots crossing south for certain treatments.'"
However, progress on these comparatively 'new' and 'non-strategic' issue areas
faced an uphill battle. After an independent review of its programme in early 1997,
UNHCR terminated its administration of the humanitarian programme.'" Moreover,
this was to unfortunately coincide with a marked deterioration in the Turkish Cypriot
leadership's view of 'Track II' activities. The self-evident belief in such programmes
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that, once progress was achieved in confidence building over specific 'humanitarian
objectives', any outside interference would be neutralised and conditions for a viable
settlement could be created through a multiplier effect, was being seriously
questioned. 160
 Even with, and at times because of, third party assistance, 'unofficial'
transboundary relations generated their own problems and, seemingly inevitably, led to
political tasks. The backlash to bicommunalism was based on the premise that the two
tracks were, at best, complementary but, more likely, threatening;
liwle cannot allow them [Turkish Cypriot participants] to be hostage to the
interests of third parties, and there are signs that it's being done in the Cyprus
context". 161
Bicommunal meetings were merely a "talk-show", with people coming together but
failing to cooperate within the (de facto) "realities" of the island. In the south too, if for
different reasons, the bicommunal movement had become an important if not unique
process of 'empowerment' for citizens, bringing with it an unfair degree of
expectancy. 162 Post-1974, only the Greek Cypriot Left was to show particular interest in
bicommunal cooperation—consistent with the international orientation of the Left and
its tendency to de-emphasise local differences through the promotion of class ideologies
cutting across allegiances to ethnicity and religion' 63—and, subsequently,
disappointment with the little progress emanating from the 'alternative' form of dispute
resolution was ultimately focused on to those very individuals trying to fill the
'mediation gap' .164
In addition, with bicommunal events which necessitated crossing at Ledra Palace
checkpoint, the Turkish Cypriot authorities played a key role as gatekeepers. The
participation of Turkish Cypriots was often determined on a case-by-case basis, with
little reason or warning given. 165 Despite vocal support from the Security Council for its
efforts, and pleas to remove obstacles to such contacts, the Turkish Cypriot authorities
continued to exercise tight control on attendance.' 66 From late January 1997,
authorisation was usually granted for events in the UNBZ, but not always for events in
the south.' 67 At the start of October, Denktash then made it clear his government's wish
for all bicommunal contacts to cease, given that, as Denktash perceived it, the EU was
trying to create the impression "it was talking to the Turkish side" when these were
contacts with NGOs and not the TRNC government.'" By late December this position
had hardened and, ignoring protests from opposition parties, Taner Etkin (TRNC
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Foreign Minister) announced that all transboundary contacts at Ledra Palace organised
by embassies, trade unions, students and other groups were suspended.' This appeared
to support a general perception amongst Greek Cypriot and international observers that
the Turkish Cypriot leadership banned, by rule, contact between institutions that would
lead to genuine rapprochement while allowing selectively only those contacts that
constituted an indirect recognition of the TRNC.
In examining the roots of `other(s7 transboundary resource needs, the
remainder of this chapter considers the problematic and ultimately limited progress of
'unofficial' (i.e., non-state) transboundary resource management initiatives. Two issue
areas—the economy and the environment—which received attention increasingly at the
island-wide scale from the mid-1980s, predominantly through third party-led,
transboundary resource management initiatives, are examined in more detail.
5.5	 Development of an 'Island State'
From the 1950s, the logic of regional development in Cyprus precipitated a widely-held
belief amongst local and international observers that there was 'no economic logic to
partition', stressing the inevitability of unity rendered by economic forces.' 7° The
historical preconditions of the Greek Cypriot policy in particular dictated that the
'Island' remained the primary unit for cooperation, integration, and ultimately
reunification, reflecting a belief that interregional transboundary links were of secondary
importance and simply reflected the wider case for 'all-Island' economic cooperation."'
Although historical, this belief was to acquire a more cohesive form after 1974 when the
promotion of the idea of natural or logical division of Cyprus' territorial space
exemplified a state-centred, nationalistic discourse based, on what Häkli has elsewhere
termed, the savoir of regions as spontaneous organic entities.'72
In this sense, projection of an 'island economy' and an 'island environment' in
Cyprus served two particular purposes. Firstly, it provided a spatial framework for
apparent mutual benefits—party political and other interest groups largely interpreted
economic cooperation to meet their own political ends, thus supporting Jervis' belief
that cooperation is more likely to occur in economic relations than in security relations,
given that the strategic structure of the former is positive-sum while that of the latter is
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more zero-sum.'" The 'island' also provided, however, a suitable metaphorical device
for a politico-geographical imagination, based on objectivist rhetoric, which sought to
evoke images of unity to give consistency and legitimacy to political order.' This
rhetoric was to be employed by both anti-partitionists in the south (and north), but also
extensively by third parties concerned with transboundary resource management and
conflict resolution while addressing 'island-wide' problems.
5.5.1 An 'island economy'
Analyses of the consequences of partition and the further fragmentation of the resource
base on the small island economy of Cyprus have generally highlighted three
distinguishing features: a rapid, so-called 'economic miracle' in the south, the relative
economic 'underdevelopment' of the Turkish Cypriot north and its integration into its
Turkish motherland, and the absence of any economic interests transcending the
UNBZ." Firstly, and as previously noted, for the Greek Cypriot community the force
of the changes of 1974 had signalled the need to avert a social and economic collapse,
but the powers of economic recuperation were equally as great.' Economic growth
became export-led, Arab markets were exploited for a growing clothing and footwear
industry such that domestic exports increased fivefold between 1973 and 1985 and, in
addition to concentrating on manufactured goods, tourism from Northern Europe
became the most important source of foreign exchange. Exposure to the international
economy found the ROC looking to shipping and offshore banking as determinants of
economic activity, and an emphasis on the tertiary sector was to by-pass to a great
extent the problem of scale.'" In spite of the political uncertainties deterring inward
investment and a limited resource base, the Greek Cypriots came to enjoy one of the
highest standards of living in the Mediterranean (and above that of Greece).
In the north, in direct contrast, economic development was to remain stunted and
non-self-supporting. 178 The Turkish Cypriot side repeatedly complained to the UN over
the all-encompassing embargo, imposed by the Greek Cypriot authorities since 1963. It
was argued that as long as they were isolated from international relations, travel, trade
and tourism, distrust and a crisis of confidence between the two communities would
only deepen.' While lagging behind the south, the northern economy was to witness
more market-orientated farming, and the manufacturing of foodstuffs and textiles.'"
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Without any major structural transformation, however, around one-third of the working
population remained in agriculture (accounting for only one-fifth of the GNP), and the
only sector to grow in competition was an unproductive public administration.'" The
northern economy was to become closely linked and over-dependent on the volatile
Turkish economy.
Relative to these observations, the third general conclusion of economic analyses
has received little further consideration. Intercommunal economic contacts were largely
insignificant, as the Cyprus conflict touched all potential levels of economic
collaboration.' Yet, it was apparent that after 1974 certain economic ventures were to
continue and others developed—a transboundary process which clearly requires more
serious consideration. The main bicommunal contacts post-1974 were trade union-led,
reflecting their general belief that the working class of the island would be guaranteed
better prospects of welfare, economic and cultural growth under a settlement. After
meeting in March 1977, for the first time since the Turkish military intervention, in July
1979 two federations—the Greek Cypriot PEO (the Pan-Cyprian Worker's Federation)
and the Turkish Cypriot Dev-Is—formulated a joint communique which called for the
reopening of factories along the UNBZ (see Chapter 6) and encouraged the employment
of Turkish Cypriots in the south.'" Although, in procedural terms, they had become
something of a 'model' bicommunal movement,'" a second forum was to again prove
difficult in organising, undermined as bicommunal contacts were by the high level
political developments.'85
At the commercial level, there were also transboundary networks. The only
petroleum refinery, as the Turkish Cypriot side were keen to point out, was situated in
the south.' 86 Since then, however, the refinery had sought to supply the entire petrol
market and a substantial proportion of the LPG and gas oil of the island, including the
north. Once again, LPG was subsidised (through higher rates on petrol in the south) and
over 3,000 tons was being supplied to the north each year because it was understood to
be directed to their most 'needy' rural areas.'" These working relationships, in other
words, involved relatively continuous cooperation which was being sanctioned not only
through the threat of loss of future savings/earnings but, again, for 'humanitarian'
purposes. By the mid-1990s, however, this trade had all but dried up as Turkish Cypriot
authorities established Turkish sources.
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Cyprus' prolonged process of accession with the EU, by way of contrast,
demonstrated at the most `supra'-national level the political economy of cooperation in
Cyprus. Given the basic tenets of neofunctionalism, the EU's growing involvement in
the Cyprus conflict would/should have a significant effect by 'upgrading the common
interests' of both communities to a higher authority. 188 Indeed, in terms of 'the
economic imperative' for the north, the ever-growing role of the EU as a facilitator of
economic cooperation in Cyprus presented a number of theoretical possibilities.'" At
the very least, the European Parliament's Council of Ministers was encouraged to
consider the extension of economic exchanges between Europe and Cyprus to the north
because, in terms of territorial unity, the economy of the island was hampered by its
being partitioned.19°
On the contrary, political hostilities and a lack of appropriate institutions were to
remain major impediments to 'purely' economic integration between north and south.
In practice, the 'chicken and egg' question remained a difficult one to answer: accession
to the EU, or an overall settlement—which should come first for (which) Cyprus:MI
This problem was first raised by the Association Agreement between Cyprus and the
EEC in December 1972, which envisaged the establishment of a Custom Union within
ten years. Until 1964, a Cypriot delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly (comprising
representatives and substitutes from both communities at a ratio of 2:1 in favour of the
majority community) had sat since the ROC joined the Council of Europe in 1961.'92
With the events of 1963-1974 soon altering the playing field, the EEC chose formally to
conduct affairs with the internationally-recognised Greek Cypriot government, funding
projects of benefit to the 'whole island'—specifically, dealing with domestic water
supply via the SCP, Nicosia's sewerage system (see Chapter 7), and the construction of
two power units at Dhekelia power station.'" Inevitably the second stage of the
agreement, scheduled for completion by 1977, was put on hold, but only until the mid-
1980s when Papandreou's government picked up the gauntlet—Greece having become a
full EC member in 1981.' 9' By 1995, it was well understood that negotiations on
Cyprus' accession would begin six months after the end of the next Inter-Governmental
Conference, with or without a settlement of the Cyprus conflict. The Secretary-General
and Security Council welcomed the development which, they recognised, would instil a
new sense of urgency and facilitate an overall settlement.'"
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In the light of a steady if drawn-out process it was therefore somewhat of a
surprise when in July 1997, reacting to an EU reaffirmation (in Agenda 2000) of its
decision to open accession talks with Cyprus, both the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish
governments set in motion a sequence of events that caused the rapid postponement of
UN-led negotiations. Several factors prompted this behaviour. By the time an
agreement to proceed with a Cyprus-EU Customs Union (by 2002) had been struck in
May 1987, Turkey had formally applied to become a full member itself. Throughout
the EU accession debate Turkish Cypriots objected strongly to the role of the Greek
Cypriot government as the sole interlocutor, just as they had objected to the process of
applying for EU aid via the government in the south. Legally, they added, under the
1960 Treaty of Guarantee the ROC could not unite with any state, and by inference, nor
become a member of any international association of which Greece and Turkey were not
members themselves. While the EU was no 'state', the Turkish Cypriots claimed one
state in particular was an integral part of the EU: Greece, thus making indirect enosis a
possibility. This defence was further founded on fears that the Greek Cypriots' call for
the 'three freedoms' would be automatically upheld as human rights on Cyprus'
accession, and that Turkish troops would be forced to leave.
July's formal announcement appeared just as galling for Turkey, given their
absence from the EU's invitation list. Although an associate member of the EEC since
1963, Turkey's only real success with the EU was its customs union in 1995. Since
then, while enlargement had been a key feature of EU affairs, Turkey continued to
receive a cool response on its prospects for membership. The EU question was not
purely political, however. In Cyprus, the economic asymmetry either side of the UNBZ
heralded a problematic integration of the north with both the south and the EU in
general, and although the EU and US were most often quoted, it was not possible to
predict who would fund the necessary restructuring.'" Though small, the economy in
northern Cyprus remained fragile and largely Turkish-funded, and in July 1994 the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) effectively banned TRNC-produced exports of citrus
fruit and potatoes to the EU, as they had to be certified by the ROC. The TRNC
government reacted by halting UN negotiations and reassessing federation as the 'only'
solution on the table, reflecting a more general perception amongst Turkish Cypriots
that EU-funding of `bicommunal' projects was skewed; Turkish Cypriot proposals
submitted (e.g., for the Morphou derivation project) were understood to have been
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rejected owing to Greek Cypriot objections that they were not `bicommunal', which
naturally brought into question the funding of the Vasilikos-Pendaskinos irrigation
system, or even the SCP system in tota1.197
From then on, Denktash's opinion of the EU rapidly worsened and there were a
growing number of occasions where further integration with Turkey, both economic and
political, rather than the EU proved more attractive. In January 1997 a Turkey-TRNC
economic cooperation protocol was signed worth US$250mn for the TRNC, while six
months later a nine-point bilateral integration agreement set up an Association Council
to oversee the 'gradual economic and financial integration and partial integration on
security, defence and foreign policy matters'. The Greek Cypriots and Greece naturally
viewed EU accession as a significant tool for levering apart the increasingly united
defence of Turkey and the TRNC. In addition, the veto of Greece—and potentially, it
must be remembered, of Cyprus—threatened to complicate the situation yet further.
Greece repeatedly sought to link the Cyprus issue with the establishment of the EU
Customs Union with Turkey, with the argument that an occupying state could not be
part of Europe, and accordingly blocked an ECU 600 mn financial protocol with Turkey
from 1994. The conflicting EU policies therefore were to persist: Turkey would try to
hold-up the accession of Cyprus while Greece was similarly unlikely to accept Turkish
membership before a settlement in Cyprus.
The unitary development of the 'island' was clearly problematic. The Greek
Cypriot government's emphasis immediately after 1974 had been on the
complementarity of investment, labour input and resources in various regions of the
island.' Non-integration would affect the viability of many sectors of industry and of
the population; looked at in isolation, each area of Cyprus was 'incomplete and
inadequate', but as part of a whole it represented 'a meaningful economic supplement.'"
Reduction (even through federalism) in the size and scale of industrial activities, and of
the 'domestic' market, would turn the manufacturing sector into the cottage industry of
the past and wipe out the advantages of technological progress."' Put in its simplest
form;
"the country is too small for the misallocation of resources [...] Economically,
Cyprus is a single unit. [...] it is utterly impossible for an administrative line to be
drawn in any manner without disregarding the problem of viability".201
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"[a]ny form of separation would inevitably cause the artificial creation of areas
rich in certain resources on the one hand and areas characterized by a complete
absence of economic resources on the other".202
Even by the time the much-heralded 'economic stagnation' and 'eternal
underdevelopment' had been avoided courtesy of dramatic economic growth
throughout the 1980s, however, the Greek Cypriot authorities maintained this 'organic'
discourse. With time, however, it was increasingly employed to address the benefits for
an underdeveloped Turkish Cypriot community: a reunited economy could bridge the
economic gap whereby market forces could establish an 'equilibrium' between the two
communities."' A common, Cypriot currency, the safeguarding of the 'three freedoms',
harmonisation with the EU, and the favourable conditions of political security would
overcome the shrinkage and waste of resources."'
Yet, while this discourse (similar to Lyne's `technocentric anti-partitionism')
persisted amongst Greek Cypriot policy-makers, there was to be a crucial condition:
there could be little development of macro or micro economic issues until an overall
settlement to the Cyprus conflict was found."' Economic cooperation was not
encouraged, except in 'humanitarian' areas, because the TRNC was not recognisable.'
In turn, to legitimise any cooperative economic approach the Greek Cypriot authorities
had to overcome the fear that cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots might indirectly
entail subsidising the Turkish Forces."' The economic status quo was to prove more
desirable than what could be achieved through diplomatic channels, wherein political
always risks had to be considered. In any case, the uncooperative tactics of the Turkish
Cypriot leadership had, it was generally perceived, nipped the majority of any
bicommunal economic initiatives in the bud. The ROC authorities were conscious of
"an iron curtain"—the Churchilian phrase applying to Cyprus now, not Russia?"
As Theophylactou also noted, this suggested that lessons could be drawn from
the German case (as noted in Chapter 3), when the FRG refused to recognise the GDR
(as Greek Cypriots failed to recognise the Turkish Cypriots) until Willy Brandt's
ostpolitik—which was to succeed ultimately where the non-recognition regime had
failed in bringing down the GDR. Its translation to the Cyprus context (as nordpolitik),
whereby the Greek Cypriots could allow the opening of the border and the acceptance of
the de facto political reality in the hope of undermining the Turkish Cypriot authorities,
had obvious advantages; moreover, the business elites in each community appeared
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receptive to economic rapprochement based on the pragmatic laws of
interdependency.' Indeed, somewhat mirroring the resurgence in economic
neofunctionalism within Europe as a whole, a growing number of proposals were being
presented by academic observers; a similar scenario, for example, was proposed by
Mehmet: "an evolutionary process of confidence-building" concentrating on economic
cooperation first (e.g., a limited free trade agreement) and closer political cooperation
later, "on the presumption that economics appeals to man's [sic] rationality". 210
Such 'all-island', economic triumphalism, however, inevitably fuelled the
insecurity of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and nationalist electorate. How could
economic contacts (like EU membership) in practice entail free movement of persons,
services and capital on an island divided into two separate parts? 2" The only sign of
acceptance was in Denktash's belief that, by leaving the border intact, economic
cooperation would further institutionalise and stabilise the political status quo, not
subvert it. For the Turkish Cypriot authorities the 'dual economy' which had developed
before 1974 was satisfactory, but 'inter-state' relations could be based on genuine
cooperation for 'mutual benefit'.212
5.5.2 An 'island environment': security discourse and bicommunalism
The island's environmental management generated a similarly broad sphere of debate,
touching as it did both on activities considered at the island-wide scale and also those
embedded at the local (and especially borderland) scale. Before assessing the progress
of arguably the most significant transboundary, bicommunal environmental study to
date, initiated by UNDP in the early 1990s, it is imperative to consider the wider
ramifications of environmental affairs in Cyprus, and their manifestation in the
bicommunal context.
/ntracommunal differences in approaching the environment, based on class and
strategies of `modemity/Europeanisation', have been rightly highlighted by Argyrou.2"
The two largest community-based environmental groups in the south—Ikologhiki Kinisi
('Ecological Movement') and Fili tou Akama ('Friends of Akamas')—were founded in
Nicosia, which arguably set most of the sociocultural standards other towns sought to
emulate (or resist). Of comparable interest was the purported 'Occident/Orient' and
`North/South' clash. A large proportion of the environmental NGOs island-wide were
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either established by British `expatsVretirees (especially so in the TRNC), or were
heavy in their numbers, generating perceptions of the 'rich North' wishing to constrain
the development aspirations of the local community. 214 Such perceptions were to be
enriched over time through separate, long-standing proposals to create National Parks
both in the Alcamas and Karpas peninsulas (in the south and the north respectively), the
two least developed and consequently most potentially lucrative tourist regions. 2 " The
situation in Akamas was further exacerbated given the presence of 125 km2 of British
military 'range area' in its heartland, in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of
Establishment.216
It can be argued, however, that this discursive relationship between the
environment and identity, such that "physical space, constructed or otherwise" lends
itself to 'ideological purposes', appeared to have been just as, if not more, pronounced
in the nationalist realm.' The 1960 constitution of the ROC contained no provision for
environmental protection, but following the work from 1967 of a Country Planning
Committee, the 1972 Town and Country Planning Law (based on British planning law)
provided for the adoption of an 'Island Plan' complemented by 'Local Plans'. In the
south this law remained the primary legislative regulator of land development and
physical planning yet, after significant pressure from prospective developers, it only
came into force in its entirety in December 1990. The institutionalisation of
environmental matters remained fragmentary; a 'Environmental Protection Law' (for
water and air pollution) was only enacted in 1991. Partly in response to this shortfall,
from the mid-1980s nearly thirty environmental NGOs were to develop in the south.
Although displaying diverse concerns about the environment, a majority operated under
the umbrella of 'The Federation of Environmental and Ecological Organisations'
(established in 1988) although, as suggested by Argyrou, this failed to iron out various
intracommunal inconsistencies in understanding and approaching environmental
concerns, as will be noted later.
In the north, at the international level the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot
authorities were unable to attend international conferences on the environment from
1974. Representatives in the north, for example, which since 1974 held 58% of the
island's coastline, were not to participate in the Mediterranean Action Plan. m While an
'Environment Law' was similarly enacted in 1990, the necessary regulations to facilitate
its legal implementation were not established until 1997. In tandem with the south, by
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the mid-1990s there were over ten environmental NG0s, most of which had developed
in the late-1980s/early 1990s, 219 and for a short period there was also an Environmental
Co-ordinating Committee to prevent duplication of efforts and to ensure major
environmental concerns were being addressed.
Given the suggested political dimension to state-led , island-wide policies, it was
no surprise that concerns over the environment were not free from ideological and
dogmatic discourse. Most notable were Greek Cypriot concerns with integration and a
uniform policy encompassing the island as a single environmental unit. Geography,
geology, weather, flora and fauna had conspired over time to make it a single country,
and the events of 1974 had challenged the intuitively appealing notion of island-wide
management. 22° For the Greek Cypriot government, the link was both direct and
conscious (it is worth quoting at some length);
"[t]he Turkish invasion and occupation of 40% of the island is considered to be
the most serious threat on the Cyprus ecosystem in recent centuries by bringing
about an almost complete division of all the ecological and environmental
parameters and dimensions".221
It was fully aware of how 'aggression and occupation' had brought about 'irreparable
damage' to the environment. 222 Moreover,
"[t]he destruction, the barbarity and plundering [...] are reminiscent of the dark
days of the Middle Ages. [...] The demographic and cultural alteration of Cyprus
threaten[s], in the long term, the whole of the island's ecosystem. [...] The
importation of foreign elements to the island's ecosystem [...] constitute[s] an
ecological gangrene".223
The discursive marriage of environmental problems and 'ecological sores' with the
'national' problem was vividly portrayed, even if its Orientalist rhetoric was put to one
side.224 Directly because of the 'division of the island' and the 'uncertainty' generated
for public and private decision-makers, the economy had been revitalised 'without the
time to consider the environment'; in turn, there was no way to plan and implement a
uniform and integrated development and conservation programme."' It was,
consequently, not until the mid-1980s that planning in the south began to move slowly
from the short-term in response to the 1974 events, to more of a long-term
perspective.'
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In addition, the "illegal 'state' of the occupied part of Cyprus" had no
obligations regarding the Berne Convention or CITES.' This was rightly based upon
the observation that the TRNC had never been bound by any inter-state environmental
treaties even though, although unrecognised, it remained subject to any obligations
concerning environmental protection, and the rules of customary law applied as it
asserted statehood'.' Following the Greek Cypriots' logic through, therefore;
"the turning point will be, of course, [...] the unification of the island which will
terminate the current artificial division of its ecosystem and will allow for a
unified environmental policy for the whole country to be implemented".229
Ambiguities concerning the environmental policy in the north, which suggested that
authorities in the north and Turkey combined had allowed unpalatable land use changes,
were also an implicit cause for concern within the UN—the Secretary-General himself
reported in 1996 that some 20% of the northern territory was now 'reserved for military
purposes'; it was, after all, one of the most densely militarised areas in the world.2"
In this light, the history of bicommunalism involving NG0s 231 from both south
and north was a short one. Many environmental concerns raised affected one
community more than the other. Rapid coastal zone development in the south after
1974, due to the focusing of political attention on settlement issues as part of the
'economic miracle', was generally understood to have created gravely negative social
and environmental effects by the late 1980 5 . 232 This development had yet to fully
emerge on a comparable scale in the north. 2" Of much greater significance, however,
were to be the political positions of the individual NG0s. Approaches to the wider
Cyprus conflict were evidently polarised along a crudely-definable Left
(rapprochement) and Right ('rejectionise) axis. Contrasting intracommunal
perspectives threw up apparently contradictory environmental rhetoric from the north
and from the south.' Yet while such oppositional voices rightly served to complicate
any generalisations, it was plausible to suggest that NGO constitutions sang broadly the
same tune as 'official' government policy, thus seriously underscoring the strangulation
of environmental bicommunalism. An example of the considerable complexities of the
political nature of cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot is a
relatively minor episode in the short history of environmentalism in Cyprus, an
initiative undertaken by the Friends of the Earth (FOE, based in the south) in 1990. The
specific point of contention was the proposal of a face-to-face meeting with a Turkish
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Cypriot environmental NGO. Encouraged by Charles Gaulkin, then UNFICYP
Spokesman, to mark 'World Environment Day' in June with a meeting at Ledra Palace,
the FOE coordinator had sought amongst the Greek Cypriot NGOs to draft a 'joint
declaration' to mark the day.235 Divisions both within the general 'green' movement
and within FOE itself over the politics of procedure were to take centre stage, however;
the most widely-proposed pre-condition set was that the Turkish Cypriot NGO should
declare in advance that "the single greatest ecological problem facing Cyprus today is
the occupation of the north of the island". 236 As a reflection of the state level's
perceived need to legitimise their control over a territorially weak 'nation', and at the
same time negate the necessity and relevance of the TRNC, 'environmental security'
was interpreted as responding to the 'unnatural occupation' of the island's ecosystem.
While a small entourage was eventually organised to attend, on the morning of the event
they were informed that, at the last minute, the Turkish Cypriot delegation had been
refused permission to cross into the UNBZ by their authorities.
The incident successfully highlighted two contradictory processes. A
'rejectionisf lobby amongst Greek Cypriot environmentalists was unable to consider
bicommunal environmental contacts free from politics, both specifically through distrust
of the 'other's' intentions and, more generally, through fear of recognition?" The
inclusion of various political elites within NGOs in the north, while improving NGO
access to decision-making parties, also led to the politicisation of such NGOs and
further complicated their perceived 'neutrality'.' Ironically, however, in addition a
`rejectionist' Turkish Cypriot leadership had refused to accept the legitimacy of such
bicommunal contacts, not only strongly indicating that the Turkish Cypriot NGO was
not in search of entrapment, but more generally illustrating the breadth of issue areas
forced to pass screening procedures set by the leadership in the north. In this case, it
reflected a belief among planners and NGOs in the north that rather than prescribing an
'island-wide' scale of management as a matter of course, the geographical scale of
intended legislation had to be appropriately determined.' Turkish Cypriot
environmentalists felt that while cooperation in the field of environmental conservation
carried a major potential for confidence-building, Greek Cypriot attempts to 'block'
international finance for such areas as water development in the north were
fundamentally counter-productive.' Yet, , the specific position of the ROC's and
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TRNC's policy on (bicornmunal) environmentalism can be deduced from the most
comprehensive third party intervention on the matter since 1974.
5.5.3 The UNDP 'Environmental Programming for Action in Cyprus' study
Fundamentally, as a distinct issue area, the environment appeared to be the most
politically 'neutral' area in which to identify mutually acceptable joint initiatives! 4 ' It
was, after all, "a subject which has no borders, no boundaries, it concerns everybody".242
An 'Environmental Profile' was seen to be an imperative, given that a World Bank
report on the Mediterranean in 1990 noted a high level of conflict over resource use on
the island, and another report three years later for the Greek Cypriot government
recognised coastal zone degradation and an unsustainable water balance as the two
problems of major concern?' To address these urgent environmental issues, additional
assistance was sought by the ROC from the UNDP through their Programme Support
Project, the progress of which this analysis will now focus on.
By the early 1970s, the ROC had come to represent the most concentrated field
of UNDP aid in the world. Since the onset of intercommunal troubles in 1963,
however, a variety of reasons had meant that the Turkish Cypriot community had
received little of it.' For the Turkish Cypriots, 'unilaterally' and 'illegally' accredited
as the UNDP was to the Greek Cypriot government, it was only by 1969—when all
hope of receiving aid direct had evaporated—that the Turkish Cypriot leadership
supported the Turkish Cypriot submission of offers for assistance?' From then on,
however, the UNDP became more individual programme-orientated, most notably
when, after 1974;
"[the] UNDP, in agreement with the Government, [...] continued its position that
for technical assistance in the area of long-term resource management and
environment, as well as in the area of human health, issues should, if possible, be
addressed for the island as a whole".246
Special emphasis was now given to development efforts which would 'promote inter-
communal cooperation' and serve both communities 'in an equitable manner'—in short,
reaffirming the UN's desire to achieve 'a return to normalcy', and for more bicommunal
development projects?"
209
Island-wide Perspective
Given the developing principle of commitment to both communities, it was
therefore with some surprise when, in early April 1997, it was announced suddenly that
the UNDP's Cyprus office (as with UNHCR's) would be closing 'within the week'.
Over thirty-seven years of involvement in Cyprus had seen the UNDP partner numerous
government bodies, if largely in the south (wholly so after 1974). The country
programme, as with all such UNDP missions, was funded by UN member states'
voluntary contributions, and for each five-year country programme the UNDP allocated
certain moneys to certain projects. The UNDP responded to government requests, was
able to reject them, and was even able non-coercively to recommend ideas for projects.
Yet, they were never able to receive and consider requests direct from any 'government'
authority in the north. Instead, a practice had developed whereby any request for
assistance from the Turkish Cypriot community came through the UNDP, but was then
channelled to the internationally recognised government, thus avoiding any inter-
'government' contact and tacit recognition of the 'authorities' in the other side.
Paradoxically, however, the UNDP was also trying to channel technical assistance to the
"whole of the nation [sic] of the country 55.248 This operational approach was clearly
problematic. In practice, any request for assistance would be scrutinised by the Greek
Cypriot government, particularly if there were any political or security implications.'
A further implication of this (notably exploited from 1963 to 1974) was that, by calling
for a greater proportion of UNDP money to impact on his beleaguered community
(whilst fully conscious that such requests would fail), the Turkish Cypriot leadership
was able to legitimise his policy of non-recognition and non-cooperation with the Greek
Cypriot 'usurpers' until a political settlement was negotiated.'
In spite of this historical background, global developments during the previous
two decades had suggested to the UNDP that the environment was a 'common cause'
requiring 'common action'.' By the 1990s the UNDP was giving high-priority to
improving public sector efficiency, and economic restructuring with the growing
prospect of full EU membership. Aware of the rapid and largely uncontrolled economic
growth over the previous two decades, long-term resource management of the island's
renewable and non-renewable resources was highlighted as a new sectoral theme,
notably with special emphasis placed on 'island-wide activities and environmental
issues'." Indeed, Cyprus was seen as a special case;
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"the continuing rapid growth of the island's economy during the past few years
has given further impetus to the need for special environmental action in order to
sustain the present pace of economic and social development without endangering
the quality of the island's natural environment".2'
Consequently, the environment was portrayed as "another logical priority area for island
wide cooperation".' Moreover, the UNDP Resident Representative went so far as to
suggest that in line with government policies (presumably those of the ROC) the
environment "could even be considered a priority area for bicommunal cooperation as
for several environmental issues an island wide approach may, in fact, be the only
avenue to long term solutions.'
With these assumptions, third party involvement was recommended to assist the
'concerned authorities'—de facto representatives and interest-groups on both sides of
the UNBZ;256 one notable observation of the 1987 UNDP report had been the
government bodies' failure to recognise fully the benefits of bringing private and non-
governmental agency efforts into the environmental planning process.' A study was
initiated in the autumn of 1989 by the UNDP Resident Representative who made
contacts with interested parties on either side of the UNBZ. In line with developing
UNDP policy in general, local rather than international consultants were approached;258
however, although two non- 'governmental' environmental planning consultants were
then contracted, there was concern that they should be able to prepare the political
environment within their own communities to make realisation of projects possible.'
The two consultants, with the Representative as moderator, met at Ledra Palace and
were able to synchronise their general approach to the project before returning to their
respective communities and formulating their own team of experts. 26° Discussions then
ensued with relevant people, notably including government personnel, on identifying
priority issues and assessing the feasibility of each idea.
The study's objectives had been to provide an update of the state of the island
environment as a whole, a systematic assessment of the need for additional action for
environmental policy and management programmes, and a formulation of specific
proposals for technical assistance to meet various priority needs. 261 In this sense, the
study was to simply present specific environmental problems to be addressed over the
next 5-10 year period. Only after completion of the reports would funding be sought,
with the UNDP and other potential international donor agencies (e.g., UNHCR, WHO,
UNESCO, UNEP) to provide the catalyst for technical assistance. This approach thus
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differed markedly from the UNDP's previous environmental reports in that it took a
broader view of Cyprus's environment (both structurally and spatially), and in turn
acknowledged what was assumed to be a genuine interest on both sides of the UNBZ to
cooperate on various environmental matters.'" The final study was eventually
presented in four parts: two volumes individually covering the two main communities,
one volume detailing approximately 40 suggestions for areas of possible technical
assistance, and an executive summary (Table 5.6). Collectively, the 40 proposals
covered specific areas that would deliver "a major positive impact on [...] sustainable
environmental developments in Cyprus", and which required external assistance.'"
In terms of geographical scale, within the final proposals it was possible to
distinguish those addressing borderland-specific problems from those concerned with
island-wide policy. Only three addressed borderland problems, all related to the
geographically partitioned capital of Nicosia (see Chapter 7). Of the island-wide
'actions' one fifth referred specifically to the Turkish Cypriot north (Table 5.6). A
number of action areas generally addressing island-wide issues were also, in reality,
problems located in the north; for example, the feasibility study on underground barriers
was largely proposed to examine their potential along the Morphou and Famagusta
aquifers. By contrast, only two 'actions' were particular to the south—dealing
specifically with tourism and wetlands management (Table 5.6).
There were structural problems in undertaking the report, given that there was
not only a general paucity in baseline information of key environmental indicators, but
that environmental data was spread between various government departments, never
mind between two de facto governments. This predetermined the degree to which the
study was able to provide an integral, literally island-wide analysis of Cyprus'
environmental management and to develop certain island-wide norms. More
fundamentally, by separating 'north' from 'south', the two most detailed reports
reproduced this analytical division. This approach was surprising, given that the UNDP
Resident Representative recognised that Cyprus' relatively small size could make it 'the
ideal country' to use as a model for comprehensive environmental programming by
"transcending the existing political divide" between the island's two communities.'"
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Table 5.6
	
The geographical scale of 'action' areas proposed by UNDP
environmental programming study
Priority areas Action	 Scale
- develop an Environmental Education and Awareness Programme 0
- feasibility study for creation of natural history museum, parks, 0
etc.
- establish EIA procedures*	 0
- formulate guidelines on 'polluter-pays' principle*
	 0
- revise the Nicosia Master Plan Transportation Study*
- comprehensive study of atmospheric fluxes of particulate matter	 0
- study on high-tech application of wind and solar energy*
	
0
- study on renewing domestic water distribution networks
- study on clearing silt from reservoirs 	 0
- control of agricultural chemical residues in all water sources*
	
0
- study on recycling used waters 	 0
- study on methods to reduce evaporation*
	
0
- study on solar-powered desalination plants*
	
0
- study on introduction of central sewage systems*
	
0
- comprehensive study on water resource management*
	
0
- feasibility study on underground barriers 	 0
- study on maintaining wetland ecosystems* 	 0
- study on bio-data of man-made and natural wetlands
- comprehensive land improvement scheme* 	 0
- pilot project to combat soil erosion on foothills of Kyrenia Range
- afforestation project on Kyrenia range
- forest fire-fighting system	 0
- project on identification of native fauna and flora* 	 0
- coastal zone and pelagic resource management* 	 0
- study for institutionalising marine resource management
- comprehensive policy and legislation regarding mines and
quarries*
- preparation of geotechnical and isoseismic data for development*
- elaboration of regulations for aseismic structures*
- workshop for pre-disaster planning*
Human	 - linear park along Pedhieos River	 n at =
settlements	 - prepare master plan for old town Famagusta
- preparation of environmental zone map*
	
0
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- upgrading of local experts and their resources in planning* 	 0
- expert assistance in town planning implementation techniques	 0
- comprehensive development plan for Paralimni and Ayia Napa	 u
- comprehensive development plan for Karpas Peninsula	 n
Human health	 - review of capabilities in monitoring toxic and harmful substances 0
and welfare	 - study of Nicosia Sewerage Treatment Plant (esp. effluent reuse)* .
- study on industrial waste treatment 	 n
- feasibility study on establishing bicommunal waste/biogas plant*
	 0
0	 - island-wide scale
u	 - specific to Greek Cypriot area of control
n	 - specific to Turkish Cypriot area of control
=	 - borderland scale
*	
- both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be trained/involved in its
preparation/implementation.
Source: Adapted by author from UNDP (1991c; 1991 a).
In the light of these observations, the determining factors behind the original
proposals are worth highlighting. To identify priority areas, the findings of previous
technical studies were considered, as was any possible involvement of NGOs in
initiatives. Perhaps most significantly, however, activities which would benefit the
island 'as a whole' and which would require the cooperation of both communities were
to receive particular attention (Appendix 8). 265 This was clearly based on the UNDP's
belief that previous UN involvement in 'technical cooperation'—be it through the
UNDP, UNHCR or other UN agencies—had greatly supported the on-going efforts for a
solution to the Cyprus conflict under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General;
"[t]hrough technical contacts and exchanges of views, mutual understanding and
cooperation between the two communities is fostered".266
There were also economic incentives to present the report as a bicommunal undertaking
given that an increasing number of funding agencies employed an explicit
`bicommunal-only' policy. After initiating the study the UNDP Resident
Representative was to become increasingly involved in its diplomatic marketing; one
track was to argue that it was possible to expand the Nicosia Master Plan 'model'
214
Island-wide Perspective
(Chapter 7) into environmental arenas, given their potential for generating other regimes
of 'practical cooperation'."
For a number of reasons, however, this was not to be the case as the overall
project failed to progress any further. The Turkish Cypriot consultant, accompanied by
the UNDP's representative, presented the final publication to Denktash in 1991, who
received and seemingly accepted its formulation. The train of events in the south was
even more unclear, however; the report was submitted to the UNDP who were then to
present it to the Greek Cypriot authorities when the whole initiative appeared to
dramatically falter. The perception in the north was that the Greek Cypriot consultant
had been unable to 'sell' the projects to the Planning Bureau of the ROC, and that these
authorities had then demanded that the publication be stopped and its circulation
terminated.' By contrast, the perception in the south was that the UNDP representative
had failed to generate sufficient interest from funding agencies before he ended his
representation role in Cyprus. Similarly, however, the Greek Cypriot consultant
suspected that the study's failure came down to what was simply termed as 'politics'.269
To understand more fully what such 'politics' might have entailed it is necessary
to set the UNDP study in its wider context. It would be possible to assume that, for
three main reasons, the Greek Cypriot authorities chose not to act on the UNDP report
as presented—to expand, in other words, on their UNDP-orchestrated 'cooperation' in
other environmental issue areas (e.g., animal and agricultural disease control).
Primarily, the ROC refused, as they had done throughout the prolonged conflict, to
recognise any other 'government' authority on the island. This interpretation was
vividly reflected in the Turkish Cypriot consultant's representation of the Greek Cypriot
point of view;
"[it was them [the Greek Cypriots] who should decide on what projects and what
to do on the island, and it wasn't up to [...] him [the UNDP Resident
Representative] to present projects and to seek, to engage the Turkish Cypriot
community in the decision-making and choice of projects".'
The fact that the team of experts in the north included officials from the unrecognised
government simply exacerbated any Greek Cypriot concerns; there was a strong
possibility that the two consultants—while nominally operating at the 'civil society' or
'Track II' level— would be coming together during more formal negotiations to discuss
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joint policies, while at the same time consulting with the de facto authorities of the two
sides."'
Without being able to identify precisely the initiator of the project, this
evolutionary 'grey area' led on directly to a second Greek Cypriot concern, that of how
the projects might subsequently be managed. It was perhaps not coincidental that
another Turkish Cypriot report, published in parallel and similarly funded by the UNDP,
called not only for the enlisting of a 'Turkish Cypriot Community Liaison Officer' to
coordinate the proposed initiatives but also for the establishment of another permanent
UNDP office, in the north."' This format was presented (once again) as being one
similar to the implementation of the Nicosia Master Plan, involving representatives
from two separate communities in a bicommunal relationship (see Chapter 7)• 2" Yet,
notably in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot authorities, it clearly was not—precisely
because of the relatively greater geographical scope, structural depth, and multilateral
character of the many projects suggested. Supplementing this was the increasingly
questionable role of the Resident Representative himself; a one-off appearance in an
environmental debate on Turkish Cypriot national TV rapidly contributed to his persona
non grata status with the Greek Cypriot government.'
Finally, there may well have been funding problems, not simply in terms of
guaranteeing support but also in distributing the funds between the two communities
given that a larger proportion of action areas fell within the north.'" The Turkish
Cypriot community had been traditionally dissatisfied with the amount of benefits
received from UNDP-sponsored assistance, reflecting their more commonly-held view
that the UN system penalised non-state interest groups;276
"outside agencies are precluded from working with or supporting the other
communities. In turn this leads to a lack of international support for
environmental protection, sustainable development and architectural heritage
conservation in the areas administered by the unrepresented ethnic groups".277
This, in addition to the more obvious recognition dilemma for the Greek Cypriots, had
greatly diluted the perceived potential for utilising environmental conservation as an
intercommunal confidence-building measure."'
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5.6	 Conclusions
From the island-wide perspective, although both 'official' and 'popular' representations
of the impact of the events of 1974 on resource management were to be made up of a
plurality of orientations and positions, certain themes could be traced within them, and
differences identified between them. Examination of political processes and social
relations in the aftermath of 1974 has revealed three areas of contestation:
transboundary resources, the meaning of transboundary resource management, and the
'state' mechanisms for facilitating this process of cooperation.
The very meaning of island-wide transboundary resource management was
contested. The ROC's consistent policy not to cooperate further with the Turkish
Cypriot authorities over water supplies, beyond specific interdependencies at the
borderland (as considered in the next two chapters), served two purposes: it avoided
direct or indirect recognition of the northern government, and it proved their ability to
survive as a state in the meantime. Given that the latter motive was in essence
contradictory, in that it conflated their more general argument for the reformation of
'island-wide' resource management structures, it would seem plausible to suggest that
the former motive—non-recognition of the TRNC—was primary. Ultimately, the
UNDP project also faltered because the parties found it impossible to compromise on a
specific issue before being assured that there would be compensations on other issues.
After partition, intercommunal relations became even more limited than between 1964
and 1974, and even the gradual pluralisation of the mediation process—involving
alternatives from 'above' (UNHCR, EU, UNDP) and from 'below' (citizen-based social
movements, elite groups) the state level—were seemingly unable to override `state'-led
political agendas. Alternative mechanisms of transboundary cooperation were
fundamentally contested. Following two significant high-level agreements in the
immediate post-partition period, the UN-sponsored search for an overall solution was
plagued by failure and talks were eventually hijacked by the development of the ROC's
application for membership with the EU.
While the character of protracted social conflict suggested that it was impossible
to isolate issue areas, in that each one was linked to others at a number of different
levels, a range of issue-specific initiatives were to develop nevertheless.'"
Internationally-sponsored bicommunal projects proved a valuable means of facilitating
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transboundary cooperation, particularly for the Turkish Cypriot community who were
barred from directly approaching international organisations. The extent to which these
informal, citizen-based networks were impacting on either the high-level negotiations or
the general consensus within each community, and whether such networks could be
considered a sufficiently cohesive 'epistemic community', remained indiscernible?"
Nationalist elements in both communities saw intercommunal contacts as an insufficient
challenge to the status quo—constituting a threat to the Greek Cypriots position that the
two communities could not live together whilst the Turkish Forces remained, while
representing a threat to the Turkish Cypriot position that the two communities simply
could not live together.' Moreover, in the latter case, it was felt critical by the Turkish
Cypriot authorities that the process should not openly challenge 'Track I' officials and
negotiators, nor allow itself to be exploited or 'degraded' by opposition parties.282
Opportunities for transboundary economic cooperation were not to be taken
formally whilst, for the UNDP, the political developments in Cyprus complicated its
position, inherently subject as it was to the birth of a new yet only short-lived unitary
state. The 'development' of the 'island' state was soon to be contested primarily
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to the extent that the UNDP's own
position became integral to the conflict' s' In turn, the UNDP's so-called 'technical' or
'functional' initiatives were to become increasingly politicised, and the UNDP's goals
in Cyprus—those being the 'creation of national self-reliance' and 'the achievement of
sustainable development for the island as a whole'—grew ever more problematic.
Reflecting on its goals, the UNDP was simply unable to facilitate 'self-reliance' at the
island-wide scale, least of all at the 'national' scale, and eventually left Cyprus at a time
when development on the island—rather than being comprehensive or 'sustainable'—
was as deeply contested as ever.
In its purest form, at the island-wide perspective from 1974 the view appeared to
hold that political questions of 'national sovereignty' were quite distinct from, and
superseded, questions of economic development, interdependence, or cooperation. The
two community authorities were willing to sacrifice their own potential advantages if
that meant denying the other side the chance to relieve the pressures it faced.'" The
Cyprus conflict had become both intercommunal and 'international'—'international' in
the sense that the relevant parties could be found beyond the borders of the de jure
Republic of Cyprus (i.e. Greece, Turkey, UK, US, EU), and also, as has been previously
218
Island-wide Perspective
argued, the conflict involved 'would-be' international actors in the form of the de facto
TRNC government. Intergovernmentalism' in Cyprus now involved de facto
collaboration between highly centralised 'states' with unequal power and resources. It
will be seen in the next two chapters how conducive this was in allowing this growing
plurality of actors to operate at the borderland scale, and in so doing to develop or
maintain transboundary links on a smaller scale than the politicised, nationalised space
of the 'island of Cyprus'.
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Chapter 6
Borderland Perspective (I): Managing Transboundary
Relations in the United Nations Buffer Zone
6.1	 Introduction
In Chapter 5 the development of transboundary resource management from the island-
wide perspective was examined. This chapter seeks to build on this insight through
refocus of the perspective of analysis on to the 'borderland', specifically the non-urban
spaces of the UNBZ. Narrowing the geographical focus from all-island to the border
scale allows for the examination of issues from a more 'local' perspective taking into
account how `borderlanders'—along with a myriad of state, international and
supranational agents most traditionally associated with 'international' relations—were
party to, and affected by, transboundary resource management.
As previously suggested in Chapter 4, the establishment of the UNBZ in August
1974 had a profound effect on UNFICYP's relations with the two main communities.
Section 6.2 reconsiders UNFICYP's broad mandate for managing these relations. The
much-speculated, formal, and high level negotiations on the territorial character of a
settlement to the Cyprus conflict have suggested the likely presence of an inter-entity
'boundary' in Cyprus for some time to come (see Appendix 2). Indeed, it is now
customary for commentators to criticise UNFICYP's consolidation of an 'abnormal'
status quo, inhibiting the long-term need for a new and viable 'political order') While
to some extent complementing this line of argument, its focus in Section 6.3 to 6.4 will
be recentred by moving it away from the traditional, 'national' scale of analysis and
repositioning it on the 'borderland' scale, as a means of provoking what appears to be a
general ambivalence over the role of the spatial entity of the UNBZ. More significant
questions evidently remain over the continued use of the UNBZ to manage contested
space in terms of resource management concerns. Furthermore, Section 6.5 then
deconstructs the meaning and the functional role of the 'buffer zone' by examining its
contested representation at the state and local level, for both Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot—a process further considered in the urban context in Chapter 7.
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6.2 UNFICYP and the Buffer Zone
As geopolitics has taught, what are termed 'buffer states' have a history of being
constructed where there was a desire to reduce the possibility of contact between two
powerful states. 2 'Buffer zones' have a similar history. They been invariably
demilitarised, although they appear to have generally differed from what have been
formally identified as demilitarised zones (DMZs) in their function. Blake, for one,
argued that lbjuffer zones are [...] generally temporary phenomena, with less
permanence than neutral zones or demilitarised zones", as exemplified by the creation of
a buffer zone to facilitate disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian forces after the Second
Sinai Agreement of September 1975. 3 Nonetheless, as the UN Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights illustrated—whose operations, coincidentally in
parallel with UNFICYP, have also been largely undertaken within a 'buffer zone' since
the summer of 1974—it would appear critical to recognise that the international
community must be prepared to administer such zones for an extended period of time.
Since its establishment, the 'buffer zone' in Cyprus has continued to provide
both a timely and topical case for reconsidering the effectiveness of 'alternative'
approaches to territorial management in contested border areas.' It is 'timely' in that,
given the continued six-monthly renewal of UNFICYP's mandate for over thirty-four
years, it would appear that the role of both UNFICYP and the buffer zone they
administered was accepted by all parties concerned. On the contrary, the 'disputants'
contested view of UNFICYP's mandate and the UN's more general peacemaking role
has been, if anything, a growing feature of studies on the conflict.' Cyprus' UNBZ also
remains 'topical' given that UN and other multinational military personnel increasingly
have the basic core function of a 'buffer force', supervising an established cease-fire
between the parties. 6
 As observers have been keen to highlight in the post-Cold War
period, therefore, many lessons are still to be learnt by critically examining this, the
longest-standing force-level UN peacekeeping mission and, in turn, one of the most
durable examples of an alternative to traditional territorial management.'
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6.2.1 Managing the territorial and military status quo
In spite of the events of summer 1974—which were, once again, radically to alter the
political geography of the island—given the lack of vocal consensus within the Security
Council at the time, it was seen as preferable not to provide a new mandate for
UNFICYP (Appendix 5)• 8
 Instead, the geography of the mandate was reconfigured such
that it should administer nearly 300 km 2
 of 'buffer zone', delimited by the CFLs of the
Turkish Forces and the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Indeed, in the light of their
spatial redeployment, UNFICYP personnel became almost entirely confined to the
UNBZ as this territory became their central focus after the population transfers in 1975.
From this point on, UNFICYP became more of a 'buffer force',9
 which held
implications for their overall mandate. In managing the military and territorial status
quo, two sub-divisions must be made: maintenance of the spatial delineation of the
CFLs and, by extension, their prevention of a recurrence of fighting by maintaining and
restoring law and order (as carried over from the 1964-74 peacekeeping period).
Chapter 4 previously illustrated how the scale of the Turkish military
intervention in 1974 dictated that UNFICYP were downgraded to a wholly ineffective
role of by-stander, 1 ° yet they were soon to return to the forefront as facilitators of an
informal cease-fire agreement. An intensive patrolling programme was undertaken by
UNFICYP to establish and record the forward limits of opposing forces. UNFICYP
observation posts (OPs) were gradually erected in between, and patrols began to
monitor activity along the confrontation lines. Crucially, however, no formal agreement
on the spatial delimitation of the CFLs was ever negotiated in 1974, nor since." In
Nicosia, by December 1974, UNFICYP were considering the establishment of a 'neutral
area' between the two parties." Elsewhere, islands of enclaves remained vulnerable,
particularly in the north where special UN detachments were restricted by Turkish
Forces." Despite the cease-fire, Turkish Forces had made notable advances in late
August in the areas of Pyroi, Galini, Dherinia, Yerolakkos, and north of Dhekelia
SBA. 14
 Yet, with strengthened fortifications elsewhere, the UN Secretary-General
observed the line of direct confrontation beginning to 'crystallise', making territorial
withdrawals evermore difficult to negotiate." Only in December was the UN able to
illustrate for the first time the new 'limit of area of Turkish control' (Appendix 7 (a)),
although reference to the CFLs invariably used the euphemistically-termed 'forward
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defended localities' (FDLs). 16 The peninsula of Louroujina ('Akincilar' in Turkish) was
not depicted as falling north of the Turkish Forces' FDL until a year later, by which
time the FDLs of the National Guard had also been included (Appendix 7 (b)).' 7 The
'areas' in between remained unnamed for some time; indeed, it was only at the end of
1976 that the Secretary-General's report referred to a 'buffer area between the two
lines'." There were now over 120 such observation posts, of which 85 were
permanently manned, and UNFICYP's patrol routes had been extended to enable the
monitoring of the whole CFL system.'
By 1978, the CFLs had begun to stabilise, but UNFICYP could only provide
either side with a trace of their respective lines.' Even then, Turkish Forces initially
declined to review their CFL, while negotiations with the Greek Cypriot National Guard
were on-going.21
 Both parties continued to establish their own version of the lines and
accordingly, by late 1980, UNFICYP still found itself with the unenviable task of
operating without any agreement with either protagonist as to their delineation. In
practice, UNFICYP (as one UN Secretary-General put it) supervised "by loose mutual
consent, two unmarked, constantly disputed cease-fire lines", on a self-confessedly ad
hoc basis. 22 By extension, troop deployments or training exercises within 1 km of either
side of the UNBZ without prior notification were considered cease-fire violations, as
were breaches of the seaward extensions of the CFLs on the coast (see below), and
overflights by military or civilian aircraft. Just as they had been from 1964, regular
cease-fire line movements were less conscious efforts by the opposing forces to expand
'territory', but more an attempt by one side to 'gain face' at the other's expense.' Even
so, local scale 'violations' of the UNBZ escalated to dangerous proportions when not
properly handled. 24 Accordingly, the disincentive for UNFICYP's alteration of the CFLs
was clear. Ironically;
"[b]oundaries and positions have become so fixed that it has become impossible to
change anything [...] The movement of an observation post even a few feet
necessitates endless negotiations and reams of paperwork".25
Hundreds of such movements occurred each year, however, and in areas where the
CFLs were in close proximity face-to-face confrontations were literally a persistent
concern —the UNBZ ran from east to west for approximately 181 km, but varied in
width from 7 km near Athienou to only 3 metres in Nicosia's old walled city (Appendix
6 (a), and Figure 4.2, Chapter 4).
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Supplementary to their maintenance of the military aspect of the territorial status
quo, UNFICYP were also mandated to preserve the 'integrity' of the UNBZ from
unauthorised entry by civilians. Traffic accidents, fires, thefts, and rubbish and sewage
disposal were only secondary concerns to that of 'crowd control', a role which was to
prove vital if often unrealised. Over the years there was a visible increase in civilian
demonstrations along and invariably within the UNBZ, originating largely from the
Greek Cypriot south. Not coincidentally, this developed in parallel with the reduction
of UNFICYP's troop strength—and dramatically so in 1993, following Boutros-Ghali's
financial reassessment, when UNFICYP was reduced in size by 44% such that its
strength temporarily dipped below 1,000. 26 The belief in a strong military presence
along the UNBZ survived in the light of the zone's acquired character, when infantry
units were still preferred over military observers to maintain effective control.'
UNFICYP themselves, however, were the first to recognise their limited resource power
and mandate, which was most vividly illustrated at Dherinia in August 1996.
6.2.2 In search of 'normal conditions'
In the light of the UNBZ's militarised character, UNFICYP were at pains to keep the
status quo, preserving what was commonly referred to (in notably state-centric terms) as
"the integrity of the buffer zone". 28 In effect, it could be argued that UNFICYP came to
"control" a fourth, de facto 'state' in Cyprus—the UNBZ constituting 3% of the island's
territory (in addition to the de jure ROC and UK SBAs, and the de facto TRNC
`states'). 29
 Yet, UNFICYP's function was clearly not aimed solely to provide a 'barrier'
between the two communities or to mount border patrols." After 1974, it had to
continue encouraging a return to what was ambiguously described as 'normal
conditions', the force's promotion of which was now focused on to a new 'borderland'.
Just as there was no agreement between UNFICYP and the opposing forces on the
delimitation of the UNBZ, however, nor was there any formal agreement on the use and
control of this zone. While the other two functions of UNFICYP as declared in their
original mandate—maintaining the cease-fire, and restoring law and order—were
relatively self-explanatory, it was in the 'return to normal conditions' that UNFICYP's
mandate was most broadly interpreted after 1974.3'
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In spite of the radical changes and the visible need for a greater peacebuilding
dimension, in late 1974 the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which
required UNFICYP to perform only certain additional functions. 32 The renewed
mandate in 1974 included cease-fire observation, the facilitation of prisoner exchange
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a humanitarian element to
encourage the resumption of normal civilian activity. 33 Very much in line with the
tripartite Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, therefore, UNFICYP became responsible
for the buffer zone; 34
 indeed, this territory became their central focus. 'Good offices'
were still made available for negotiating over public services, particularly water and
electricity crossing the UNBZ, and a humanitarian element to encourage the resumption
of 'normal' civilian activity was institutionalised with the establishment of a special
Humanitarian and Economics Branch at UNFICYP HQ, on 22 July 1974. 35
 In other
words, peacebuilding was in principle to become more developed at the local scale, as
UNFICYP quickly realised that it was not in the interest of either side to turn the UNBZ
into a 'waste land', a 'barren, depopulated zone'. 36 In the restoration of economic
activity, UNFICYP therefore encouraged 'ad hoc measures designed to save lives,
minimize suffering and, to the extent possible, restore civilian activities'.37
The 'extent possible' was largely determined, however, by the degree to which
the 'return to normal conditions' (one sub-mandate) was dependent on maintaining the
cease-fire and restoring law and order (the other sub-mandate). Soon after UNFICYP's
establishment in 1964, UN Secretary-General U Thant had viewed this relationship as
sequential, the latter preceding the former. 38 This view left outstanding, however,
questions as to whether this approach largely predetermined the primacy of the
military/security function of the UNBZ over and above its integrationist function;
moreover, which time period were 'normal conditions' referring to—the 1960-1963
'Cyprus', which was itself unstable and grew increasingly 'abnormal'? Or the 1963-
1974 'Cyprus'?
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6.3	 Economic Activities at the Borderland Scale
The idea of transforming what had become characteristically a 'security' or 'boundary
landscape' back to some derivation of a 'normal' landscape became a complicated and
paradoxical aspect of UNFICYP's operational mandate after 1974." Primarily, there
were questions over access to and utilisation of the resources within the zone itself, but
in spite of the institutionalisation of UNFICYP's management of these problems, the
economic development of the UNBZ was to remain piecemeal and, in socio-
psychological terms, transitory.
6.3.1 Access and utilisation
UNFICYP were positioned between the opposing forces with the intention of pursuing
'normal civilian activities' in the area, and from 1986 an all-weather patrol track ran
along the whole length of the zone, allowing UNFICYP surveillance opportunities, the
resupply of OPs, and rapid reaction to any incidents (Figure 6.1).' Nevertheless, access
to and development of the UNBZ was extremely convoluted, and this was most vividly
illustrated in agricultural practices which had been previously the dominant economic
activity along the 181 km length of the UNBZ.
From 1974, UNFICYP were keen to point out that the UNBZ contained some of
the most valuable agricultural land of Cyprus. Indeed, at the time of its establishment
the UNBZ, while only taking up 3% of the land area, accounted for an estimated 10% of
cultivated agricultural land on the whole island, cutting as it did through the southern
section of the irrigated area of Morphou, the cereal-growing region of the Eastern
Mesaoria, and the potato-growing area of Kokkinokhoria (Figure 6.2). 41
 This was set
against the backdrop of an economy, both north and south of the UNBZ, traditionally
dominated by agriculture; of the GDP in 1960, the agricultural sector contributed 21%,
and an estimated 39% of the population were farming full-time.' As far as the
territorial partition subsequently affected the resource base, Greek Cypriot estimates
noted in particular that the loss of Morphou basin—with the largest concentration of
citrus plantations—and Famagusta and Kyrenia, had dealt a heavy blow to citrus
production in both the rural and overall economy of the ROC.' The majority of the
Greek Cypriots displaced were agriculturalists, faced with cultivating different crops or
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The United Nations Buffer Zone
Figure 6.1 Diagrammatic representation of the management of the UN buffer
zone
Source: Adapted from Grundy-Warr (1994b: 181).44
seeking out new professions!' These relative changes were complemented with the
need to use formerly-agricultural lands for redeveloping the economy, resulting in a
further absolute loss of available land. For their part, by 1977 the Turkish Cypriot
negotiators were arguing (initially with less concern) that their land comprised 28.66%
of the agricultural productivity island-wide.46
Recognising the self-evident value of intra-boundary resources falling
within the UNBZ, UNFICYP chose to allow farming and other economic activities, if
with two crucial provisos: primarily, cultivation should not be a threat to the legitimate
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security interests of either side, and, secondarily, proof of ownership or rightful
employment was needed before access was permitted. From 1974 farming permits were
issued ad hoc at various locations along the UNBZ. By mid-1975, however, Turkish
Forces were reported to be placing unilaterally new restrictions on the farming, grazing
and harvesting activities of Greek Cypriots in areas where such activities had previously
been permitted.'" Indeed, many Greek Cypriots were being arrested in the zone."
UNFICYP accordingly developed an innovative system of escorting farmers, shepherds,
and others working in areas of confrontation: a 'Farming Security Line' (FSL) (Figure
6.1) was established to administer the largely agricultural economic activities, its
delimitation—to reiterate—dependent upon the two principal guidelines of security and
ownership."
The first major test case for these new regulations occurred at Avlona, an
abandoned Greek Cypriot village 21 km west of Nicosia (Figure 6.3), which after 1974
had become bounded by Turkish Forces not only to its south, but also to its west where
the citrus plantations fed by Cyprus' most important groundwater aquifer and dam
lay.50The Morphou area was also noted for its excessive fragmentation of land holdings,
mainly because of the existence of perennially irrigated land. 51 Since the autumn of
1974, Greek Cypriot farmers were able, under UNFICYP escort, to farm their land in
this area within 500 metres (m) of the Turkish Forces' CFL; indeed, this practice had
been formalised within a year by an agreement with the local Turkish command." By
the spring of 1976, however, there were moves to repopulate Avlona by Turkish
Cypriots, whose authorities had sought UNFICYP's agreement to a 200 m wide strip of
land forward of their CFLs to be made available to the new village inhabitants. The
implications of this issue were eventually discussed amongst officials of the UN, Turkey
and the two Cypriot communities. UNFICYP expressed their understanding that while
new farming activity arrangements could be made subject to consent, existing local
agreements would remain in effect until so modified." It became clear that the Turkish
Cypriot side objected to what they perceived as an inequitable division of the intra-
boundary resources, proposing instead the use of 'grid line 90 0
 Northing' as the
'approximate boundary' for farming (Figure 6.3). s4
 This line, however, would have
necessitated the transfer to Turkish Cypriots of land previously cultivated by Greek
Cypriots, and behind the lines originally agreed upon in 1975. Furthermore, the Turkish
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Cypriot side proposed the formation of an ad hoc committee to review all existing
practices between the CFLs."
The implications of this proposal, not only for the local communities' economy,
but also for the precedent being set for future transboundary issues, spilt over into
localised violence in September 1976 as Turkish Cypriots attempted to work the
contested land." Even the UN Secretary-General himself became involved in high-level
discussions as the issue escalated. While compromise proposals were eventually drawn
up, the Greek Cypriot authorities continued to reject on principal any transfer of Greek
Cypriot-owned land to Turkish Cypriot farmers, which they saw to be disturbing the
status quo within the UNBZ. 57 Elsewhere along the length of the UNBZ, by mid-1977
there were over 100 different locations where informal, 'local agreements' had been
made with the Turkish Forces to allow limited Greek Cypriot farming." From thence,
however, expansion was slow, such that there were only 160 such locations recorded by
May 1979." General activity steadily increased during subsequent years, and
agricultural practices reemerged to the extent that, by 1993, the UN Secretary-General
reported that over 1500 land owners now farmed in the UNBZ—indeed farming had
been extended 'almost to the limit of land available'.6°
Clearly, however, the limit of land 'available' was determined by several factors,
many of which were to all intents and purposes not 'normal' but 'abnormal'. There was
an outstanding problem with mines. During the construction of defensive positions in
August 1974, neither side complied with international procedures for marking
minefields. 61
 Although UNFICYP undertook to record those known, the problem failed
to be resolved with neither side assisting in confirming its scale; accordingly, an
estimated 38 minefields and booby-trapped areas remained inside the UNBZ, and a
further 73 were located within 500 m of it. 62 An estimated 16,000 mines were contained
in these areas. In addition, like the CFLs, delimitation of the FSLs was proving difficult
in the light of the intense distrust between respective military personnel, to the extent
that UNFICYP were forced to begin demarcating these during 1982. 63 By 1988,
however, concern was expressed by the Turkish Forces over the close proximity to their
CFL of some of the Greek Cypriot farming activities." On 18 October, following
negotiations, UNFICYP was able to formulate an agreement with the Commander of
Turkish Forces such that, while the 'current farming situation' would be `frozen';
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"[n]o new farming up to 200 metres from TF [Turkish Forces] CFL would be
authorised by HQ UNFICYP [...] [but a]ny new farming in the 200-400 metres
bracket from TF CFL would be discussed at HQ UNFICYP/HQ TF Kyrenia level
to assess security implications before UNFICYP would authorise it".65
Farming was being determined by militarily-precise boundaries. Unfortunately, while
the Turkish command had agreed to accept and not be consulted over any farming
further than 400 m from their CFL, the ratification of the 'current' farming situation
remained a sticking point. A large portion of the FSL was soon demarcated, yet many
so-called 'problem areas' were never ironed out. Moreover, while UNFICYP stated
explicitly that this intra-boundary `no-go' area was established purely for 'security
reasons', and in no way constituted any extension of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty, it had
constituted another de facto appropriation of ROC territory.66
Yet, probably the greatest problem of utilisation of the UNBZ which remained
largely unspoken was that of land tenure. As previously noted, UNFICYP chose to
allow farming and other economic activities with two provisos: proof of ownership, and
provided that activities presented no security threat to either side or to UNFICYP.
Farming permits were issued, nonetheless, with little recognition of ambiguous
territorial sovereignty. As Christodoulou noted, the land and water tenure system at the
time of independence became intelligible only in so far as its antecedents were known.°
A complex pattern of land ownership, notably with scattered Turkish Cypriot plots, and
with many villages claiming common grazing lands, meant that while 18% of the
cultivated lands were in Turkish Cypriot possession, this was made up of widely
scattered, small fragmented plots." This only began to be addressed with land
consolidation in the 1970s, but the population exchanges of 1975 curtailed consolidation
and led again to an increasing number and decreasing size of holdings in the south.69
Although illegal after 1964, the selling of land to members of the 'other'
community was commonplace, but such sales were never registered; of those deeds
established prior to then, the ethnicity of the landowner was never recorded." Since
1963, neither community was willing to open its land registration books to an impartial
audit,' and after 1974 land tenure was to be further complicated as title deeds for the
land of displaced persons had to be reconsidered island-wide, an almost impossible
endeavour given that the ROC Land Registry's records for Famagusta and Kyrenia fell
to the north.' The (Greek Cypriot) Land and Survey Department remained the only
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source used by UNFICYP, making it impractical for Turkish Cypriots to contest
ownership.
With time, even the issuing of farming or work permits also proved
administratively problematic. In Sector 4, for example, in line with UNFICYP practice
as a whole, permits had been issued on an 'until recall' basis since the early 1980s. By
December 1996, however, changes of ownership had proven this unlimited regulation
obsolete and new permits were (re)issued on a yearly basis. In spite of the threat of UN
restrictions and warnings from the relevant municipal authorities, illegal Greek Cypriot
farming continued, to the extent that one-tenth of those farming in the sector enjoyed
'past tolerance' practice:3 In essence, UNFICYP faced the problem of identifying and
administering an industry increasingly characterised by a mobile (and thus less 'locally'
identifiable) workforce:4 The percentage of urban resident land holders in the south had
risen from less than 11% in 1977 to over 20% in 1985; indeed, many farmers using the
UNBZ would rent neighbouring land the owners of which were unwilling to cultivate
themselves, and so undertook their own de facto land consolidation." Further
complicating UNFICYP's administration, however, was that in the UNBZ itself five
villages remained populated—Troulli, Athienou, Pyla, Mammari, and Dhenia
(Appendix 6 (a)). 76 These were designated 'civilian use areas' and manned by local
civilian police. By 1996 their combined population totalled 8,000, almost entirely
Greek Cypriot, except for Pyla—a mixed village including over 350 Turkish Cypriots."
One direct implication of these 'indigenous' settlements was that, by 1977, at the
same time as the farming activities were being resurrected, there were moves to
rejuvenate industrial ventures in the UNBZ. In March, a proposal by the Greek Cypriot
trade union SEK to reopen 7 factories, recreating 1500 jobs, was rejected by Turkish
Cypriot union leaders—because of 'security reasons', reactivation was a 'political
issue':8 This response from the north was in apparent contradiction of their authorities'
efforts to reactivate latent, and environmentally contaminating infrastructural resources
elsewhere—at Lefka, where the de facto territorial partition in 1974 had separated
economic interdependencies. The dislocation of the Cyprus Mines Corporation's
(CMC) installations at Xeros and Lefka had forced the Skouriotissa mines to close, and
the loss of the Hellenic Mining Company's loading installations at Karovostassi (Figure
The internationalisation of the transboundary resource had complicated matters
for the Turkish Cypriots, however, and resulted in considerable environmental concerns.
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The US-owned, CMC-operated copper mine and associated purification, storage and
transportation facilities located between Lefka and Karavostassi had remained
untouched since 1974, and local Turkish Cypriot interest groups became aware that
30,000 tons of tailing deposits left in the earth reservoirs posed a serious environmental
threat." Groundwater samples taken locally suggested that arsenic was three times and
selenium was six times their respective legal limits, and storm water runoff was directly
discharging into the Mediterranean discolouring a 2 km stretch of the shoreline.' Even
so, the US-based, transnational company refused to accept any responsibility when
approached by Leflca municipality in March 1996. CMC conveniently argued that until
1974 the environmental standards had been acceptable; only in the light of the
disruptive events of 1974, and the exceptional political situation of 'Turkish
occupation', had environmental problems arisen.' No 'compensation', it was added,
had been offered by the Turkish government."
Elsewhere along the border, there were those more successful at turning the
divisions presented by the border to their economic advantage. The asymmetry between
the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot economy had created the theoretical
possibility of Greek Cypriot borderlands becoming growth poles, exploiting cheap
labour from the north. While this was never fully realised, since independence the
British SBAs had traditionally employed some 2% of the Cypriot workforce (in 1973 up
to 1700 Turkish Cypriots were employed), and from 1974 Dhekelia SBA formed the
largest example of an intercommunal employer on the island." Dhekelia had a new
neighbour along 45 km of its northern boundary, where UNFICYP held no immediate
responsibilities or independent means of communication for the Ayios Nicolaos-SBA
link road (Appendix 6 (a)). By mid-1996, up to 6,000 Turkish Cypriots were crossing
the border to work each day in the south, usually in construction but also in the SBAs
themselves where the majority of the 300 Turkish Cypriots employed by the SBAs
worked." Advantage was taken of salaries fivefold the average in the north."
Following the violent period of August 1996 in Dherinia, however, these economic
interdependencies were put to the test. All Turkish Cypriots working in the south—
commuting from the north, from Pyla, or from the south—found themselves adversely
affected economically, and—except for the SBAs—most were suspended temporarily
from their employment. Although Turkish Cypriot employment within Larnaca and
Potamia was largely unaffected," UNFICYP as a whole were able to negotiate only
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unemployment entitlements for others. IRCIVPOL, the UN's civilian police,
specifically sought to reestablish local employment opportunities for Pyla.88
Other `borderlanders' nearby had a much longer history of negotiating such
boundaries, however, given the presence of Dhekelia SBA (and, for that matter, Alcrotiri
SBA) since 1960. The colonial administration, as noted in Chapter 4, had sought to
demarcate 'out' the Greek Cypriot villages around Dhekelia SBA so as to include them
in the new independent state. This inclusionary process was, by definition, also
exclusionary in that capital investments and titled property consequently fell on the
'other' side. Some 60% of the SBAs were privately owned, and taking up their
'freedom of employment and cultivation' under the Treaty of Establishment, were
intensively farmed by the Cypriot populace." But as a result of the refugee influx
between 1974 and 1975, the enclaved villages spread across the international borders
and into the SBAs such that of some 6,500 Greek Cypriots that came to live in the
villages, over 5,000 were refugees. 9° Transboundary resource utilisation appeared in its
most contested form in the `enclaved' Greek Cypriot villages of Xylotymbou, Ormidhia,
and Xylofagou (see Figure 6. 7 below), and to a lesser extent Dhekelia power station,
with notable riots by local Greek Cypriot farmers in March 1986 (over water supplies in
Akrotiri), and in July 1993 and October 1994 (over land rights in Dhekelia). 9 ' While
the SBA authorities forwarded military and security concerns for the prevention of
economic development, symbolically, in respective cases the farmers saw themselves as
"just like the Greek Cypriot enclaved in the north", "enclaved by the British since
1960.92 The SBA boundary had indeed become an entrenched 'frontier' between the
former British Empire and its former subjects.93
 For some Greek Cypriots, the Turkish
military intervention was not the first time they had had their land `taken'.94
6.3.2 Managing migratory resources
At its eastern and western extremities, where the UNBZ borders the Mediterranean Sea,
the maritime dimension to the geographical separation had a similar if less pervasive
effect on the normalisation of the two main communities' exploitation of resources.
Seaward extensions of the two CFLs, and what UNFICYP termed the 'Maritime
Security Line' (MSL), were established by UNFICYP "as a practical measure for
security and safety purposes in the vicinity of Koklcina and Famagusta" (Figure 6.1, and
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Appendix 6 (a)).95 The first such delimitation came in 1985 following a tense period in
Famagusta area, during which persistent violations of the seaward extension of the
Turkish Forces' CFL by Greek Cypriot fishing boats and pleasure craft led Turkish
Forces to use light weapon fire as warning shots.' UNFICYP eventually negotiated an
MSL—a median line in the area between the two CFL extensions. Indeed, the Turkish
Forces subsequently marked the seaward extension of their cease-fire line with four
buoys (Figure
Optimal management of renewable resources which were of substantial interest
to several states in the region, and which had been treated as common property in recent
history, was to prove virtually impossible. 98 Although the contribution of the fishing
industry to the economy of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot was small, the 1974
de facto maritime partition had socio-economic ramifications. Greek Cypriots estimated
that 41% of their boats and trawlers had been left behind or destroyed by the events,
while 8 out of 12 fishing shelters had fallen north of the UNBZ." Out of 1,100 m 2 of
fishing grounds, nearly half was accessible only from the north; 60% of the annual
fishing income was lost.' Although stocks in the resource-rich Famagusta Bay were
largely overexploited by 1974, and trawling dangerously intensified in subsequent
years, measures implemented in 1982 by the Greek Cypriot authorities, whereby the
fishing season was shortened, were to reactivate markedly a flagging industry. 101
Consequently the small fishing community on both sides of the UNBZ, with fishing in
Cyprus being carried out mainly on the island's continental shelf, were increasingly to
frequent the MSL environs, predominantly derived from the south but also from the
north despite the presence of military no-go areas offshore." This particularly focused
on access to fish within the area of the UNBZ maritime extension, an issue which
became a water-based version of the contested agricultural activities on land. At times,
MSL violations were based on the perception that richer fishing grounds lay in or
beyond the delimited zone; as one British Lieutenant dryly observed, "the fish are not
stupid, they know it is safer here with UNFICYP"."
Predominantly, however, such activities constituted a more politically-conscious
response to the need to use the island's waters for economic purposes, particularly for
Greek Cypriot fishermen.' In Kato Pyrgos, while also reflecting a perception amongst
the Greek Cypriot fishermen that the MSL area was resource-rich, the fishing activities
illustrated that they "[did not] want to recognise the so-called dead zone in the sea".'95
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Always, however, this had to be balanced with a legitimate fear of the Turkish Forces
sea patrols "waiting to shoot them" or, at the very least, confiscating their boats.'"
Similar problems were experienced with enclaved Greek Cypriots in the Karpas
peninsula, where four fishing vessels were worked by Greek Cypriot families subject to
permission from Famagusta's authorities.'
6.3.3 A `liminal' state
From the above analysis, it is clear that access and utilisation of the UNBZ was
problematic, and the development of the territorial zone as a region of `transborder
collaboration' (as advocates of the 'Europe of Regions' might phrase it) became even
more stunted over time. One insightful way of illustrating this point when considering
the views of those living within and along the UNBZ is by drawing upon a metaphor
employed in Wilson's 1993 anthropological examination of liminality' in the Irish
border region.'" `Liminality' is, as Wilson suggested, a metaphor for both the situation
in which people at the border live, and for the conditions which travellers who cross the
border experience. This liminal state is;
"temporary, necessary, and polluting [...] a paradoxical condition of permanent
transition [...] At the risk of taking this metaphor too far, [...] international borders
and border zones are liminal states (i.e., transitional conditions of culture and
community) between the ordered, structured, and unpolluted 'conditions' of
nation and state. Frontiers are expected to be different and uncomfortable"."
This metaphor aptly captured the abnormal 'conditions' of the UNBZ where, in
principle, UNFICYP sought to recreate normal 'conditions'. This would appear to have
been the case for the three main interested parties.
In Cyprus, in 1976, the UN Secretary-General had observed that "in the area
between the lines, the status quo L.] is maintained, without prejudice to an eventual
political settlement concerning the disposition of the area"."° The present, in other
words, was represented as being transitory and with an (as yet undefined) time-limit.
While this approach was understandable in terms of maintaining diplomatic neutrality, it
of course had repercussions for those who lived, worked or indeed crossed the UNBZ.
For UNFICYP, gatekeepers to the 'fourth state', their time in the zone was a brief one as
dictated by what was commonly a six-month 'tour of duty'. In turn, their decision-
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making powers were similarly limited. UNBZ incidents were dealt with by UNFICYP
through a liaison system which started with the ground-troops, and then moved to the
sectoral headquarters, with UNFICYP HQ as the last stop." As a consequence of this
low-level liaison with opposing forces and borderlanders, great responsibility was
placed with the ground-troops, particularly considering the cumulative number of
'small' incidents that were resolved at the first port of call each and every day. In
military terms, as Fursdon observed;
"[t]hrough briefing and experience on the job, the UN soldier soon gets to know
the pattern of normal activity authorised in his [sic] area. He learns, for instance,
the type and level of farming work authorised in his part of the buffer zone, and its
associated movement; the normal military routine of the soldiers of the two sides
manning positions in his area [...] He will memorise the look of their dug-in
defensive positions".112
Yet UNFICYP's inevitable 'shuttle diplomacy'-style of mediation, rather than face-to-
face contact, suggested a lack of increased dialogue or understanding.' 3 UNFICYP, in
their military peacekeeping function, exercised indeterminate territorial rights as
rationae personae, although not sovereign rights per se.' On one hand, given the
overall duration of their operation on the island, they developed more of a detailed
understanding of a particular local and human space relative to any other interested
party on the island, and relative to many other UN missions worldwide.'" Through this,
it was possible for them to maintain a critical degree of communication on key resource
issues between the two sides. However, given the condition of 'permanent transition' of
each peacekeeper, the subsequent lack of continuity translated into sub-optimal
decision-making. As Cranshaw noted pre-1974;
"the UN functioned by persuasion. The turnover of troops was rapid and
performance varied from unit to unit. The personality of a single officer in
handling a delicate problem could make the difference between success and
failure".'''
Moreover, the 'normalities' to which Fursdon referred to were of a predominantly
military nature and—contrary to what UNFICYP's mandate implicitly implied—failed
to offer sufficient evidence of a return to any sense of non-military, non-bounded
'normality'.
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The other interested parties were naturally those who wished to make use of the
UNBZ—the two main communities. This was predominantly Greek Cypriot land-
owners who, in periods of relative peace, were encouraged to apply for permits.
Conversely, incidents in certain areas brought about a sudden drop in applications to
cultivate land. The violent clashes at Dherinia in August 1996, for example, had
widespread repercussions: the disrupted lives of one Greek Cypriot couple illustrated
quite graphically the transitory nature of borderlanders in the UNBZ. Farming just 1 km
outside Dherinia, about half of their land fell within the UNBZ which they sought to
continue using because of the soil quality and access to a highly productive private
water borehole. They had to visit a one-roomed house each day to water their
greenhouse," 7 and a relationship built up with UNFICYP's patrol whereby the couple,
because of the regularity of their visits, were informally excused from bringing and
showing their permits each day. At times, therefore, working in the UNBZ was
virtually synonymous with farming elsewhere. However, since the reduction in
UNFICYP's patrols after the 1993 financial review, followed by the violence of August
1996, they increasingly operated in what they perceived as an environment of 'fear' and
' insecurity'." 8 Neither of them now stayed overnight in their house as they once had the
option of doing, especially after rumours that Turkish Forces were reconnoitring their
area under dark. A certain uneasiness pertained to farming with 'alien' soldiers looking
on, as one UNFICYP peacekeeper noted."'
These perceptions were common amongst those who lived, worked or indeed
crossed the UNBZ, who often found themselves in an uncomfortable position, yet
`neutral'. 120 This awkward sense of transition or postponed 'becoming' (Loizos termed
it 'the waiting') was significant in that it interlinked with the Greek Cypriot farmers
own notion of transition and activism (see below).' In another context, Paasi
recognised metaphorically similar 'prisoners of space', who even though;
"in general have accepted the rather normative rules that have been established in
the zone and have accepted them as being caused by the curiosity and blundering
of [others], [...] have been rather frustrated by them".'
Thus, the imposition of a buffer zone nominally along modern, 'Western' notions of
territorial delimitation was for many at odds with local perceptions of spatial mobility.
The converse was largely true with Turkish Cypriot borderlanders. Although
UNFICYP reported a slight upturn in the area farmed by Turkish Cypriots north of the
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FSLs as from 1982, such land was to be largely utilised as scrub or for rough-grazing
land for goats alone. 123 Two main factors contributed to this apparent Turkish Cypriot
disinterest in utilising this space, one being the presence of 3 km-deep Turkish Forces'
'military zones' north of the UNBZ which discouraged (both physically and
psychologically) Turkish Cypriots utilising UNBZ land. In a number of locations, even
UNFICYP were unable to negotiate directly with the few Turkish Cypriots with permits,
being channelled instead through a Turkish military 'Liaison Officer'. In addition, and
perhaps most significantly, while the Turkish Cypriots had access to more cultivable
land relative to their counterparts as a whole, they had owned little of the land which
now fell within the UNBZ. This was clearly evident in the two most 'rural' sectors of
the UNBZ. By early 1997 in Sector 1 (Appendix 7 (c)), west of Nicosia where over
5,000 plots of land were allowed to be worked, out of 1,118 work permits only 5 were
held by Turkish Cypriots. 124 The area to the east of Nicosia (Sector 4) was solely Greek
Cypriot-farmed, save for ten Turkish Cypriots farming `Haliland' on the Pyla-Pergamos
plateau. 125 The 'fourth' state was therefore also a state only for those who
most frequently entered it—UNFICYP and Greek Cypriots.
6.4 Water Resource Management (II): Hydrological Interdependencies In
and Across the UNBZ
One further implication of the existence on an important agricultural and economic
resource base in the UNBZ and its environs was the directly associated presence of
scarce, transboundary water supplies.' Until 1974, with less direct precipitation than
the mountain ranges both due north and to its south-east, the central plains were
generally supplied by localised, underground water reserves, supplemented by an
embryonic colonial, ROC, and then de facto Greek Cypriot state-controlled water
distribution system. The UNBZ and its associated borderland which was subsequently
imposed onto this hydrological landscape, in addition to being exposed to the same
erratic precipitation levels as elsewhere on the island, was also witness to the demise of
the very aquifers upon which the region's economic development had been historically
built. As previously suggested in Chapter 5, despite the shortage of extensive
distributional infrastructure at the island-wide scale pre-1974, there were a number of
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strategically important hydrological interdependencies post-1974 and, under the
historical quid pro quo agreement, a series of transboundary water exchanges existed at
the borderland scale (Figure 6.5). 127 While these were small in scale compared to the
main Morphou-Nicosia transfer, their importance was to grow, if only symbolically, as
the water supply regime established for the capital became unstable (as considered in
detail in Chapter 7). The analysis considers the interdependencies from east to west
(Figure 6.5).
It is possible to observe that in Athienou, to the west of the city of Famagusta
(considered in detail in Chapter 7), prior to the finalisation of the SCP in 1994 the
town's only permanent drinking water sources were two pipelines originating in a
complex and increasingly unreliable trans- and intra-boundary borehole system around
Potamia (Figure 6.5). From there water was pumped to a 270 cu.m. storage tank at
Skasmata in the so-called Louroujina 'pocket', then to flow by gravity to the former
Turkish Cypriot village of Petrophani, where it was used to irrigate land north-west of
the now deserted settlement by farmers from Athienou. By the mid-1990s, up to 350
cu.m./day passed from Potamia to Petrophani, and UNFICYP regularly checked water
meters at either end. 128 This pipe connection received no maintenance from 1974, and
with air pressure outlets often jammed, the old pipes burst for which UNFICYP were
forced to organise bicommunal meetings to organise repair teams." From 1974,
Athienou's second pipe source supplied drinking water again from the Potamia region,
where six boreholes fed an underground pipe lying north of Skasmata through the
UNBZ, directly to Athienou. The so-called 'airstrip' water meter, south-west of
Athienou, was checked by UNFICYP to ensure that between 700-900 cu.m./day was
received.' Overall, however, it was inevitable that Athienou's complex supply system
generated fragile transboundary relations. Indeed, in September 1992 the ROC Ministry
of Commerce, Trade and Industry noted how the town's inconsistent water and
electricity supplies, which crossed into the north in various locations, had affected the
local farming and industrial economy.m
With 'Phase I' of the SCP completed in 1994, which included a conveyor system
to Kokkinokhoria, Athienou and Troulli, an extra 450 ha of Athienou's cultivated land
could be irrigated, and the town became independent from the convoluted Potamia-
Skasmata-Petrophani supply route." Even so, other infrastructural developments were
to impact negatively north of Athienou. According to a local-level, bicommunal
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agreement orchestrated by UNFICYP in January 1992, the northern, Turkish Cypriot
village of Ayia was disconnected from its 200 cu.m./day historical link with the
Potamia-Petrophani supply in the light of worsening pipeline capabilities. The northern
authorities in turn rejected a Greek Cypriot offer to deliver some 70 cu.m./day via a pipe
through the village of Melousha, also north of the Turkish Forces CFL, which made
similar use of a pre-existing pipeline connection.' 33 Melousha's own supplies came
from the Athienou 'airstrip' pipeline and were much-needed for a region largely cut off
from the Turkish Cypriot water projects developed after 1974 (see Chapter 5)—
although, once again, broken pipes and formal protests forced UNFICYP to seek local-
level solutions involving the installation of UN-monitored water meters at key points. It
could be assumed, nonetheless, that the water supply for the northern villages of
Melousha, Ayia and Louroujina were, exceptionally, deployed free of charge through
pipelines from the south, with UNFICYP assistance." 4 The Turkish Cypriot authorities
continued to charge Turkish Cypriots, Turkish settlers and UNFICYP for the
consumption of water provided free of charge from the south.
As for Louroujina itself (Figure 6.5), after 1974 the primary source was, as
before, the Kochati well, fed by a shallow aquifer. Once again, a UNFICYP-monitored
agreement saw 70 cu.m./day transferred across the CFLs, and at times up to 150
cu.m./day was being supplied to the Turkish Cypriot peninsula. As elsewhere,
nonetheless, the agreement was brought increasingly into question with the drier years
of the 1990s; although bicommunal meetings were initiated (notably with
representatives of the Greek Cypriot WDD from 1994-95), Louroujina's water problem
gradually deteriorated such that only 4 cu.m./day was leaving the well at the start of
1997, leaving Louroujina to truck in potable water and irrigate its land with what little
remained.'"
In addition to piped sources, groundwater in the border region continued to be
utilised privately. Drilling permits for new wells in the UNBZ were generally
established by the mid-1980s, under the same provisos as for land, although many older
wells were never formally registered by UNFICYP or its related agencies.' 36 Under the
ROC's legislation, all groundwater, surface water and wastewater resources were
invested to the state, but the acquisition of drilling permits lay with the authority. While
the District Officer held the ultimate authority to grant permits, many boreholes were
unlicensed, farmers purchased neighbour's water, and overpumping was common."' Ab
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antiquo water rights existed on most streams, moreover, and an estimated 10-15% of the
island's water supplies came from sources tied up by private water rights. Like land and
trees, water rights in Cyprus were historically complex, forming part of citizens'
property titles which were divided upon the death of the owner among his/her
dependants.'"
Historical water rights also became a complicating issue to the west of Nicosia
(Figure 6.5). In 1977, Greek Cypriot authorities were accused of turning off private
Turkish water supplies from Kato Koutraphas, south of the UNBZ, to Angolemi and
Elea. 139 In addition to the previously examined disputes in Avlona, therefore, the
problem of sharing not only multi-communal but also multi-ownership waters persisted
and, with that, tentative diplomacy. Considerable effort was expended by UNFICYP to
ensure the water distribution system was being 'fairly and efficiently operated', even
during periods of high-level political unrest."° After the dry summer of 1991,
UNFICYP unsuccessfully offered to sponsor intercommunal meetings between
respective water boards and departments and, specifically, from 1992 the peacekeepers
made repeated representations for bicommunal cooperation to prevent the further
deterioration of the Morphou aquifer."' The agricultural economy of the border
villages, and now even Morphou itself, was beginning to be affected by a band of
underground seawater intrusion moving southeastwards, towards the UNBZ. 142 In April
1992, a US$15 mn project proposal was also unsuccessfully submitted by the TRNC's
Ministry of Interior, Rural Affairs and Environment to the UN, which proposed the
construction of a 15 km clay barrier along the coastline.' 43 As part of the parallel
debates over the 'Set of Ideas', Denktash noted that Morphou supplied 160 of the 700
mn tons of Cyprus' water, and all of it was located within the Turkish Cypriot zone.'"
In the light of these failures to further extend the limited cooperation from the
'local level' at the citrus-growing border region to the 'high level' at Nicosia, over time
UNFICYP's on-going observation and negotiation role was to prove crucial. In mid-
1986, they assisted on a maintenance programme carried out on the Marathasa Dam, it
being under the control of the Greek Cypriot government yet providing water for
irrigation to Turkish Cypriots in Lefka (Figure 6.4 and 6.5)." 5 Prior to 1974, local
Turkish Cypriots had feared the transfer of water from the Tylliria area (where there was
a large Turkish Cypriot population with an estimated 38,000 donums of land requiring
irrigation) to Greek Cypriot Morphou.'" Cooperative intercommunal relations had been
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therefore sanctioned such that, by the early 1970s, 1300 donums to the north and south
of Lefka was being supplied by Marathasa Dam, while due west of the town another 770
donums was commanded by Kafizes Dam.' 47 After 1974, the roles had truly reversed,
with the Greek Cypriots as the upstream users but, as an extension of the quid pro quo,
their water authorities had chosen to maintain the release of overflows to the north.
Once again, in 1989, UNFICYP were able to facilitate two bicommunal water projects
in the repair of the conduit providing water from Kafizes dam to Lefka following flood
damage and, by November, in the desilting of the dam at Marathasa.'"
This pipeline diplomacy was increasingly called into question as proposals for
rival 'upstream' and 'downstream' projects on the Xeros river became apparent in the
early 1990s. Turkish Cypriot authorities were preparing to build a dam to trap water
flowing from the south and so improve their Morphou Derivation Project, at the same
time as the Greek Cypriots completed a feasibility study on the construction of another
dam, upstream on the same river but south of the UNBZ. 149 In fact, consultants had
been called upon to study a project for the combined utilisation of all Tylliria's seasonal
rivers—Marathasa, Xeros, Kambos, Limnitis and Pyrgos (Figure 6.4)." The proposed
Northern Conveyor Project, to augment both the urban water supply in Nicosia as well
as to provide for irrigation in the Solea Valley, received serious consideration from the
mid-1990s."' It seemed that the ROC water department had been forced finally to focus
on the remaining existing surface water resources, which had previously proven too
political to consider.' Only kilometres future east, studies were also being carried out
on freshly damming the Peristerona river and further damming the Akaki river, both
flowing north, for local irrigation needs."
From 1974, in summary, while the UNBZ physically separated the two
communities, at the same time, and seemingly paradoxically, it was also to bring them
together to cooperate through necessity. These localised, small scale interdependencies
demonstrated not only the role of informal, local-level agreements invariably initiated
and managed by UNFICYP, but just as significantly the persistent of water shortages
and mutual necessities at the borderland scale. While the political reasons detailed in
Chapter 5 for why the quid pro quo was established remained just as salient, other
functional reasons for the continuation of such interdependencies, based on
geographical proximity and spatial interaction, had to be added.
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6.5 Buffer Zone, Nekri Zoni, or Sinir?
Before drawing conclusions on the management of transboundary resources in and
along the UNBZ, and moving on to consider the manifestation of these relations in the
urban context in Chapter 7, it is necessary to begin tying together a number of
characteristics suggested throughout this chapter regarding the functions of the UNBZ
itself in relation to transboundary relations. Strategists have often prescribed
approaching the Cyprus conflict through concentrating on regional- and geo-politics,
especially on the so-called Cyprus 'triangle' of Nicosia-Ankara-Athens. 154 In turn, the
de facto boundary has been reduced to representations of "the never-ending
juxtaposition of the heirs of two empires", "a frontier between the West and the Middle
East as well as between Christianity and Islam" or, even more concisely, "civilisation's
faultline". 1 " Such 'formulaic dyadisms' have served many agendas, acting as neat yet
`totalising binary cliches'. 156 Moreover, while recognising these legitimate boundary
narratives, the aggrandisement of their geopolitical significance threatens to overshadow
localised facets of the 'green line'-UNBZ character.
There appears much explanatory power to be gained for understanding
transboundary resource management by examining in more detail the cognitive
processes involved in determining relations in and around the UNBZ. This section
examines not only how, firstly, the UNBZ—despite its self-evident contested
management—was used to supplement particular policies by the 'state', but also how
the functional realities of the borderland previously noted led to the generation of a
different, and at times contradictory, boundary discourse at the 'local' level. Both
approaches to the UNBZ, it is argued, held major implications for the development of
the UNBZ as a 'borderland'.
6.5.1 Contrasting approaches to boundary management
It was previously suggested in Section 6.2.1 that, as far as UNFICYP were concerned;
"[w]hile the buffer zone is not maintained by UNFICYP to divide the
communities in Cyprus, it is an element in the cease-fire arrangements accepted
by both sides".157
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Clearly, this 'acceptance' was not necessarily universal as both communities developed
their own policy of approach to its management. In terms of controlling border
crossings, for example, three locations developed following the creation of the UNBZ in
1974 where one or both communities and other nationals could legally cross, either
northwards or southwards. Only one checkpoint—at the Ledra Palace Hotel in central
Nicosia—provided anything resembling a formalised border-crossing point however.'58
Here, diplomats and tourists had to pass through three separate halts—Greek Cypriot,
UN, and Turkish Cypriot—to cross from one side to the other. There was little
encouragement to travel south-to-north and, given that the Greek Cypriot government
declared all seaports and airports in the northern territory 'prohibited ports of entry and
exit', non-Cypriots were not allowed to enter the south from the north, although, by
agreement with UNFICYP, Greek Cypriot police allowed Turkish Cypriots (but not
Turkish 'settlers') to cross south for 'humanitarian' purposes.' 59
 As for the northern
authorities, Greeks or Armenians were specifically rejected from crossing to the north.
In territorial terms, these border management policies reflected wider interests.
For successive Greek Cypriot governments, the UNBZ was to represent a temporary
phenomena—what Richarte termed a 'black-spot'—which, during its existence, served
only to highlight the 'national struggle' and to illustrate the military threat of Turkey; 160
accordingly, only in exceptional circumstances, such as with the Turkish Cypriot UDI in
November 1983, did the Greek Cypriot authorities close the border."' And for legal
precedent if nothing else, the Greek Cypriot government continued to protest all
violations of their territorial waters, and of their airspace both south and north of the
UNBZ when Turkish military aircraft were involved in exercises.'62
This relatively consistent anti- 'border' policy of the Greek Cypriots, however,
met something of a challenge in October 1996, revealing a more problematic approach
to transboundary relations. Prompted by the shooting of Greek Cypriots along the
UNBZ over the preceding three months (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.1), DIKO MP
Marios Matsakis set up a blockade on the southern side of Ledra Palace checkpoint.
Accompanied by refugees, the close family of those killed in Dherinia, and often
schoolchildren, his action halted virtually all crossings of people northwards. Emphasis
was placed on 'persuading' tourists not to cross north, each one intending to spend at
least CY£20 on a day trip, and he claimed that up to 1,000 had been dissuaded in the
first three weeks of the campaign. Matsakis highlighted the border crossing procedure
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of paying CY£1 at the northern checkpoint, and of signing an official form of the 'so-
called TRNC';
"[i]f this is not recognition of Denktash's state, then what is? We are talking about
hundreds of thousands of pounds which we [the Greek Cypriots] have given to the
Turkish military forces".163
What became known as the 'anti-occupation' or 'enlightenment' campaign also became
a headache for the Greek Cypriot government, however, as DenIctash, in direct response
to what he represented as "border closures", made veiled threats to deport the enclaved
Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, or at least prevent them from coming
south.'" Eroglu, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister, warned that his community was
losing some CY£10,000 each day. 165 As Denktash carried out his threat of border
closure on 6 November, Matsakis announced plans to make the blockade a daily event
(initially it was only enforced at weekends), despite calls from the Greek Cypriot
Foreign Minister to end the campaign which was seen as hurting Turkish Cypriots
(economically) more than Turkey, and providing a confused message internationally.
At times, the free movement of UN and diplomatic personnel had been impeded. The
blockade extension never transpired, but the protests gathered steam over the new year
and, in one incident on 19 January, tear gas was used by Greek Cypriot police to
disperse 40-50 demonstrators blocking the crossing point.'" By the time UNFICYP had
negotiated the reopening of the border, the Turkish Cypriot authorities had further
reacted by preventing virtually all bicommunal events, a prohibition not lifted until the
Tekke mosque crossing the following January.
There were other inconsistencies in the Greek Cypriot border policy. Indeed,
much less formally, transboundary smuggling was to develop soon after the August
cease-fire, gaining a reputation for profitable transfers involving various merchandise
travelling south-to-north, but also, from north-to-south (citrus, olive oil and whisky).
Smugglers initially used the common channel of Dhekelia SBA (especially the
Pergamos-Pyla link) rather then the Ledra Palace checkpoint, but later exploited weak
spots at Lympia, Athienou, Potamia and Astromeritis (Appendix 6 (a)).' A localised
smuggling economy transcending the border was based on extensive informal contacts;
although minimal, it became at times highly symbolic—in April 1979, a Turkish
Cypriot district court ruled that smuggling across the UNBZ was not a crime, a view
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which Denktash immediately and categorically rejected because "Where cannot be a
state without boundaries".'"
By the mid-1980s, the issue had become an economic concern even for the
south. In early 1987, it was estimated that visitors to the mixed, UNBZ-village of Pyla
were spending over CY£250,000 on smuggled fish and whisky per month.'" As
Martinez generalised elsewhere, it appeared morally and culturally 'acceptable' to
breach border regulations that interfered with economic gains.'" In the border area
south of Pyla and towards Larnaca, the development of expensive houses illustrated not
only the safety of the SBA and a burgeoning tourist infrastructure market, but also the
lucrative trade of smuggling. Fish and fashion goods travelled south, and the smuggling
of livestock from the north was to become a daily occurrence; indeed, in 1995 and again
in April 1997 the Greek Cypriot authorities were forced to consider an animal
identification 'tagging' system."' Under threat of breaking their own embargo,
however, one local newspaper suggested that US$1 mn of goods (especially livestock
and other agricultural produce) was sold to the south from the 'other' community and
US$300,000 worth of goods (especially vehicle spare parts) was sold by the Greek
Cypriots to the north in the first half of 1995 alone.'
In this sense, whilst UNFICYP's 'buffer' duties were frowned upon by the
Greek Cypriot administration, it was axiomatic that the Greek Cypriot authorities
suffered from the same paradox as UNFICYP. As Karavas, the ROC Defence Minister,
had reaffirmed after border incidents in December 1995;
"[Greek Cypriot] guardsmen [...] must realise that although our goal always
remains Cyprus' unification, the mission at the buffer zone is to guard the gates
and that we cannot trust those on the other side or develop relations with them".'"
The practical maintenance of their CFLs sat uncomfortably with 'national' policy. This
was apparently also a similar case for the Turkish Cypriot authorities—reflecting their
policy of official non-recognition of the CFLs, they instead 'observed' them from the
'military zone' demarcated north of the disputed CFLs (up to 3 km deep in rural areas,
but as little as 5 m in Nicosia). 1" Yet, while they disputed the CFLs which UNFICYP
maintained, from 1974 there was, nonetheless, tacit and vocal recognition of a sinir
('border'). Both the Turkish Forces and the Turkish Cypriot leadership used the
growing institutionalisation of the UNBZ as means of proof.'
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This was most effectively illustrated in practical terms in April 1988, when
Turkish Cypriot authorities suddenly required that certain categories of Greek Cypriots
and foreign nationals entering from the south present their passports for stamping."
Both the Greek Cypriot government and the UN Secretary-General immediately
recognised this as a move to establish crossing-point procedures synonymous with an
international border, and called on Denktash to restore the status quo. In their formal
territorial proposals (Appendix 2), Greek Cypriot authorities had generally sought to
avoid separate customs either to the north or to the south of any potential federal
boundary.' 77 By the second half of the year the status quo was restored,' but another
incident arose—symbolically, a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In November
1990, Denktash allowed Greek Cypriot journalists to cross north without regular
'border' formalities, and proposed that Greek Cypriots with legitimate business in the
north be allowed to cross at a day's notice. This relaxation was short lived; the number
of journalists was restricted and, as other Greek Cypriot pilgrimages and demonstrations
were barred, the border quickly reclosed—"the wall must stay", Denktash had
concluded, until the Greek Cypriots stopped 'violating the borders' and gave up their
demands for sovereignty over the north.'" The `routinisation' of the TRNC's response
to border 'violations', complemented by UNFICYP's mandate, led inevitably to a de
facto acceptance of the territorial sovereignties.'"
Notably, two years later, passport controls for Turkish Cypriots and Turks
travelling between Turkey and northern Cyprus were abolished, suggesting both the
relaxation of border controls only with certain neighbours, and further integration with
Turkey. Again, in 1994, after the effective ECJ ban on their exports, 1,000 Turkish
Cypriot workers blocked the checkpoint and,"' offering further proof of their
management of a sinir shared with the Greek Cypriot 'administration', the Turkish
Cypriot authorities imposed new regulations and fees for entry and exit from the north
in April 1998—for the first time, a £15 sterling 'visa' fee for Greek Cypriots and
Maronites crossing north, and a £4 sterling tax for all people crossing the checkpoint
southwards.' 82 While tourists were still encouraged to cross north, therefore, 'other'
visitors were effectively controlled.
From almost as soon as it was established, the UNBZ had become a political
tool for the two communities as much as for UNFICYP, but it was to be especially
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effective for the Turkish Cypriot leadership's argument. Whilst discussing the TRNC's
'border of 189 [sic] kilometres' in 1990, Denktash proclaimed that;
"a state may have a dispute with its neighbours about its boundaries; indeed, the
boundaries may not have been decided upon [...] and yet, if the territory exists and
its people call it their homeland, if people and territory combined form the
fatherland, the foundation for statehood exists".'"
It was, nevertheless, possible to demonstrate also the coincidence of the Turkish Cypriot
'people' and their sinir, and to suggest the accumulation of a more 'territorialised'
identity since 1974, through less explicit means. The project of mapping the 'state'
provided a visualising device, and the 'map' became an increasingly popular tool for
representing and celebrating these spaces, . and the resources they encompassed.
Cartographical discourse adopted an inclusionary/exclusionary role; even annotations on
tourist maps served a particular purpose—for instance, to counter the ROC's 'official'
cartographical depictions of the 'island state', whereby the northern territory was
presented as an 'Area Inaccessible Because of The Turkish Occupation', Turkish and
Turkish Cypriot 'official' cartography ambiguously but effectively referred to the Rum
Bolgesi (`Greek sector') on their own maps.'"
As Krishna noted in post-partition India, such a preoccupation with borders and
operation of the inside/outside antinomy "serves not so much to prevent 'foreign
infiltration' as it does to discipline and produce the `domestic(ated) self' " 85 The
territorial proposals for a solution to the Cyprus conflict (Appendix 3) traditionally
represented the most formal mode of ethnic delimitation. Gottmann more generally
illustrated how the 'state' may create iconography to cement national solidarity, 186 a
process which can be further institutionalised by forming what Paasi termed a 'symbolic
shape', similar to what B. Anderson referred to as the `logo-map'—a recognisable,
pervasive emblem reinforcing the 'imagined community'.'" The post-1974 amendment
to the insignia of the Turkish Cypriot's, state-owned KTP petrol company illustrated
(Plate 6.1), by way of example, how 'official geographies' supplemented the more
pervasive political representation of the territory of the TRNC. 188 Sant Cassia has
argued, moreover, that this 'fetishism' of sovereignty increasingly led to the emphasis
of its symbols rather than its substance, as the TRNC was to remain practically and
politically isolated.'89
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6.5.2 Reading between the lines: discursive representations of space and place
Just as it was possible to examine how boundaries were contested yet, at the same time,
used to support the various interests of the parties involved in the high-level
negotiations for a settlement, so it became possible to consider, in association with the
UNBZ, relations between these dominant and other, more popular 'imaginative
geographies'—which could be seen as;
"descriptions and discursive constructions around place which are made and re-
made within a particular cultural setting"."
'Place' in this sense, and as previously argued in Chapter 1, can be considered as not
only bound up with connections to specific territories at specific times. In addition,
"different localities and their structures of expectations are [...] bound with the
constitution of personal spatial practice and experience".' In short, it is necessary to
distinguish between the physical identity of a border region and the identity of the
people living there seeking to access and utilise its resources (i.e., their interpretations of
the 'border'). While the United Nations read the area geopolitically as a 'buffer zone',
there were other processes of discursive construction that need to be isolated to
understand fully the impact of the 1974 boundary delimitation and demarcation process
on transboundary resource management.
An examination of how those experiencing the everyday life of the UNBZ
themselves portrayed the zone provides valuable insights.' Both Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots created respectively their own 'buffer zone' discourse. For Greek
Cypriots living or working in the UNBZ, the area had two common and interrelated
features, both underlined by the representation of the area as the nekri zoni ('dead
zone'). This term served as a metaphor for the UNBZ both as an everyday 'place', and
as an ideological approach. Firstly, the zone was 'dead' through its personification of
what had been 'killed' by Turkish actions in 1974: an economically viable and valuable
area. In this sense, it could be argued that it was a common psychological reaction after
the creation of a boundary after violent conflict: fear, particularly on the 'losing' side.'
The territory was 'dead' because of the militaristic character it soon acquired; it was a
'security landscape', akin to a `no-man's land' (a term which often replaced nekri
zoni).1"
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Plate 6.1	 Redrawing 'Cyprus' through the logo-map': KTP station signs, pre-
and post-1974
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Secondly, and more significantly in psychological terms, the area between the
CFLs was 'dead' because it was there to be rejuvenated, perhaps even 'resurrected'.'"
Sant Cassia wrote on the nekri zoni;
"it is a place of death, a place where transgressions are staged and managed for the
purposes of representation".'"
This was notably reflected by one elderly farmer in Dherinia who stated that;
"Netween 1974 and '83 this land was dead, and no one was using it. At '83, [I]
thought 'well, something is going to give', so I went through the police and the
UN authorities and got permission to utilise a piece of it and slowly got
permission to utilise more, to the extent that I'm using it today—and freed the
dead zone from being dead".197
Through these narratives, the reuse of the UNBZ by Greek Cypriots was an integral part
of 'living' in the nekri zoni.
In contrast, the authorities north of the line preferred to keep their side as
uncultivated, open ground, a defensive strip ahead of their fixed military positions.'"
Accordingly, farmers were discouraged from crossing into it and thus the Turkish
Cypriot area reaffirmed its symbolism to the Greek Cypriots—'brown and dead'. For
Turkish Cypriots, the 'green line' had, since 1963, represented a more 'natural
demarcation' which ensured their security of life and property,'" and the UNBZ
subsequently inherited this sinir characteristic as the Turkish Cypriot leadership and
Turkish military personnel concerned themselves with defining the 'state' limits. Sant
Cassia rightly concluded, therefore, that for the Turkish Cypriot state the border "had to
be 'protected' from transgressions, physical, symbolic and somatic", while for the Greek
Cypriots the evident lack of order along the UNBZ (to be later demonstrated par
excellence at Dherinia in 1996) "delegitimized the TRNC whilst legitimating the
Republic"?'
However, as the actions of Greek Cypriot farmers suggested, while access to and
transgressions of the CFLs were political in character, the UNBZ did not fail to become
an integral part of the (non-political) 'everyday' life of people on both sides of the
CFLs. In spite of the idiosyncrasies manifested throughout the UNBZ, economic life
emerged. For people living in this border environment, boundaries were an essential
part of the activities and discourses of daily life. Access was, at times, informal
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(especially with an increasingly under-resourced UNFICYP), as one Athienou farmer
noted;
"[i]n Potamia, if I go to the buffer zone for 3 days, I don't have to go every day to
get the [UN] paper. They sign the dates, let's say from 11th up to 16th, and I can
use the same paper every day"?'
Autonomy in daily routine was evident in other forms, with, in a number of cases, the
larger land-holders in an area of the UNBZ often becoming informal interlocutors with
UNFICYP concerning general developments in their environs on behalf of their
neighbours.' This micro-scale institutionalisation of local politics reflected a need to
'get on with life' such that, with structures established, the UNBZ (re)developed a
'sense of place' for those willing to regularly accommodate its more generally
anomalous and liminal character. Greek Cypriots were not using access to the UNBZ as
an opportunity to retaliate and instigate inter-ethnic conflict, their own well-being
overriding any such desires.' This was most evident during transect walks/drives with
those utilising the UNBZ, where the landscape prompted stories of confrontations, near-
arrests or near-shootings along the FSLs, while being interspersed with general, routine
comments about daily, 'mundane' agricultural practices.
This 'normalisation' was also reflected in a general lack of cognisance of the
precise delimitation of CFLs. Paasi has argued elsewhere, it must be noted, how
personal territorial identification may be more "lived out in daily practice rather than
being thought of reflectively". Consequently, questions to people regarding such
identification can be "at worst a [...] violent intervention in their socio-spatial
representations and [...] an expression of scientific colonialism". 204 There was certainly,
at times, a lack of explicit 'territorial' consciousness amongst people in the villages
adjacent to and even in the UNBZ, to the extent of not being aware of the general
location of the CFLs and how much of their property fell 'in' or 'out'. 205 In this sense,
those acquainted with the UNBZ for most of its existence had become increasingly
socialised to the existence of the boundary. By being able to use the UNBZ courtesy of
UNFICYP from a relatively early stage after the zone's creation, Greek Cypriots in
particular had learnt to operate in the zone as part of 'everyday' life. Such remarkably
personalised spaces, reflecting the need to understand and manage life in the UNBZ,
were even created by UNFICYP themselves. As Fetherston noted, a key preventive
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method to deter changes to the CFLs was to label them as 'UN' material items—barbed
wire, buildings, and OPs.' One extension of this labelling process was the generation
of successive layers of place-naming over time, most intensively illustrated along
Nicosia's 'green line' (Figure 6.6). Along its route were "notable landmarks": 'Yellow
Car' (the rear bumper of which marked the CFL, although the Turkish Forces' disputed
this), `Annie's House' (where a Greek Cypriot woman lived until 1991), 'Magic
Mansion' (formerly Nicosia's largest department store), and 'Buffer Zone Café' (run by
Greek Cypriots, and opening into the UNBZ, and frequented by UNFICYP until the
early 1990s). There was, in short, "a tale to be told at every twist and turn on the
line".2°7
From the above observations, it is plausible to suggest that, in the border area,
identity, space and political power were to become contested within the discursivity of
'everyday' affairs. 2" Highlighting the inter- 'state' and dyadic nature of border
relations, in other words, threatens to overshadow more locally and personally
constructed transgressions, notably by the Greek Cypriot community. It should not be
surprising, in addition, that the separate and distinct representations of the UNBZ by
each community naturally brought into question perceptions of UNFICYP at the local
scale. In seeking explicitly to preserve the 'integrity' of the UNBZ from unauthorised
entry or activity, at the same time UNFICYP sought to maintain the peacekeeper's
character of impartiality and noncoercion.' The social interaction of military and
civilian was to demonstrate the importance of the views of disputants on not only the
nature of the conflict, but the actors involved.' The presence of UNFICYP
immediately added an extra line of authority to 'everyday' life. As Papadakis observed
from his study of Pyla, Greek Cypriots within the UNBZ had to contend with gaining
formal UN permission to build when they would more usually go ahead with such
activities before approaching their own authorities.2"
The extension of the UN's authority such that it further restricted and frustrated
what Greek Cypriot's perceived to be 'normal' conditions was a source of conflict. But
a further implication of this friction was the questioning of UNFICYP's impartiality.
UNFICYP's liaison and decision-making was to be carried out through 'persuasion and
negotiation exclusively'. 212
 To reiterate, UNFICYP's legal framework of relations with
the 'host' government had been provided by the end of March 1964, such that
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arrangements for close and continuous liaison with the ROC and the Turkish Cypriot
leadership were made?' These arrangements, however, suggested 'equality' between
the parties, and this lacked appeal to one Greek Cypriot farmer in Potamia, who
questioned the establishment of certain farming practices near his barley fields. He
generally saw UN double-standards;
"the Turks shouldn't be allowed to farm on our side of the dead zone, south of the
UN street [patrol line] [...] It is illegal that the Turks are on this side".214
UNFICYP were perceived to have taken the side of the "powerful Turks" over the "poor
and powerless" Greek Cypriots. On the issue of impartiality, however, this view of
UNFICYP was to be uncommonly shared with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, as
previously noted at Avlona.
From the foregoing, it can be argued that local scale territorial divisions in the
UNBZ were generally 'microcosms' manifest and reproduced by the state 'macrocosm'
of two, de facto exclusive territorial sovereignties. As J. Anderson and Shuttleworth
have noted in Northern Ireland, the 'macrocosm' of exclusive territoriality at the state
level produced and was reproduced by the 'microcosms' of activity at the local level. 215
Yet 'place' was also a composite of more than one geographical scale, being
international, national and in certain cases local.' Territoriality provided a link
between the 'local' with the 'national' spatial scales—it became part of the general,
active discourse of Turkish Cypriot partitionism and, conversely, Greek Cypriot anti-
partitionism.
6.5.3 Delimitations of the borderland
It remains to be considered to what extent and in what forms the two communities
recognised a 'border region' or a 'borderland' extending beyond the inherently border-
dominated spaces within the UNBZ. Reference throughout this chapter has been made
to a 'borderland', yet it is clear from the above analysis that, in terms of the
contemporary conceptualisations of 'borderlands' and 'border regions' forwarded in
Chapter 2 (Table 2.1), delimitations (either politico-territorial or socio-spatial) of this
phenomenon in Cyprus have reflected consistently 'non-integration' across rural
sections of the UNBZ.
273
The United Nations Buffer Zone
South of the UNBZ, it could be argued that, post-1974, there was little evidence
of any distinguishable 'border region' separate from other areas under de facto Greek
Cypriot control, especially given the relatively small scale of the island. This was to a
large extent a reflection of the more general, historical lack of regional autonomy and
identity on the island, as noted in Chapter 4. 2" Like many post-colonial states, both the
unitary and partitioned ROC tended towards political and economic centralisation and,
in turn, little social sense of 'regionalist cohesion' within communities only further
exacerbated by the population movements of 1974-75. 2 ' This observation, however,
does not negate the existence of a 'border region' at other scales. Indeed, Hitchens
observed a more all-encompassing 'invisible but still palpable line of division';
"[t]here is no village or town, however far from the that line, which does not pay
an indemnity to it with impoverished refugees housing, and with memories".219
In terms of how the Greek Cypriot community considered the partition lines, therefore,
this view suggested that no regional borderland had developed but that rather, at the
extreme, the whole island was a borderland.220
It is worth reiterating, however, Hansen's definition of a 'border region': "sub-
national areas whose economic and social life are directly and significantly affected by
proximity to an international [sic] boundary1,.221 With this in mind, and therefore
supplementary to Hitchens' observations, it is necessary to note the existence of 'border
regions' which were delimited from 1974. Admittedly, in the rural areas of the south,
population movements did not alter such that the whole of the border area became
significantly depopulated. Urbanisation was to continue as the key factor influencing
population distribution and settlement pattern, and the pen-urban areas of Nicosia (and
to its south-west), Larnaca, and the Kokkinolchoria region to the east were to benefit
most from population influxes resulting from a combination of refugee settlement,
urbanisation and a burgeoning coastal tourism industry. 222
 Yet, immediately after 1974,
the Greek Cypriot government were aware of the negative implications of proximity to
the CFLs, which meant that 22 schools could not operate, various industries in the south
"bordering the dangerous zones" were closed, some 5,500 houses were abandoned, and
the 24,000 people displaced from the 'area' were left jobless. 223
 In planning terms, for
successive Greek Cypriot governments, the ideological nature of the border region
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rested upon people moving towards or living in the nekri zoni, and this was manifested
concretely into various pro-settlement policy decisions.
Probably the first ROC pledge to 'border regions' was witnessed in June 1977,
when the Minister of Commerce and Industry, speaking at Paralimni, observed that
"hundreds are working at the risk of their life in lands adjacent to the occupation
forces". A month later it was announced that CY£250,000 worth of infrastructure
would be invested in the industrial and tourist development in the Kokkinokhoria
region, 'cut off' from the remainder of the island.' The revival of the development of a
recognised 'border region' had become, in principle, a new policy. Subsequent pleas for
government recognition were to be heard at both the western and eastern extremities of
the UNBZ by the mid-1990s,' particularly in terms of infrastructural investments such
as road access. The settlement structure of these areas were particularly
disadvantageous, lacking large urban centres, and in Kato Pyrgos to the west (Appendix
6 (a)), cut off from the ROC's de facto centre by the UNBZ to its west and east, and to
its south by the Troodos range, 226 a road link through to the Tylliria region had been
postponed since 1974. Similarly, to the far east of the island, a proposed Dhekelia-
Famagusta highway presented an awkward planning problem. 227
 The middle section
would follow parallel to the Dhekelia-Famagusta SBA road (Figure 6.7) but, while to
`nimby' SBA residents this route would avoid affecting cultivable lands to the south, to
one local MP it would create "an additional buffer zone south of the present one".228
Dherinia, Athienou and neighbouring settlements were generally regarded by the
ROC planning authorities as akritikes ('fringe/border') places (Figure 6.7). 229 Dherinia,
which pre-1974 was developing as a suburb of Famagusta, had its growth northwards
halted by the UNBZ, and it subsequently became a secondary service centre for the
region's tourist centres to the south.2" Soon after 1974, however, a government-led
scheme provided low-interest housing loans up to CY£15,000 to young families,
encouraging them to build in the UNBZ-affected villages—specifically, Dherinia,
Athienou, Troulli, Lymbia, Mammari and Dhenia (Figure 6.7 and Appendix 6 (a)).'
Athienou was the largest settlement located wholly within the UNBZ since 1974, and
was populated by 4,500 Greek Cypriots by 1996.232
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This pro-settlement policy would suggest, therefore, that Hitchens' perception of
an all Greek Cypriot-encompassing borderland was a reflection more of an 'official'
Greek Cypriot belief in the non-recognition of the 'border', and the recognition instead
of a 'frontier'. As previously noted, in political geography 'frontiers' have been
commonly distinguished from 'boundaries' and 'borders', whereby;
"[a] frontier is [...] outward-orientated and boundary inward-orientated. Whereas
a boundary is a definite line of separation, a frontier is a zone of contact". 233
A 'frontier' suggested a dynamic, progressive and ultimately temporary character to the
'border region'.
North of the UNBZ, a similar if symbolically different regional character was to
develop. In the aftermath of 1974, settlements along the UNBZ (along with other
economically or geographically 'remote' areas) were to be predominantly inhabited by
Anatolian Turkish immigrants, engaged in livestock production.' As Heinritz and
Wellenreuther have observed, the Turkish Cypriot settlement policy aimed to dispersing
the new state's population to all quarters, particularly to prevent whole areas being left
abandoned.' A large proportion of the villages to be left abandoned were along the
UNBZ, and inhabited by Greek Cypriots pre-1974. This move suggested a pro-border
settlement policy similar to that in the south, but Wellenreuther's work suggested that
by the early 1990s, along the length of the UNBZ (excluding Nicosia and Famagusta's
western suburbs) these areas remained either 'stagnant' or 'emptied' areas relative to the
TRNC as a whole.236
 Turkish Cypriots living along the UNBZ did not necessarily feel
more established or able to think in the long-term. While perceptions in and along the
UNBZ suggested that Turkish Cypriots (as Greek Cypriots) had successfully
"internalised the border into their everyday lives", 237
 the process of translating this level
of self-awareness into political or economic benefits was incomplete, largely due to the
liminality of the area which stunted the establishment of any regional structures to plan
for the 'borderland' over the longer-term.
This was demonstrated most by people from borderland villages—both those
using the UNBZ for their livelihood and local officials—who were aware of their
village's status in the high-level negotiations on a territorial settlement (see Appendix
3), and the possibility of, often once again, becoming refugees. This was especially the
case in Lysi ('Akdogan' in Turkish), for example, where although the region remained
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agriculturally important, inward investment was limited (Figure 6.7). 238 In Lefka, the
local economy had historically depended upon its strategic location on the western
mountain pass and the rich copper deposits (see above), but after 1974 it found itself
10Icm from the UNBZ and Skouriotissa. 239 The debate between local interest groups,
the municipality and the central government illustrated a conflict of priorities. Not only
was the local population to manage the economic and environmental problems
associated with the mines, but its geographical location at the extreme western end of
the TRNC meant that it received only minimal direct investment—in the form of a new
University and new housing, and only after lengthy prompting from the municipal
authorities and realisation that, under Boutros-Ghali's 1992 territorial proposals
(Appendix 3), the town would remain 'Turkish Cypriot'. 240 North of the UNBZ,
therefore, the borderland villages generally received even less government recognition
beyond the initial incentives for the settler population to inhabit abandoned villages.
There was little reason for distinguishing these economic disadvantages from any other
region, given the fragile condition of the TRNC economy overall.'
While these locally-based discursive representations outlined here do not
contribute directly to the Cyprus conflict, they arguably framed and contextualised the
situation within which transboundary disputes occurred, by reiterating on a daily basis
the imaginative geographies through which both the state and the people apprehended
and understood their place on the island. Although there were to develop
distinguishable border regions on either side of the rural areas of the UNBZ,
fundamentally these two regions were not to merge to form a transboundary spatial unit.
As such, the Cyprus case reflected both Martinez's 'alienated' and Momoh's 'zero'
borderland (Table 2.1). The de facto existence of two centralised states operating back-
to-back brought with it the problem of differential access to resources on each side.
Even if more transboundary cooperative ventures had been attempted and allowed
(House's 'Az-Bz' transactions), different remits and contrasts in legislative and
executive powers underlay the organisational problems endemic in any attempt to
defend the local transboundary environment in an integrated, effective manner. 'Direct
rule' and local unaccountability channelled all negotiations through the central 'state'.
It can be posited that the lack of a regional consciousness and civil society gave the
predisposition for all politics to be 'nationalist' ;242 lacking any fully legitimate,
comprehensive overview or coordinating body in the transboundary context, the
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regional development problems continued to be fought on each side unilaterally, and
with a large measure of self-interest.
6.6	 Conclusions
To summarise, there have developed various constructions of the UNBZ since 1974.
The most dominant one has represented a territorial boundary—both the temporariness
and the integrity of which UNFICYP problematically sought to preserve. In traditional
security terms, UNFICYP's buffer zone proved something of a palliative. While Alan
James noted the 'prophylactic' effect of having a buffer zone which by definition, was a
threat to neither side, it must be recognised that UNFICYP further institutionalised the
conflict through their institutionalisation of de facto territorial partition.243 This
argument has been rightly tempered by those who have noted that local level cease-fire
maintenance remained an essential prerequisite to any meaningful high level
negotiations.' The belief in maintaining a buffer zone to manage 'space' in the
territorial sense was vindicated by the low number of killings and general maintenance
of the military status quo. It remains to highlight, however, the highly contested nature
of UNFICYP's 'buffer zone', and its reinterpretation and representation at both the
'state' and 'local' level which held direct implications for transboundary resource
management at the borderland scale, and beyond.
The UNBZ's development as an 'alienated' borderland, both in terms of
intercommunal contact and sufficient recognition from the central 'state', led to
generally 'alienated' resource management. From 1974, any formalised cooperation at
the scale of the non-urban border region was to subsumed by an array of tacit, informal
arrangements, invariably negotiated via UNFICYP as third party. Apart from the
limited developments in water supplies and transboundary workers' movements, and the
overall understanding concerning access and utilisation of the zone itself, little or no
officially-coordinated transboundary political or economic activity occurred in the
region. In parallel, the populace of the non-urban region of the UNBZ, either Turkish
Cypriot or Greek Cypriot, were unwilling or unable to sufficiently contest this dominant
discourse of non-cooperation.
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They were, nonetheless, able to reinterpret and remould this discourse as it
affected their everyday lives within the borderland. By moving away from mapping the
abstract territorial space of the UNBZ to begin understanding the real 'place', the
vignettes (as Krishna declared elsewhere) "serve to acquaint us with a part of the world
we have pulverized in our minds into a space dominated by 'the border'". 245 By
including the voices of these actors within the context, an ethnographic imagination and
method has allowed for increased comprehension of lives and perspectives involved in a
struggle for recognition and control of transboundary resources.
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Chapter 7
Borderland Perspective (II):
Nicosia, Famagusta and Transboundary Urban Space
7.1	 Introduction
In this chapter the management of transboundary resources will be examined within the
urban context: primarily, in the transboundary urban spaces of Nicosia and, secondarily,
of Famagusta. In Chapter 1 it was argued that an 'organic logic' of transboundary
resource management can be extended to 'urban ecosystems'; in recognition, this
chapter examines transboundary resource interdependencies at the urban scale of these
two partitioned settlements. Focus is placed largely on the transboundary management
of public utilities and urban planning. Chapters 5 and 6 have already referred to a
political decision by both communities to continue with transboundary water supplies in
the urban context, and Section 7.2 examines this in detail. This section is then followed
by analysis which concentrates more on the overall planning of the urban system, and is
split for analytical reasons by examining, firstly, Nicosia and, secondly, Famagusta.
P.J. Taylor has argued that boundaries and capitals are the two most explicit
products of the inter-state system.' In practice, the urban area of Nicosia, therefore,
provides something of an apogee in 'inter-statism': it is two capitals, it is two primate
cities, and it is separated by the oldest section of the de facto boundary in Cyprus.
Nicosia therefore provides a rich testing ground to lay substantive foundations for the
analysis of complex 'intermunicipal', 'intercommunal' and (de facto) 'international'
relations in the urban context. Given the dualistic development of post-partition
Nicosia, briefly considered in Section 7.3.1, a number of central government and, most
significantly, municipal government actors became gravely concerned over the growth
of what had arguably, up until 1963, operated as an 'urban ecosystem'. In an attempt
further to ameliorate this bifurcation in planning post-1974, two major transboundary
projects were instigated with UNDP assistance: a city-wide sanitary sewerage system
(Section 7.3.2) and the Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) (Section 7.4), the latter of which the
UNDP recognised as being the most celebrated bicommunal activity they had ever
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supported on the island. 2 The NMP became the activity by which the UNDP and many
others seeking cooperatively to manage transboundary resources were most encouraged:
'a singular example' of 'pursuing a developmental strategy of unification goals'. 3 The
origins of this cooperation are critically examined in Section 7.4.2, and cautionary
observations are made on the NMP in Section 7.4.3. The problematic development of
Famagusta is then considered in Section 7.5, from which it is argued that, despite the
interest of third parties, the 'spill over' effect of various precedents set in Nicosia failed
to undermine the saliency of the border in both partitioned cities. Conclusions are then
drawn in Section 7.7.
7.2 Water Resource Management (III): Nicosia and Famagusta
In Nicosia, the hydrological realities of de facto partition, examined in different contexts
in Chapters 5 and 6, were at their most stark. While the longest (seasonal) river on the
island—the Pedheios-Yialias, which had once divided the Old City on a west-east
axis—had been rerouted to the city's northwestern flank in 1567, 4 it was to be replaced
almost precisely in orientation in December 1963 by another separating body, the 'green
line'. It was ironic therefore that this fledgling boundary was subsequently to contribute
to the separation of the administration of water supplies in partitioned Nicosia. Neither
the 'green line' nor its later manifestation, the UNBZ, were able, however, to separate
completely the water supply for the city. Indeed, it can be argued that the engine for the
quid pro quo cooperation over water supplies, observed in Chapter 5 from the island-
wide perspective, is historically located within the urban borderland context of Nicosia.
By extension, the on-going 'success' of the quid pro quo agreement was largely
determined by a change in the water balance in Nicosia. It will become clear that these
developments were largely mirrored in Famagusta.
7.2.1 The supply of the capital(s)
Figure 6.5, in Chapter 6, illustrated the hydrological interdependencies traversing the
UNBZ, and the link that Nicosia's water supply held with the water reserves of
Morphou's aquifer. It is necessary to reiterate that the history of water transfers to the
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south across the UNBZ generally, and across the 'green line' in particular, was
perpetually to be contested. Examining figures available, however, it would appear that
southern Nicosia after 1974 received over 3 mn.cu.m./yr. of water from the northern
source of Morphou, crossing the UNBZ to the west of Nicosia. On a yearly average,
similarly, it was generally understood that this roughly corresponded to an equivalent
amount then transferred back—across the city's 'green line'—to north Nicosia. This to-
and-froing of water resources represented an integral part of the 'water-for-electricity'
arrangement.
These transboundary transfers at the urban scale could also be explained to a
great extent, however, by examining the administrative set-up of the water supply for
the whole of Nicosia from 1960. While the central government's Water Development
Department (WDD) was responsible for the operation and maintenance of all sources of
water supply for Nicosia, including the conveyance of water to service reservoirs on the
urban fringe, from there water was sold in bulk to the Nicosia Water Board who
undertook the distribution of water within their area of supply. A Nicosia Water
Commission held the responsibility for the distribution of water to the whole of Nicosia
within-the-walls, and it operated its own well and borehole sources. As with all town
water boards in Cyprus, the ROC government historically charged the Nicosia
authorities for water delivered to its storage reservoirs, although the WDD oversaw the
initial conveyance costs. After 1974, the Nicosia system was always treated as a special
case even though, in north Nicosia, a separate central government water department
developed post-1974 and, moreover, from 1993 the northern municipality also had its
own water works department.' To operate the urban water supply geographically as
one, a common water distribution system serving both Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot sectors of Nicosia was maintained post-partition, whereby water was transferred
from the Morphou aquifer region, crossed the UNBZ southwards via pipelines, and was
then stored in the suburbs of southern Nicosia, to be treated and mixed with other waters
coming from the foothills of the Troodos mountains (and eventually via the Kornos
treatment plant). Water was then transferred into the urban agglomeration, and—due to
the historical unity of the distribution system in central Nicosia—supplied the whole of
Nicosia, south and north.
In 1974, and for a number of years afterwards, the Morphou aquifer was the
main supply for the whole of Nicosia; this dependency was an integral part of the more
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general quid pro quo. Greek Cypriot estimates suggested that, in 1974, between one-
half and three-quarters of all of Nicosia's water supply still came from the Morphou
aquifer; by September 1974, for example, the minimum daily requirement for Nicosia
was 24,000 cu.m., of which 12,000 cu.m. came from Morphou. 6
 There were,
nonetheless, immediate threats to this regime. The influx of refugees into Greater
Nicosia, had put massive pressures onto the Nicosia Water Board, despite a wet year
and city-wide water rationing from early April 1974, 7
 and the abandonment of the
Morphou-Tylliria project (which was to address the already expanding domestic needs
of the capital) further exposed Nicosia's dilemma. In addition, in the months leading on
from the violent summer events, Morphou's pump station proved unreliable. While the
average daily supply in summer months was over 28,000 tons, of which half was from
the Morphou-Pandayia area, only 16,000 tons in total were being supplied for weeks
after the August cease-fire.' Moreover, from June 1975 until February 1976, there was
to be a series of interruptions of water supply from Dikomo, and from a broken pump at
Syrianolchori (north-west of Morphou), which forced water rationing in Nicosia. While
Greek Cypriot offers of assistance in repairing Morphou's infrastructure were allegedly
rejected, it was clear that the Turkish Cypriot authorities were just as anxious to renew
supplies in the light of the implications for north Nicosia.9
In practice, UNFICYP generally escorted any repair work on the water network
(as they did for electricity), and chaired meetings concerning the supply of what were
seen as 'essential services'. 10
 Reaffirming the degree to which the existence of networks
of transboundary, inter-agency contacts favoured successful agreement on shared
waters." In consecutive dry summers of 1981-82, for instance, UNFICYP were able to
initiate a meeting at Ledra Palace to arrange a contingency water distribution and
rationing programme for Nicosia as a whole over the coming winter.' They also served
as couriers for damaged or unserviceable parts being sent to the south for repair or
replacement.
In the light of these observations, it would appear that the water transfer regime
in Nicosia was developed because, in terms of supplies, the Greek Cypriot authorities
initially recognised that several important sources and conveyance systems serving the
city were located within the north. The Morphou boreholes historically made a
significant contribution to the total water requirements of the city." The technical
realities of de facto partition in terms of managing a unified urban water system also
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made, for the Greek Cypriot authorities, the cooperation of both sides 'necessary' to
achieve the desired results." The hydrogeological environment in which these relations
were conducted could not be ignored. The Greek Cypriots maintained this tacit regime
knowing that they would have to lay a whole new system of water pipes, to replace
those installed to serve a unified island network during the colonial period."
7.2.2 The destabilisation of the quid pro quo
It is necessary to note, however, a gradual but significant change in the balance of what
was purportedly 'supplied' to the south and 'returned' to the north. The Greek Cypriot
Nicosia Water Board have since claimed that originally, after the military intervention
in 1974, for every 4 cu.m. of water heading south from Morphou, only 1 cu.m. was
returned to the north. A balance was met, with electricity being supplied to the north.
By the 1990s, in contrast, for every 1 cu.m. of water supplied from Morphou, the Greek
Cypriot authorities claimed that between 3 cu.m. were being returned, although the
Turkish Cypriot water authorities continued to claim that they received the equivalent to
their supply from Morphou, if not slightly less." Figure 7.1, based on UN statistics up
to 1994, would appear to confirm this but illustrates, more significantly, the fall in the
Turkish Cypriots supply from Morphou to the south.
This apparent change was, therefore, not just in relative but also in absolute
terms: in 1974, at times up to 10,000 cu.m./day came to the south from Morphou,
whereas by 1996 only 2,500 to 3,000 cu.m./day headed south." In turn, by 1993 the
supplies from Morphou were making up only 15% of the (Greek Cypriot) Nicosia Water
Board's available resources, and by 1996 this had halved." By the mid-1990s, the quid
pro quo agreement had been transformed such that while the Greek Cypriots supplied
between 2.6 and 3 mn.cu.tn/yr
 to north Nicosia, this was after having received only 1
mn.cu.m/yr from Morphou
Changing water supply levels were largely the result of two hydropolitical
developments. At one level, by the early 1980s the ROC government was coming under
increasing pressure over Nicosia's dependency on Morphou's resources. Lyssarides, the
president of the (centre left) socialist party EDEK, perceived a link with the 'national
struggle', and DISY members argued that "securing adequate supplies of water to the
capital should be part of the general defences of the country". 2° As part of the ROC's
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Figure 7.1 Nicosia's transboundag water supply: supply from Morphou and to
north Nicosia, 1974-1994
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more general water development works programme, examined in Chapter 5, Nicosia's
supply accordingly became a priority. The Vasilikos-Pendaskinos project sought to
augment the capital's domestic water supply, along with Lamaca's and Famagusta's,
and the construction of the Kornos treatment plant was to provide 32,000 cu.m./day
from 1985. Moreover, in the light of the abandonment of the Morphou-Tylliria project,
the Southern Conveyor Project (SCP) was accordingly expanded after 1974 to include
Nicosia's domestic water supply.' With these investments, what was received from
Morphou took up a smaller share of southern Nicosia's overall supplies.
Furthermore, although these exchanges clearly involved small amounts of water,
they represented a valuable resource for the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Indeed, the
reason for the fall in Morphou's supply to the south was largely the increasing needs of
north Nicosia, for which the supply from the south continued to represent approximately
40% of all water supply.22 In practice, over 90% of north Nicosia's total water supply
was to come eventually from Morphou in that, by 1997, north Nicosia received 2-3,000
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cu.m./day from the south, and 7,000 cu.m./day from Morphou direct. Yet, of that direct
supply, 2,000 cu.m./day had then to be transferred on to Famagusta (see below). North
Nicosia's only other supplies were from wells at Dikomo and other, private boreholes.
Moreover, north Nicosia used to be able to supply its consumers 3 times a week, but
since winter 1996-97 this dropped to once a week. In the summer, for example, while
the city's water demand peaked at 15,000 cu.m./day, the supply lay between 7 and 9,000
cu.m./day at best.23 The destabilisation of the quid pro quo could therefore be better
understood on examination of the relative transboundary resource needs of the two
communities.
While the 'balance' in the general quid pro quo relationship did not exist from
the 1980s—as the south became less dependent on the Morphou supply, while it was
still supplying power to the north—in the mid-1990s, there arose the possibility of this
'understanding' returning to some sense of equilibrium, with the north becoming
virtually self-sufficient in electricity generating power. Yet, the quid pro quo remained
unstable as the Greek Cypriots maintained the policy of supplying water to the north;
only on occasions, when the hydrogeological environment in which these relations were
being conducted could not be ignored—such as the island-wide drought from 1990, did
they consider lessening these supplies. From the observations made in Chapter 5, it can
be assumed that this was a consequence of the primacy of their overall 'humanitarian'
policy. While the Greek Cypriot water authorities (both centrally, and locally) often
presented the integrated, interregional character of water conveyance on the island as a
function of the necessity of a 'rational water programme'," on reflection, the 'meaning'
of this particular type of integration was quite different. For one senior Greek Cypriot
representative, this set-up was;
"not my definition of cooperation. Cooperation in my view is [...] a joint effort to
develop a resource. [...] Cooperation is not to supply something for free, simply
because that was the set-up before [1974]."
Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot side repeatedly highlighted the process whereby water
was 'supplied' to the north, yet no 'payment' was received in return.'
By 1993, the Nicosia Water Board calculated that Turkish Cypriot consumers
'owed' CY£3 mn in unpaid bills.' While acknowledging the role of UNFICYP as third
party, they frequently highlighted their own provision of spare parts or the replacement
of pumping units in the north. Even though the water from Morphou became much less
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significant to their supplies over time, this relationship was maintained because of the
'humanitarian aspect' of the water problem. 28 Indeed, mirroring Denktash's use of the
term 'humanitarianism' during the electricity dispute in 1994, the Turkish Cypriot
authorities, for their part, similarly stressed that they had continued to supply water from
Morphou post-1974 because of both communities' basic water `needs'. 29 More
obviously, however, they maintained the regime knowing that Morphou's water was
increasingly too saline, as indeed it was for domestic consumption, becoming up to ten
times the salinity of the Troodos waters." The process of mixing these waters with the
south's treated waters from Kornos subsequently solved this problem. In addition, any
political decision to cut the transfer of Morphou's water to the south would provide the
Greek Cypriots with a reason to cut their supplies to the north elsewhere along the
UNBZ (see Chapter 6), and to Famagusta (see below).
Not surprisingly, this highly informal policy adopted by the Greek Cypriot
government was widely misunderstood, and left it open to internal criticism. The fact
that Greek Cypriots were perceived to be supplying the north with electricity and water
in Nicosia for free, in addition to the smaller transfers along the length of the UNBZ
already examined in Chapter 6, became a legitimate cause for concern amongst the
Greek Cypriot community as water rationing in their own sector grew more common.'
Nicosia's southern consumers were particularly displeased with being charged nearly
threefold the amount domestic consumers in Limassol were paying, and blame for this
was often placed on the subsidisation of water supply to the north.' This appeared even
more baffling to them given the likelihood of north Nicosia becoming integrated into an
international distribution system through the Turkish water balloon imports (if, at the
same time, becoming even more 'dependent' upon external water supplies).
Nevertheless, these arguments failed to appreciate that Nicosia's water supply had
developed as an integral part of the ROC government's policy, with much wider
implications than simply for the capital city.' The 'humanitarianism' of successive
Greek Cypriot governments had become a primary rhetorical device, and a potential
negotiating tool.
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7.2.3 Famagusta's dual dependency
These conclusions can be further substantiated on examination of water supplies to the
eastern, coastal urban area of Famagusta. In 1960, at independence, problems with the
quality and quantity of water supply in the district of Famagusta were recognised as
being the most acute island-wide, chiefly as a result of an artificial-recharge scheme
begun under colonial administration in 1954 which had clogged the main aquifer with
suspended silt and clay.34
 Exacerbating this, overpumping from 1955 to 1965 had
resulted in the southeastern Mesaoria water table falling by 7.6 metres; indeed, from
1965 to 1980 this major aquifer was to be overextracted by 20 mn.cu.m./yr. 35 Seawater
intrusion at Famagusta had destroyed the agricultural potential of the coastal area up to
1.5 km inland by the mid-1960s," and while the city was to receive water within the
original SCP proposal, de facto partition had resulted in this end section of the project
being shelved by the Greek Cypriot authorities.'
Famagusta, and most other settlements along the Nicosia-Famagusta road,
temporarily improved their independence on water following the construction of a main
pipeline from the Morphou aquifer to Famagusta in 1991, water from which was
centrally stored in two 3,500 cu.m. reservoirs. Even so, Famagusta continued to rely
upon historic supplies from the south, via Phrenaros reservoir. Since 1974, water had
been supplied free of charge from Phrenaros to a watertower in Varosha; for over a
decade and a half after 1974, this continued to operate on an informal basis although
UNFICYP had become increasingly aware of problems with compliance. Therefore,
according to agreements reached at a bicommunal water authorities' meeting in early
1991, a set volume of 1900 cu.m./day was to be transported south to north." This was
then recorded daily by UNFICYP, which allowed for the detection of any illegal
connections to the pipe. More often than not, however, the daily average amounted to
1,000 cu.m., helped little by the loss of 120 cu.m. through leakages."
Reacting to regular protests from Famagusta's Turkish Cypriot mayor over the
short supply, Greek Cypriot authorities reasoned that the cause of the breakdown in this
transboundary water regime was scarce supplies in the south, despite the SCP surface
water inputs since 1987. Locally, the 170 km 2
 Kokkinokhoria aquifer, located largely in
the south, had been overpumped since the 1950s such that only 18% of the original
reserves were still available.' Not only had a government-sponsored scheme, whereby
301
Transboundary Urban Space
boreholes were dug for private irrigation, run since 1927 but in practice some 47% of
the 8,000 boreholes in this region were being mined without permit." UNFICYP
similarly interpreted the problem as structural, if originating more at the island-wide
scale; the south observed water restrictions of which the north had been reluctant to
introduce.'
An alternative interpretation was that the quid pro quo had been further
destabilised. For the Turkish Cypriot local authorities there was an implicit
understanding behind the agreement that their water supply from the south was a form
of 'compensation' from the Greek Cypriots for what they were being supplied from
Morphou. As noted previously, however, Greek Cypriots were fully aware that south
Nicosia was by now only receiving some 4,000 cu.m./day from Morphou; accordingly,
for 'humanitarian reasons' they were still delivering 1,700 cu.m./day to Famagusta (but
no more)." Additional to this, moreover, after a series of protests in the summer of
1994, UNFICYP learnt that the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces had secretly installed a
link to the main pipe near Dherinia, siphoning off up to 40 cu.m./day for army
installations in Varosha (see below)."
As the supply of water supplied to the north was dependent upon the gravity
flow generated at Phrenaros reservoir, water shortages were regular during summer
months, when Phrenaros had to supply in addition the south's tourist resorts of Ayia
Napa and Protaras. Water would then be supplied to the north during night hours,
creating dangerous high pressure on a pipe which had not been maintained since 1974.
However, after crossing the UNBZ the pipe entered the fenced area of Varosha where
UNFICYP were traditionally refused free access, and UNFICYP argued that, without
such access, they were unable to verify the claims of Famagusta's mayor that the south
was failing to supply the agreed water quantity." Once again, in September 1994, and
in tandem with power cuts (see Chapter 5), the Greek Cypriot supply of water to
Famagusta reportedly fell to 1,100 tons from the 'agreed 2,000 +' tons." The Turkish
Cypriot local authority's problems were being dictated not only by their dependency on
the Greek Cypriot supply, but also by 'internal' dilemmas. Famagusta's input from
Morphou in 1995 was approximately 1500 cu.m/day yet, given the salinity of the
Morphou water, the top-up waters from the south proved vital to establish a mixing
process. By extension, and further demonstrating the asymmetrical dependency, both
Famagusta's water quantity and quality had become contingent on the south."
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7.3 Underground Cooperation: The Nicosia Sanitary Sewerage System
Whilst partitioned Nicosia was linked underground through water supplies, another and
arguably more substantive form of cooperation between Nicosia's two communities
was, somewhat innocuously, over their sewerage. While it was to be 'underground' in
physical character, the cooperation was also 'underground' in its political formation—a
feature that held implications for longer-term urban planning in Nicosia and the island
in general. Initially, however, it is necessary to consider this transboundary initiative in
the context of Nicosia's post-partition development.
7.3.1 The bi-polar development of Greater Nicosia
Urbanisation had developed rapidly in Cyprus. In 1946 less than 26% of the population
of the island were urban-based, and by independence—despite witnessing a change
from a rural-based to a more commercial and industrial economy—this had grown only
a further 10%.48 By 1973, however, just less than 270,000 (42%) of the 632,000 island
inhabitants were officially urban. 49 Of more importance to this analysis, however, was
the tendency for the growing suburbanisation to be ethnically-segregated, and Nicosia
was no exception. Some 40% of the Turkish Cypriot population inhabited towns
compared to 26% of Greek Cypriots." Even by 1960, the suburbs of Kaimakli and Orta
Keuy held over 82% of Nicosia's Turkish population, yet only 3% of the Greek Cypriot
inhabitants (Figure 7.2). In fact, over one-half of the urban Turkish Cypriots were to be
found in Nicosia, and it was no coincidence that the city came to represent the 'mutual
incompatibility of the two main communities'.'
Nicosia had been the island's capital for several centuries previously. Its urban
population of 34,463 in 1946 had risen to 45,629 by 1960, at which time it had become
the administrative centre for the newly-independent state, but from 1963 it was to
develop into two de facto capitals. The culmination of partition in 1974, as previously
indicated, led to a concentration of resources such that refugees were temporarily
housed in and around urban centres. With approximately 200,000 refugees post-1974,
the process of urbanisation in the south became more rapid so that by 1982 urban
residents accounted for 63.5% of the total population of the ROC. 52 By 1992, this had
risen to 68%, with 30% (over 47,000) of the overall population falling within Nicosia's
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Figure 7.2 Greater Nicosia and the UN buffer zone
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southern urban complex, as it sprawled out to the south and west (Figure 7.2)." In the
north as a whole, the population remained dispersed after 1974, except for Nicosia
which by 1978 hosted over 23,180 inhabitants. Like its southern half, north Nicosia
witnessed suburban growth, if in more consolidated form, and by 1996, according to a
de facto census, north Nicosia's population stood at some 40,000.
7.3.2 The Nicosia sanitary sewerage system
At the time of independence the sewerage system of Nicosia, as with the majority of
Cyprus, consisted of individual septic tanks and absorption pits within each property.
Yet, the clay content of a large area of the city was such that such pits were inadequate.
In addition, storm water collection was relatively undeveloped city-wide. In 1965, less
than two years after Nicosia had become geographically partitioned, the ROC
government approached the World Health Organisation to prepare a pre-feasibility study
on the sewerage and drainage system for the whole of Nicosia. In the light of this report
a full study was then undertaken in 1968 by a Canadian consultancy firm who prepared
a fifty-year master plan for Nicosia's sewerage and storm collection system. 54 In spite
of the presence of the 'green line', they analysed the urban area as a whole, and were
formally given the task of deciding whether to proceed with a separate or combined
(i.e., bicommunal) sewerage system.
The 1968 Report proposed three development stages and, for the treatment plant,
a site in the north east of the city at Mia Milia, at the time controlled by Greek Cypriots,
was chosen after consideration of the geology, relief and prevailing-wind direction
(Plate 7.1)." Three-quarters financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the balance being met by the ROC government, work began in
1972 and was scheduled for completion by August 1974.5'
The events of summer 1974 clearly had a direct impact on the progress of the
system's construction, particularly now the Mia Milia sewage treatment was located 2.4
km north of the Turkish Forces' CFL. Most of 'Stage 1' had been completed, in
particular most of the treatment plant (Plate 7.1). 57 Yet, a crucial part of the main outlet
now in the UNBZ remained unfinished, large sections of the route of the main trunk
sewer fell in the north, and the treatment plant itself needed substantial repair work in
the light of the violent conflict. In addition, Nicosia's population—with an influx of
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refugees—had poured into areas which had not been anticipated, meaning that sewerage
system expansions planned for the future were now needed urgently. However, in terms
of this project's administration there were substantial problems. Nicosia had become a
city with two distinctive heads (three, if UNFICYP as 'gatekeepers' to the UNBZ was
included). In order to supervise its implementation and administer the system, the
Nicosia Sewerage Board, a semi-independent government body, had been set up in
January 1971. Even so, the officially recognised, Greek Cypriot Municipality of
Nicosia had not controlled the administration of its northern enclave since 1964, and
was now physically exempt from all affairs north of the National Guard's CFL.
Unofficially, Nicosia now had two municipal offices and two mayors."
Although funded by the IBRD, the project was originally, and remained after
1974, a UNDP technical assistance project. Reacting with relative speed, the UNDP
used this role to oversee negotiations between what were termed (to avoid the political
minefield) Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 'representatives' at the municipal level,
Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci respectively, with the participation of
representatives of the World Bank and UNFICYP.
It would appear, however, that cooperation developed incrementally; as will
become clearer in subsequent analysis, it is necessary to examine this process in some
detail. In the afterglow of the Makarios-Denktash breakthrough at high-level
negotiations in 1977 (Appendix 1), there were rumblings of an agreement struck by the
UNDP with Denktash's approval, and this was presented by the Turkish Cypriot press
as enabling the Greek Cypriot sector to complete its part of the project. 59
 Negotiations
were to stall, however, and it was not until Demetriades, mayor of (southern) Nicosia
and also Chairman of the Sewerage Board, took up the gauntlet and obtained permission
to proceed with a transboundary project from both Clerides and Denktash,' and later
from Makarios. Demetriades has since recounted Makarios' response to his proposal;
the Archbishop privately declared "yes, you can do it, but be careful. If you succeed
you shall get the credit, if you don't we shall dismiss you as an irresponsible mayor".61
Demetriades recognised a coalition of views, nonetheless, which had generated a
moment 'ripe for resolution'; both he, Clerides and Denktash were lawyers by training
and, despite the obviously opposing political views, shared some common ground,
while Akinci was a trained architect and one, according to Demetriades, "not ready to
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divide a city".62
 Akinci had his own hurdles to overcome, given his standing as a
political opposition figure.'
Eventually, after a formal round-table meeting between Demetriades and Akinci
on 25 September 1978, chaired by the UNDP, an agreement was reached, although the
apportionment of costs between the two sides had been postponed until a later date.64
Work was expected to commence within three months to provide improved sanitary
facilities and domestic water connections both sides of the UNBZ. Notably, the UN
Secretary-General hoped the joint project would soon be followed by others, and
welcomed it as a 'gratifying development'." UNFICYP provided escorts for inspection
of the construction site, and facilitated the transfer of equipment, 66
 but while a series of
talks went ahead in February it was significant that work did not begin again until
August. Akinci raised concerns over the agreement text which he felt left out the
Turkish Cypriot areas in 'Stage 1', which indeed had been left untouched since early
1970." But by May 1980, 'Stage 1'—including the new work on the Turkish Cypriot
side—had been completed with the aid of construction firms from both communities.
As hoped for, in December 1982 the EEC and the European Investment Bank agreed to
fund 'Stage 2', as part of their financial protocols, which got under way in May 1984
(Plate 7.1). 68 It was further extended until late 1986, 69
 a complicated process involving
the laying of pipes across the UNBZ for which UNFICYP provided liaison and military
escort, especially given that the Mia Milia site was now located within a Turkish Forces
'high security military area'.
While the reasoning behind this cooperation appeared, at the functional level,
relatively self-explanatory, it is necessary to question further why and how this apparent
cooperation came about. To this end, the relationship between Demetriades and Akinci
at the municipal level of Nicosia must be reconsidered. While the third party role
played by the UNDP was crucial, the two representatives moulded its procedural
character, demonstrating their more grounded understanding of the island's politics."
As Demetriades noted;
"[w]e went away from the central UN organisation and got under the umbrella of
UNDP which was more concerned with down to earth things like funding and
technical stuff, rather than with political issues. Equally important was that we
decided that we do not keep minutes [...] [a]fter the first two or three
meetings".21
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The representatives' handling of their own constituencies appeared to be similarly
effective. Plate 7.2 represented the congenial view from Satiriki, a Greek Cypriot
newspaper; Demetriades was clearly able to legitimise his cooperative relationship with
Akinci: IN* both had in mind the interests of all the people of the Nicosia area.
Politics became secondary to the importance of humanitarian and public health
considerations".' For Yeniduzen, a Turkish Cypriot (opposition party) newspaper,
however, such an interpretation was not so well illustrated (Plate 7.3). Rather, the 'wall'
remained and the relationship was somewhat dehumanised. It is these small but distinct
differences in interpretation and discursive representation of intermunicipal (yet
intercommunal) relations that will be carried across into an examination of this project's
successor, the bicommunal Nicosia Master Plan.
7.4 The Nicosia Master Plan
Prior to 1974, urban planning in Nicosia, in terms of centralised control, was largely
unaddressed and uncoordinated. During the colonial period the city had extended
outside the historic walls and economic development saw the urban area expand south-
west (Figure 7.2). Planning law was a direct inheritance from the colonial legislation
which was, in turn, overlaid on Ottoman legislation. A planning study of Nicosia
undertaken by Nottingham University (UK) in 1968 was all but nullified by the
subsequent geographical separation, although, even at its time of completion, Nicosia
was ethnically segregated. In addition, a 'Town and Country Planning Law' had been
enacted by the (Greek Cypriot) ROC government in 1972—an 'Island Plan' was
approved by the Council of Ministers in 1973, and was nearing publication in 1974. At
the same time, 'Local Plans' for the island's six major towns were being prepared. The
events of 1974 meant that, although sections relating to preparation of the above plans
were implemented, the laws' provisions were never enacted. Building control both in
the south and the north, therefore, was for the next fifteen years to be exercised
effectively under the colonial provisions of the Streets and Buildings Regulations Law
and the Buildings Regulation of 1946.
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7.4.1 A second agreement
Nicosia was no exception to these weaknesses in planning control, the shortfalls of
which were most vividly illustrated after 1974 when Nicosia's urban structure was
separated most effectively. Notably, it was the city's two 'representatives' who once
again began transboundary dialogue to address this issue. In October 1979,
Demetriades and Akinci met, under the chairmanship of the UNDP once more (and with
their own technical experts) and, as with the sewerage links, in a capacity as
'representatives' of their respective communities." This time, an agreement stated that;
"[t]here should be close co-operation between the two sides for the purpose of
examining and finally reaching conclusions for a Master Plan of Nicosia. To
achieve the above, meetings between the two sides and their experts at Ledra
Palace should be continued".74
Following this agreement, technical assistance was requested from the United Nations
Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS (Habitat)) and funding from the UNDP. An
NMP 'team' was composed of international experts,' and professionals—urban
planners, architects, sociologists and economists—from both communities.
LTNCHS (Habitat) conducted a preparatory mission at the end of 1979,
producing a project document that was signed by all parties concerned in March 1980,"
and from early 1980 the NMP team met regularly under UNDP auspices at Ledra
Palace, the UN headquarters in Nicosia's 'green line'. Work began with UNFICYP's
assistance on socio-economic surveys, and assessments of physical structures, land use
patterns, and existing legislation. The results of these surveys were revealing,
particularly for Nicosia-within-the-walls: the urban land uses were changing rapidly,
with warehouses, workshops or vacant plots replacing residential areas, particularly
areas contiguous to the 'green line', and young families were giving way to the elderly
and the unemployed. By 1976 nearly 50% of the residents of Nicosia within-the-walls
were refugees.' The diagnosis was, in the words of the UNDP, that the "heart of
Nicosia would soon become a derelict no-man's land".' After all, the UNBZ, while
taking up one-tenth of the Old City, also took up one-sixth of the Greater Nicosia area
(according to the NMP boundaries).79
A plan was finally completed in July 1984 and, at the official handing-over
ceremony at Ledra Palace in January 1985, Demetriades hailed the occasion as "a
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landmark in the tormented life of our capital city"." The NMP plan itself was divided
into two phases. 'Phase 1' (from 1981-84) would involve drafting a long-term physical
plan for Greater Nicosia to the year 2000, while the second (1984-85) would focus on a
more detailed operational plan for Nicosia's central area. The overall objective was to
establish a general planning policy, and the general strategy remained one of urban
consolidation, the containment of urban sprawl, and the optimal use of available
resources. 81 While the 'official' reasons for the NMP were multitudinous, they all
addressed the fundamental problem of planning what was seen as a unified urban
system. In essence, 'Phase 1' developed two scenarios so as to be flexible enough to
accommodate the various territorial proposals for a political settlement to the Cyprus
conflict. Consequently, plans were duplicated, yet made compatible: a contemporary
Nicosia 'with buffer zone', and another possibility for Nicosia 'without buffer zone'
(Plate 7.4).
:Phase 2' of the NMP (from 1984 onwards) dealt specifically with the
preparation of an Area Scheme for the Old City, and the Central Business District
(CBD), both north and south. At the time, with no Town and Country Planning Law
enacted, the NMP team decided to concentrate on only those measures deemed
'essential' for the immediate implementation of the Area Schemes.' The two main
'special projects' focused on Chrysaliniotissa in the south (Plate 7.5), and Arab Ahmet
in the north (Plate 7.6), which were designed to act as 'pilot' schemes and demonstrate
how both public and private investment could combine the old with the new." In
Chrysaliniotissa, restoration focused on 27 dwellings, a public garden and other open
spaces, with housing grants for 108 inhabited houses; while, in Arab Ahmet, 30 houses
were to be restored (with repair grants for 8 units) and various community facilities
(e.g., a museum) were provided for." Planning activities were carried out by the local
team members, although the UNDP through UNCHS (Habitat) continued to finance
short-term consultants. From 1987, when the third phase started, funding was
forthcoming from UNHCR (essentially USAID funds) while the UNDP continued to
seek out other funding agencies.
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Plate 7.5	 Urban regeneration in Chrystdinratissa: Annum St., Nicosia (south 1
Plate 7.6	 Urban regeneration in Arab Ahmet: Mural Pasha St., Nicosia (north)
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7.4.2 Common or superordinate goals?
The 'unofficial' reasons for the establishment of both the NMP and its predecessor, the
sanitary sewerage system, during a five year period after partition—a period which, but
for the 1979 Agreement, was characterised by deadlock within the high-level
negotiation process (Appendix 1)—clearly deserves further consideration. With regards
to the NMP, as the UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus noted in 1985, "[t]hat
such a plan could be drawn up in the middle of political turmoil and dissent is due to the
wisdom and courage of these Cypriots [Demetriades and Akinci] of both communities
who found the strength to cast aside any misgivings and mistrust they may have felt
towards each other"." In evaluating the NMP, however, which stood out as the most
significant and celebrated transboundary resource management venture to develop on
the island since 1974, an appreciation of the perceptions of the decision-makers is
imperative. As one former NMP team member cautioned, "the [NMP] at times means
different things to different people"."
To consider this observation, it is necessary to return to the initial cooperation on
the sewerage system. Akinci himself sought to clarify on a number of occasions that the
origins of cooperating over sewage were more functional: "the kidneys were on our side
after 1974 and [...] it was not economical, nor feasible, to build another treatment plant.
They [the Greek Cypriots] had to come to an agreement"." The acceptance of the NMP
by the Greek Cypriot authorities was also encouraged by strategic factors. By the mid-
1980s there was heightened concern over the economic 'blight' of what was once the
capital's Central Business District (CBD); south of the UNBZ, between 1976 and 1992
while the population of Greater Nicosia grew by over 64%, that of Nicosia-within-the-
walls fell by 62%." This translated into a growing political concern over the demise of
the areas along the 'green line' and UNBZ—in particular the decline of businesses and
population numbers which might lead to the de facto extension of UN territory and
further de facto contraction of the ROC."
At the municipal level, in particular, soon after the creation of the UNBZ
Demetriades was having to balance pressures from the small shopkeepers association
(Povek) along the 'green line' who, initially, called for financial assistance to encourage
them to stay in the '1,000' shops within the 'depressed areas'." As a result of the
political and economic instability post-partition, the land market had suffered a slump
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which was felt differentially across the urban space. Reversing the classic 'distance-
decay factor', land prices fell along the 'green line' and in the suburbs which touched on
the UNBZ as it ran out from the city—as a result not only of the psychological effect of
the demarcation line, but also of the low rentability of old housing and superannuated
infrastructure." Nicosia's Greek Cypriot population had 'turned its back' on the CBD."
Hermes Street, already affected by the 'green line' from 1963, was all but subsumed by
the UNBZ, and the CBD subsequently shifted southwards to fall outside the old city
walls."
The Greek Cypriot government's initial fear over the consolidation of a 'border
area' in its capital was further evidenced in June 1991, when ROC President Vassiliou
announced plans to invest CY£10 mn through infrastructural developments and through
a package of financial incentives for rejuvenating areas in proximity to the 'green line',
and to Nicosia's UNBZ in general (Figure 7.3). 94 Serving as a catalyst for private
investment separate from the NMP, more importantly, it sought to stem the
depopulation of Nicosia's 'border areas' and to reverse the trend in the development of
workshops in the Old City which were perceived to be `dangerous'. 95 Looking towards
a 'reunited Nicosia', a pedestrianisation programme was proposed (eventually funded
by the EC), centrally-located car parks were planned (funded by the ROC), and housing
loans made available to support the local population and boost rebuilding in the
"depressed areas"." Indeed, there was a desire to attract 'anyone at all' to the area to
prevent its depopulation."
For Greek Cypriots, the NMP thus complemented the 'national struggle',
encouraging the breaking down of the nekri zoni, and institutionalising the possibility of
reunification (if not of Cyprus,' then at least of Nicosia). 99 The Town and Country
Planning Law of 1972 was only ever partially implemented and, in the south, blame for
this was specifically placed on the 'Turkish invasion'. As far as Greek Cypriot
sentiments were concerned, the prolonged division of the island's territory had;
"had a destructive impact on the settlement system on the Island [sic].
Population distribution, the functioning relations and interconnections which
have been established through centuries have literally been disconnected by
artificial boundaries dividing cities (i.e. Nicosia), severing communication
networks (national and regional road systems), enforcing the duplication of
major infrastructure (airports, ports, power plants, etc.), and bre[a]king up social
and cultural ties".'
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Figure 7.3	 Priority 'revitalisation areas' for Greek Cypriot government funding in
central Nicosia, 1991-1996
Source: Compiled by author from unpublished ROC Town Planning and Housing
Department maps.
Nicosia's 'Local Plan', along with the 'Island Plan' as a whole, had been outdated by
the influx of refugees and territorial partition across Greater Nicosia as a whole.'°'
Within the NMP itself, therefore, the 'green line' within the Old City was recognised as
"the most important 'gluing' area in the functional integration of the city". 1 °2 Such
integrationist rhetoric was also common in Demetriades' public statements. Nicosia,
invariably but also incorrectly presented as 'the last divided capital city in the world'
(note the definite articles), was "a divided city brutally separated by a dead zone [...]
This is what the Turkish Attila has left us with".' Symbolically, in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, Demetriades observed that "[w]hile tyrants fall and walls of
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shame are torn apart elsewhere, the walls of Attila still stab our lands, the walls of
shame are still here".'" However, through cooperation over the sewerage and the NMP,
it was now possible to prove that "Nicosia is a divided city on the surface, but
underneath it's fully united"?'
As Theophylactou has noted, neorealists would argue that leaders are unable to
conform through fear of failing to maximise their own long-term gains, regardless of
their attitudes towards a common good.' Yet, clearly Demetriades' belief in the
common good of Nicosia reflected more personal instincts, and the exploitation of such
populist slogans was perhaps more in order to placate the `rejectionise lobby. It is
therefore necessary to return to the role played by the two municipal leaders, highlighted
previously by the UNDP representative. The evident 'bargaining skill' of Nicosia's
mayoral 'representatives' provided strong evidence of the dangers of placing too much
weight on the role of structural power in processes of regime formation at the
transboundary level. m
 The origins of the NMP's establishment and momentum was
largely due to the regime's introduction of new actors who influenced, crucially, both
municipal and national behaviour and contributed to the development of coordinated
and convergent planning. Common principles and norms gave way to a common set of
planning rules. In turn, the NMP provided many functional goods—information about
the environment and other actor's choice, and a stable forum for interactions that
reduced the transaction costs of planning an historically integrated urban area.
The operating level of the NMP was, although horizontal, between
municipalities whose 'national' basis remained moot. Pragmatically, in the light of the
problematic constitutional legitimacy, as long as specific 'official' labels were not used
there was perceived to be no 'absolute need to agree' in order to cooperate.'" Politics
was, temporarily, by-passed. Distinct, therefore, from the 'balanced reciprocity' evident
in the original 'water-for-electricity' arrangement, where benefits were largely
calculated by the state authorities, in the case of the NMP, reciprocity was more
`generalised'.'" Maintenance of the relationship was perceived to be more important
than short-term gain, and the norm of the relationship appeared more altruistic.
Demetriades, with Akinci in tandem, became an 'entrepreneurial leader' by using
certain negotiating skills to cast Nicosia's issues in a way that facilitated cooperative
bargaining, and to broker interests around the choice of a preferred regime
arrangement."° The role of these two political leaders, who found relatively (but not
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absolutely) 'neutral' political space at the municipal level to cooperate, was significant.
In addition, the 'mayors' proved 'structural leaders' in that they successfully politicised
their space to achieve their objectives." The municipal level had to be both political
and yet apolitical: it was political in the way that Nicosia's problem were presented as
an issue requiring immediate attention; it was apolitical in that it was rarely if ever
considered in high-level negotiations.
Briefly put, the role of Demetriades and Akinci was foundational to cooperation,
whether or not they sought political rewards. Indeed, it has been argued that it is more
reassuring if leaders are motivated to engage in entrepreneurial activities out of a
durable sense of self-interest rather than an ephemeral consideration of altruism.' 12 In
terms of assessing the effectiveness of both these transboundary regimes, it is necessary
to consider, inter alia, their original goals. As Young noted;
"[m]ore often than not, those engaged in regime formation are motivated by goals
they do not feel comfortable articulating in public as well as by goals they deem
appropriate for inclusion in public statements. Typically, these unstated goals
deal with distributive concerns in contrast to the pursuit of some common
good"."3
As with the majority of transboundary initiatives, nonetheless, secrecy was paramount
and so was silence. Cooperation, as depicted in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, was
kept secret and, quite literally, underground." 4 The instigators lost out because of this
secrecy, however, with little if any recognition, although this was no doubt their wish.
7.4.3 'Functional spill over' and the limits to cooperation
In considering the 'spill over' of these developments in Nicosia, it is useful here to
distinguish further between three strands of what neofunctionalists have understood
'spill over' to be: 'functional spill over' may arise from overriding forces of technical
interdependence; 'political spill over' suggests the refocusing of a society's activities
and expectations to a new supranational centre; while 'cultivated spill over' places
emphasis on the possibility of the 'upgrading' of common interests to a central
institution."' The result of the cumulative 'spill over' would probably lead to the
integration of other tasks.
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Transboundary resource management in Nicosia, it can be argued, benefited
from 'functional spill over' as determined by its centrality, both in terms of its
geography and the available conflict resolution structures. In geographical terms, the
strains and distortions resulting from one integrative step (the sewerage system) resulted
in pressures from related fields of urban management for coordination (as opposed to
Stein's `collaboration'). 116 The NMP, in turn, set a redevelopment precedent for central
Nicosia as whole, which was even to include the rejuvenation of those derelict buildings
within the 'green line'. It became apparent, in September 1996 that 40 collapsing
buildings in Hermes Street were to be pulled down by UNFICYP for safety reasons."7
The impending prospect of buildings written in to the NMP being demolished dictated
that these intra-boundary resources received much consideration, and Demetriades
successfully sought ROC Cabinet funds for their repair."' In terms of available conflict
resolution structures, the location of Ledra Palace Hotel under UN administration, in the
UNBZ just outside Nicosia's walls was vital. Parallel to their provision of arrangements
for developing the Master Plan in 1979, UNFICYP assisted other meetings between the
communities' union leaders and journalists and, in early 1980, between officials from
the Water and Health Departments.' 19
 By mid-1993 UNFICYP had managed to
establish a Humanitarian Exchange Point at Ledra Palace, for family reunions, welfare
payments and where visa requests could be administered.' A journalists' meeting
room was also provided in early 1995."
A precedent had been set by the NMP. In
 Nonetheless, these benefits of
centrality alone failed to generate a high level of interdependency, or so-called 'issue
density', whereby expectations stabilised and the NMP regime was able to
institutionalise the likelihood of both sides becoming involved in long-term
cooperation.' While the NMP provided many lessons, they largely remained with that
project,' as the NMP failed to generate a truly interdependent, transboundary planning
body; the regime's political set-up proved too inflexible to encompass any development
of the NMP teams' powers. 125 In turn, this encouraged a negative perception of the
'meaning' of the NMP amongst `rejectionise elements of the two communities. For
many Greek Cypriots there was a perception that the northern municipality was a 'free-
rider', a view which grew from 1990 when the popular intermunicipal pairing of
Demetriades and Akinci ended, the latter losing his seat after 14 years in office." In
this sense it is necessary to recognise that their independence, which gave them
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significant power, was forever being contained by the political leadership on either
side.'"
For the Turkish Cypriots, as Alcinci has commented, they may well have
preferred positive 'spill over' from the sewerage system into joint water system projects
rather than urban planning. 128 Indeed, certain Turkish Cypriot officials refused to treat
the NMP as pure 'cooperation', but rather as an extension of the sewerage plan—a
functional imperative, unproductive for them in economic terms, which constituted the
'core' of subsequent transboundary relations in Nicosia, relations not of 'cooperation'
but of separate coexistence.'" It was less surprising, therefore, that no comparable
central state-led 'border rejuvenation' scheme developed in the north. Even when
supporting the NMP, however, Turkish Cypriot 'official' policy remained concerned
over viewing 'cooperation' in the urban context as a de-politicised planning initiative—
as anything more than Sherif's `superordinate goal'—precisely because Greek Cypriot
authorities saw the recreation of a unified Nicosia as an attractive confidence-building
measure, which might eventually lead to the reintegration of the two Cypriot
communities on the island.'
It would be short of the mark to blame the limited progress of the NMP in purely
political terms, however, given additional structural constraints. While the zoning was
there, the legislative sanctions were not. In the north, although a zoning map and
physical plan was drawn up in 1975, it remained non-implemented such that, from the
completion of the NMP plans in 1984 little was then possible until 1989 by which time
the original plans needed substantial (re-)revision. Of particular note, however, were the
economic constraints on the NMP. The magnitude of funds required for its schemes
were unprecedented for urban development in Cyprus. While in the south the financial
injection of private funds was to dwindle (along with relatively static municipal and
government funding), in the north the financing of the projects within the overall plan
was severely debilitated. Arab Ahmet, in particular, was restored much more slowly
than Chrysaliniotissa due to lack of funds and poor planning control."'
It was necessary to set the funding of the NMP in the context of the TRNC
economy as a whole. There were major practical problems concerning recognition with
UNHCR (and later the EU), in particular the fact that all UNHCR funds were prescribed
according to the population ratios at the time of the 1974 military intervention.' 32 This
was approximately 80% Greek Cypriot and 18% Turkish Cypriot and, ever since, the
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Turkish Cypriot community—in line with their call for complete political equality—
sought a 50:50 share of incoming funds. In terms of public funds, the annual per capita
Gross National Product (GNP) in the north, it should be remembered, was less than a
quarter of that in the south, and this had been even worse at the municipal level of
Nicosia. A survey conducted in 1985 concluded that municipal revenues in the south
were estimated to be 7 times those in the north, and expenditure almost 9 times as
much.' 33 Yet, even in the south the possibility of significant revenue for the
municipality further strengthened the impetus to cooperate. The political economy of
cooperation (or the so-called 'neofimetionalist logic') it would seem, played a vital role
given that, on viewing the project as a whole, both sides expected there to be an
economic 'lollipop' at the end of it.'
Nor was there unconditional success with the original cooperation over the
sewerage system. 'Stage 3' remained outstanding, and given that not all of Nicosia had
been connected and that capacity at Mia Milia was nearing overload by the mid-1990s,
the stability of transboundary relations remained an integral part of the on-going project.
In the UNDP's environmental study of 1990 (see Chapter 5), concerns were raised—
particularly by the Greek Cypriots—of 'malodorous effluents' being discharged into the
Pedhieos River bed at the Nicosia sewage treatment plant.' 35 Turkish Cypriots were
themselves concerned that north Nicosia's new industrial zone, nearly four times the
size of the old site near Mia Milia, had no sewerage pretreatment facilities at all (Plate
7.1). 136 In response, and reaffirming their general optimism, the 1991 UNDP report
noted that the successful completion of the proposed reuse of treated effluent "could
well serve as a model for the development of other bicommunal projects"." 7 Yet the
UNDP continued to provide logistic support for its operation and maintenance only until
its 1997 departure (see Chapter 5).138
7.5 Famagusta: The Other Divided City
Not only was presenting Nicosia as, variously, 'the last divided capital city in the
world', 'the last divided city in Europe', or even just 'the last divided city', largely
mistaken, it also surprisingly ignored one other example of urban physical separation on
the island post-1974. Like Nicosia, Famagusta's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
323
Transboundmy Urban Space
communities were ethnically segregated from 1963, but the establishment of the
UNBZ—and in particular, the anomalous character of territorial control in Famagusta's
southern suburb—was to affect most dramatically the political geography of the
settlement's future development.
7.5.1 Post-partition development of Famagusta
Since the early days of colonial rule, Famagusta was the location of the chief port,
linked to the rest of the island along its east-west axis by the sole railway line.'" Its
population had grown sixfold between 1881 and the mid-1950s, but of that population,
the Turkish community comprised only 17%. 14° The central walled city—the Kaleici-
remained predominantly Turkish Cypriot, but by independence a new suburb Varosha,
to the city's south, was to be made largely of Greek Cypriot residents. Varosha
represented the first substantial tourist development along Cyprus' coastline.
From a figure of 34,774 in 1960, Famagusta's population stood at just 17,180 in
1978, in line with the spatial shrinkage of its 'urban area' as a whole as a result of the
peculiar cease-fire arrangements of 1974. Advances by the Turkish Forces in late
October 1974 (subsequent to, in other words, the 16 August cease-fire) were recorded in
the Dherinia area, south of Famagusta (Appendix 6 (a)), but were designated as
unacceptable by the UN. I41 An arrangement was eventually reached whereby the central
part of Varosha was fenced off, and fell under the control of the Turkish Forces (i.e., the
Turkish Government) who could not allow change the status quo in the area pending a
solution. As such, derelict Varosha was bounded on three sides by territory under
Turkish Cypriot control, to the east by the sea, and to the south by the UNBZ (Figure
7.4)—in total, an area covering some 4 km by 1.5 km of coastal and once-agricultural
land.
This dislocation from central Famagusta ('Gazimagosa' in Turkish) of what had
become the settlement's new growth pole (with 116 hotels) had a significant impact on
the morphology of Famagusta's subsequent development. Whereas from the mid-1950s
to 1974 new developments were beginning to cluster south of the Kaleici, from 1974 the
direction of Turkish Cypriot development turned 180 0 (Figure 7.4). Ribbon
development was encouraged by the locating of industry on the new Famagusta-north
Nicosia road, and in particular the establishment of the largest university in the north in
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1986 which, by the mid-1990s, housed over one third (approximately 10,000 students)
of the municipality's population. 142 Areas contiguous to Varosha's fence failed to
attract investment, particularly given the unpredictable future of the military-controlled
area,"3
 and, as will be considered below, after 1974 political interest was to be focused
on the southern suburb which was widely perceived to have become a 'ghost town'.
7.5.2 Exorcising the ghost
As from August 1974, the issue of reopening Varosha (`Marash' in Turkish) was
generally used as a political tool by both communities, but in particular the Turkish
Cypriot leadership who, given that Turkish Forces controlled the area de facto, was
effectively able to control its future. In fact, 'unofficially', at the ground-level the status
quo had been altered soon after 1974, when the steady removal of commercial items and
other movable objects from the area into the north became a common occurrence—the
Turkish Cypriot authorities explaining to UNFICYP that records were being kept and
that compensatory measures in certain cases would be taken in the event of a political
settlement.' By the end of 1977, however, a hotel management school and a casino
had been opened, and the renaming of streets had begun.'45
For the purposes of political negotiations, however, the Turkish Cypriot
government were to use the 'official' status quo as a bargaining tool. In May 1978, as
high-level negotiations progressed, Denktash announced that between 30-35,000 Greek
Cypriots could return to Varosha but, at the same time, the threat of a number of hotels
being reopened by the Turkish Cypriot community was used.' 46
 While the 1979 high-
level agreement prioritised the resettlement of fenced-off Varosha, whereby Greek
Cypriot refugees would return immediately upon a settlement, the Turkish Cypriot side
held that an overall settlement had to be considered first, given that Point 6 of the
agreement (Appendix 2) called for a 'return to normal conditions', interpreted by
Denktash as an end to the Greek Cypriot economic blockade.' 47 Maps subsequently
forwarded by the Turkish Cypriot side would, however, have left the Greek Cypriots
only a narrow enclave on the coast, permitted limited refugee-return, and subjected them
to a Turkish border control.' 48 By contrast, the Greek Cypriots insisted on Varosha
falling under UN control as part of any likely settlement to the dispute.' 49 It was of little
surprise therefore when Denktash chose to argue in 1981 that, with its submission as
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part of comprehensive Turkish Cypriot proposals, the Varosha issue had come to be
treated as an integral part of an overall settlement.'
In January 1984, the Turkish Cypriot authorities reopened access to 10-20
houses inside Varosha's northwestern perimeter fence as a 'temporary relief measure' .'51
By then, the Security Council had reserved it exclusively for resettlement by its pre-
1974 inhabitants, preponderantly Greek Cypriots." Moreover, on 16 March the
Secretary-General reiterated his belief that Varosha, as delimited by the Turkish Cypriot
proposals in 1981, should be transferred to the UNBZ by Turkey: 53 The issue remained
unresolved however, and by November 1986 UNFICYP reported the accommodation of
students from Famagusta's university in two hotels inside the fenced area. Denktash
responded to the Secretary-General's protests over the change to the status quo by
stating this was a temporary set-up;' 54 additionally, in response to the Secretary-
General's reaffirmation of the perimeter of the fenced area (by supplying a map) and of
their consideration that the Turkish government was responsible for the area, Denktash
claimed that there was no such common understanding. Varosha was a 'municipal
matter' within the TRNC: 55
 Speculation continued when, on 19 July 1990, security
forces from the Turkish mainland were replaced in Varosha by TRNC military
personnel, in a coordinated demonstration of anger over the Greek Cypriots' EC
membership application a fortnight previously (see Chapter 5), and on the 16th
anniversary of the Turkish military intervention:56
7.5.3 Rebuilding as 'confidence building': Boutros-Ghali's `CBMs', 1993-1994
By the early 1990s, consequently, Varosha had remained largely untouched and
undeveloped for fifteen years. It was in this light that the UN-Secretary-General
proposed the inclusion of Varosha within a package of 'confidence-building measures'
(CBMs). In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali attempted to develop the UN's
overall post-conflict peacebuilding capacity which;
"may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more
countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can only contribute to
economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so
fundamental to peace".157
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Little academic attention had previously been given to CBMs involving `intra-' or
'pseudo-state' identity groups, when compared with inter-state conflicts, although this
was hardly surprising given CBMs' working definition.' In this context, CBMs
(which may be uni-, bi- or multi-lateral) were firmly based on the principles of
international law as documented by the UN." Goldblat has advocated their translation
to the regional level, where confidence building could promote better communication,
impose military constraints, and strengthen cooperation among parties. In this last
domain, CBMs might include the reinforcement of existing political cooperation and
economic integration, the undertaking of joint economic development in border areas,
the pooling of resources for mutual assistance, or the institutionalisation of
environmental protection.' Ben-Dor and Dewitt proposed a functionally broader
interpretation of confidence-building processes and instruments to include less
traditional avenues such as humanitarian gestures, cultural exchanges, the media, and
'functional steps' such as resource management:61
A variety of tentative CBMs had been employed in Cyprus, under various
guises, from 1974. With the 'Ten-Point Agreement' in 1979, the UN Secretary-General
had expressed his wish to concentrate on Varosha, the constitution, territorial aspects,
and 'initial practical measures': 62
 When talks resumed in June 1979, however, the
parties were unable to address any of the substantive aspects, and talks were to falter as
procedural issues and security concerns came to light.' The most concerted effort to
incorporate CBMs into the formal negotiating sphere, however, came a decade later:64
In mid-1990, the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar declared that if no progress
was to come from the reconvening of intercommunal talks in the coming October, then
the Security Council would have to "give serious consideration to alternative courses of
action": 65 No progress came, and by November 1992 the new Secretary-General,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had concluded that there was "a deep crisis of confidence
between the two sides": 66 In an attempt temporarily to leap-frog' the difficulties which
had arisen with the 'Set of Ideas' throughout June, and reflecting a tangible optimism
within the UN, he forwarded a series of CBMs in a resolution: 67 Both the Security
Council members and the UN's Cyprus representatives invested heavily in the belief
that, while neither an end in themselves nor a substitute for the wider political process,
the CBMs would be mutually beneficial and facilitate the political process towards an
overall settlement.168
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The process of placing Varosha under UN administration had been again
supported in the 1992 'Set of Ideas'. 169 Within the UN Secretary-General's CBMs in
1993, however, came the opportunity to address this long-standing problem.
Specifically, the proposal was to place the fenced area under UN administration for
bicommunal contact and commerce, in particular making any economic opportunities
available to Turkish Cypriots. As a "special area for bicommunal contact and
commerce, a kind of free trade zone", Varosha would be opened in two stages—two
months after falling under UN control, the fenced area south of Dhimokratis Avenue
would be rejuvenated for the largely Greek Cypriot owners, while the area north of the
Avenue would be addressed at a later stage (Figure 7.4). 1 " Intercommunal and tax-free
trade in the zone would be promoted."'
It was necessary, however, to place the proposals for Varosha within the context
of the CBM package as a whole. The Secretary-General's Deputy Special
Representative, Gustave Feissel, held 34 meetings in New York with the two leaders
during April and May 1993, 172 during which it was possible to reach agreement on a list
of CBMs that both sides would be prepared to implement. While constituting an 'old
idea resurrected', evidently on this occasion more pressure was being applied for
progress on the CBMs when representatives of the five permanent members of the
UNSC attended the first meeting."' The CBMs themselves also threw a new light on
issues the UN considered suitable for consideration in 'high level' talks. The draft
proposals identified 14 CBMs, 12 of which were taken to be already 'acceptable' to
both sides.' Although 14 in number, they were actually presented as three separate
issues: the first two (in order of reading) were the placing of Varosha under UN
administration, and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport (NIA) located in the
UN Protected Area to civilian traffic under the control of the UN. The third was in itself
an eclectic mix of 12 issues on which there was already informal agreement (including
party leaders' and Chambers of Commerce meetings, joint projects in Nicosia,
electricity), and issues on which the UN had been seeking agreement in recent low-level
talks (UNBZ unmanning, bicommunal journalists' centre, etc.). Thrown in amongst
these were relatively novel proposals, but their meaning was more open-ended and
ambiguous (including 'expert'-led cooperation in water, environment, and an 'equitable'
distribution of international funds). For the next 18 months the leaders' were to focus
on the CBM package.
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On Varosha, while the Greek Cypriots accepted the draft proposals, micro-
territorial amendments were sought by the Turkish Cypriot side, who argued that the
fenced area lying north of Dhimolcratis Avenue had to be excluded from UN
administration, to generate a 'security buffer' between it and Famagusta's port (Fiigure
7.4). 1 ' In essence, an area comprising 20% of Varosha's territory, would separate
Greek Cypriots from an exclusive Turkish Cypriot settlement.' While he retreated
from this position, Denktash did so with the understanding that the Turkish Cypriots
would control the access road from the south even though it would pass through Greek
Cypriot areas (Figure 7.4). Denktash also reiterated his position of 1981, whereby such
an area would be settled by Turkish Cypriots. As the joint meetings proceeded through
May 1993 it had became clear that both the Greek Cypriots and Greece were in
agreement with the proposals, on condition that, as Vassiliou put it, they "must not put
the cart before the horse". 177 Recognition—direct or indirect—of the TRNC was not a
proviso. The Turkish Cypriot side, however, suggested that, in addition to small scale
amendments of the territorial scenario for Varosha, any opening of this area deserved
the removal of all restrictions on their seaports and airports, including Ercan (`Tymbou')
airport. Moreover, Denktash eventually stated that any response would be delayed for
over a fortnight as he considered technical issues with the administrations both in
Nicosia and Ankara, and back in Nicosia he faced a hostile reaction to the package."'
Notably the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, widened his
contact base in the autumn, suspecting that the 'practical' way the CBMs could work on
the ground had not been yet fully appreciated. Two 'technical missions' to Cyprus were
organised,'" and on both sides of the UNBZ the Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
trade unionists, politicians and technicians were approached throughout October and
November. The findings were positive, if again largely restricted to the two main issue
areas; significant economic gains would benefit both communities—the Greek Cypriots
with a 15% increase in tourism capacity through rejuvenation of Varosha, but
particularly the Turkish Cypriots who would take up half of an estimated 9,000 new
jobs, would allegedly lessen their economic embargo by 80-85%, and would boost their
GDP by 20%.'"
In this light, the Security Council continued to believe unanimously in an
agreement intended to facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement. The
package was to facilitate speedy progress, but not to substitute an overall settlement of
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the Cyprus conflict; even so, the Secretary-General could not fail to note that the CBMs
would represent the most important development on the island in two decades,
manifesting good will towards the 'other' and transforming the atmosphere on the
island.' 81 The first two CBMs, the 'experts' report proclaimed;
"would at long last provide avenues of contact between the two communities and
would give them the opportunity, in a limited setting devoid of risk to their
respective communities, to become reacquainted and to reveal to each other their
goodwill and respect, and their desire to get together and to cooperate".'82
Proximity talks were initiated in February 1994, by which time Denktash had returned
and was now backed by a coalition of views.
On 9 March, Clerides and Denktash received a paper detailing the draft ideas for
the implementation of the CBMs. Feissel proposed that, in Varosha, the Dherinia road
should fall under UN protection and that the southern perimeter of the fenced area and
the UNBZ be unmanned by Turkish Cypriot forces but, after a series of six different
maps in the fenced area were considered, it was clear its southern edge, passing through
the suburb of Ayios Memnon, was contested (Figure 7.4). 183 Discussions followed
between each leader and the Secretary-General's special representatives, who took on
board new ideas and finally presented an 'adjusted' draft paper on 21 March.'" While
Clerides accepted what became known as the '21 March paper' on condition that
Denktash did likewise, the latter community leader objected to what he saw as wording
concerning Varosha and NIA that had changed from the 1 July 1993 package. The
unmanning of the area south of Varosha, the placing of the passage through this area
under UN control, and micro-territorial disparities between UN maps and those of the
Turkish Cypriots were, for DenIctash, unacceptable changes.'"
Come the end of April, Denktash announced that the talks had collapsed, and in
June Clerides said "the package of the CBMs and the process is dead". Informal direct
talks took place in October, but by December the Secretary-General was to announce
that while Denktash sought agreement on Varosha and the NIA, Clerides now required
acceptance of the basic principle of an overall settlement based on single sovereignty
and international personality.' This reflected sincere Greek Cypriot concerns over the
consolidation of the status quo through such 'partial' solutions; there was a perceived
need to ensure that sufficient common ground existed, otherwise 'meaningless'
discussions on the CBMs could not be considered until after an overall settlement.
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Clerides was also now using the EU membership process as a negotiating lever, and the
export-ban decision of the ECJ in July 1994 had, for the Turkish Cypriots, negatively
impacted any likely benefits from the CBMs." 7 In November, direct talks on the CBMs
failed to reemerge.
The Secretary-General himself had stated in February 1994 that the modalities
for implementing the CBMs needed to be worked out within two months. By mid-1995
that moment had long passed, and the prospects for movement in the near future were
weak.' 88 In line with observations made in the previous chapter, the specifics of
boundary management—what the 'border' would separate, where the 'boundary' would
fall, and who could cross the 'border'—greatly contributed to the stalling of the
negotiations' progress on the reopening of Varosha (and the NIA). More significantly,
it is argued, unlike Nicosia, Famagusta's development had been tied up integrally with
the 'high politics' of the two de facto states."' Although focused on the borderland
scale, neither Varosha (nor the NIA) were limited to the borderland either in terms of
actors involved or politico-economic ramifications. An opportunity to cooperate on
what Boutros-Ghali had perceived to be 'practical' issues had failed, and Varosha
retained its role as a political rather than socio-economic resource. In May 1995,
Turkish Cypriot authorities reopened a church in Varosha as an icon museum for the
public;'" later, in the light of the Greek Cypriots' S-300 missile deal in January 1997,
Denktash announced that he would not only shelve his 'implicit' agreement to the
CBMs if the missile deployment went ahead, but that Varosha would be socially and
economically integrated with the main city.'
7.6	 The Saliency of a Dualistic Borderland
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the urban development of both Nicosia
and Famagusta remained politically and geographically divided, despite various
practical third party and local level interventions. Finally, it remains to briefly consider
the saliency of the partition boundary in this light, reflecting both the 'ground-level'
reality and the on-going contested representation of the border by the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities in the urban context.
332
Transboundary Urban Space
7.6.1 Land uses along the 'green line'
Despite the limited nature of their study of central Nicosia in 1994, Kliot and Mansfield
drew two notable conclusions.' First, it was argued that Nicosia's urban division was
relatively 'open', failing to constitute a real 'obstacle' for those wishing to cross. It has
been previously noted in Chapter 6 that this can be largely refuted given that, while
Ledra Palace constituted the main crossing point on the island, crossing procedures were
specific and highly restrictive, even for the 'foreign tourist'. However, Kliot and
Mansfield's second conclusion, that Nicosia's land-use development on either side of
the 'green line' pointed towards the entrenchment of 'separateness', appears more valid
and deserves further consideration. In Nicosia, the dualistic character of its urban core
established in 1963 was to remain. As Figures 7.5 and 7.6 illustrate, while the
rejuvenation measures—municipal/NMP- and central government-led in the south, but
only municipal/NMP-led in the north—halted both the complete degradation of the Old
City of Nicosia, and the complete loss of CBD functions within-the-walls, land uses
along the 'green line' remained fundamentally unconventional for a city 'centre'.
This detailed survey of the contemporary land use along the 'green line', both to
its north and to its south, revealed an array of characteristics, of which three
generalisations appear to be key.' Firstly, extensive evidence of military security
features in the urban landscape remained on both sides, but most notably the existence
of the Turkish Forces 'military zone' which represented a de facto extension of the
'green line' northwards (Figures 7.5 and 7.6). While the 'military areas' were less
conspicuous along the 'green line' in the north, the border line was more
distinguishable. This contrasted with land uses in the south which more generally
abutted or spilled over into the 'green line', especially in areas affected by military
unmanning agreements (disused public buildings within the UNBZ are bracketed).'"
Secondly, on examination of the land use itself, it was generally discernible that there
remained a high density of vacant/derelict plots, workshops, while the zoning of trade
and residential plots was more haphazard, especially when compared with the 'planned'
land uses under the NMP (see Plate 7.4). In Chrysaliniotissa (Figure 7.6) and Arab
Ahmet (Figure 7.5), for example, locations of the two 'Area Schemes' of the NMP,
traditional residential land uses had been consolidated, and in both Ledras Street and
Arasta Street (Figure 7.5) there were signs of a resurgence in shops, restaurants and
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open meeting places. It was also, as Kliot and Mansfield suggested, 'business as usual'
at the communities' respective municipal markets.
Overall, nonetheless, the 'green line' was, as Kliot and Mansfield hypothesised
and in line with the NMP's conclusions some twelve years earlier, non-conducive to
residential and 'desirable' commercial uses, while at the same time attracting
'obnoxious' land-uses. And even in areas which had (re)gained a residential character
on both sides, land-uses considered 'undesirable' by the respective municipal authorities
were very much evident (e.g., Kurdish 'settlers' housed in the east of north Nicosia, and
'red light' areas in certain locations along the 'green line' in the south). This
contributed to the overall disjointed and 'unplanned' nature of the urban centre as a
whole.
7.6.2 Representations of the border
Within that urban landscape, even so, it was necessary also to consider not only the
'real' but also the 'symbolic' messages transmitted by the 'green line'. 195 The city is a
powerful medium for the communication of messages—political, economic, socio-
cultural—both consciously and subconsciously, through the very design of space and
the way in which it is used. It is argued that the messages, often explicit but sometimes
hidden, within the urban landscape of Nicosia (and Famagusta) reproduced opposing
boundary discourses of a nekri zoni (for the Greek Cypriot community) and of a sinir
(for Turkish Cypriots).
On the Greek Cypriot side, at the northern tip of Ledras Street (Figure 7.5), the
main retail and commercial axis for the city until its demise from 1963, a memorial
allowed visitors to peer into the 'green line', and (uniquely) to take photographs (Plate
7.7). The memorial sought both to consolidate the representation of pain and suffering
from the 1974 'invasion', while at the same time silencing the visitor who might have
concluded that the border was permanent. 196 In a number of instances, the presence of
the boundary was also used for economic advantage, in addition to political
commentary; at 'Berlin No.2' cafe, with 'Check Point Charly' written across its
signboard, the visiting tourist could sit and 'relax' only five metres from the 'green line'
(Figure 7.6). Indeed, other seemingly 'perverse' interests in the border were arguably
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Plate 7.7	 Ledras Street viewing point and memorid, Nicosia (south)
Plate 7.8	 'Border' shop, Kyrenial"
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Plate 7.9	 The border as 'spectacle': adrertising hoardings in Dherinia
Plate 7.10	 Varosha through the looking-glass
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exploited by UNFICYP themselves. A weekly 'Green Line Tour', led by UNFICYP
between the CFLs, had become something of an event for which diplomats, UN
personnel, relatives and other accepted guests were encouraged to enjoy the 'pleasure'
of a walking tour through the 'landmarks' along the 'green line' (see Chapter 6).198
The Greek Cypriot government increasingly voiced its opinion that the use of
the UNBZ as a 'tourist site' was a 'disgrace'. 199
 This seemed somewhat hypocritical,
nonetheless, given a similar venture of their own making at Dherinia, south of
Famagusta. Here, cafe rooftops and binoculars were to be hired out so the visitor could
look out and northwards, across the UNBZ (Plate 7.9). On view was the 'ghost town' of
Varosha, a potent symbol of death and the visible failure of time to heal wounds and
dispel memories (Plate 7.10). While this might have come across as 'negative sight-
seeing', it specifically provided an opportunity to visually tour the northern landscape,
presenting an 'idealised' image of what Turkish Forces had created while, at the same
time, insulated the voyeur from the real dangers of gazing on the 'other' •200 Sant Cassia
observed;
"[t]hrough this looking-glass border, mimesis and exchange conspire to create and
service images of the self and the other. [...] Indeed, all the Green Line [sic] is
intended to be seen and seen as not intended to be seen".20'
Whilst photography was prohibited in all other locations along the UNBZ, its
acceptance at Dherinia (as on Ledra Street) served to allow for an appreciation of the
'death' of the dead zone in a controlled environment. It has been previously illustrated
how the Greek Cypriot community's policy of dhen xehno CI don't forget') reflected an
unrelenting desire to return to their previous homes, and their rejection of the present as
a `solution'; in the border context, Gumpert and Drucker similarly observed that "{l]ife
on the other side' becomes an obsessive mystery, curiosity made compulsive because
access is blocked. In a strange way, the 'Green Line' [sic] invites, but bars individuals
from crossing".202
 In Nicosia, in particular, the marriage of tourism and the boundary
appeared most striking.203
Characteristically, no such sites to gaze from were presented north of the 'green
line', nor anywhere else along the UNBZ's northern CFLs. In contrast, one of only very
few obvious references to the presence of the UNBZ was the succinctly titled 'Border'
shop north of Ledra Palace checkpoint (Plate 7.8), along with more general graffiti on
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the walls which, in contrast to the south, lined sections of the 'green line'. When
considered together, messages in both Nicosia and Famagusta sought to reproduce the
discursive representation of the UNBZ as, on one hand, a nekri zoni and, on the other, a
sinir. These were supplementary to the 'ground-level' realities of a distinct border
region negatively affected in terms of socio-economic land-uses.
7.7	 Conclusions
In spite of the various endogenous and exogenous efforts to dilute the significance of the
de facto partition boundary between the two communities, it remained a salient feature
of the urban landscape on both of its sides. It has been demonstrated that cooperation
over Nicosia's sewerage system and its Master Plan failed to 'spill over' largely
because, in themselves, the two regimes were the result of a specific time (to a large
extent exploiting the confidence generated through the 1977 and 1979 'high level'
agreements respectively) and, also, of a specific place and space (both political and
functional, at the level of the municipality). This concluding statement will be
considered in more detail.
Firstly, it must be acknowledged that technical and functional issues—even
`superordinate goals' like the sewerage system—were inherently dealt with within
cultural contexts, in which they were embedded. Efforts at resolving transboundary
issues in Nicosia demonstrated that these disputes, set as they were in a protracted
conflict setting, were not simply about water, electricity, sewage or urban planning; they
took on many of the attributes of the larger conflict. The parties involved viewed the
transboundary resource dispute as a manifestation, or microcosm, of the political rivalry.
Only when transboundary initiatives were accepted by the high-level political actors—a
process successfully undertaken in Nicosia with the sewerage system and the NMP, but
wholly unsuccessful with plans for the rejuvenation of Varosha and NIA—was any
degree of effective cooperation possible.
However, and secondly, as a direct result of this political system being played
out in local 'places', the system was also 'infected' by localised factors. The most
important factor in Nicosia, it would appear, was the role of human agency in the form
of local political leaders—Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci—who found the
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political 'space' at the municipal level to cooperate.'" To better understand the
contrasting evidence highlighted above—complex, contradictory processes of both
cooperation, coexistence, and conflict in Nicosia—it must be recognised explicitly that
boundaries (de jure or de facto) have a differential impact at different scales of analysis.
This largely explains why the NMP, in the words of Lellos Demetriades, acquired some
sort of 'diplomatic immunity', operating at a scale where the effect of physical space
and of geographical proximity in producing functional interdependencies was always
relatively clear and unproblematic for the respective political leaderships.
However prosaic a common sewerage system may seem, it constituted an
important and possibly epochal punctuation mark in Nicosia's post-partition history: the
moment when geographical separation had to take the functional factor into account.
Technocratically, if not socially, this suggests that there developed something of a
'borderland' (if not `epistemic') community in urban Nicosia, a border region
functionally linked by a small number of resource management issue areas. As such,
this case reflected Goonerate and Mosselman's conceptualisation of a 'resource based'
border region (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1). 205
 While it is not possible to state that the
relatively high level of cooperation in Nicosia was the consequence of the urban
context, it is conversely not possible to say that the UNBZ was homogenous and
uniform along its length. The 'urban' context evidently witnessed more substantive and
interactive transboundary cooperation than the 'rural', as considered in Chapter 6.
This brief analysis has revealed a much more nuanced understanding of the
geography and history of cooperation in the contemporary city of Nicosia. Cooperation
in post-partition Nicosia has never been simply about solutions to practical, functional
issues; its current form may be read as a 'rationalisation' of partition rather than an
attempt to transcend it. 206
 Cooperation was largely limited to the practical problems of
the UNBZ and its associated spatial discontinuities because it had been, and remained,
inextricably enmeshed in relations of political power. A city is not separate from the
problems of society at large, and neither Nicosia nor Famagusta were an exception.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions: Cyprus, Partition and Transboundary Resource
Management
8.1 An Overview
This thesis has demonstrated the significant relationship between partition boundaries—
both territorial and socio-spatial—and the complex process of transboundary resource
management. This has been achieved through an examination of the debate amongst
political realist and liberalist accounts of the origins and forms of 'international'
cooperation, as manifested in the context of the de facto partitioned island of Cyprus.
This final chapter reconsiders the research questions forwarded in Chapter 1, and brings
together the main descriptive and analytical elements of the study so as to highlight its
original contribution in three concluding arguments. The first reflects on an
understanding of the interplay between 'high' and low politics', and seeks to explain
their relative importance to transboundary relations in Cyprus. The second conclusion
highlights the political economy of recognition, and its predominance in the context of
this de facto partitioned state. The third reaffirms the utility of adopting a spatially
differentiated perspective in understanding the 'bows' and 'whys' of transboundary
resource management, and stresses the importance of geographical scale and
territoriality in contextualising such analysis. The final two sections of this chapter then
suggest broader conclusions emerging from this study.
352
Conclusions
8.2 Explaining Transboundary Resource Management in Cyprus
How does the process of transboundary resource management operate in this
partitioned state? To what extent have institutionalised principles and practices of
transboundary resource management been able to develop since partition?
This thesis has contributed to embryonic discussion on the multifaceted concept of
cooperation and its ability to provide a richer explanation of processes of transboundary
resource management. Using case study analysis, a solid empirical base has been built
for the principal contentions of this study, which are detailed below.
8.2.1 The rise and fall of `low politics'
Why are mechanisms formed to deal with some transboundary resource management
issue areas, but fail to achieve success in connection with others? Is it possible to de-
link resource conflict issues from the protracted political conflict, so that the former
could be resolved without reference to the latter?
It has been demonstrated that post-partition Cyprus exhibited a number of islands of
cooperation over transboundary resource management, and a strong case has been put
forward that the conflict has not been unchanging and intractable, and that
accommodatory relations were evident in the midst of conflict. In so doing, a number of
crude stereotypes and over-simplifications have been challenged. Both observers of,
and parties to, the Cyprus conflict have often argued that because so many elements of
the conflict are identity-based and existential, the conflict is zero-sum by definition and
joint problem-solving is impossible. Assumptions of non-cooperation in Cyprus are not
merely reductive; in addition, they suggest that those who fail to cooperate are
hopelessly incorrigible, those who do cooperate inherently enlightened, and the
relationship between these appropriate and legitimate.
First, in terms of identifying the origins of transboundary resource management
in Cyprus, it is possible to conclude that the 'state' alone was not successful in
generating these transboundary, arguably 'cooperative' initiatives. By the late 1970s, it
became clear that a new intercommunal framework was emerging, stimulated by the
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'internationalisation' of the local political environment. The high-level agreements, the
growth in international funding for bicommunal transboundary cooperation, and the
development of leaders at the municipal borderland level, all marked a significant break
with the preceding period as they introduced 'new' actors into the political arena.
In this case, general theories of transboundary cooperation—particularly
'classical realist'—can be rejected because of their treatment of interest formation and
norms as extraneous variables. Admittedly, at this 'borderland' scale, however,
transboundary resource management was largely to benefit the Greek Cypriots. It is
suggested that this was due to the presence of a more active 'borderland' community
(both in the rural and the urban context) to the south of the UNBZ, and the provision of
third parties. In Nicosia, the 'entrepreneurial leadership' of Lellos Demetriades,
benefiting from the pro-rapprochement support of Mustafa Akinci and an essentially
`neofunctionalise UNDP policy, was able legitimately to negotiate a unified sewerage
system. While assisting both sides over the long-term, it primarily alleviated an
immediate problem for the Greek Cypriot municipality, and once transboundary
contacts were successfully established at the municipal level, Demetriades was able to
exploit the 'shadow of the future' and initiate a common planning initiative in the form
of the NMP. These developments appeared to concur with the differences between what
Martinez distinguished as 'national' and 'transnational' borderlanders. 1 The former are
unwilling or unable to develop more than low-level contact with the 'other side', while
the latter are immersed (Martinez assumed that this was voluntarily) in a binational
system.
In addition to local actors, clearly third parties allowed the communities to
establish cooperative contracts with the 'other'. Intermediaries—UNFICYP, UNDP,
UNHCR, or the EU—acted as links, supplying information and monitoring compliance.
Regarding the cooperation over sewerage, for example, Demetriades made it clear that
were it not for the UN, in addition to the "considerable diplomatic as well as
engineering skills" of the Canadian consultant, there would not have been any progress.2
Benefiting from the presence of UNFICYP, an informal third party framework
developed which provided for access and utilisation of transboundary resources without
the threat of recognising the northern or the Turkish military authorities. At times, they
operated not only as guarantors but also as gatekeepers. Through this arrangement,
Greek Cypriot farmers, fishermen, industrialists and hunters sought to break the border
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down. The 1989 unmanning agreement, orchestrated by UNFICYP, similarly provided
for the nominal but symbolic retrieval of parts of the nekri zoni for Greek Cypriots in
Nicosia.
As such, these transboundary arrangements demonstrated the extent to which the
ideas of issue area 'hierarchy' and the boundaries between low' and 'high politics'
were dissolved. The politics of agenda formation (high/low issues) and more subtle and
differentiated than 'realists' would have us believe. The raising—or politicisation—of a
transboundary issue also came 'from below'; in so doing, this rightly illustrated another
dimension in the means and ways 'international relations' are being conducted.
Contrary to the simplicities of orthodox 'realism', a plurality of interests, ideas and
actors were engaged in political processes transcending the UNBZ. Notably,
borderlanders themselves were not merely passive victims of structures and decisions
imposed from above. Some responded to marginalisation by turning the border into an
economic resource through smuggling and, more recently in the south, the accessing of
grant-economies, although such strategies were insufficient antidotes to overall socio-
economic disadvantage in the UNBZ, and in areas of close proximity.
Indeed, spatial proximity could not be ignored when looking to explain the
significant cooperative developments detailed above. The effect of physical space—of
geographical 'closeness'—in producing these functional imperatives was clear.' The
most durable and long-lasting transboundary resource management initiatives were
limited to the borderland scale. Such cooperation was largely determined by the
practical, functional problems of the UNBZ and its associated spatial discontinuities.
Indeed, many collaborative ventures were a response to geographical interdependencies
in existence prior to 1974; a distinction can be made between transboundary
interdependencies established pre-partition (water and electricity supplies), those
established in the 'active' period of partitioning (Nicosia's sanitary sewerage system),
and those established post-partition (the Nicosia Master Plan)—for analytical as well as
chronological reasons. The simplest form of transboundary resource management was
clearly based on existing networks—be they infrastructural in focus (as with water and
electricity), or social (as with the trade unions and 'other' transboundary resource
needs). Existing and preconditioned networks or institutions were reused to reduce
transaction costs, but were not formed necessarily for that purpose.
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Moreover, what the scale of analysis division demonstrated is how an 'issue
area' was not internally consistent—transboundary 'water' was managed differently
between the two communities at the border scale compared to how it was managed at
the island-wide scale. In turn, this study has highlighted an important 'horizontal',
spatial consideration to the traditional, 'vertical' distinction of 'low' from 'high'
politics.
For instance, while the UN were often at pains to stress the island-wide nature of
their many and diverse activities in Cyprus, this was never close to being the case. The
1991 UNDP environmental project and 1993-94 CBMs largely faltered, it could be
argued, because although certain issues may have been concentrated in the border region
(where they might have appeared more 'functional' or `superordinate'), they were in
essence interrelated with issues of the macro-political economy of the Cyprus conflict.
The Nicosia sewerage project and NMP dealt with relatively functional and technical
matters geographically limited to the de facto border area, and exemplified the role of
local actors operating within a less-overtly politicised space of the municipality. The
NMP remained something of a flagship for those seeking reintegration. Yet,
fundamentally, spatial proximity and interdependency proved determining forces for
this utilitarian integration. The political reality instead suggested that isolated efforts at
transboundary cooperation were incapable of generating any quantifiable momentum—
neither for a reunion of the two sides to Nicosia, nor certainly for a resolution to the
Cyprus conflict. While neofunctionalists were right to recognise common interests,
these did not necessarily 'spill over' and alter the hierarchy of 'low' and 'high politics'
over the long-term.
It remains to recognise, however, that this diversity and complexity co-existed
with, and was directly related to, a central over-arching political cleavage over
recognition and sovereignty. Resource management conflicts were patently concerned
with territory, borders and 'national' sovereignty. The 'normal' politics of interest-
groups, classes and localities were invariably distorted by the de facto partition, and
subordinated to the 'Cyprus problem'. Transboundary resource management failed to
develop this further, instead confirming the primacy of politics over economic and
'other' issues in the border region, and the limited involvement of sub-state actors in
new structures. This persistent centralisation of political power was to prove a limiting
factor.
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This would appear to reflect what has been identified elsewhere as the 'dual
paradox' of 'spill over'. 4
 Firstly, for the process to begin, a non-controversial, separable
issue had to be found; but if the issue was that unobtrusive, then it was highly unlikely
that there was reason for further expansion. Consequently, the two communities (and
their associated problems) were simply reinforced. Secondly, if the issue generating
cooperation was more likely to facilitate 'spill over', then neofunctionalism would
become `self-disconfirming'; the (predominantly state) actors would realise, in addition
to short-term gains, a long-term threat to their sovereign power.' Excepting instances
where there exists a functional imperative (determined by spatial proximity or pre-
existing interdependencies), due to this paradox low politics' may rise but may then fall
again, pushed down by the high politics issues of 'national security' and the political
economy of recognition.
8.2.2 The political economy of recognition
How has the general 'milieu' of Cyprus affected the progress of both transboundary
resource management and intercommunal peace?
In a number of ways, therefore, the political economy of recognition has represented the
crux and kernel of the struggle over transboundary resources. With fear of stating the
obvious, the creation of a partitioned Cyprus was not the product of contractual
agreement. In turn, the raisons d'être of both new 'states' were undermined (in the case
of the ROC) and poorly defined (in the case of the TFSC). Accordingly, they became
inward-looking and mutually antagonistic. Post-partition, the Cyprus conflict was to
become primarily a political one, with self-identity inseparably married with a sincere
concern for political and economic recognition.
In turn, transboundary resource management in Cyprus was never simply about
utilitarianism or rational planning. It was inextricably enmeshed in relations of power,
dependency, and identity. What was perhaps more remarkable about island-wide
transboundary problems—in light of the considerable amount of positive rhetoric that
they generated at the borderland scale—was how the central state remained, as a
symbol, a key if not the key determinant of policy-making in transboundary affairs
within Nicosia, Famagusta and along the rural sections of the UNBZ. The 'recognition
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game' came to dominate transboundary relations leading to a distributive, zero-sum or
'us' versus 'them' approach to transboundary resource disputes. Socio-psychological
dynamics (in particular ethnocentric and exclusionary perceptions) played a key role;
historical factors weighed heavily among the determinants of the decisions affecting
transboundary relations.
Consequently, it is plausible to suggest that this 'recognition game' was in effect
part of James' broader 'game' of international relations, whereby political elites sought
to (re)gain power relative to their enemies through whatever means possible. 6 This was
illustrated after the events surrounding the 1990/91 environmental study, when, as far as
the Turkish Cypriot side was concerned, the UNDP country programme as a whole
became `inactive' 7
—the UNDP's 'member states only' approach was considered to be a
fundamental impediment to its operational effectiveness. A similar reading was made
of the more recent `bicommunal' approach;
"instead of helping to improve intercommunal relations this concept has now
become a political obstacle to co-operation [...] [M]any projects which would be
beneficial to one or other community do not lend themselves to a bicommunal
approach, for geographic, social, cultural, or economic reasons"!
Without a logical pattern of administering funds to assist directly in locality-specific
problems in the north, the country programme's success had been severely limited
spatially.' While the south became officially 'developed', the north—with little
financial resources per se—remained unofficially `under-developed'. 10
 This only served
to reproduce the Turkish Cypriot belief that the UN, in continuing to recognise the
monocommunal ROC since 1964, was violating its equal political status." The further
implication of this 'internationalisation' of arguably 'intercommunal' affairs was that, in
operating 'behind their back', the UN afforded the Turkish Cypriots no consideration of
legitimate rights and interests.' The UN's often technocentric and ecocentric discourse
essentially advocated anti-partitionism which, in turn, reflected and articulated
rationality tied to 'state' institutions and practices. At the inviolable core of the
discourse lay ideas concerning the nature of transboundary resource management which
ultimately provided the techno-/eco-centricism's raison d'être. These ideas—the
natural, organic-like whole of the 'Island' of Cyprus, its 'small' territorial size, and its
common, unified past and/or future—existed in the form a particular set of discursive
limits which actively influenced the management of political space in Cyprus.
358
Conclusions
By extension, in Cyprus the UNDP, unlike UNFICYP and UNHCR post-1974,
failed to sufficiently remould its operational approach to the changing political realities
on the island. This appeared even more anomalous given that much of the necessary
groundwork was laid by the controversial introduction of a UN peacekeeping force from
1964. The key difference was, however, that the UNDP formed an integral part of the
optimism and nominal 'unity' that came with the establishment of the new republic in
1960. Other UN bodies only entered the theatre once the intercommunal troubles
resurfaced, and recognition of the de facto existence of a separate Turkish Cypriot voice
had evolved. To paraphrase Escobar, the UNDP in line with United Nations
resolutions, chose the internationally recognised ROC as its 'client'." Key to this was
the 'objectification' of 'Cyprus' through the UN's discourse, a 'Cyprus' within which it
failed to recognise (or, rather, failed to recognise by way of self-criticism) its own
internal role. An organisation devoting itself to the cause of developing across borders
was itself an element of the most powerful system of state (i.e., border) legitimisation in
the world."
This state-centric, essentially asymmetric approach meant that the rhetoric of
managerialist interdependency in the case of Cyprus, whereby international
organisations such as the UNDP oversaw state ('national') development, was subverted
by the reality of intradependencies on the island. In this sense, and as Gallarotti has
argued more generally, third parties can in fact prove destabilising forces rather than
simple palliatives—their solutions discourage states from pursuing more substantive or
long-term solutions to international (or in this case, `transboundary') problems when
they are a source of destabilising linkages and, ultimately, when it 'takes sides' in
conflicts. I5
 Within this systemic framework the UNDP, just as UNFICYP had done in
fossilising the pre-1974 political map, became an important instrument of statecraft;
throughout its 37-year mission, it found itself hostage as each side sought to justify
recognition.16
This thesis has therefore demonstrated how a lack of regard for developing
principles of transboundary resource management—the exchange of information,
equitable utilisation, and avoidance of harm to other resource users—was fundamentally
undermined by a general disinterest in a duty to cooperate, supporting a 'realist' belief
that the two communities' interests in Cyprus remained unchanged for a longer period
of time than anticipated by third parties, even in the light of new institutions." This
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observation requires one notable clarification, however; there was in fact extensive
'interest' in cooperation, in that its appearance in whatever form, in whatever context,
was to be scrutinised by the respective community authorities to a remarkable extent.
Managing 'cooperation' became a matter of judging how important it was in terms of
potential political gains/losses." Transboundary resources were seen in absolute but
also (and especially) in relative terms.
In the light of these conclusions, it should not have been surprising that there
were literally no formal agreements to cooperate over transboundary resources at the
high level, even in the case of continuing to supply water and electricity. For successive
Greek Cypriot governments such a move would have been tantamount to accepting the
present state of affairs for the indefinite future. Instead, to overcome this 'temporary'
set up—although one which found them supplying more water than they were receiving,
and nursing an unpaid multi-million pound electricity bill—cooperation was presented
as a 'humanitarian gesture'. Cooperative transboundary resource management was
essentially 'repackaged' to make a political gain out of an economic loss. This form of
cooperation was still based on some form of calculation as the communal authorities
were able to weigh up the costs of defaulting. In this sense, the sanctions were in the
form of moral pressures from the other party or other, third parties.
For the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish authorities, by contrast, the hope was that a
'step-by-step' approach on the 'smallest issues', such as common municipal problems,
would lead to minimal friction (i.e., maintenance of a satisfactory status quo) and for the
'grand' issues to be considered only later. 19
 Thus, while the Turkish Cypriots argued
that Greek Cypriots blocked joint economic and environmental projects because of
questions of recognition, the Greek Cypriots replied that Turkish Cypriots often used the
'bait' of joint projects to achieve extra recognition, and that the Greek Cypriots would
then be accused of 'backing off' when they refused to agree on 'official' labelling.'
Island-wide cooperation over so-called 'low politics' issues was therefore to exist only
in the management of transboundary water and electricity supplies, for two specific
reasons: the fact that there were interdependencies pre-dating the events of 1974 and,
secondly, because they were considered to be 'humanitarian' in nature. In sum, there
was a self-evident basic need for these resources for both communities, even though that
need was as much governed by improving their negotiating position as by physical
resource scarcity. The collaborative regime overseeing water transfers at the borderland
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scale exemplified the dilemma of common interests or, to take it one step further, the
'tragedy of the commons' in that both sides sought to resist individually rational
behaviour (that would lead to a collectively suboptimal outcome in game-theoretic
terms) and, instead, exercised mutual restraint by collaboratively managing the
resource.' Much of UNFICYP's diplomatic work, although fitful, was the
manifestation of this dilemma of common interests.
In both absolute and relative terms, through the electricity linkage the north
made all the material 'gains' well into the mid-1990s. And again, cooperation over
water supplies benefited the Turkish Cypriot side throughout, particularly when after the
mid-1980s its own contributions to Nicosia's supply diminished, inspite of the
continued perception of a quid pro quo relationship. When these two mechanisms are
considered together, however, and set within the context of strategic interests, it is
evident that benefits through the 'water-for-electricity' arrangement were shared more
equally. The Greek Cypriot side realised that by participating in this transboundary
regime, even when it became unbalanced, they avoided both diplomatic and military
losses—the former to the international community for failing to supply 'basic needs' to
the Turkish Cypriots, and the latter to Turkey who remained throughout a potential
military threat. To further illustrate this point, there would have been, for example, no
incentive for cooperation over transboundary water supplies in the border region (where
the Greek Cypriots, as the 'upstream' user, held the trump card) if the Turkish Cypriots
themselves had no reciprocal power over the south. In practice, however, the north did:
in the form of supplies to Nicosia but more significantly humanitarian principles and
military threats. Indirectly, there was reciprocal interdependence.
It is important for political geographers and international relations analysts to
accept, therefore, that cooperation (as with conflict) is not uniformly interpreted as
homogenous. The concept is diverse in origin; additionally, its development is
perpetually contested and reformed. In order to move the debate forward, a most
important step lies in distinguishing between different kinds and bases of cooperation.
In general, given the inevitable coincidence of strategies, interactive decision-making
involves an element of cooperation and conflict.
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8.2.3 The institutionalisation of territoriality
How useful is it to use a 'borderland' perspective to address problems of resource
management affecting two or more (de jure or de facto) states? In Cyprus, to what
extent is the 'borderland' an appropriate managerial unit in the context of
transboundary resource problems?
In presenting a spatial (island-wide/borderland) perspective on the Cyprus conflict, it
has already been noted how it was possible to better comprehend the often 'hidden'
geographical origins of transboundary resource management. Two additional
observations are possible, and concern the parallel processes of deterritorialisation and
reterritorialilsation in Cyprus which have significantly contributed to a non-uniform
character of the 'borderland'.
First, the plurality of actors operating within the borderland, coupled with the
establishment of a number of transboundary regimes, led to a breaking down of the
'barrier' function of Cyprus' de facto partition boundary from 1974. It is useful to
return briefly once again to the original functions of the UNBZ. Groom threw
favourable light on its formation in that it provided a new starting point, of a
bicommunal and bizonal character;
"the process of coming together must be slow and incremental, at least initially,
through practical co-operation at the grass roots level in a variety of functional
dimensions. Indeed, the situation has a seemingly paradoxical element in that
the precondition for coming together is a period of separation"."
Through the UNBZ, the overall level of violence and number of territorial 'violations'
were subsequently contained and, ultimately, an inter-NATO war has thus far been
prevented.' This is an imperative given that, as the events of August 1996 fully
illustrated, there were occasional dramatic failures in containing violence. The UNBZ
technically remained a cease-fire regime and, in principle, the separation of Greek
Cypriot from Turkish Cypriot provided a necessary degree of security from which
members of the two communities could move toward functional relationships not
impinging on ethnic issues. If, as Burton and Vayrynen have suggested, this de facto
territorial position had been accepted at an early stage, the two separate autonomies
could have been helped more efficiently to arrange positive functional arrangements in
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areas of common interest.' In Nicosia and in rural parts of the UNBZ, there was
limited acceptance of the territorial 'realities' in the first few years of partition.
It is necessary, however, to examine a second observation drawn from analysis
of the borderland. The juxtaposition of the growth of local transboundary activities with
on-going territorial controversies, such as those over CFL fortifications along the
UNBZ, illustrated how the border could be diluted and yet consolidated at the same time
and in the same place. Indeed, of much greater significance to this study was how the
Cyprus conflict became increasingly (re)territorialised. While it may appear ironic that
boundary discourse is so pervasive in a political environment where only one
international boundary officially exists (between the ROC and the UK SBAs, albeit in
two sections), there is clearly much more of significance to this. Chapter 4 fully
illustrated how `partitionism' and 'partitionists' laid strong foundations in the 1955-74
period of hostilities. From 1960, the colonial buffer between the two communities was
largely removed, inviting direct confrontation; 25
 territorially, the Cyprus conflict
subsequently evolved from being amongst other things a contest over freedom of
movement within a fragmented state (during 1963 to 1974), 26
 to a much more dyadic if
less violent debate essentially concerned with sovereign rights (from 1974). In turn, the
Cyprus conflict became not only a de jure intranational (Greek Cypriot-Turkish
Cypriot) and international (Greek-Turk) conflict, but also a de facto 'international'
(read: transboundary) dispute, which could only add to the complexity of its
resolution." Both Kumar and Stultz recognised that partition plans often involved the
creation of just two political entities, which would suggest the promotion of this dyadic
approach to conflict.'
The nebulous concept of 'local autonomy' was, from 1964, to complicate
virtually all high-level negotiations,' although the TRNC did not require 'international
recognition' in order to influence political relations; in fact, for the Turkish Cypriot side
'recognition' remained a 'political' rather than legal matter throughout. A position of
transition was adopted—a `statelet in limbo', somewhere between de facto and de jure
recognition—from which they were to bargain for more 'judicial realism'. 30 It became
increasingly practical for foreign governments and international organisations to note
the existence of two autonomous administrations on the island, and to operate within
that framework.' Within this framework, territoriality and Paasi's `socio-spatial
consciousness' were visibly contested in Cyprus. Territorial identities and narrative
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accounts of `us' and 'them' were produced and reproduced, not just at the state level but
also beyond the 'official narratives' at the local level, where spaces of exclusion and
inclusion were similarly pronounced.' The `ROC-TRNC' clash, nonetheless, remained
the most widely recognised discourse. The ROC emphasised the development of
'divided sovereignty', while the TRNC developed a discourse of 'partitioned
sovereignty' ."
The UN, boundary-managers par excellence, greatly facilitated this process.'
From 1974, while the island hosted the internationally recognised ROC and two UK
Sovereign Base Areas, and an unrecognised TFSC/TRNC, in addition it was divided
into a United Nations-administered buffer zone, and a Turkish Forces-administered
Varosha. The associated boundaries, as noted in Chapter 2, reified the power 'within',
whereby territoriality was further institutionalised." The prime exemplar was the
political construction of the TRNC, arguably along 'Western' lines, which facilitated the
use of such rhetorical devices as 'state security' and 'territorial integrity' by the central
authorities. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriot leadership (willingly) fell into the
'territorial trap' of reifying the northern de facto state as a fixed unit of sovereign
space.' The management of the UNBZ by UNFICYP, however, also fell into this
'trap'. UNFICYP' s role in 'micro-diplomacy' that became part of 'everyday' life in and
along the UNBZ should not be underestimated. In handling resource management
issues, while respecting innocent civilian activity and the exercise of property rights,
UNFICYP successfully adopted a damage limitation approach. 37 Yet in this sense
resources within the buffer zone were 'quarantined'; the benefits to be gained from this
action were confined to only certain spaces in the border region and, in turn, to certain
issue areas as dictated by security concerns. By definition, this boundary management
was always sub-optimal because UNFICYP (if unwillingly) were, in essence, generating
their own powers of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'. As has been argued more generally,
the 'good fences make good neighbours' approach in fact prevented intercommunal
association.' UNFICYP's mandate reaffirmed the primacy of military and security
over both socio-economic and psychological concerns.
What these two additional observations also imply, therefore, is the need for the
realisation that the UNBZ was not a monolith. There is a tendency to approach a
'border', 'boundary' or 'borderland' as a single, homogenous entity. Clearly, in the
case of Cyprus, the 'boundary' must be understood as an amalgamation of different, and
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often conflicting, patterns and processes. The UNBZ (as 'borderland') had indeed
become, to employ Gupta and Ferguson's description, a place of 'incommensurable
contradictions' ,39 where cooperation developed in parallel with conflict,
deterritorialisation with reterritorialisation, the 'official' with the 'unofficial'.
Immediately following the population exchanges in September 1975, generally the
UNBZ became for the two communities, on one hand, the prospective boundary of two
separate political entities, while on the other a point of severe contest.' In this sense,
the local communities' discourse reflected 'official' policy yet, ironically, both state's
'official' representations of the UNBZ were to be also undermined by processes
operating at the local scale. Firstly, for the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the Turkish
Forces, the dynamic rejuvenation and 'pushing back' of many parts of the UNBZ by
local Greek Cypriots was to remain a constant threat to their maintenance of a single,
definable and uncontested border. Secondly, Greek Cypriot representations of a single,
territorially integral, island state, legitimised and rationalised by UN resolutions,
became increasingly contested by de facto territorial realities which, over a thirty-four
year period, saw multiple boundaries develop and become institutionalised into a more
single boundary overall.
8.3 Prospects for Cyprus
What recommendations may be made for the future management of transboundary
resources in Cyprus, whether in a political climate of reunification, or in one of
perpetual de facto or eventual de jure partition?
The preceding analysis does not license any unqualified predictions regarding the
prospects for transboundary resource management in Cyprus. Clearly, de facto
cooperation and its associated 'hidden' political geographies must be examined within
the context of systemic and historical processes of change affecting the de facto
partitioned state. From this, a number of implications are discernible.
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8.3.1 Implications for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict
Questions remain over the potential for furthering cooperation beyond its current
confines. Overall, it has been implicitly suggested in the analysis of a number of issue
areas that the operational character of 'cooperative' transboundary resource
management is at times unsustainable over the long-term. This observation requires
clarification on two accounts.
First, transboundary cooperation in post-partition Cyprus was near impossible
and where it was possible, it was often unpopular and consequently furtive. The
inability to identify the net direction of transboundary interactions between the south
and the north provided evidence of institutional insensitivities to transboundary issues in
Cyprus. In this light, it should not have been surprising that cooperation did not just
remain tacit, but fundamentally contested. The 'secret diplomatic', quid pro quo
agreement of 'swapping' water for electricity, for instance, became asymmetrical
largely because of its inherent informality and lack of compliance checks. In terms of
absolute versus relative gains, the 'water-for-electricity' arrangement clearly
transformed from the late 1980s and, while the cooperative relationship should not be
undervalued in itself, it evolved such that it gave little more than a confused and
inherently contestable message to both communities: to the south, Turkish Cypriots
were increasingly considered to be 'free riders' while, to the north, Greek Cypriots were
criticised for cutting off what were understood in the north to be 'compensatory'
electricity and water supplies.
Similar cautionary observations can be made of the NMP, which was to stand
out as the ground-breaking transboundary linkage developed in Cyprus after 1974. As
noted in Chapter 7, the inertia the NMP generated was insufficient to 'spill over' into
more substantive transboundary structures, a shortfall which may be only just beginning
to dishearten those (particularly Greek) Cypriots and interested third parties who placed
so much hope in its potential. Bicommunal activities sponsored by international
agencies were also undermined by the absence of any perceivable 'spill over'. It has
been noted with regard to the 'two tracks' of conflict resolution, of which 'Track II'
Denktash generally characterised as interference in 'internal affairs', that they were in
danger of failing to converge but instead continuing into the distance unconnected.' In
relation to this, concerns over the `routinisation' of transboundary activities have been
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raised by Strassoldo, who suggested that while 'charisma' gets less expressive and
events become 'bureaucratised', "cross-border relations may come to be seen as any
other social relation, with various mixes of cooperative and conflictual elements".'
Secondly, it would be plausible to conclude from this observation that, as with
most protracted social conflicts, the sense of inertia in Cyprus' political and territorial
status quo remained dominant. The repeated UN initiatives, the ebb and flow of US and
UK interest in the search for a solution, and the battle to avoid the blame for breaking up
any talks and/or other transboundary relations gained some sense of inevitability. This
view fails to do justice to the considerable efforts of the UN in particular, yet the search
for a resolution was not only supported but perhaps even complicated by a mix of ad
hoc and loosely-coordinated inter/supranational-led initiatives across the broad range of
transboundary resources. The diplomatic attention given by the two communities to the
US, UK and EU demonstrated how tightly the UN's hands have been tied in facilitating
a solution alone. This study would appear to substantiate observations that the existing
status quo has a dynamic of its own, and this inertia has been underestimated."
Furthermore, and as sections of this study have clearly demonstrated, the introduction of
a 'third party' to assist the conflict resolution process may not guarantee any progress at
all. Rather, what that party represents to both internal and external interest groups is
crucial. The experiences of the EU and the UNDP have fully illustrated the complex
position an international organisation may play in Cyprus.
8.3.2 Contested territory: state, inter-state or trans-state management?
As the spectre of the 1960 settlement remains in evidence, those on and off the island
continue to ask how a (con)federated Cyprus would function? Groom proposed that
thinking in terms of psycho-social communities and networks, and of complex
interpendence and regimes, provides a range of instruments of governance which may
be appropriate for many trans- and extra-Mediterranean ties." In considering this, it is
useful to return to P.J. Taylor's interest in encouraging trans-state, trans-territory, and
trans-nationality processes.' In analysing the conflict, taking for granted the
boundary—be it portrayed as de facto or de jure—obscures precisely what is at issue:
the question of boundaries, sovereignty and identity. Therefore, and mirroring
O'Dowd's conclusions on the Northern Ireland conflict, what needs to be negotiated and
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agreed is the 'meaning' and 'management' of boundaries and state sovereignty."
Krishna has suggested that the process of `decolonisation' necessitates the
denationalisation of the narratives that embody space and time.'" Following this logic
through, as long as boundaries, borders, territory and sovereignty remain contested,
Cyprus will fall short of any semblance of a postcolonial condition.
Nonetheless, settlement of the sovereignty issue should not be considered the
sine qua non for an improvement in `transboundary' resource management island-wide.
'National' solutions to a 'national' problem, which emphasise intercommunal borders
and relations within given state frontiers, invariably succeed in 'managing' rather than
'resolving' because of their failure to generate transnational strategies involving
transborder institutions and non-territorial forms of political participation." It has been
argued elsewhere that, in order to address UNFICYP's poor peacemaking record,
detailed agreements could in principle be reached regarding the delineation and
demarcation of the CFLs, and of the status and use of the buffer zone!' Political
boundaries would clearly be less important the greater the powers of a federal
government,' but only in certain functions; as long as economic disparities of the two
communities are divorced from negotiations, the stability of any settlement is likely to
remain questionable.' And should a prospective central federal authority have
exclusive jurisdiction on physical borders, or on the management of water resourcesr
The repudiation of exclusive territoriality would, thus, be a prerequisite to ending the
'recognition game', in parallel with the advancement of non-ethnic modes of
mobilisation around issues of resource management, the environment and planning.
Only then is it likely that the de facto border could be straddled, never mind
transcended. As Martinez noted generally;
"conditions on the border may change, but the innateness of the boundary as an
agent of abrasion will not disappear unless itself completely disappears"."
Cyprus' boundaries will have to be rewritten or unwritten, to expurgate the imagination,
before they are erased in reality.54
Therefore, while certain neoliberal institutionalist initiatives which profess to
depoliticise particular areas of conflict may appear naive in the wider context, it is
unnecessary to 'throw the baby out with the bath water'. Briefly put, a neofunctionalist
emphasis on low politics' issues as an incentive for transboundary cooperation is not
368
Conclusions
necessarily invalidated because, arguably, the duty to cooperate over transboundary
resource management has become not only a recognised principle to encourage the
peaceful resolution of transboundary conflicts per se, but also to facilitate more
equitable management and sustainable development of (non)renewable resources. The
state and its people, ecocentrics may note, are not the only 'victims' of partition in this
region; it is plausible to argue that any transboundary resource management initiative
deserves recognition in its own right, whether it contributes to the resolution of the
wider conflict or not. This would appear to be particularly paramount given the
normative questions relating to environmental policy and a broadening of the 'security'
concept in the Mediterranean as a whole.'
Although transboundary resource mechanisms, regimes, and institutions may be
limited in scope and power, they may begin to redefine political identities by developing
transboundary (political) communities which undercut the fixation with national
territoriality. 56 It would be necessary to swallow two bitter pills, however: 5' for (either
'official' or 'unofficial') Greek Cypriots seeking cooperation over transboundary
resources, cooperation would have to be conducted between two politically equal
parties, while for Turkish Cypriots this would necessitate dropping their call for
international, de jure state recognition. Particularly in the light of the precedents being
set within the EU, just as transboundary resource management continues to develop so
its value as an international norm increases. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the
negotiating rhetoric of the Greek Cypriot ROC may transform from its preoccupation
with sovereignty and territorial integrity towards a determination to recognise and even
prioritise transboundary issues within an enlarged Europe.
What is currently holding back such an entente is the Turkish Cypriot belief in
self-determination, a similar yet apparently contradictory international principle which
is, in turn, perceived to threaten the raison d'être of the ROC." Yet, in time such a
scenario could be accommodated within a variety of 'solutions' to the conflict, be it
federation, confederation, or even the annexation of the TRNC to Turkey (assuming
Turkey were to fall further under the EU umbrella in the coming decades)." Far from
being mutually contradictory, in principle autonomy and regionalism is encouraged
within a union of states. Accordingly, transboundary resource management appears
inherently but not necessarily at odds with the broad principle of self-determination
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because self-determination, while loaded in ideals, may be achieved through non-state-
threatening means.
It remains to be stated, nevertheless, that in spite of the apparently legitimate
need for creating more devolved transboundary authorities given the democratic and
economic benefits, the potential repercussions for both governments have retained their
saliency and primacy. In Cyprus, it is apparent that the speed with which usage of the
island's resources is likely to increase has quickly outpaced developments in the realm
of effective managerial arrangements. It is self-evident that both communities, living
under insecurity and anticipating final political solutions, could not manage to the
optimal degree the natural and infrastructural resources of their community.' Echoing
Azar's thesis, the notion of 'sharing' territory in Bosnia, Palestine and Cyprus "may be
based on universal concepts of human rights and equality, of multiculturalism and
shared identities, but it is not based on the reality of protracted conflict, animosity,
hatred and mistrust"." A belief that new institutional frameworks would lead to the
domination of localised cultural identities and practices relies largely on a fetishised
understanding of liberal institutionalism. It has been left to Adelman to suggest that
engendering confidence is much more difficult than the position adopted by traditional
CBM theorists in cases of intercommunal conflict where;
"issues of mutual recognition of the other are in question and when there are also
disputes over territory, [...] in situations where existential questions and turf wars
are central".62
Ben-Dor and Dewitt themselves concluded that CBMs were out of their depth when
dealing with the 'substantive issues' which require most attention." Groom similarly
suggested, for the Cyprus case, that it was more fruitful to start with behaviour, building
local ties of a practical, infrastructural nature rather than substantive issues of
constitutional principle.'
Again, however, it has been clearly illustrated that in the Cyprus case this raised
the feasibility problem of identifying 'issues' unrelated to the political economy of the
antagonists. It remained to facilitate an international regime for the management of the
natural resources of Cyprus which was simultaneously acceptable to the principal actors
involved and desirable in terms of well-defined normative criteria. Transboundary
resource management became surrogate for deeper-rooted political and economic
struggles relating to resource distribution and medium-term 'state' development. Any
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hopes in formally separating the 'humanitarian' from the 'high-level' politics, a process
which remained surprisingly salient for many parties," would have to somehow
overcome these dilemmas. From this, in terms of the complex associations between
security and transboundary resource issues, it can be suggested that substantive
transboundary management frameworks look only feasible in the context of a durable
resolution to the broader Cyprus conflict (if not, the Greek-Turk conflict). Yet, the
point should not be ignored that the 'management' of transboundary resource conflicts,
rather than their resolution, is likely to further entrench the protracted social conflict.
This `managerialisf approach is premised, and one could say flawed, on a pragmatic
acceptance of communal separation within Cyprus and, as it cannot supersede it, it
uncritically accepts its primacy and permanency. The discourse on 'partition' and
'geographical separation' exacerbates this.
8.4 Partition and Transboundary Resources
What lessons, if any, can be learned from Cyprus to develop understanding of managing
transboundary resources in other partitioned states, and other boundary-related
contexts?
In answer to the questions posed by Waterman, in general in the case of Cyprus an
uneven distribution of resources hindered the separate development of the de facto
partitioned state, failed to encourage its eventual reunification, and prompted the party
better endowed with a particular resource to consolidate its separate development."
Throughout this study reference has been made to transboundary resource conflicts in
other, contemporary and historical cases of partitioned states. As Chapter 3 illustrated,
the Cyprus case is not unique in all its characteristics; problematic interrelations
between partition and transboundary resources are similarly as important in other cases
of state partition. Further, comparative work is required to better distinguish
commonalties, and the framework forwarded in Chapter 3 should inform such work.
By examining the Cyprus conflict as a case of partition, however, this thesis has
highlighted two politico-geographical processes which it has been demonstrated may
significantly affect the development of transboundary resource management: the
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dialectic of state sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples and, secondly, the
functions of territorial and socio-spatial boundaries. Far from ending conflict between
self-identifying groups—be they so-called peoples, nations, or states—territorial
separation through partition is often a causal factor in the (re)emergence of disputes,
such as the creation of transboundary resources, and the seemingly inevitable conflict of
interests over their subsequent management. Partition in this sense can be regarded as a
temporary expedient until either a more suitable or a more permanent solution can be
found.° These are familiar objections in this context, though they do not carry less
weight for being so.
There are clearly a number of features which combine to make this case
'unique': its island status, its spatial proximity to motherland actors, the relative absence
of divided cities in all but a few other states, and the particular mix of colonial, regional
and superpower actors in the 'milieu'. More generally, however, Cyprus arguably
represents a prototypical case of the need to blend legitimate identity group interests
with the advantages of collective cooperation; directions towards resolution of this hold
significant implications to the global political system as a whole." Kumar recently
argued that Bosnia constituted a turning point in the international community's
approach to partition as it transpired that 'divide and quit' might turn into 'divide and be
forced to stay'. 69 In the twenty years leading up to Bosnia, developments in Cyprus
necessitated a protracted commitment to a protracted conflict in an unstable region. As
this thesis has shown, events in Cyprus already provide ample evidence of the need to
invest in transboundary institutions, as an easier route to 'withdrawal'. And,
unfortunately, with the persistence of the dysfunctional nation state ideal, and the
efficacy of territoriality, the canons appear to be established for further partition.
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Appendix 2: High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979
(a)	 High-Level Agreement of 12 February, 1977
1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bicommunal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in
the light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership.
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the
right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into
consideration the fundamental basis of a hi-communal federal system and certain
practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
4. The powers and functions of the central government will be such as to safeguard
the unity of the country having regard to the hi-communal character of the state.
(b)	 High-Level, 10-Point Agreement of 19 May, 1979
1. It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February
1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks should deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement of the resettlement of Varosha under
UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the
interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive
settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be
implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of
the Cyprus problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of
the talks, and special importance will be given the initial practical measures by
both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal
conditions.
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7. The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating
thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the
Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with
any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained
manner, avoiding any delay.
10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.
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Appendix 3: Mapping the Territorial Boundary Proposals
(a)	 Greek Cypriot proposal, March 1977
(b)	 Turkish Cypriot proposal, April 1978
Sources: PIO (north) (1978); unpublished Turkish Cypriot maps supplied to author by
PIO (south).
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(c)	 The Ghali `non-map', August 1992
Source: UN S/24472.
(d)	 The 'revised' Ghali map, October 1992
Source: Filelefiheros (25/10/92).
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Appendix 4: In-depth Semi-structured Interviewing
As with most interpretative research, the main goal for this study was the investigation
of causal processes in context to elicit a holistic (rather than reductionist) range of
explanatory factors; the purpose of this methodological approach was primarily to
obtain more in-depth knowledge about the multiple ways interested parties have
managed transboundary resources. It is for this reason that, complementary to
systematic documentary analysis, a mainly qualitative method of data collection was
chosen. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion, with predominantly
open-ended questions to elicit the interviewee's personal specification of key issues, and
their positions on them.' In so doing, this approach considered both what has been
differentiated as the 'operational' and the 'psychological environment' of decision-
making in policy, to formulate explanations for the progress of, and suggest the
potential for, transboundary resource management within the combined 'milieu'.
So-called 'snowball' or 'purposeful' sampling was employed as the respondent
selection procedure, whereby 'information rich' cases were recruited, until 'redundancy'
or 'saturation' when no new themes emerged.' These groups were of course not entirely
homogeneous, nor were they necessarily mutually exclusive but they constituted a
reasonable cross-section of the different parties to the resource management process. It
was also evident that, because of the selection criteria employed, the research population
and low sample size was not necessarily representative. Rather than applying a
generative viewpoint, an attempt was made to explore the different processes involved
in generating and maintaining the characteristics of transboundary resource
management.'
The principal research tools used were two semi-structured questionnaires or
'checklists' (see below), with the assumption that an informed, interactive and
collaborative dialogue would allow a joint construction of meanings, yielding a fuller
and more nuanced response than a structured questionnaire. 4
 'Checklist A' was
generally used for in-depth interviews (e.g., farmers, fishermen, residents, and other
`borderlanders'), in particular for narrative reconstruction Coral histories'), although
themes were amended slightly when interviewing mayors, mukhtars and other local
administrative personnel to accommodate more structural and institutional issues.
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'Checklist B' was generally used with 'key informants' and 'key actors' (e.g.,
government elites, UNFICYP, non-government interest groups). Both 'checklists' were
piloted during preliminary fieldwork in December 1995, and divided into three sections.
The first on 'Checklist A' comprised of basic socio-economic questions (information for
which was not always gathered directly), while the next two used more open-ended
questions on resource access and utilisation and perceptions of the border region.
'Checklist B' was more formally structured to elicit often specific information, yet this
was supplemented by open-ended questions on resource management and any future
plans and prospects.
Even though the interview represented a 'snapshot', a temporal dimension to
responses was always sought for. If respondents led on to a topic that formed a later
question, this was followed, and the original point was then returned to. On each
section (and notably after the interview), while the checklist acted as guide, space was
left to record additional comments and conversations. During the ethnographic
interviews, a photocopy of a large-scale map of the relevant area was always available;
its appearance sometimes proved an interruption to the conversation, invariably because
of its alien representation of what were often personal 'mental maps' (as discussed in
Chapter 6). It was nevertheless invaluable for locating the details of often
geographically-specific issues.
Although English was widely spoken, in less 'urban' areas translators were
employed although not always required. With agreement, interviews with both 'key
actors' and sometimes 'key informants' were recorded and catalogued, and then later
transcribed to facilitate their more accurate representation.' Where interviewees are
quoted, direct verbatims are presented in order to recognise `emic' terminology (i.e.,
concepts introduced by the respondent alone). In a number of instances, this
necessitated the re-translation of specific sections of the tape record. For ethical
reasons, in certain contexts it was anticipated that a recording of the interview was
inappropriate, but the respondent's permission was sought prior to the interview on all
other occasions (although recording was refused only once). In a number of cases,
respondents were revisited or recontacted to clarify interpretations and meanings.
It is contextually significant to document the location of interviews. While
informal interviews were conducted in a variety of localities, the ethnographic research
concentrated on eight borderland settlements—three in the south (Dherinia, Potamia,
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and Astromeritis), three in the north (Famagusta ('Gazimagosa' in Turkish), Lysi
('Akdogan'), Lefka ('Lefke'), and two of which were wholly or partly within the buffer
zone (Nicosia and Athienou) (Appendix 6 (a)). The general characteristics of these
settlements are discussed in the main text, and Nicosia and Famagusta receive detailed
treatment in Chapter 7. As anticipated, away from the formal office the interviewing
environment was less 'controllable'. In spite of the patriarchal system which employs
the kafenion or kahve ('coffee shop', in Greek and Turkish respectively) which made
them a problematic meeting place6 and with a propensity to generate 'group
discussions', it was often viewed in preference due to available time and to circumvent
the social/political complications of respondents inviting a researcher into their home.
In turn, although some women were involved, 'Checklist A' interviews were biased
towards the traditionally (if not wholly realistically) 'male' domains of farming and
fishing.
General Layout of Semi-Structured Interview 'Checklists'
Checklist A
	 Checklist B
Socio-economic status
place(s) of residence;
primary (and secondary) occupation; type,
extent, and location of units of ownership
(e.g., land, boat, borehole);
other contextual characteristics (often
recorded cumulatively as 'oral history').
Resource access and utilisation
access to resource units (inc. any
procedural issues); utilisation of resource
units; socio-economic sphere of influence;
history of territorial changes on the above;
responses (personal and collective);
outstanding problems.
Perceptions of the buffer zone
personal attitudes (inc. security; degree of
personal involvement);
collective attitudes (at various
administrative and social levels);
future plans and prospects.
Contextual background
history of agency being represented;
chronology of development of
(perspectives on) resource management.
Resource management
general resource management (i.e., from
island-wide, regional and local
perspectives); impact of intercommunal
conflict on above;
collective (i.e., agency) responses;
outstanding problems.
Future plans and prospects
collective ('official') beliefs on
development of resource management;
personal beliefs on development of
resource management;
personal beliefs on development of wider
conflict.
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Appendix 5: UNFICYP's Mandate of 1964
UN Security Council Resolution (186), 4 March 1964
The Security Council
Noting that the present situation with regards to Cyprus is likely to threaten
international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures
are promptly taken to maintain peace and security and so to seek a durable solution.
Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed in
Nicosia on 16 August 1960;
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its
article 2 par.4. which reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations";
1. Calls upon all member-states, in conformity with their obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to
worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international
peace;
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the
maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary
to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost
restraint;
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4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a
United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force
shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Commander of the Force shall
be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who
shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically
to the Security Council on its operation;
5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of
preserving peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting
and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and
a return to normal conditions;
6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three
months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by
the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The
Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;
7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with
the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the UK, a
mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities
and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful
solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of
Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The
mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as
appropriate, for the remuneration of the mediator and his staff.
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b)	 Maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean
Sources: US State Department (1972); Prescott (1985: 307); Blake (1987b: 102);
Ahnish (1993: 257).
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(c)
	
Territorial sea boundary of Cyprus-UK (Sovereign Base Areas), Section 3
of Annex A, Treaty of Establishment between the United Kingdom, Greece,
Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, 16 August, 1960 (CMND, 1960).
Section 3 
1. The Republic of Cyprus shall not claim, as part of its territorial sea, waters lying
between Line I and Line II as described in paragraph 2 of this Section, or
between Line III and Line IV as described therein.
2. The lines for the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows: —
Line I: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 163° direction
from Point No. 57D11, as defined in Schedule A to this Annex, in
a 163° direction for 6.85 miles; then in a 207° direction for 3
miles; and then in a 204° direction.
Line II: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 1081/2°
direction from Point No. 59A/5, as defined in Schedule A to this
Annex, in a 108V2° direction for 7.8 miles; and then in a 136°
direction.
Line III: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 170° direction
from Point No. 41B/10, as defined in Schedule B to this Annex,
in a 170° direction for 3.8 miles; then in a 136° direction for 3.1
miles; and then in a 156° direction.
Line IV: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 103° direction
from Point No. 42B/3, as defined in Schedule B to this Annex, in
a 103° direction for 0.9 miles; then in a 150° direction for 6.3
miles; and then in a 176° direction.
3. In paragraph 2 of this Section, the distances quoted are in sea miles reckoned at
1,852 international metres to one sea mile, and the bearings are referred to the
True North and are given in degrees reckoned clockwise from 000° (North) to
359°.
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(d) Geographical Coordinates Showing Baselines For Measuring the Breadth of
the Territorial Sea, Text submitted by the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to
the United Nations in a note verbale, Ref. No. 2001/254, 3 May 1993
Sequence Latitude Longitude
1. 350 06' 49" 32° 16' 52"
2. 35° 05' 40" 32° 16' 31"
3. 35° 04' 15" 32° 16' 12"
4. 35° 02' 21" 32° 16' 15"
5. 350 01' 30" 32° 16' 29"
6. 34° 57' 05" 32° 18' 15"
7. 340 53 59" 32° 18' 32"
8. 34° 51' 30" 32° 21' 03"
9. 34° 45' 19" 32° 24' 15"
10. 34° 42' 13" 32° 29' 42"
11. 340 39' 17" 32° 39' 29"
12. 34° 38' 30" 32° 42' 19"
13. 34° 38' 42" 32° 54' 07"
14. 34° 34' 01" 32° 56' 06"
15. 34° 33' 47" 33° 01' 45"
16. 34° 34' 06" 33° 02' 12"
17. 340 40' 14" 33° 02' 30"
18. 34° 42' 19" 33° 15'42"
19. 34° 43' 12" 33° 19' 37"
20. 34° 43' 52" 33° 22' 06"
21. 34° 46' 45" 33° 29' 47"
22. 34° 49' 08" 33° 36' 18"
23. 34° 51' 48" 33° 38' 18"
24. 34° 55' 41" 33° 38' 57"
25. 34° 58' 44" 330 43' 52"
26. 34° 56' 32" 33° 51' 46"
27. 34° 58' 52" 34° 57' 23"
28. 34° 57' 20" 34° 05' 05"
29. 34° 57' 38" 340 05' 13"
30. 34° 59' 21" 34° 04' 38"
31. 35° 00' 40" 34° 03' 55"
32. 35° 13' 10" 33° 54' 15"
33. 35° 16' 50" 33° 55' 36"
34. 35° 19' 45" 34° 04' 00"
35. 35° 22' 25" 34° 05' 22"
36. 35° 29' 40" 34° 18' 40"
37. 35° 33' 21" 34° 24' 30"
38. 35° 38' 31" 34° 33' 40"
39. 35° 39' 04" 34° 34' 15"
40. 35 0 42' 36" 34° 36' 22"
41. 35° 39' 10" 34° 25' 52"
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Sequence Latitude Longitude
42. 35 0 33' 41" 340 10' 38"
43. 35 0 28' 57" 340 03' 11"
44. 35 0 24' 33" 330 45' 11"
45. 35° 21' 37" 33° 36' 25"
46. 35° 21' 00" 33° 17'27"
47. 35° 22' 08" 33° 06' 52"
48. 35° 24' 08" 32° 55' 10"
49. 35° 13' 42" 32° 55' 15"
50. 35 0 08' 38" 32° 50' 15"
51. 35° 10' 58" 32° 44' 25"
52. 35° 11'45" 32° 40' 11"
53. 35 0 45 32° 38' 37"
54. 35 0 10' 35" 32° 33' 15"
55. 35° 08' 37" 32° 31' 27"
56. 35° 3' 20" 32° 27' 05"
57. 35° 02' 30" 32° 23' 52"
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(e)	 Letter to H.E. Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary-General of the United
Nations Organisation, from Mr. Taner Etkin, TRNC Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Defence, 23 October, 19967
Your Excellency,
I wish to refer to the geographical coordinates transmitted by the Greek Cypriot
administration to the United Nations on 3 May 1993, showing baselines for measuring
the breadth of the territorial sea of "Cyprus". In this connection, I would like to bring to
your kind attention the following:
In spite of the current political realities, the said geographical coordinates transmitted by
the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus encompass the territorial waters of
the whole island. As such, the Greek Cypriot administration, once again, purports to
demonstrate that a unified "Cyprus" exists and that it had jurisdiction and sovereignty
over the entire island.
I wish to reiterate that there is no unified Republic of Cyprus as established under the
international Cyprus treaties of 1960. The partnership Republic established in 1960 by
virtue of the 1960 Agreements was destroyed by the Greek Cypriot partner's onslaught
on the Turkish Cypriot partner. In December 1963, Turkish Cypriot elements in all the
state organs were forcefully ejected. During the 1963-74 period, the Turkish Cypriot
people were subjected to a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Greek
Cypriots. Since 1963, each side has ruled itself while the Greek Cypriot side has
continued with the false pretence that it is the "legitimate Government of Cyprus".
Within the course of a gradual process of political and administrative evolution, two
autonomous administrations, the existence of which was recognised by the three
guarantor powers with the Geneva Declaration of 30 July, 1974, have emerged. In their
present form, these are the Greek Cypriot administration in the South and the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the North.
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I wish, therefore, to set the record straight by pointing out that it is erroneous and an act
of misinformation for the Greek Cypriot administration to have transmitted the said
data, purporting to represent the island as a whole. The geographical coordinates of the
starting points of the Lateral Border of the Territorial waters of the TRNC are as
follows:
Latitude Longitude
West of Erenkiiy (Kokkina) 35 0 10'43.36" 32° 35'53.07"
East of Erenkby (Kokkina) 35 0 11'21.26" 32° 37'41.68"
East of Derinya (Dherinia) 35 0 04'12.05" 330 59'56.46"
West of Yesilirmak 35° 10'59.89" 32° 42'32.91"
Ellipsoid and Datum: WGS 84
Zone number:
	 36
Zone width:	 6°
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Endnotes
I See J. Anderson and Goodman's (1994: 59-60) instructive methodological approach to interviewing
in the Irish context.
2 Baxter and Eyles, (1997: 513). With key informants, sampling was inherently an iterative process in
the light of 'feedback' (Tremblay, 1982: 99).
3 Burgess (1992: 209) classified this as 'theoretical' sampling. While noting this, respondents were
drawn from different status levels within organisations (e.g., UNFICYP) to accommodate any
contradictions (Burgess, 1984: 75).
4 Burgess (1982); Schoenberger (1991).
5 Silverman (1993).
6 Loizos (1981: 16-17).
7 This previously unpublished letter was kindly deposited with the author by the TRNC Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Defence.
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